ADVANCED-GUARD,  OUT-rOST, 
DETACHMENT    SERVICE    OF  TROOPS, 

wrrH  THIS 

ESSENTIAL  PRffiCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY, 

AND 

GRAND    TACTICS 

FOB  THK  USE   or 

OFFICERS  OP  THE  MILITIA  AND  T0LUNTEEK8. 

Br  D.  H.  MAHAN,  LL.D., 

PBOFE880E   OP  MIUTAKT  AND   CITIL   ENGHfEERINO,  AND  OP  THB 
ABT  OF  WAS  U(  THS   UNITED   BTATES  UILITABY   ACADBMT. 

NEW  EDITION,  WITH  TWELYE  PLATES 


NEW  YORK : 
JOHlSr    ^WILEY, 

No.  535  BROADWAY. 
1864. 


'J  ff3 

A/  7,-. 


Kntercil,  according  *o  Act  of  Congress,  in  tho  year  lft47,  by 

D.  II.  MAIIAN, 
In  Ihc  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United 
btJiteB  for  the  Southern  District  of  Kew  York. 


8.    CRAIGHEAD, 
Prkntr,  SicirKiyper.Hnii  tloetroljrper, 

Carton  ISiiiltiinQ, 
•    n,  as,  a«(  85  Ctntrt  :iirttt,  N.  Y, 


PREFACE. 


The  suggestion  of  this  little  compilation  orig- 
inated in  a  professional  intercourse,  some  months 
back,  with  a  few  intelligent  officers  of  the  Volun- 
teer Corps  of  the  city  of  New  York. 

The  want  of  a  work  of  this  kind  has  long  been 
felt  among  our  officers  of  Militia  generally,  as 
English  military  literature  is  quite  barren  in  sys- 
tematic works  on  most  branches  of  the  military 
art,  especially  so  on  the  one  known  among  the 
miUtary  writers  of  the  Continent  as  La  Petite 
Guerre,  or  the  manner  of  conducting  the  opera- 
tions of  small  independent  bodies  of  troops ;  and 
but  few  of  these  officers  are  able  to  devote  that 
time  to  military  studies,  which  their  pursuit  in  a 
foreign  language  necessarily  demands. 

In  making  this  compilation,  the  works  in  most 
repute  have  been  carefully  consulted,  and  a  selec- 
tion made  from  them  of  what  was  deemed  to  be 
most  useful  to  the  class  of  readers  for  which  it 
is  intended.  The  object  of  the  writer  has  been 
to  give  a  concise  but  clear  view  of  tlie  essential 


vi1.7GR3i 


If  PREFACE. 

points  in  each  of  the  subjects  introduced  into  the 
work ;  if  he  has  succeeded  in  tliis,  he  trusts  that 
the  very  obvious  defects  of  the  work  will  be  over- 
looked. 

An  aclcnowledgment  is  here  due  from  the  wniter 
to  Major-General  Sandford,  commanding  the  First 
Division  of  the  New  York  State  Militia,  and  to 
II.  K.  Oliver,  Esq.,  Adjutant-General  of  the  State 
of  Massachusetts,  as  well  as  to  the  officers  gen- 
erally of  the  First  Division  N.  Y.  S.  M.,  for  their 
kind  aid  in  bringing  forward  the  work. 

The  previous  editions  of  this  work  having  met  with 
very  general  circulation  among  the  class  of  our  offi- 
cers for  whose  use  it  was  originally  designed,  and  the 
approval  of  the  most  distingui.shed  of  our  General 
Officers,  it  has  been  deemed  well  to  enlarge  the  work 
by  the  addition  of  a  concise  statement  of  the  Princi- 
l>ks  of  Strategy  and  Grand  Tactics,  with  illustrations 
from  several  of  the  most  celebrated  campaigns  of 
Napoleon. 

This  new  matter  has  been  chiefly  drawn  from  the 
writings  of  Thiers  and  Dufour. 

U.    S.   MlLITABT   AOADEMT,  ) 

Dec.  let,  1862.  1 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER. 

FASK. 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE  MOST  REMARKABLE 
EPOCHS  IN  THE  MILITARY  ART  FROM  THE 
TIME   OF   THE   GREEKS   TO   THE   PRESENT      .         7 

CHAPTER  I. 
TACTICS 32 

CHAPTER   n. 

MANNER  OF  PLACING  AND  HANDLING  TROOPS       .      48 

CHAPTER  in. 
POSITIONS 63 

CHAPTER  IV. 

ADVANCED-GUARDS  AND  ADVANCED-POSTS  .      83 

CHAPTER  V. 
RECONNAISSANCES 105 

CHAPTER  VI. 
DETACHMENTS 117 

CHAPTER  VII. 
coirvoTS 155 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

SUEPRISES  AND  AMBUSCADES  .  .  .    165 


VI  CONTENTS. 

FAOB 

CHAPTER  IX. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  STRATEGY   AND   GRAND   TACTICS     .    169 

CHAPTER  X. 
ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  U.   a   MILITARY  FORCES    .   267 


INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER. 

HISTORICAL  SKETCH  OF  THE    MOST    REMARK  A.BL* 

EPOCHS    IN    THE    MILITARY    ART    FROM   THB 

TIME  OF  THE  GREEKS  TO  THE  PRESENT. 


1.  No  one  can  be  said  to  have  thoroughly  mas- 
tered his  art,  who  has  neglected  to  make  himself 
conversant  with  its  early  history ;  nor,  indeed,  can 
any  tolerably  clear  elementary  notions,  even,  be 
formed  of  an  art,  beyond  those  furnished  by  the  mere 
technical  language,  without  some  historical  knowl- 
edge of  its  rise  and  progress;  for  this  alone  can 
give  to  the  mind  those  means  of  comparison,  with- 
out which  everything  has  to  be  painfully  created 
anew,  to  reach  perfection  only  after  many  cycles  of 
misdirected  mental  toil. 

2.  To  no  one  of  the  arts,  that  have  exercised  a 
prominent  influence  on  the  well-being  of  society, 
are  these  observations  more  applicable  than  to  that 
of  arms.  To  be  satisfied  of  this,  there  needs  only 
the  most  cursory  glance  at  the  grand  military  epochs 
of  the  ancient  and  modern  world.  Looking  at  the 
art  as  it  was  among  the  Greeks,  under  Epaminondas, 
Fnilip,  and  Alexander  ;  and  among  the  Romans, 
about  the  time  of  Julius  Cajsar,  of  eacli  of  which 
epochs  we  have  full  authentic  records ;  comparing 
it  with  the  phases  it  assumed  in  the  decline  of  the 


Roman  Empire  and  during  the  Feudal  period  ;  ana 
following  it,  iroiii  the  introduction  of  gunpowder 
down  to  the  brief  career  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  its 
first  great  restorer  in  Europe, — it  seems  incredible 
that  anytiiing,  short  of  the  most  entire  ignorance  of 
the  past,  could  have  led  professional  soldiers  to 
abandon  the  spirit  of  the  organization  and  tactics  of 
the  early  Greeks  and  Romans,  so  admirably  adapted 
to  call  into  play  tlie  mental  and  physical  energies  of 
man,  for  the  lumbering  and  unwieldy  engines  that 
clogged  the  operations  of  the  Imperial  armies  of  the 
Empire ;  or  for  tiie  almost  equally  unwieldy  iron- 
clad chivalry  of  the  middle  ages,  whose  presiigg 
was  forever  obscured  by  the  first  well-organized 
infantry  brought  against  it. 

3.  Coming  to  a  more  recent  period,  did  we  not 
rememl>er  by  what  slow  and  uncertain  stages  the. 
march  of  improvement  in  other  arts  has  proceeded, 
— how  much  has  been  seemingly  owing  to  mere 
chance,  rather  than  to  welUlirected  investigation,^ 
how  rarely  a  master  has  arisen  to  imbody  into  sim- 
ple formulas  the  often  complicated  processes  and 
obscure  doctrines  of  those  who  have  preceded  him, 
we  should  have  still  greater  cause  of  astonishment, 
that,  at  a  time  of  more  general  diffusion  of  science, 
art  and  literat\ire,  and  particularly  of  the  classical 
writers  of  antiquity,  no  master-mind  should  have 
evoked,  from  the  campaigns  of  a  Marius,  or  a  Han- 
nibal, the  germ  of  the  comparatively  modem  science 
of  strategy ;  nor  have  gathered,  from  that  almost 
liom-book  of  the  school-boy,  Cajsar's  Commentaries, 
the  spirit  of  those  rapid  combinations  by  which,  with 
a  handful  of  troops,  the  great  Roman  capt;iin  so  uni- 
formly frustrated  the  powerful  and  oft-repeated 
struggles  of  a  warlike  and  restless  people  ;  but,  that 
it  should  have  been  left  to  the  great  Captain  of  tliia 


age  to  brush  aside  the  mosli-work  woven  by  routine 
and  mUitary  pedagoguisin  ;  wliilo,  by  the  develop- 
ment of  gigantic  plans,  made  and  controlled  with 
almost  matliematical  precision,  he  fixed  immovably 
tliose  principles  wliich,  when  acted  upon,  cannot 
fail  to  connnand  success,  and  which,  when  over- 
looked or  neglected,  lead  to  defeat,  or  else,  leaving 
all  to  chance,  make  of  victory  only  a  successful 
butchery. 

4.  However  desirable  it  might  be  to  give  to  this 
b.-anch  of  the  military  art  the  consideration  to  wtiich 
it  is  justly  entitled,  it  does  not  come  within  the  scope 
of  a  work  like  this  to  do  so.  The  most  that  can  be 
attempted  will  be  to  make  a  brief  recapitulation  of 
the  most  marked  epochs ;  with  a  view  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  young  military  student  to  the  impor- 
tance of  this  too-frequently  neglected  branch,  and 
to  lead  him  into  a  field  of  research,  where  the  spirit 
of  inquiry  will  always  be  gratified,  useful  additions 
be  made  to  his  previous  stock  of  acquirement,  and 
hints  be  gleaned  which  he  will  find  fully  to  justify 
the  correctness  of  Napoleon's  decision  upon  the 
influence  which  a  study  of  the  campaigns  of  Alex- 
ander, Hannibal  and  Caesar,  must  have  in  the  edu- 
cation of  a  thorough  captain. 

5.  Tactics  of  the  Greeks. — The  Greeks,  if  not 
the  earliest  people  who  reduced  the  military  art 
to  fixed  principles,  are  the  first  of  whose  military 
institutions  we  liave  any  exact  account ;  and  even 
of  theirs,  and  of  the  system  of  their  successors  in  • 
conquest,  the  Romans,  several  points  still  remain 
obscure. 

6.  A  Grecian  army,  at  the  period  when  the  mil- 
itary art  was  in  the  greatest  perfection  among  them, 
was  composed  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  The  formel 
was  made  up  of  three  different  orders  of  soldiers ; 


10 

termed,  1 .  The  OplUai,  or  heavily  armed,  who  wore  a 
very  complete  defensive  armor,  and  bore  the  sarissa, 
or  Slacedonian  pike,  a  formidable  weapon  either  fo 
the  attack  or  defence,  about  24  feet  in  length.  2. 
The  Fsiloi,  or  light  infantry,  who  were  without  de- 
fensive armor,  and  carried  tlie  javelin,  bow,  and 
sling.  3.  The  PeltasUc,  who  were  intermediate  be- 
tween tiie  otlier  two,  carrying  a  lighter  defensive 
armor,  as  well  as  a  shorter  |)ike  than  thg  oplitai. 

7.  The  cavalry  consisted  of  two  kinds.  1.  The 
Cataphracti,  or  heavy  cavalry,  in  which  both  rider 
and  horse  were  well  covered  with  defensive  armor; 
the  former  armed  with  the  lance,  and  a  sabre  slung 
from  a  shoulder-belt.  2.  A  light  cavalry  of  an  ir- 
regular character,  who  were  without  defensive 
armor,  consisting  of  archers  and  lancers,  who  also 
carried  a  sword,  javelin,  and  a  small  buckler. 

8.  The  clemonlarj'  tactical  combinations,  or  formO' 
lions,  of  the  Greeks,  were  methodical  but  very  sim- 
ple. An  army  corps  was  composed,  1.  Of  a  Tetra- 
phalangarchia,  also  termed  a  grand  phalanx,  con- 
sisting of  16,354  oplitai.  An  Epitagma,  of  8192 
psiloi ;  and  an  epitJigma  of  cavalry  of  4096  men. 
The  heavy  armed,  or  infantry  of  the  line,  bore  to  the 
light  infantrv  and  cavalry  the  ratio  of  the  numbers 
2,  4,  and  1.' 

9.  The  composition  of  the  grand  phalanx  was  as 
follows:  Tetraphalangarchia  =  4  Phalanxes ^\(i 
Chiliarchi(C  =  6i  SyrUairmata  =^256  Tetrarchuc^= 
1 024  Z/cWtoi  or  files=4096  Emmilicc  of  4  men  each. 
It  is  thus  seen  that,  in  the  various  formations,  a 
division  of  the  whole  could  be  made  by  the  powers 
of  2  or  4. 

10.  This  body  of  infantry  was  thus  officered. 
Each  tetrarchia,  consisting  of  4  files,  or  64  men, 


11 

was  commanded  by  a  Tetrarch,  who  was  filo  leadei 
of  the  first  file. 

11.  The  syntagma  of  16  files,  which  was  the 
army  unit,  and  corresponds  to  our  battahon,  was 
commanded  by  a  Sijntagmatarch,  who  was  stationed 
in  front  of  his  command,  having  an  adjutant  on  his 
left ;  a  color-bearer  immediately  in  hi;;  rear ;  on  the 
right  a  herald-at-arms,  to  repeat  the  commands ;  and 
on  the  left  a  trumpeter,  to  sound  the  signals.  In 
the  rear  of  the  syntagma  was  stationed  an  officer 
who  was  the  second  in  command. 

12.  The  phalanx  was  commanded  by  a  general 
officer  bearing  the  title  of  Strategos. 

13.  The  formation  of  the  peltastae  and  psiloi  was 
analogous  to  that  of  the  oplitai,  the  number  of  files 
being  8,  instead  of  16  as  in  the  last ;  and  the  sub- 
divisions receiving  ditfarent  denominations  also. 

14.  The  epitagma  of  cavalry  was  divided  into  two 
equal  parts,  each  composed  alike,  termed  Telea. 
One  was  placed  on  each  wing  of  the  line  of  battle. 
The  telos  was  subdivided  into  5  divisions ;  the 
strength  of  each  subdivision  being  the  half  of  the 
one  next  in  order  above  it.  The  lowest,  termed 
lla,  of  64  horsemen,  corresponding  *d  the  modern 
squadron,  was  drawn  up  on  a  front  of  16  with  4 
files,  and  was  commanded  by  an.  officer  with  the 
title  of  Ilarch. 

1 5.  The  grand  phalanx,  in  order  of  battle,  was 
divided  into  two  wings,  with  an  interval  of  40  paces 
between  them,  and  one  of  20  between  the  phalanxes 
of  each  wing. 

16.  The  oplitai,  when  formed  for  exercise  or 
parade,  were  drawn  up  in  open  order ;  leaving  an 
equal  interval  between  the  men  of  each  rank  and 
between  the  ranks.  When  ready  to  charge,  each 
man  occupied  a  square  of  3  feet,  and  tlie  six  lead 


12 

Ing  ranks  brought  their  pikes  to  a  level;  thus  pre- 
senting an  array  in  which  tne  pikes  of  the  sixth 
rank  extended  3  feet  in  advance  of  the  front  one. 
In  attacks  on  intrenchments,  or  fortified  cities,  the 
men  of  each  rank  closed  shoulder  to  shoulder,  a 
sufficient  inter\-al  being  left  between  the  ranks  to 
move  with  celerity;  the  leading  rank  kept  theii 
shields  overlapped  to  cover  their  front ;  the  others 
held  them  above  their  heads  for  shelter  against  the 
weapons  of  the  enemy. 

17.  The  peltast  corresponded  to  our  elite  corps 
of  infantry,  selected  for  enterprises  requiring  both 
celerity  and  a  certain  firmness. 

18.  The  psiloi  performed  all  the  duties  usually 
devolved,  in  the  present  day,  upon  light  infantry, 
both  before  and  at  the  opening  of  an  engagement. 

19.  The  position  of  the  cavalry,  in  line  of  battle, 
was  on  the  wings.  The  duties  of  this  ami  were 
mainly  to  charge  that  of  the  enemy.  The  cata- 
phracii,  for  this  purpose,  were  drawn  up  on  each 
wing,  with  a  portion  of  the  light  cavalry  on  each  of 
their  Hanks.  The  charge  was  made  by  the  former, 
and  the  latter  followed  up  any  success  gained  by 
them. 

20.  Tlie  marches  of  the  Greeks  were  usually 
made  by  a  flank.  Sometimes,  when  tlie  character 
of  the  ground  permitted,  two  phalanxes  marched  side 
by  side,  presenting  a  front  of  32  men,  and  being  in 
readiness  to  offer  a  front  on  both  the  flanks,  if  ne- 
cessary. 

21.  Among  the  orders  of  battles  among  the 
ancients,  that  known  as  the  ivcdge,  or  hoar's  head^ 
is  the  most  celebrated.  In  this  disposition,  the  foint, 
or  head;  is  formed  of  a  subdivision  of  the  phalanx 
of  greater  or  less  strength,  according  to  circum- 
stances; tills  being  supported  by  t\TO,  three,  and 


13 

four   subdivisions  of  the  same  force,  one  behind 
another. 

22.  Tactics  of  the  Romans.  Up  to  the  time  of 
Marias,  by  whom  the  germ  of  the  decadence  of  the 
military  art  among  the  Romans  was  sown,  a  Con- 
sular Army  consisted  of  two  Legions;  and  of  two 
Wings  composed  of  social  troops.  The  legion  was 
composed  of  infantry  of  the  line,  light  infantry, 
and  cavalry.  The  infantry  of  the  line  was  divided 
into  three  classes.  1.  The  Hastati.  2.  Principes. 
3.  Triarii.  These  classes  wore  a  very  complete 
defensive  armor;  they  were  all  armed  with  the 
sfiort  straight  Spanish  sword ;  the  Pilum,  a  kind 
of  javelin,  about  7  feet  in  length,  used  equally  to 
hurl  at  a  distance  and  in  hand-to-hand  engagements, 
was  added  to  it  for  the  two  first ;  and  the  triaxii 
carried  the  pike. 

23.  The  light  infantry,  termed  Velites,  used  only 
the  casque,  and  a  buckler  of  stout  leather,  and  bore 
the  Spanish  sword  and  a  short  javelin,  termed  the 
Hasta,  only  half  the  length  of  the  pilum,  and  used 
as  a  missile. 

24.  The  cavalry  wore  the  helmet  and  cuirass, 
and  (^.rried  a  buckler ;  their  arms  were  a  long  sabre, 
the  Grecian  lance,  and  a  quiver  with  arrows. 

25.  The  legion  was  officered  by  six  Tribunes , 
sLxty  Ceniurians,  with  an  equal  number  of  officers 
who  served  as  file-closers  for  the  infantry ;  and 
twenty  Decurions  of  cavalry ;  besides  these  there 
were  the  officers  of  the  velites,  who  fought  out  of 
the  ranks. 

26.  Until  about  the  period  of  the  Civil  Wars,  the 
legion  was  commanded  by  the  tribunes  in  succes- 
sion ;  the  tour  of  duty  for  each  being  two  months ; 
afterwards  the  rule  was  adopted  of  placing  tha 
legion  in  command  of  an  officer  styled  Legatui 

2 


14 

Wliilst  the  tribmios  exorcised  the  command,  those, 
who  were  not  on  this  duty,  served  on  all  occasiona 
of  detachment  service  generally. 

21.  Each  class  of  the  infantry  of  the  line  was 
eubdivided  into  ten  portions,  each  termed  a  Manipu 
lus.  The  velites  were  attached  to  these  by  equal 
portions.  The  cavalry  were  divided  into  ten  troops, 
termed  Turma.  To  each  munipulus  there  were 
assigned  two  centurions,  and  two  tile-closers ;  and 
to  each  turma  two  decurions.  The  v^tcs,  although 
forming  a  part  of  the  manipuli,  had  centurions  as- 
signed to  them,  to  lead  them  in  battle. 

28.  The  normal  order  of  battle  of  the  Romans, 

Erior  to  the  time  of  Marius,  was  in  three  hnes  :  the 
astati  in  the  first ;  the  principcs  in  the  second ;  the 
triarii  in  the  third  ;  and  the  cawalry  on  the  wings. 

liy.  The  manipulus,  which  was  the  unit  of  force, 
was  drawn  up  in  12  tiles,  with  a  depth  of  10  ranks, 
in  the  linos  of  hastati  and  principes ;  in  the  line  of 
triarii  there  were  only  6  files.  The  right  and  left 
Jiles  of  the  manipulus  were  led  by  a  centurion,  and 
closed  by  an  officer  file-closer. 

30.  The  manipu4i  of  the  three  lines  were  dis- 
posed in  quincnn.\  order ;  the  manipulus  of  one 
line  op[)osiie  to  die  inten'al  between  the  manipuh 
in  the  one  in  front,  this  being  the  same  as  the  man- 
ipulus front.  The  intervals  between  the  lines  were 
the  same  as  the  depth  of  each  line.  An  inter\'al 
of  about  3  feet  was  left  between  the  ranks  and  the 
tiles  of  the  manipulus. 

3 1 .  The  same  order  of  battle  was  followed  for 
Uie  social  troops  on  the  wings.  The  two  legions 
occupied  the  centre ;  but  what  inter\'al  was  left 
between  them,  or  between  the  centre  and  wuigs,  or 
how  far  the  cavalry  was  posted  from  the  infantry,  i» 
not  well  ascertained. 


15 

32.  The  velites,  before  engaging,  were  posted 
usually  between  the  intervals  of  the  triarii,  and,  m 
part,  between  those  of  the  turma. 

33.  In  both  the  legionary  and  allied  cavalry  the 
turma  were  formed  in  8  files  and  4  rank-;.  An  in- 
terval the  same  as  its  front,  was  left  between  each 
turma.  Of  the  two  officers  commanding  a  turma, 
one  was  placed  on  the  right,  the  other  on  the  left 
of  the  front  rank.  Each  wing  of  cavalry  was  com- 
manded by  an  officer  styled  Prefeclus.  In  some 
instances  the  cavalry  was  placed  as  a  reserve,  in 
rear  of  the  triarii,  and  charged  when  necessary, 
through  the  intervals  of  the  manipuli. 

34.  In  their  engagements,  the  velites  performed 
precisely  the  same  part  as  that  of  the  light  troops 
which  form  the  advanced-guards  and  advanced-posta 
of  the  present  day.  Watching  and  occupying  the 
enemy  before  the  main  body  is  brought  into  play ; 
then  retiring  and  taking  position  to  harass  him  far- 
ther, as  opportunity  may  serve. 

35.  The  main  body,  from  its  organization,  and 
formation,  was  admirably  adapted  to  meet  any  emer- 
gency ;  presenting,  if  necessary,  by  advancing  the 
manipuli  of  the  principes  into  the  intervals  of  the 
hastati,  an  unbroken  impenetrable  front ;  or,  by 
throwing  the  manipuli  of  the  different  lines  behind 
each  other,  leaving  an  unobstructed  passage  to  the 
front,  or  rear. 

36.  From  the  preceding  brief  exposition  of  the 
phalanx  and  legionary  formations,  the  respective 
properties  of  these  two  celebrated  bodies,  on  the 
field  of  battle,  may  be  readily  gathered.  The  legion 
was  evidently  far  better  adapted  to  circumstances 
of  locality  than  the  phalanx,  which  could  only  move 
well  and  effectively  on  even  ground.  In  tiie 
phalanx,  the  keeping  together  of  tJie  entire  body,— 


16 

whether  in  moving  onward  to  bear  down  the  enemj 
bv  its  ortssure,  (^r  in  waiting  to  resist  his  shock  by 
iis  inertia, — was  everj'thing.  In  the  legion,  indi- 
vidual activity  and  the  ease  with  which  the  mani- 
puli  lent  themselves  to  every  requisite  movement, 
gave  to  the  entire  machine  the  vohtion  and  strength 
of  life.  The  attack  with  the  pilum,  cast  on  nearing 
tlie  enemy,  was  followed  up  immediately  by  the  on- 
slaught with  the  terrible  short  straight  sword,  equally 
effective  to  hew,  or  thrust  with.  Each  mauipulus, 
equal  to  any  emergency,  was  prepared,  bythe  celerity 
with  which  its  movements  could  be  made,  to  improve 
every  partial  advantage,  and  meet  the  enemy  on  all 
sides.  Against  cavalry  alone,  was  the  impenetra- 
ble front  of  the  phalanx,  bristling  with  a  forest  of 
sarissas,  superior  to  the  legion.  The  open  order 
adoj)ted  for  the  vigorous  action  of  the  individual, 
who  to  the  charge  of  the  horse  had  only  his  pilum 
to  oppose,  so  inferior  to  the  fire  of  the  musket,  that 
dread  of  modern  cavalry,  proved  fatal  to  the  legion 
on  more  than  one  sanguinary  field ;  till  experience 
taught,  that  safety  might  be  found  in  ranks  more 
serried,  and  by  presenting  a  front  of  pike-heads, 
borne  by  the  first  four  ranks  of  the  hastali. 

37.  Marius,  urged  either  by  policy  or  the  neces- 
sities of  the  times,  made  a  fundamental,  and  it  is 
thought  fatal  change,  not  only  in  the  organization 
of  the  legion,  but  in  other  parts  of  the  military  sys- 
tem of  his  country.  By  substituting  for  that  glow 
of  patriotism  with  which  an  army  drawn  wholly 
from  the  bosom  of  the  people  is  ever  found  to  be  an- 
imated, the  mercenary  spirit  and  its  consequences, 
he  aimed  a  vital  blow  against  the  only  real  safe- 
guard of  a  nation's  honor,  a  national  army. 

In  a  despotism,  such  as  Prussia  was  under  Fred* 
erick,  the  contriAong  power  of  an  energetic  will 


17 

may,  for  a  season,  not  only  ward  off  the  attacks  of 
powerful  neighbors,  but  reap  conquests,  and  strug- 
gle  with  fortitude  against  great  reverses,  with  an 
army  recruited  from  the  scum  of  mankind ;  but  so 
soon  as  a  state  with  any  pretensions  to  republican 
institutions,  substitutes  the  mercenary  wholly  for 
the  national  spirit  in  its  armies,  its  fate  is  sealed. 
Like  Rome,  during  the  brilliant  career  of  Marius, 
Pompey,  and  Caesar, — like  Venice,  under  some  of 
her  able  condottieri,  as  the  Colonnas  and  Sforzas,  it 
may,  through  the  singular  ability  of  particular  lead- 
ers, still  present  to  the  world  the  dazzling  preatige 
that  military  success,  under  all  aspects,  carries  with 
It ;  but  the  result  is  as  certain  as  the  ashes  that 
succeed  to  the  flame ;  anarchy  comes  in  with  all 
its  ills,  from  the  rival  pretensions  of  successful  par- 
tisan leaders,  and  the  spectacle  is  again  seen  which 
Rome  exhibited  at  the  period  referred  to ;  or  else 
the  imbecility  and  utter  prostration  which  Venice 
presented,  almost  from  the  very  moment  when  out- 
wardly she  had  attained  to  her  loftiest  flight,  down 
to  the  pitiable  closing  scene  that  wiped  her  name 
forever  from  the  book  of  independent  states. 

38.  In  the  truly  great  days  of  Rome,  the  days  of 
the  Scipios,  the  raising  of  her  legions  was  done 
with  all  the  best  guards  of  a  constitutional  popular 
election.  Six  tribunes  for  each  legion,  having  first 
been  chosen,  either  by  the  consuls  or  by  the  popu- 
lar voice,  the  conscripts  to  fill  its  ranks  were  de- 
signated in  each  tribe  by  the  proper  magistrate ; 
these  were  divided  by  the  tribunes  into  the  follow- 
ing classes : — 1 .  The  youngest  and  least  affluent 
were  selected  for  the  VeUtes ;  2.  The  next  in 
years  and  wealth  for  the  Hastati ;  3.  The  next  in 
the  same  gradation  for  the  Principes;  and  4.  The 
oldeat  and  most  wealthy  for  Triarii.  The  cavalry 
2* 


or  knights,  formed  a  privileged  class,  into  wf.ici 
only  those  were  admitted  who  paid  a  certain  tax. 
This  ciassiticiition  being  made,  the  tribunes  named 
[0 first  and  10  second  centurions  for  the  infantry; 
with  10  first  and  10  seco7id  decurions  for  the  cav- 
alry; and  then  in  concert  with  the  officers  thus 
selected,  divided  the  classes  into  manipuli  and 
turma,  assigning  to  each  its  two  proper  officers ; 
whilst  tliose,  in  turn,  selected  the  two  officers  in 
each  maniple  who  acted  as  file-closers. 

39.  Besides  tlie  distinction  of  first  and  second 
centurion,  these  officers  took  rank  according  to 
class.  The  first  centurion  of  the  Triarii,  termed 
Primipilus,  was  the  highest  in  rank  of  his  grade, 
and  took  command  of  the  legion  when  the  tribunes 
were  absent. 

40.  In  the  time  of  ihe  Scipios  the  legion  was 
composed  of  1200  velites.  1200  hastati,  1200  prin- 
cipes,  600  triarii,  and  300  knights. 

41.  Polybius  states  that  the  Consular  army  con- 
tained 6000  legionaries  of  the  line,  2400  velites, 
and  600  knights  of  Roman  troops  ;  and  of  social,  or 
allied  troops,  6700  infaTitr\'  and  800  horse  for  the 
wings ;  with  an  additional  extraordinary  levy  of 
1700  infantry  and  400  cavalry ;  making  a  grand 
total  of  18,600  men. 

42.  Marius  introduced  the  Cohort  instead  of  the 
maniple  as  the  unit  of  force ;  forming  it  of  three 
maniples,  and  abolishing  the  ancient  modes  of  clas- 
sification. The  cohort  preserved  both  the  number 
and  designation  of  the  officers  attached  to  the  man- 
iples. It  was  commanded  by  the  first  centurion, 
until,  under  the  emperors,  it  received  a  superior 
officer,  termed  the  Prefect  of  the  Cohort.  The  use 
was  also  introduced  of  making  of  the  first  cohort  • 


19 

:orps  cfelite,  to   tvhich  was  intrusted   tho  eagle, 
under  the  orders  of  its  primiple. 

43.  Tiie  order  of  battle  by  coiiorts  depended  upon 
circumstances ;  usually  live  were  placed  in  the  tirst 
and  tive  in  the  second  line.  The  number  of  ranks 
Off  the  cohort  was  also  variable ;  depending  on  the 
front  necessary  to  be  presented  to  the  enemy. 

44.  With  the  settled  despotism  of  the  emperors 
arose,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  in  still  bolder 
rehef,  the  mercenary  system.  The  substitution  of 
auxiliary  cavalry  for  the  Roman  Icnights,  arid  the 
fntroduction  of  foreigners  and  of  slaves,  even  among 
the  legionaries,  soon  left  not  a  vestige  of  the  ancient 
military  constitution  of  the  army ;  and  that  train  of 
results  was  rapidly  evolved  in  which  defeat  was 
followed  by  all  its  ills  but  shame,  and  the  once 
proud  legionary  became  an  object  of  terror  to  his 
master  alone.  Effeminacy  led  to  the  abandonment 
of  Ids  defensive  armor ;  and,  too  craven  to  meet  the 
foe  face  to  face  with  his  weapons  of  offence,  the 
legionary  sought  a  disgraceful  shelter  behind  those 
engines  of  war  which  were  found  as  powerless  to 
keep  at  bay  his  barbarian  opponent,  as  was  the  lum- 
bering artillery,  chained  wheel  to  wheel,  of  the 
Oriental,  to  arrest  the  steady  t^read  of  the  English 
foot  soldier. 

45.  Feudal  Period.  To  fohcw  down  the  mili- 
tary art  through  all  the  stages  of  its  fall  until  the 
rise  of  the  feudal  system,  could  not  fail  to  be  a 
most  instructive  lesson,  did  the  limits  of  this  work 
permit  it.  Grand  as  were  the  occasional  deeds  of 
derring  do  of  the  chivalric  age,  they  were  seldom 
more  than  exhibitions  of  individual  prowess.  Art 
and  consummate  skill  there  undoubtedly  were  in 
tills  period,  but  no  approach  to  science.  Countries 
and  provinces  invaded  and  ravaged,  cities  ruined 


20 

and  castles  razed,  accompanied  b  wholesale  butch* 
ery  of  the  frightened  pousant,  mocked  with  the  ap- 
pointments and  title  of  soldier,  sucli,  witiiout  other  re- 
sult, were  the  deeds  of  cliivalry,  and  such  they  must 
have  continued,  had  not  the  Swiss  pike,  that  broke 
the  Austrian  yoke,  opened  the  way  to  free  Europe 
from  its  wretched  thraldom,  and  again  to  raise  the 
profession  of  arms  to  its  pro])er  level,  in  which  mind 
and  its  achievements  have  the  first  rank,  and  brute 
force  combined  with  mere  mechanical  skill  a  very 
subordinate  one. 

46.  Rise  of  Art  in  Modem  Times.  After  the 
decisive  day  of  Morgaten,  the  Swiss  name  re- 
sounded tliroughout  Europe  ;  and  in  time  it  became 
a  point  with  the  leading  powers  to  gain  these  moun- 
taineers to  tlieir  side  in  their  wars ;  and  even  to  re- 
tain a  body  of  them  permanently  in  their  pay.  The 
same  men  wlio  at  home  were  patriot  soldiers,  were 
known  abroad,  in  foreign  service,  as  the  real  mer- 
cenaries ;  deserting,  or  upholding  a  cause,  as  the 
one  or  the  other  party  bid  highest.  The  true  rank 
of  infantry  now  began  again  to  be  appreciated  ;  and, 
with  the  more  permanent  military  estabhshments 
soon  after  set  on  foot,  an  organization  on  juster 
principles  gradually  found  its  way  in ;  and  witli  it 
some  glimmering  views  of  ancient  art. 

47.  Although  able  leaders  from  time  to  time  ap- 
peared,  and  order,  with  a  rude  disciphne,  was  intro- 
duced among  the  hireling  bands  of  which  the  per- 
manent portions  of  armies  in  most  European  slates 
consisted,  after  the  first  essay  of  regularly  paid 
troops  made  by  Charles  VII.  of  France;  still  no 
one  arose  who  seemed  to  compreliend  the  spirit  of 
ancient  art,  until  the  period  of  the  Revolt  in  the 
Netlierlands  brought  forward  the  Princes  of  Orange 
and  ISassau,  William  and  liis  son  Maurice,  both  of 


21 

whom,  but  particularly  the  latter,  gave  evideriCe  of 
consummate  military  talent.  The  camp  of  Mau^ 
rice  became  the  school  of  Europe,  from  which 
came  forth  many  of  the  most  eminent  generals  of 
that  day. 

48.  Epoch  of  Gustavus  Adolphus.  But  the  great 
captain  of  tliis  age  was  Gustavus  Adolphus  ;  a  mau 
who  combing  the  qualities  of  hero,  warrior,  states- 
man and  philosoplier ;  one  who  early  saw,  what  in 
our  day,  and  especially  in  our  country,  is  still  dis- 
puted, that  war  is  both  a  science  and  an  art,  and 
that  profound  and  varied  learning — an  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  literature  as  well  as  science — is 
mdispensable  in  the  formation  of  the  thorough 
soldier. 

49.  Since  the  invention  of  gunpowder,  the  mili- 
tary art  had,  in  some  respects,  retrograded,  owing 
to  a  misapprehension  of  the  true  value  of  this  new 
agent.  The  apprehension  expressed  by  the  bravest 
of  the  old  chivalry,  that  it  would  be  the  means  of 
extinguishing  noble  daring,  was  soon  seen  to  be 
not  ill-founded,  in  the  disappearance  of  individual 
prowess  in  the  cavalry ;  whilst  the  cumbrous  ma- 
chines put  into  the  hands  of  the  infantry,  and  the 
unwieldy  cannon,  that  but  poorly  replaced  the  old 
engines,  rendered  all  celerity,  that  secret  of  suc- 
cess, impossible.  At  the  tight  of  Kintzig,  for  ex- 
ample, w^hich  lasted  from  mid-day  to  evening,  and 
which  took  place  after  the  fork,  that  served  the 
old  musketeer  as  a  rest,  had  been  suppressed,  and 
the  cartridge  been  introduced  by  Gustavus  Adol- 
phus, it  is  narrated,  that  the  infantry  were  drawn 
up  in  six  ranks,  and  that  the  tire  of  musketry  was 
so  well  sustained  that  the  slowest  men  even  di3< 
charged  their  pieces  seven  times. 

50.  Besides  tliis  improvement  in  small  arma, 


22 

Gustavus  Adolphus  was  the  first  to  make  the  cla* 
sification  of  artillery  into  siege  and  field-pieces, 
adopting  for  the  latter  the  calibres  corresponding 
nearly  to  those  used  for  the  same  purposes  in  the 

E)resent  day.  He  formed  a  light  regiment  of  artil- 
ery ;  and  assigned  to  the  cavalr}'  some  light  guns. 

51.  Iinporiant  changes  were  made  by  him  in  the 
cavalry ;  its  armor  was  modified,  thg  cuirassiers 
alone  preserving  a  light  cuirass,  and  being  armed 
with  a  long  sword  and  two  pistols. 

52.  By  adopting  a  new  disposition  for  battle, 
which  he  termed  the  order  by  brigade,  the  idea  of 
wliich  was  clearly  taken  from  the  dispositions  in 
tlie  Roman  legions,  he  broke  up  the  large  unwieldy 
bodies  into  which  troops  had  hitherto  been  massed ; 
and  thus  gave  not  only  greater  mobility,  but  de- 
creased the  exposure  to  the  ravages  of  missiles. 
In  his  order  of  battle,  each  arm  was  placed  accor- 
ding to  its  essential  properties ;  so  that  ease  of 
manoeuvring  and  mutual  support  necessarily  fol- 
lowed ;  and  pecuUar  advantages  of  position  were 
readily  seized  upon.  To  this  end,  his  forces  were 
drawn  up  in  two  or  three  parallel  lines ;  either  be- 
hind each  other,  or  in  quincunx  order ;  the  cannon 
and  musketry  combined ;  the  cavalry  either  in  the 
rear  of  the  infantry  to  support  it,  or  else  upon  the 
wings  to  act  in  mass.  The  cavalry  was  formed  in 
four  ranks. 

53.  The  dispositions  made  at  a  halt  at  night 
were  always  the  same  as  those  to  receive  the  enemy, 
should  he  unexpectedly  attack.  The  order  of  march 
was  upon  several  columns,  at  suitable  distances 
apart. 

54.  Such,  summarily,  were  the  main  points  in 
the  improvements  made  by  this  great  captain,  who, 
OQ  the  field  of  battle,  exhibited  the  same  warrior 


23 

instinct,  in  perceiving  and  availing  liimself  of  the 
decisive  moment.  Betrayed,  as  every  original  mind 
that  reposes  upon  its  own  powers  alone  must  be 
into  occasional  errors, — such,  for  example,  as  inter- 
posing, on  some  occasions,  his  cavalry  between 
bodies  of  infantry,  he  more  than  cancelled  them,  by 
being  the  earliest  to  perceive  the  true  power  of  each 
arm,  as  shown,  in  massing  his  artillery,  and  by  keep- 
ing it  masked  until  the  effective  moment  for  its  ac- 
tion arrived. 

65.  Epoch  of  Louis  XIV.  The  wars  that  pre- 
'  ceded  the  period  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  and 
those  induced  by  it,  developed  the  seeds  sown  bj 
Gustavus  Adolphus  and  the  Princes  of  Nassau. 
The  old  chivalry  having  become  a  thing  that  was, 
there  arose  that  young  chivalry,  equally  distin- 
guished by  valor  and  courtesy,  which,  although 
sometimes  assuming  a  fantastic  hue,  has  trans- 
mitted some  of  its  spirit  even  to  this  day,  through 
terrific  scenes  of  popular  struggles,  and  t!ie  loosen- 
ing of  every  evil  passion  engendered  by  such  strifes, 
and  converted  the  battle-field  into  an  arena  where 
glory  is  the  prize  contended  for ;  and  where,  the 
contest  over,  the  conquered  finds  in  the  victor  a 
brother  eager  to  assist  him,  and  to  sympathize  in 
his  mishap.  At  the  head  of  this  distinguished  band 
we  find  the  Montecuculis,  the  Turennes,  the  Condes, 
the  Eugenes,  the  Marlboroughs,  the  Catinats,  the 
Luxembourgs,  the  Vaubans,  and  a  host  of  others. 
Still,  with  the  exception  of  some  improvements  in 
the  weapons  in  use,  as  the  changes  in  the  musket, 
by  substituting  for  the  old  match-lock  the  one  with 
the  hammer  an.i  flint,  the  addition  of  the  bayonet, 
and  the  introduction  of  the  iron  rammer,  together 
with  a  better  organization  of  the  artillery,  the  pro- 
gress made  in  the  art  during  this  period  was  in  no 


34 

degree  commensurate  with  the  grand  scale  on  whicli 
it.s  mihtarji  operalions  were  conducted.  Tlie  sci- 
ence of  fortification,  and  its  kindred  branch,  the 
mode  of  conducting  sieges,  form  an  honorable  ex- 
ception to  this  general  stagnation  of  the  art.  Each 
of  these  were  brought  by  Vauban  to  a  pitch  of  per- 
fection that  has  left  but  little  for  his  successors  to 
achieve,  so  lon^  as  the  present  arms  and  means  are 
alone  employea. 

56.  It  was  also  in  this  period  that  the  infantry 
pike  was  abandoned.  This  change  was  first  made 
by  Marshal  Catinat,  in  the  army  which  he  com- 
manded in  Italy;  and  it  was  gradually  adopted 
throughout  the  French  service  by  the  efforts  of 
Vauban,  who  demonstrated  the  superiority  of  the 
musket  and  bayonet  to  the  pike  both  as  a  defensive 
and  an  offensive  weapon.  At  the  same  time  the 
distinction  between  light  and  heavy  infantry  became 
more  prominent,  partly  from  the  introduction  of  the 
hand-grenade,  for  the  handling  of  which  men  of  the 
greatest  stature  and  strength  were  selected,  who, 
from  this  missile,  were  termed  grenadiers,  and 
partly,  from  the  practice  of,  at  first,  placing  the 
improved  musket  only  in  the  hands  of  the  best 
marksmen. 

57.  With  the  more  effective  use  of  fire-arms,  the 
necessity  was  felt  of  adopting  a  formation  botli  of 
infantry  and  cavalry,  that  would  present  a  less  ex- 
posed mark  to  their  balls ;  but  the  disinclination  to 
innovation  wliich  seems  natural  to  all  professions, 
retarded  this  change,  and  it  was  onlv  after  the  war 
of  the  Spanish  Succession  that  the  French  gave  the 
example  of  a  formation  of  infantry  in  tliree  ranks. 
The  cavalrj'  was  still  far  from  that  point  of  efficiency 
which  it  subsequently  reached.  Its  movements 
were  slow  and  timid,  and  fire-arms,  unwieldy  im- 


25 

plements  in  the  hands  of  horsemen,  were  still  pre» 
ierred  by  it  to  the  sword.  • 

68  The  usual  order  of  battle  was  in  two  oT 
three  lines ;  the  infantry  in  the  centre,  and  cavalry 
on  the  wings.  The  hnes  were  from  300  to  600 
paces  apart ;  having  intervals  between  their  battal- 
ions and  squadrons,  in  each  equal  to  their  front,  so 
as  to  execute  with  ease  the  passage  of  lines.  Tlii3 
importance  of  keeping  some  troops  in  reserve,  ta 
support  those  engaged,  and  also  to  be  used  for  sj)e- 
cial  objects,  as  turning  the  flank  of  an  enemy,  begun 
also  now  to  be  acted  on.  Yet  the  trammels  of  rou' 
tine  were  but  slowly  laid  aside.  Manoeuvres  and 
marches  made  with  a  tediouaness  and  circumspec- 
tion ditficult  to  be  comprehended  in  the  present  day ; 
engagements  commenced  along  tlie  entire  front  at 
once ;  the  intermingling  of  cavalry  with  infantry ; 
the  power  of  artillery  but  vaguely  felt ;  little  a[)- 
preciation  of  the  resources  to  be  found  in  varied 
ground ;  battles  fought  apparently  with  no  other 
view  than  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the  battle-field  ; 
such  were  the  prominent  military  features  of  this 
celebrated  epoch, — -one  of  faults,  wliich  deserve  to 
be  attentively  studied  for  the  lessons  they  afford 
even  to  the  present  day. 

69.  The  period  intervening  between  the  age  of 
Louis  XIV.,  and  the  rise  of  the  Prussian  power  un- 
der Frederick  II.,  was  one  of  comparative  stagna« 
tion  in  the  military  art.  The  Duke  of  Orleans,  the 
afterwards  celebrated  Regent,  on  one  it  two  occa- 
sions, gave  promise  of  great  military  talents.  The 
mad  career  of  Charles  XII.  of  Sweden,  and  the 
achievements  of  Marshal  Saxe,— -to  whom  we  owe 
the  modern  cadenced  step,  and  the  well-known 
axiom,  that  the  secret  of  victory  resides  iri  the  legs  of 
the  soldiers, — ^re  the  most  instructive  events  of  tliia 
3 


26 

time;  particularly  as  regards  the  nse  of  fortified 
points  at  an  element  of  tactics ;  shown  in  the  de« 
Btruction  of  Charles's  force  at  Pultowa,  and  in  the 
influence  of  tlie  redoubts  on  the  renowned  day  of 
Fontensy,  with  which  flosed  the  military  life  of 
Marshal  Saxe. 

60.  Epoch  of  Frederick  II.  With  Frederick  11. 
of  Prussia  arose  a  new  order  of  things  ;  a  mixture 
of  sound  axtoms  and  execrable  exactions  upon  the 
natural  powers  of  man,  of  which  the  latter,  for 
years  afterwards,  in  the  hands  of  ignorance  and 
military  pedagoguism,  became  the  bane  of  the  art, 
and  the  opprobrium  of  humanity,  through  the  cruel 
tasks  and  wretched  futilities  with  which  the  private 
soldier  was  vexed ;  to  convert  a  being  whose  true 
strength  resides  in  his  volition  mto  a  machine  ol 
mere  bone  and  muscle. 

61.  What  influence  the  early  hardships  to  which 
Frederick  was  subjected  by  the  half-mad  tyrant 
to  wliom  he  owed  his  being,  or  the  mercenary  ma- 
terial, fashioned  under  the  same  regimen  as  him- 
self, with  whicli  afterwards  he  was  obliged  to  work, 
may  have  had,  in  creating  this  state  of  things,  it  is 
not  easy  to  say ;  but  it  seems  incredible  that,  with- 
out some  sucii  bias,  a  man  who  sliowed  such  emi- 
nent abilities,  as  a  statesman  and  soldier, — who,  in 
most  things,  thought  wisely,  and  acted  well,-— 
should  have  fallen  into  an  error  so  gross  and  la- 
mentable ;  one  that  even  the  poor  shallow  pliiloso- 
phy,  of  wliich  he  made  his  plaything,  ought  to  have 
detected  and  reformed. 

62.  Frederick's  lirst  attention  was  given  to  tlie 
drill,  or  the  mere  mechanism  of  the  art,  in  which  he 
attained  a  sad  celebrity.  Firing  executed  witli  a 
celerity  that  rendered  aim  impracticable,  and  with 
au  ensemble  which  made  a  point  of  honor  of  having 


27 

the  report  from  a  battalion  undistinguishable  from 
that  of  one  gun;  mancEuvres  calculated 'with  ma- 
thematical jirecision,  applied  with  equal  precision  by 
human  beings  tutored  as  dancing-dogs;  the  cane 
of  the  drill-sergeant  more  dreaded  than  the  bayonet 
of  the  enemy  ;  the  field  of  battle,  that  arena  where 
genius  and  military  instinct  should  be  least  tram- 
melled, converted  into  a  parade  ground,  for  carrying 
on  all  the  trivial  mummery  of  a  mere  gala-day : 
such  were  some  of  the  worst  features  of  Frederick's 
system. 

63.  But  whenever  his  mind  was  left  free  to  carry 
out  an  original  conception,  the  master  of  the  art  again 
shone  forth.  In  his  orders  of  march  and  encamp- 
ment, his  choice  of  positions  to  receive  an  attack,  he 
seldom  failed  to  exhibit  the  consummate  general. 
In  his  appreciation  of  the  powers  of  the  oblique  order 
of  battle,  by  which  he  obtained  such  decisive  results 
on  tlie  field  of  Leuthen ;  the  perfect  state  to  which 
he  brought  his  cavalry,  and  the  brilliant  success 
with  which  he  was  repaid  by  it,  for  his  exertions  in 
restoring  it  to  its  essential  purposes  ;  his  introduc- 
tion of  Hying  artillery,  and  his  clear-sighted  views 
as  to  the  proper  employment  of  this  arm  generally 
on  the  battle-field ;  Frederick  has  high  claims 
upon  the  profession,  as  well  as  for  liis  written  in- 
structions to  his  generals,  which  are  a  model  both 
of  miUtary  style  and  good  sense. 

64.  Frederick  adopted  invariably  the  formation  of 
three  ranks  for  his  infantry,  and  that  of  two  for  his 
cavalry.  From  the  preponderating  va)  ue  gi\  on  to 
the  effects  of  musketry,  his  dispositions  for  battle 
were  always  with  lines  deployed,  and  so  disposed  as 
to  favor  an  easy  passage  of  lines.  This,  and  the 
curious  importance  attached  to  preserving  an  exact 
ftligiuuent  in  all  movements,  deprived  the  troops  of 


28 

Oic  advantages  of  celeritj',  and  the  use  of  the  bay- 
onet, to  which  the  present  column  of  attack  so  ad- 
mirably lends  itself. 

65.  The  great  authority  of  Frederick  overshad- 
owed, and  kept  down,  the  naturally  rebeUioua 
promptings  of  common  sense  against  parts  of  his 
system;  and  all  Europe  soon  vied  in  attempts  to 
rival  its  worst  features,  without  comprehending  its 
essence.  In  England,  it  was  silently  imposed  upon 
a  hired  soldiery  without  difficulty;  and  showed  it- 
self in  a  guise,  in  which,  but  for  the  painful  fea- 
tures, the  exhibition  would  have  been  eminently 
ludicrous.  Throughout  Germany  it  made  its  way, 
in  spite  of  the  impenetrable  character  of  the  insti- 
tutions of  the  day.  In  France,  a  furious  war  of 
words  and  writings  was  waged  between  the  re- 
spective advocates  for  the  true  French  laissez-faire, 
and  the  Prussian  tournequetism  and  strait-jacket- 
ism ;  as  well  as  upon  the  more  important  question 
of  the  deep  and  shallow  formations.  If  this  con- 
test did  nothing  more,  it  provoked  discussions  in 
wliich  the  voice  of  the  real  soldier  was  occasionally 
heard  in  the  din  of  mere  military  pedagogues.  It 
produced  the  brilliant  pages  of  Guibert,  and  the 
whimsical  scene,  so  graphically  described  by  De 
Segur,  of  the  experimentum  crticis,  to  which  he  in- 
voluntarily, and  a  comrade  voluntarily  were  put,  to 
ascertain  man's  powers  of  endurance  under  the 
punishment  of  the  flat  of  a  sabre.  Then  came 
that  event  which  swept  all  these  puerilities  and 
most  other  futilities  into  one  vortex, — the  French 
Revolution.  The  value  of  proper  control,  and  the 
evils  arising  from  i*s  want,  were  here  equally  dem- 
onstrated ;  and  a  just  medium  at  length  hit  upon, 
which  left  to  the  individual  his  necessary  powers 
under  all  circumstances. 


29 

66.  Epoch  of  the  French  Revolulion,  and  its 
Sequel.  With  tho  emigration  of  her  nobles,  France 
saw  herself  deprived  of  nearly  all  those  who  were 
deemed  capable  of  organizing  and  leading  her  ar- 
mies. Her  enemies  were  upon  her,  still  brilliant 
with  the  prestige  of  Frederick's  name  and  Freder- 
ick's tactics  ;  and  to  these  she  had  to  oppose  only 
ill-armed  and  disorganized  masses,  driven  to  the 
field,  in  some  cases,  more  through  apprehension  of 
the  insatiable  guillotine,  than  through  any  other 
motive,  dreading  it  more  than  the  disciplined  Prus- 
sian. But  here  the  man,  thrown  on  his  own  re- 
sources, lifted  up  and  borne  onward  by  an  enthusi- 
asm bordering  on  fanaticism,  showed  himself  equal 
to  the  emergency.  Like  our  own  first  efforts,  so 
those  of  the  French  were  the  actions  of  individitals. 
Where  the  drill  had  done  nothing,  individual  mil- 
itary instinct  filled  up  the  want.  A  cloud  of  skir- 
mishers, soon  become  expert  marksmen,  harassed 
and  confounded  lines  taught  to  fire  only  at  the  word 
of  command  ;  the  compact  column,  resounding  with 
the  Ca  ira,  scattered  to  the  winds  feeble,  frigid  lines, 
torpid  with  over-management,  and  effected  a  revo- 
lution as  pregnant  to  the  military,  as  the  political 
one  to  which  it  owed  its  birth  was  to  the  social 
system.  Thus  was  laid  the  foundation  of  the  tac« 
tics  of  this  day ;  a  system  that  partly  sprung  up  in 
the  forests  of  America ;  and  upon  which,  a  few 
years  later,  the  ingenious  Bulow  would  have  had 
military  Europe  to  base  its  system. 

67.  The  frenzy  of  enthusiasm  past,  reason  and 
discipline  again  claimed  their  rights;  and  the  v«-ell- 
judging,  able  generals  of  France,  brought  both  the 
system  of  skirmishers  and  the  column  of  attack,  to 
their  proper  functions ;  and  the  way  was  prepared 
for  that  Genius  who  swayed  these  two  elementary 

3* 


30 

facts  with  a  power  that  shook  Europe  to  its  centrCj 
and  caused  her  firmest  thrones  to  reel. 

68.  Napoleon  appeared  upon  the  scene  at  a  mo- 
ment the  most  propitious  for  one  of  his  gigantic 
powers.  The  elements  were  prepared,  and  al- 
though temporarily  paralyzed  by  a  state  of  anar- 
chy, resulting  from  the  political  and  financial  cor>- 
dition  of  the  country,  they  required  only  an  organ- 
izing hand  to  call  into  activity  their  inherent 
strength.  This  hand,  endowed  with  a  firmness 
and  grasp  that  nothing  could  shake,  or  unloose,  was 
that  of  Napoleon.  To  him  we  owe  those  grand 
features  of  the  art,  by  which  an  enemy  is  broken 
and  utterly  dispersed  by  one  and  the  same  blow. 
No  futilities  of  preparation ;  no  uncertain  feeling 
aboyt  in  search  of  the  key-point ;  no  hesitancy 
upon  the  decisive  moment ;  the  whole  field  of  view 
taken  in  by  one  eagle  glance ;  what  could  not  be 
seen  divined  by  an  unerring  military  instinct ; 
clouds  of  light  troops  thrown  forsvard  to  bewilder 
his  foe  ;  a  crushing  fire  of  cannon  in  mass  opened 
upon  him  ;  the  rush  of  the  impetuous  column  into 
the  gap  made  by  the  artillery ;  the  overwhelming 
charge  of  the  resistless  cuirassier ;  followed  by  the 
lancer  and  hussar  to  sweep  up  the  broken  dispersed 
bands;  such  were  the  tactical  lessons  practically 
taught  in  almost  every  great  battle  of  this  great 
military  period.  The  task  of  the  present  one  has 
been  to  systematize,  and  imbody  in  the  form  of 
doctrine,  what  was  then  largely  traced  out. 

69.  In  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  peculiar 
application  of  each  arm,  and  a  just  appreciation  of 
their  respective  powers ;  in  all  that  is  lofty  in  con- 
ception, skilful  in  design,  and  large  in  execution, 
Napoleon  confessedly  stands  unrivalled.  But  it 
has  been  urged  that,  for  the  attainment  of  his  endi 


31 

on  the  battle-field,  he  has  shown  a  culpable  &»• 
regard  of  the  soldier's  blood,  and  has  often  pushed 
to  excess  his  attacks  by  masses. 

To  do  the  greatest  damage  to  our  enemy  with  the 
least  exposure  to  ourselves,  is  a  military  axiom  lost 
sight  of  only  by  ignorance  of  the  true  ends  of  vic- 
tory. How  far  this  may  have  been  disregarded 
by  Napoleon,  can  be  known,  with  certainty,  onlj 
through  Napoleon  himself.  He,  who  suffered  no 
important  fact,  or  its  consequences,  to  elude  his 
powers  of  analysis,  could  hardly  have  been  un- 
Qiindful  of  the  fate  of  the  grand  column  at  Fonte- 
nay,  nor  have  forgotten  the  imminent  danger  in 
which  those  squares  were  placed  that,  at  the  battle 
of  the  Pyramids,  resisted  like  walls  of  iron  the  head- 
long charge  of  the  reckless  Mameluke,  when  he 
launched  forth  the  formidable  column  of  M'Donald 
OQ  the  field  of  VVagiam. 


CHAPTER  L 


70.  Tactics  may  be  defined  to  be  the  art  of  ilrain* 
ing  up,  and  moving  troops  systematically.  It  ad- 
mits of  a  classification  into  two  divisions.  1.  Mi' 
nor  or  elementary  tactics ;  under  uhicli  head  may  be 
placed  all  that  refers  to  the  drill,  and  other  prepara- 
tory instruction  of  troops,  to  give  them  expertness 
in  the  use  of  their  weapons,  and  facility  of  move- 
ment. 2.  Grand  tactics ;  or  the  art  of  combining, 
disposing,  and  handling  troops  on  the  field  of  battle. 

71.  I'he  manner  of  drawing  up  troops,  or  their 
disposition  in  their  pritnitive  order  of  batiie,  evi- 
dently must  depend  upon  the  kind  of  weapon  with 
which  they  are  armed,  and  tlieir  mode  of  righting. 
A  glance,  upon  the  preceding  pages,  will  show  how 
the  primitive  order  of  battle  lias  been  modified  by 
these  circumstances,  in  difierent  nations,  and  at  dif- 
ferent epochs.  Without  stopping  to  consider  these, 
or  to  enter  into  an  analysis  of  the  once  vexed  ques- 
tion respecting  the  merits  of  the  deep  and  shallow 
orders,  we  shall  take  it  as  practically  solved,  for 
the  present,  by  tlie  adoption  in  all  civilized  states, 
of  the  uniform  system  now  in  use ;  wiiich  is  for  in- 
fantry troops,  eitlier  dispersed,  or  deployed  in  lines 
for  firing ;  and  in  columns  of  march,  or  attack,  for 
movements ; — for  cavalry,  either  deployed  lines  or 
dispersed  order  for  attack,  and  columns  for  manoeu- 
vres, and  exceptionally  for  attack.  To  this  it  may 
be  added,  that  no  soldier,  who  has  made  himself 
conversant  witli  the  resources  of  liis  art,  will  a  Uov» 


33 

Iiimself  to  be  trammelled  by  any  exclusive  system. 
What  the  case  requires  he  will  do,  if  conlident  of 
his  troops ;  throwing  a  deployed  line,  with  the  bay- 
onet advanced,  upon  his  enemy,  if  he  judges  the 
moment  propitious ;  or  charging  impetuously,  with 
his  horse  in  column,  under  like  circumstances. 

72.  The  systems  of  tactics  in  use  in  our  service 
are  those  of  the  French ;  not  that  opinion  is  set- 
tled among  our  oflicers  on  tliis  point;  some  pre- 
ferring the  English.  In  lavor  of  tJie  French,  it 
may  be  said,  tliat  there  is  really  more  affinity  be- 
tween the  military  aptitude  of  the  American  and 
French  soldier,  than  between  that  of  the  former 
and  the  English ;  and  that  the  French  systems  are 
the  results  of  a  broader  platform  of  experience, 
submitted  to  ihe  careful  analysis  of  a  body  of  offi- 
cers, who,  for  science  and  skill  combined,  stand 
unrivalled ;  whereas  the  English  owes  more  to  in- 
dividual than  to  general  talent;  and  therefore  is 
more  liable  to  the  defects  of  individual  pride  of 
opinion,  than  where  this  can  only  be  felt  in  discus- 
sion at  the  council  board,  at  which  its  morgue  is 
liable  to  be  checked,  and  its  fallacies  exposed,  by 
rival  talent. 

73.  In  all  tactical  combinations,  experience  has 
shown  that  for  each  arm  there  is  a  certain  numeri- 
cal fc/rce,  which  lends  itself  best  to  the  essential 
conditions  demanded  in  all  troops ; — which  are 
strength,  activity,  and  the  faculty  of  moving  in 
any  direction.  This  force,  termed  the  unit,  varies 
in  the  different  arms.  In  all  cases,  it  should  not  be 
so  great  but  that  all  the  men  of  which  it  is  com- 
p<>sed  may  be  overlooked  by,  and  be  known  to,  the 
officer  in  command  of  it ;  and  also  when  drawn  up 
in  its  order  of  battle,  be  within  reach  of  his  voice. 
These  last  conditions  place  a  practical  Umit  to  tha 


34 

tactical  unit ;  owing  to  the  extent  to  which  the  hu. 
man  voice  can  be  distinctly  heard ;  the  space  taken 
up  by  each  combatant ;  and  the  form  and  dimen- 
sions of  the  figure  covered  on  the  ground  by  the 
unit  in  its  order  of  battle. 

74.  The  battalion  is  the  unit  of  the  arm  of  in- 
fantry ;  the  squadron  that  of  the  arm  of  cavalry ; 
and  the  battery  of  six  guns  that  of  the  arm  of  ar- 
tillery. 

75.  For  each  of  these  units,  particular  subdi- 
\'isions  have  been  adopted ;  and  their  command  in- 
trusted to  officers  of  suitable  grade,  both  to  overlook 
and  to  lead  ihem  in  the  various  combinations  to 
which  the  unit  may  be  subjected.  For  the  details 
on  all  these  points,  as  they  do  not  come  within  the 
scope  of  this  work,  reference  may  be  had  to  the 
systems  of  elementary  tactics  adopted  in  our  ser- 
vice. 

76.  The  order  of  battle  of  the  unit  is  usually 
based  upon  the  nature  of  the  weapon  used,  and  the 
space  required  for  handling  it  freely. 

77.  The  habitual  ord.T  of  battle  of  infantry  is  in 
two  or  three  ranks.  With  us,  that  of  two  ranks  is 
generally  preferred,  partly  because  our  battalion  is 
small,  and  therefore  requires  all  the  front  thai  can 
be  given  without  presenting  a  line  liable  to  waver 
at  every  change  of  position ;  but  mainly  because 
every  musket  can  be  made  to  tell  effectively:  a 
point  of  great  importance  where  the  troops,  like 
ours  generally,  are  habituated  to  handling  fire- 
arms almost  from  childhood. 

78.  Cavalry  is  now  universally  formed  in  two 
ranks,  in  order  of  battle.  The  efficiency  of  this 
arm  resides  in  the  power  of  its  shock  ;  and,  as  in  a 
charge,  the  first  rank  alone  is  brought  into  actual 
contact  willi  the  enemy,  the  only  reason  for  placing 


35 

i  second  is  to  close  up  gaps  made  in  the  front,  by 
casualties  whilst  charging ;  and  also  in  the  mel6e 
tliat  succeeds  the  charge,  to  have  a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  sabres  in  hand  to  do  good  service. 

79.  The  order  of  battle  of  artillery  is  necessarily 
a  line  of  pieces  in  front;  a  second  of  caissons  for 
the  supply  of  immediate  wants,  and  a  third  line  of 
caissons  in  reserve  to  the  rear,  beyond  the  reach 
of  casualties  from  the  enemy's  fire. 

80.  The  subdivisions  of  the  unit  have  their  ha- 
bitual position  in  the  order  of  battle.  This  is  ne- 
cessary, in  order  that  the  mechanism  of  the  unit 
may  have  that  simplicity  and  uniformity  in  which 
there  will  be  no  difficulty  in  its  being  comprehended 
and  retained  by  ordinary  minds,  to  the  end  that  every 
movement  may  be  executed  with  promptitude.  Still 
cases  may  occur  in  which  the  requisite  rapidity  to 
meet  an  attack,  or  to  move  in  a  given  direction,  can- 
not be  attained  without  changing  the  habitual  order. 
Such  cases  are  provided  for  by  what  are  termed 
inversions,  in  which  the  subdivisions  temporarily 
cliange  places  and  parts. 

81.  In  all  changes  of  position  that  demand  a  dis- 
turbance of  the  fundamental  order  of  battle  of  the 
unit,  it  is  broken  into  its  subdivisions,  which  are 
placed  in  certain  relative  positions  with  respect  to 
each  other,  according  to  the  object  in  view.  These 
combinations  are  termed  manoeuvres,  and  their  chiet 
object  usually  is  to  change  the  direction  of  the  li-unt 
of  the  unit,  according  to  the  particular  exigency. 

82.  Mincpuvres,  like  all  the  rest  of  the  mechan- 
ism pertaining  to  the  unit,  should  be  stainped  with 
simplicity  and  uniformity,  for  reasons  already  as- 
signed. The  tactics  of  the  present  day  present,  in 
this  respect,  a  remarkable  contrast  to  those  of  the 
period  anterior  to  it ;  wliich  is  owing,  in  no  small 


85 

nieasyre,  to  the  little  scope  left  for  individual  fancy 
every  proposal  being  submitted  to  the  formal  exam- 
ination of  an  enlightened  board.  Stage  spectacles 
alone  now  occasionally  fumish  some  notions  of 
those  whimsies  of  olden  times ;  so  happily  hit  off 
in  the  well-known  article  of  Salmagnndi,  where 
the  street-pump  figures  as  an  almost  impassable  ob- 
stacle to  the  show  soldier  of  that  day. 

83.  The  foregoing  observations,  upon  the  spirit 
of  the  actual  state  of  tactics,  can  doubtless  convey 
nothing  more  than  a  vague  idea  of  the  subject. 
They  were  introduced  with  this  view  only ;  so  that 
the  young  student  of  the  art  might  have  some  gen- 
eral notion,  though  a  vague  one,  of  what  is  pro- 
posed to  be  attained,  before  his  mind  gets  more  or 
less  bewildered  in  what  must  seem,  for  some  time  at 
least,  a  maze  of  technicalities,  and  mere  rote-work, 
— the  systems  of  elementary  tactics  for  conducting 
the  drill. 

84.  Army  Organization.      Although  not  alto- 

f  ether  \\ithin  the  design  of  this  work,  a  few  words 
ere  may  be  not  out  of  place  on  army  organiza- 
lion.  Of  all  the  civilized  states  of  Christendom,  we 
are  perhaps  the  least  militarj',  though  not  behind 
the  foremost  as  a  warlike  one.  A  sounder  era, 
however,  is  dawning  upon  us.  The  desire  for  war, 
as  such,  is  decreasing,  wliilst  a  feeling  of  the  neces- 
sity for  being  always  ready  for  it  is  becoming  more 
general.  All  our  battle-fields,  up  to  the  glorious 
feat  at  Buena-Vista,  have  proved  to  the  world  that 
the  American  soldier  was  wanting  in  no  military 
quality,  but  combined  the  \'ivacity  of  the  French 
with  the  tenacity  of  the  English.  But  this,  how- 
ever, couid  make  but  little  impression  upon  the 
soldier -statesmen  of  Europe.  To  be  warlike,  does 
not  render  a  nation  formidable  to  its  neigbbor!* 


37 

Tliey  may  dread  to  attack  it,  but  have  no  appre- 
hensions from  its  offensive  demonstrations.  It  was 
reserved  for  the  expedition  to  Vera-Cruz,  and  its 
sequel,  the  victory  of  Cerro-Gordo,  to  bring  into 
strong  relief  the  fact,  that  wo  were  unostentatiously, 
and  almost  silently,  becoming  a  powerful  military 
state.  The  lesson  will  not  be  lost  upon  our  neigh- 
bors, however  slowly  we,  in  the  end,  may  profit  by 
it.  A  shout  has  gone  forth  from  the  Rio-Grande, 
and  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  which,  heard 
on  the  Tliames  and  the  Seine,  has  resounded  along 
the  far-oif  shores  of  tlie  Baltic  and  Black  Sea,  and 
will  reach  the  farther  Ind,  bearing  with  it  a  signifi- 
cance that  no  prudent  statesman  will  hereafter 
affect  to  misunderstand.  What  are  the  military  re- 
sources of  this  great  Republic  is  no  longer  a  ques- 
tion ;  a  more  thorough  organization  is  alone  want- 
ing for  their  complete  development. 

85.  Napoleon,  at  the  period  of  the  preparations 
for  his  descent  uj)on  England,  had  a  moment  of 
leisure  which  he  could  bestow  upon  his  military  or- 
ganization. Then,  for  the  first  time,  it  is  believed, 
was  introduced  a  systematic  organization  of  grand 
masses,  termed  Army  Corps ;  each  one  comprising 
within  itself  all  the  elements  of  a  complete  army, 
and  apt  for  any  emergency. 

Since  then  this  has  served  as  a  type  to  France, 
and  other  European  states,  in  their  organization. 

86.  An  army  is  now  composed  of  one,  or  more 
army  corps,  made  up  of  infantry  and  cavalry ;  an 
artillery  equipage,  comprising  several  batteries ; 
several  artillery  parks  of  reserve ;  with  a  grand 
one  to  which  is  attached  a  bridge-train. 

87.  Each  army  corps  consists  of  one,  or  more 
Divisions  ;  each  division  of  several  Brigades ;  the 
brigade  comprising  two  Regiments. 

4 


38 

Two  batteries  of  foot-artillery,  of  six  pieces  each, 
are  attiiched  lo  each  infantry  division ;  and  one  ot 
horse-artillery,  of  the  same  strength,  to  each  division 
of  heavy  cavalry. 

Besides,  for  each  army  corps  of  infantry,  there  is 
a  reserve  of  several  batteries ;  and  a  few  served  by 
foot  artillery.  In  some  cases,  one  of  the  batteries 
of  reserve  is  served  by  the  horse-artillery. 

88.  A  company  of  engineer  troops,  termed  Sap- 
pers, is  generally  attached  to  each  infantry  division; 
and  to  each  infantry  army  corps  a  brigade  of  light 
cavalry  ;  with  a  company  of  PonLoniers,  which  has 
charge  of  the  bridge-train. 

89.  In  France,  each  brigade  is  commanded  by  a 
Marechal  dc  Camp,  a  grade  corresponding  to  our 
brigadier-general ;  each  division  by  a  Lieuienanl- 
General,  which  corresponds  to  our  major-general ; 
and  an  army  corps  by  a  Marechal  de  France. 

90.  The  particular  organization  of  the  General 
StaiF,  and  the  diflerent  arms  of  service,  would  lead 
to  details  of  no  importance  here.  The  proportion, 
^however,  of  each  arm  of  an  army  to  the  others,  is 

a  subject  of  great  interest,  as  upon  this  depends,  ir 
.a  great  degree,  the  more  or  less  of  excellence  ir 
■the  military  institutions  of  a  state. 

91.  The  infantry,  from  its  powers  of  endurance 
•its  capabilities  for  battle  in  all  kinds  of  ground,  and 
its  independence  of  those  casualties  by  which  the 
other  arms  may  be  completely  paralyzed,  is  placed 
as  the  Jirst  arm ;  and  upon  it  is  based  the  strength 
of  all  the  others.  It  generally  forms  about  fouv' 
ffths  of  the  entire  force. 

92.  In  all  states  where  the  military  art  is  justly 
appreciated,  the  cavalry  arm  is  placed  in  tlie  secoiid 
rank  to  the  infantry.  To  it  an  army  is  often  in- 
debted for  turning  the  scales  of  victory,  and  givmg 


39 

s  decisive  character  to  the  issue.  To  it.  the  infan« 
try,  wiien  cxhau.sted  by  fatigue,  or  broken,  often 
owes  its  safety,  and  through  the  respite  gained  by 
its  charges,  linds  time  to  breathe  and  reform. 
Without  it,  much  of  advanced-post  duty,  patroles, 
and  detachment  service  requiring  great  celerity, 
would  be  but  badly  performed. 

But  the  arm  of  cavalry  by  itself  can  effect  but 
little  ;  and,  in  many  circumstances,  does  not  suffice 
even  for  its  own  safety.  The  smallest  obstacles 
are  sufficient  to  render  it  powerless ;  it  can  neither 
attack  nor  hold  a  post  without  the  aid  of  infantry ; 
and  at  night  is  alarmed,  and  justly  so,  at  every 
phantom. 

The  proportion  borne  by  the  cavalry  to  the  in- 
fantry should  vary  with  the  features  of  the  seat  of 
war ;  being  greater  in  a  c-:ami)agne  than  in  a  broken, 
or  mountainous  country.  Tlie  proportion  of  one^ 
fourth  of  the  infantry  for  the  first,  and  oiie-sixlh  for 
the  last,  i.s  generally  admitted  by  received  military 
authority  as  the  best. 

93.  'i'he  artillery  is  placed  iliird  in  rank  among 
tlie  arms.  Its  duties  are  to  support  and  cover  the 
other  arms  ;  keep  the  enemy  from  approaching  too 
near ;  hold  him  in  check  when  he  advances ;  and 
prevent  him  from  debouching  at  particular  points. 
To  perform  these  duties  it  is  considered  that  an  al- 
lowance of  one  piece  fur  each  thousand  men  of  the 
other  arms,  and  one  in  reserve  forms  the  proper 
quota  of  this  arm.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however, 
that  this  proportion  supposes  the  other  arms  in  an 
excellent  state  of  organization  and  discipline.  In 
tlie  contrary  case,  the  quota  of  artillery  musL  be  in- 
oeased ;  for  it  inspires  poor  troops  with  conridence, 
ati  they  rely  upon  it,  to  keep  off  the  enemy,  and  to 
cover  their  retreat.     But  here  arises  another  disad- 


40 

vantage  ;  as  artillery  is  utterly  incapable  of  defend- 
ing itself,  and  therefore,  when  present  in  an  ovef 
proportion,  it  must  necessarily  sustain  great  losses 
in  guns  and  the  other  materiel. 

94.  The  arm  of  engineering,  although  requiring 
more  science  and  a  higher  grade  of  talent  for  it? 
dutios  than  any  other,  takes  the  last  place  in  tactical 
cons id'Taf ions.  To  it  is  intrusted  all  that  pertains 
to  opposing  passive  obstacles  to  an  enemy's  advance, 
and  removing  those  which  he  may  have  raised.  To 
it  is  assigned  that  most  difficult  of  all  tasks  to  the 
soldier,  paiicnt  endurance  of  manual  toil,  and  a  dis- 
regard of  cverytliing  but  the  work  in  hand,  wliilst 
exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire.  The  proportion  of 
engineer  troops  will  depend  in  a  great  measure 
upon  the  character  of  the  operations  undertaken ; 
being  most  in  sieges,  and  least  in  those  depending 
mainly  on  manoeuvres.  In  the  French  sen'ice,  the 
engineers  are  one-half  the  strength  of  the  artillery ; 
a  large  number,  but  rendered  necessary  by  the  pe- 
culiar military  position  of  that  country. 

95.  the  troops  which  compose  the  three  principal 
arms  are  generally  subdivided  into  two  classes, 
heavy  and  light ;  partly  arising  from  the  nature  of 
tlieir  weapons,  and  partly  from  their  destination  on 
the  field  of  battle. 

96.  This  subdivision  is  less  marked  in  the  in- 
fantry than  in  that  of  the  other  arms ;  for  although 
in  most  foreign  armies,  a  portion  of  the  infantry 
carries  a  sabre  with  the  musket,  still  this  additional 
weapon  is  of  rather  questionable  utility ;  for  the 
musket  is  the  one  which,  under  all  circumstances 
of  attack  and  defence,  will  be  resorted  to. 

97.  All  inf-intry  now  receive  the  same  instruc- 
tion ;  but  whether  a  portion  of  it  ought  not  to  be 
reserved  especially  for  ihc  duties  consigned  to  light 


41 

troops,  is  still  a  disputed  point.  One  thing  is  cer 
tain,  that  perfection  is  more  easily  reached  by  con 
fining  the  individual  to  one  branch  of  his  art.  thai 
by  requiring  him  to  make  himself  con/ersant  with 
the  whole.  Still  it  might  be  often  foimd  incon- 
venient, at  the  least,  if  infantry  were  not  able  tc 
perform  all  the  functions  required  of  it. 

98.  The  service  of  light  infantry  often  demands 
great  individual  address,  intelligence,  and  well-de- 
veloped physical  powers  ;  a  combination  of  qualities 
not  easily  found,  and  seldom, -indeed,  without  care- 
ful habitual  training.  Whereas,  in  infantry  of  the 
line,  tlie  qualities  of  the  individual  are  of  less  im- 
portance, as  results  here  depend  almost  solely  upon 
the  action  of  the  mass. 

99.  The  habitual  order  of  battle  of  light  infantiy 
is  the  dispersed  order;  and  whether  actinn-  ofFen- 
sively  or  defensively,  it  depends  for  its  results  upon 
tlje  effect  of  its  fire,  resorting  to  the  close  order, 
and  using  the  bayonet,  only  exceptionally.  As 
each  individual,  although  immediately  supported 
by  his  own  file-closer,  and  those  on  his  right  and 
left,  is  still  often  thrown  upon  his  own  resources, 
being  obliged  to  take  cover  where  he  can  most  con- 
veniently find  it,  he  must  be  a  good  marksman, 
cool,  deliberate,  and  circumspect;  since  it  may  be- 
come necessary  to  keep  an  enemy  occupied  hours, 
and  even  days  together,  pressing  on  him  at  one  mo- 
ment and  yielding  to  him  the  next,  or  holding  with 
tenacity,  and  disputing  inch  by  inch  some  particu- 
lar point,  as  it  may  suit  the  views  of  the  general  in 
command. 

100.  In  infantry  of  the  line,  as  success  depends 
upon  the  action  of  the  mass,  ensemble,  coolness,  and 
determination  should  characterize  all  its  movements, 
whether  it  delivers  its  fire  in  line,  forms  in  column 

4* 


42 

to  attack  Avith  the  bayonet,  or  throws  itself  into 
square,  to  await  the  charge  of  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

101.  The  duties  of  hght  infantry  are  to  open  an 
On^gement,  and,  after  it  is  fairly  got  under  way, 
to  keep  it  going ;  turning  it  to  advantage  if  suc- 
cessful, otherwise  breaking  it  off.  In  its  relations 
to  the  infantry  of  the  line,  it  should  cover  the 
flanks  of  the  latter;  clear  the  way  for  its  advance 
by  rooting  the  enemy  out  of  all  covers,  and  then 
holding  them  if  requisite.  Upon  it  devolves  all 
advanced-post,  detachment,  and  advanced  and  rear- 
guard service. 

102.  To  the  infantry  of  the  line  is  confided  eve- 
rything where  firmness  is  the  essential  requisite ; 
as  the  attack  or  defence  of  key-points,  the  forma- 
tion of  all  supports  and  reser\'es ;  whether  on  the 
field,  or  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  posts. 

103.  There  is  a  third  class  of  infantry,  termed 
rijlemp.n,  which  does  not  form  a  part  proper  of  the 
arm  of  infantry  ;  partaking,  when  properly  consti- 
tuted, more  of  the  character  of  partisan  than  of 
regular  troops ;  being  chosen  only  from  that  por- 
tion of  a  po])ulation  whose  habits  lead  them  to  a 
daily  use  of  fire-arms,  and  give  them  an  unerring 
aim.  As  an  auxiliary  in  the  defence  of  particular 
localities,  where  they  are  secure  from  the  attack 
of  the  bayonet,  or  of  cavalrv',  and  can  deliver  their 
fire  with  that  deliberation  which  their  weapon  de- 
mands, riflemen  will  often  be  found  invaluable  ;  as 
nothing  is  more  dreaded  b.y  troops  generally  than 
this  lurking,  and  often  invisible  foe,  whose  where- 
about is  only  divined  by  the  destruction  he  deals 
around  him. 

104.  In  cavalry,  the  distinction  between  hca\7 
and  light  is  moie  strongly  marked,  and  the  func> 
tions  of  each  more  clearly  defined  than  in  infantry 


43 

105.  The  cuirassiers,  from  their  defensive  ar- 
mor and  heavy  sabre,  wliich  in  botli  man  and  horse 
call  for  great  physical  powers,  constitute  the  true 
tieavy  cavalry.  The  dragoons  and  hussars  belong 
to  the  liglit,  and  the  lancers  indifferently  perform 
the  functions  of  either. 

106.  The  most  essential  quality  of  all  cavalry, 
which  distinguishes  it  from  all  other  arms,  and 
gives  it  tiie  facidty  of  taking  an  enemy  frequently 
at  disadvantage,  is  that  of  celerity.  If  to  tliis  the 
rider  unites  boldness,  and  even,  when  called  for, 
recklessness,  it  makes  of  tliis  arm  a  truly  fearful 
one. 

107.  Cavalry,  to  attain  its  ends,  should  unite 
several  essential  conditions ;  horses  and  weapons 
in  good  condition ;  suificient  depth  of  ground  both 
in  front  and  rear  to  gather  speed  for  the  charge, 
or  space  for  rallying ;  to  be  led  boldly  but  skilfully 
into  action ;  have  its  flanks  covered  against  a  sur- 
prise ;  and  be  followed  by  a  support,  or  reserve,  to 
cover  the  retreat,  or  secure  from  tiie  effects  of  con- 
fusion the  line  charging,  if  brought  up  unexpect- 
edly by  the  enemy. 

108.  There  are  qualities  which  are  peculiar  to 
each  kind  of  cavalry,  growing  out  of  the  duties  re- 
quired of  this  arm.  To  the  heavy  cavalry,  the  cui- 
rassier sa7is  peur,  should  belong  the  attribute  of 
irresistibility.  Apparently  as  careless  and  indiffer- 
ent to  the  maddening  strife  around,  as  was  le  Noir 
Faineant,  in  the  "  Gentle  and  Joyous  Passage  of 
Arms  of  Ashby-de-la-Zouche,"  whilst  waiting  the 
moment  for  action ;  the  cuirassier,  when,  with  sa- 
bre raised,  he  rushes  on  his  foe,  should,  like  the 
tornado,  level  all  before  him,  and  leave  nothing  of 
his  task  unfinished  but  the  gathering  of  the  wreck 
he  leaves  in  his  track. 


44 

109.  The  dragoon,  when  first  instituted  to  com- 
bine the  functions  botii  of  tlie  foot  soldier  and  cava- 
lier, was  found,  like  most  mongrels,  to  have  the 
qualities  of  neither  in  a  very  serviceable  degree. 
He  still  retains  his  musqucloon,  and  on  outpost 
duty,  and  skirmisliing  in  broken  ground,  does  a  sol- 
dier's duty  with  this  weapon.  Apt  for  attacks, 
whether  in  close  order  or  dispersed,  he  should  lend 
himself  to  the  charge  kindly ;  and  in  cases  where 
thrown  on  his  own  resources,  display  all  the  intel- 
ligence, activity,  and  circumspection  of  tlie  best 
light  infantry. 

110.  The  dashing  bold  hussar,  that  epitome  of 
military  impudence  and  recklessness  at  the  tavern, 
should  present  those  qualities  in  a  sublimated  form 
on  the  field.  Regardless  of  fatigue  and  danger,  Ms 
imagination  should  never  present  to  itself  an  ob- 
stacle as  insurmountable.  On  the  march,  con- 
stantly at  the  enemy's  heels ;  in  position  keeping 
him  at  all  moments  on  the  alert,  harassing  him 
either  with  fatigue,  or  apprehension  for  the  secu- 
rity of  liis  rear  and  communications ;  on  the  field 
careering  with  a  falcon's  speed  and  glance  upon 
his  quarry,  however  it  may  seek  to  elude  his  blow, 
such  should  be  the  hussar. 

111.  The  lancer,  like  the  poet,  "  is  born  not  fash- 
ioned." In  the  hands  of  the  Pole,  the  lance,  whether 
used  to  charge  in  line  or  in  the  dispersion  of  pursuit, 
is  a  truly  fearful  weapon ;  but  to  those  to  whom 
long  practice  in  its  use  has  not  made  it  a  second 
nature,  it  is  only  embarrassing,  and  more  to  be 
avoided  by  a  comrade  than  by  a  foeman.  Still  the 
apprehension  of  being  run  through  has  a  jx)werful 
moral  effect  upon  a  man ;  and  there  is  no  sound 
more  appalling  to  a  flying  enemy  than  "  here  come 
tlie  lancers." 


45 

112.  As  the  functions  of  heavy  cavalry  are  to 
h-iar  down  all  opposition,  and  present  an  impassa- 
bic  wall  to  the  enemy's  efforts,  its  duties  are  con- 
fined to  the  battlc-tield  ;  there,  placed  in  the  reserve, 
it  is  held  in  hand  until  the  decisive  moment  arrives, 
when  it  is  launched  forth  to  deal  a  blow  from  which 
the  enemy  hopelessly  struggles  to  recover,  either  to 
achieve  victory,  or  to  fend  otF  utter  defeat. 

113.  To  light  cavalry  are  intrusted  the  impor- 
tant duties  of  securing  from  surprise  the  flanks  of 
the  heavy ;  to  watch  over  the  safety  of  horse  artil- 
lery, and  to  perform  the  services  required  of  them 
by  infentry  divisions,  and  those  of  detachment  ser- 
vice in  general. 

114.  The  artillery,  which  had  for  a  long  period, 
and  even  still,  preserves  the  character  of  eminent 
respectability,  has  of  late  years  begun  to  infuse  a 
dash  of  the  dare-devil  spirit  of  the  cavalier  into  its 
ranks.  If  it  has  not  yet  taken  to  charging  literally, 
it  has,  on  some  recent  occasions  in  our  service, 
shown  a  well-considered  recklessness  of  obstacles 
and  dangers,  fully  borne  out  by  justly  deserved 
success. 

115.  The  distinction  between  light  and  heavy  in 
this  arm  arises,  not  only  from  the  difference  of  cal- 
ibre in  the  pieces,  but  also  in  a  difference  of  their 
tactical  application.  * 

116.  The  heavy  field  cahbre  is  the  12-pounder, 
which  is  reserved  for  batteries  in  position,  and  is 
seldom  shifted  during  the  action. 

117.  The  light  field  calibre  is  the  6-pounder,  and 
the  24-pounder  howitzer,  wliich  are  served  either  by 
foot  or  horse-artillery,  and  follow  the  movements 
of  the  other  arms. 

118.  Improvements  both  in  the  materiel  and  the 
tactics  of  artillery  have  been  very  marked  within 


46 

late  years.  Formerly,  considered  only  in  the  light 
of  an  auxiliary  on  the  battle-field,  artillery  now  as- 
pires, and  with  indisputable  claims,  to  the  rank  of  a 
principal  arm.  Its  decisive  effects,  at  the  late  bat- 
tles on  tlie  Rio-Grande,*  are  supported  by  testi- 
mony too  empliaiic  to  be  overlooked. 

119.  From  the  studies  required  of  him,  the  artil- 
lerist is  well  trained  to  maintain  the  characteristics 
of  his  arm  ;  courage  of  the  highest  order,  in  which 
the  physical  is  always  under  the  control  of  the 
moral  element,  producing,  as  a  necessary  result,  un- 
bounded devotion  to  the  task  assigned  ;  a  presence 
of  tnind  that  nothing  can  disturb ;  and  tliat  coolness 
which  no  danger,  however  appalling,  can  impair. 

120.  The  tactical  applications  of  artillery  on  the 
field  depend  on  the  calibre.  To  the  heavy  are  as- 
signed the  duties  of  occupying  positions  for  strength- 
ening the  weak  points  of  the  field  of  battle ;  for 
securing  the  retreat  of  the  army  ;  for  defending  all 
objects  whose  possession  might  be  of  importance  to 
the  enemy,  as  villages,  defiles,  &-c. ;  and  for  over- 
turning all  passive  obstacles  that  cover  the  enemy, 
or  arrest  the  progress  of  the  other  arms. 

121.  The  light  pieces,  served  by  foot-artillery, 
follow  the  movements  of  the  infantry  ;  covering  the 

*  In  alludin?  to  the  late  brilliant  achievements  of  our  artil- 
lery, it  is  but  just  to  call  attention  to  the  fact,  that  the  country 
is  indebted  for  it  lo  the  [Inn.  .Joi'l  R  I'oinsett,  late  Secretary  oi 
War  under  the  adininislration  of  President  Van  Buren.  With- 
out the  forelhou'rht  and  niilitiry  sagacity  of  this  accomplished 
genlleinan,  and  his  unlirinfielforts.  while  in  ofticp.  to  promote 
th'>  public  good  and  insure  its  safety  if  suddenly  brnught  into  a 
si  lie  of  war  ;  the  country,  in  all  probability,  would  have  been 
found,  on  the  breakuig  out  of  the  .Me.vican  difficulties,  in  the 
same  dilemma  with  regard  to  this  most  important  arm,  as  it  was 
in  some  other  hardly  less  essential  points.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  the  m;i.vim  so  oi"ten  idly  repeated,  and  the  value  of  which 
Was  here  forcibly  illustrated,  In  Fca.ce  prepare  for  fVir,  may 
uot  again  be  used  in  vain. 


47 

flanks  of  its  position,  preparing  the  way  foi  its  on- 
set, and  arresting  that  of  the  enemy,  ll  is  of  this 
that  the  principal  part  of  the  artillery  in  reserve  is 
composed. 

122.  The  horse-artillery  is  held  in  hand  for  deci- 
sive moments.  When  launched  forth,  its  arrival 
and  execution  should  be  unexpected  and  instanta- 
neous. Ready  to  repair  all  disasters  and  partial 
reverses,  it,  at  one  moment,  temporarily  replaces  a 
battery  of  foot,  and  at  the  next  is  on  another  point 
of  the  field,  to  force  back  an  enemy's  column.  In 
preparing  the  attacks  of  cavalry,  this  arm  is  often 
indispensable  and  always  invaluable ;  brought  with 
rapidity  in  front  of  a  line,  or  opposite  to  squares  of 
infontry,  v/ithin  the  range  of  canister,  its  well- 
directed  fire,  in  a  few  discharges,  opens  a  gap,  or  so 
shakes  the  entire  mass,  that  the  cavalier  finds  but  a 
feeble  obstacle,  where,  vvathout  this  aid,  he  would  in 
vain  have  exhausted  all  his  powers. 


CHAPTER  n. 

MANNER    OF    PLACING    AND    HANDLING    TROOFS. 
INFANTRY. 

123.  Posfkion  and  Formation.  On  llie  field  of 
battle,  whether  the  object  be  to  attack,  or  defend, 
the  infantrj'  is  divided  into  three  bodies ;  an  advan- 
ced-guard, the  main-body,  and  a  reserve.  Their 
relative  proportion  will  depend  upon  the  total  force, 
and  the  character  of  the  position  occupied.  The 
advanced-guard  must  be  of  sufficient  strength  to 
hold  the  enemy  in  check,  but,  at  the  same  time, 
the  main  body,  upon  which  the  brunt  of  the  action 
should  fall,  must  not  be  left  of  insufficient  force,  by 
unnecessarily  increasing  the  advanced-guard  ;  and 
the  reserve  should  be  strong  enough  to  repair  any 
disaster  that  may  befall  the  main  body ;  or  to  profic 
by  its  success  in  accomplisliing  the  complete  over  ■ 
throw  of  the  enemy. 

124.  These  three  bodies  are  separated  from  each 
other  by  intervals  which  will  depend  upon  the  na- 
ture of  the  ground.  Tiie  advanced-guard  occupy- 
ing the  front ;  the  main-body  at  a  distance  from 
150  to  300  paces  in  its  rear;  and  the  resen'e  at  a 
like  interval  to  the  rear  of  the  main  body.  Where 
the  ground,  for  example,  is  undulating,  and  therefore 
favorable  to  masking  the  troops  from  the  enemy's 
fire,  these  intervals  may,  if  requisite,  be  reduced  to 
80  or  100  paces. 

125.  The  troops  composing  these  three  bodies 
will  be  formed  either  in  columns  of  battalions,  or 


4: 

be  deployed,  according  to  the  circumstances  nnder 
wliich  they  may  be  placed.  For  an  attack,  for  evo- 
lution, or  tor  defence  against  cavalry,  the  formations 
of  columns  of  battalions  is  best.  To  repel  the 
enemy's  attack  by  a  tire,  and  in  some  cases,  to  pre- 
sent d  loss  favorable  mark  to  his  artillery,  the  bat- 
talions are  deployed.  The  battalions,  whether  de- 
ployed or  in  column,  preserve  the  proper  intervals 
for  evolutions  ;  these  intervals  may  be  increased  in 
obstructed  ground  without  weakening  the  defence. 

126.  The  battalions  composing  the  main-body 
may  be  drawn  up  in  one  or  two  lines.  The  latter 
usually  obtains  only  when  a  large  force  is  present. 
In  this  case  tlie  reserve  no  longer  holds  the  position 
of  a  third  line,  as  in  the  other ;  but  forms  an  inde- 
pendent body,  to  be  used  according  to  the  emer- 
gency ;  the  second  line  supporting  the  battalions  of 
the  first,  and,  for  this  purpose,  occupying  positions 
to  the  rear,  opposite  to  their  intervals. 

127.  Defence.  When  the  position  is  taken  up 
to  receive  the  enemy's  attack,  and  then  either  to  re- 
main on  the  defensive,  or  to  assume  the  offensive, 
as  circumstances  may  justify,  the  advanced-guard 
will  be  posted  on  the  ground  most  favorable  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  check,  and  so  force  him,  by  disputing 
it  with  tenacity,  to  develope  his  means  and  plans. 
Tills  is  best  done  by  a  judicious  combat  of  skir- 
mishers, who,  for  this  purpose,  are  thrown  forward 
300  or  400  paces,  to  feel  the  enemy,  and  are  only 
reinforced  when  closely  pressed. 

128.  Whether  the  advanced-guard  shall  maintain 
its  ground  obstinately  until  reinforced  by  the  main- 
body,  or  whether  it  shall  fall  back,  either  on  the 
flanks  or  to  the  rear  of  the  main-body,  must  be  de- 
termined by  the  strength  of  its  position.  If  ttiis  be 
so  strong  that  the  enemy's  loss  in  carrying  it  must 

5 


60 

be  gieat,  then  it  should  be  pertinaciously  main> 
tuined ;  in  the  ''ontrary  case  it  must,  after  a  suita- 
ble show  of  resistance,  be  abandoned. 

129.  As  a  general  rule,  troops  should  be  placed 
as  much  out  of  view  as  practicable  before  they  go 
into  action,  by  taking  advantage  of  covers  offered ' 
by  the  ground.  The  main-body  should  be  kept 
masked  in  this  way  until  it  is  called  to  engage  the 
enemy.  If  it  advance  to  support  the  advanced- 
guard,  it  will  usually  attack  with  the  bayonet ;  if 
the  advanced-guard  is  called  in,  the  main-body  will 
usually  receive  the  enemy  by  its  tire;  the  battalions 
being  deployed  for  this  purpose.  If  the  enemy  is 
staggered  by  this  fire,  or,  in  advancing,  shows,  by 
the  wavering  or  confusion  of  his  line,  a  want  of 
confidence,  the  fire  may  be  followed  up  either  by  a 
charge  of  the  troops  in  line ;  or  they  may  be  formed 
in  columns  of  attack  before  charging,  if  the  enemy 
perseveres  in  his  onward  movement.  A  charge  by 
a  colunm,  when  the  enemy  is  within  50  paces,  will 
prove  effective,  if  resolutely  made. 

130.  The  reserve  is  composed  of  the  most  reU- 
able  troops.  It  should  be  distinguished  for  cool 
courage  ;  acting  under  all  circumstances,  either  de- 
fensive or  offensive,  with  circumspection  and  de- 
termined resolution. 

As  the  object  of  the  reserve  is  to  infuse  greater 
energy  into  the  action  of  the  main-body,  and,  if  ne- 
cessary, to  strike  a  last  and  decisive  blow,  it  should 
be  kept  masked  from  the  enemy's  fire  and  view 
until  called  into  action.  The  proper  moment  for 
engaging  the  reserve  is  either  when  the  enemy  has 
been  shaken  in  his  attack  by  the  resistance  offered 
by  the  main-body,  or  when  the  latter  is  unable  far- 
ther to  resist  the  enemy's  efforts.  If  engaged  too 
soon,  the  resistance  offered  to  the  reserve  may  pre- 


51 

vont  its  making  a  decisive  blow ;  if  not  engaged  in 
time,  the  main-body  may  be  too  far  exhausted  and 
disorganized  to  rally. 

In  cases  where  the  reserve  forms  a  second  line, 
to  support  the  main-body,  it  should  approach  the 
first  line  when  it  becomes  engaged,  to  be  ready  to 
replace  it  when  circumstances  may  render  it  neces- 
sary. The  advanced-guard,  in  such  cases,  should 
retire  to  the  rear,  to  act  as  a  reserve. 

131.  Attack.  In  the  attack  of  infantry,  the  same 
fundamental  dispositions  are  made  as  for  the  defen- 
sive. The  advanced-guard  will  not  throw  forward 
its  skirmishers  until  they  are  near  enough  to  en- 
gage the  enemy.  The  line  of  skirmishers  should 
be  strongly  supported,  and  will  press  the  enemy 
with  vigor  and  without  relaxation.  If  the  force 
engaged  be  small,  the  main-body  will  regulate  its 
movements  by  those  of  the  line  of  skirmishers ;  if 
considerable,  the  reverse  will  obtain. 

132.  The  main-body  and  reserve  follow  in  col- 
umn the  advanced-guard,  preserving  the  requisite 
intervals.  The  columns  should  take  every  advan- 
tage of  the  ground  to  mask  their  movements  ;  get- 
ting rapidly  over  any  where  they  are  much  ex- 
posed to  fire.  So  soon  as  the  advanced-guard  is 
checked,  it  will  fall  back  either  on  the  flanks  of 
the  columns,  or  to  the  rear ;  and  the  main-body 
will  b^  immediately  brought  into  action,  either  by 
deploying  and  opening  its  fire,  or  by  a  vigorous 
charge  with  the  bayonet.  If  the  main-body  falters 
in  its  attack,  or  gives  any  signs  of  want  of  resolu- 
tion, the  reserve  should  advance  at  once  through 
the  intervals,  and  make  a  vigorous  charge  with  the 
bayonet. 

133.  If  the  attack  by  the  main-body  is  made  with 
the  bayonet,  the  interval  between  it  and  the  col- 


M 


62 

amns  of  the  reserve  may  be  lessened  to  80  or  100 
paces.  The  flanks  of  the  columns  of  attack,  and 
the  intervals  between  them,  should  be  occupied  by 
skirmishers.  This  is  an  important  precaution ;  as, 
by  forchig  the  enemy  to  deUver  his  fire  before  the 
columns  have  reached  within  a  destructive  range, 
the  main  obstacle  to  their  onward  movement  will 
be  removed. 

134.  Pursuit.  If  the  assailed  retires,  the  pur- 
suit must  be  conducted  with  system  and  in  good 
order.  The  line  nearest  the  enemy  will  throw  for- 
ward a  few  troops  in  pursuit ;  wliich,  in  most  cases, 
will  be  preceded  by  skirmishers.  The  line  in  close 
order,  will  follow  these  troops  until  it  attains  a  good 
position  to  receive  the  enemy,  should  he  make  an 
offensive  movement,  when  it  will  be  halted  and 
formed  i^n  readiness  for  action.  A  pursuit  by  in- 
fantry alone  cannot  h?,  pushed  far,  even  should  the 
enemy  retire  without  any  order,  or  show  of  resist- 
ance, as  the  retreating  force  will  soon  distance  their 
pursuers. 

135.  Retreat.  When,  either  in  the  defensive,  or 
offensive,  it  becomes  necessary  to  retire,  the  first 
point  to  be  attended  to  is  to  withdraw  the  troops 
engaged ;  either  to  a  good  position  to  their  rear, 
where  they  can  halt  and  face  the  enemy,  or  else 
behind  the  line  in  their  rear,  wliich  should  hold  the 
assailants  in  check,  and  allow  the  retreating  troops 
to  fall  back  in  good  order.  Having  fairly  got  dis- 
engaged, dispositions  must  be  promptly  made  to 
withdraw  from  the  field.  This  may  be  done  by 
the  entire  force  moving  off  together,  if  the  enemy 
shows  no  disposition  to  follow  up  his  success  with 
energy ;  or,  in  the  contrary  case,  by  retiring  by 
successive  portions ;  the  line  which  withdraws  fiill- 
ing  some  150  paces  to  the  rear  o*^  the  one  by  wliich 


53 

It  is  covered,  whilst  falling  back,  and  thai   forming, 
tc  cover  in  turn  the  retreat  of  the  latter. 

The  dispositions  made  in  the  retreat  will  depend 
entirely  upon  the  character  of  the  enemy's  pursuit, 
and  the  features  of  the  ground.  It  will  usually  be 
made  in  columns,  covered  by  skirmishers,  if  the 
pursuit  is  made  by  infantry  alone ;  if  by  cavalry, 
the  retreat  must  be  made  with  great  circumspec- 
tion ;  the  troops  retiring  slowly  and  in  good  order, 
adopting  the  formation  against  cavalry ;  never  has- 
temng  the  march,  unless  very  near  a  good  position 
for  defence,  which  should  be  attained  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  unless  closely  pressed  by  the  cavalry. 

136.  If  it  be  necessary  to  continue  the  retreat 
for  some  marches,  under  the  eye  of  the  enemy,  a 
rear-guard  must  be  formed  ;  selecting,  from  a  fourth 
to  a  third  of  the  entire  force,  for  this  service.  The 
main  duty  of  the  rear-guard  is  to  hinder  the  enemy 
from  pressing  too  closely  on  the  main-body ;  and  it 
should  therefore,  under  no  circumstances,  allow 
itself  to  be  forced  back  upon  the  main-body.  The 
dispositions  adopted  by  the  rear-guard  will  depend 
Tipon  the  features  of  the  ground ;  its  rear  will  usu- 
ally be  covered  by  a  line  of  skirmishers.  The  rear- 
guard will  keep  within  good  supporting  distance  of 
the  main-body ;  and,  when  pressed  by  the  enemy, 
the  latter,  whenever  a  favorable  position  offers,  will 
halt  and  form ;  to  cover  the  former,  and  force  the 
enemy  to  greater  circumspection. 

1 37.  Measures  for  protracting  an  Engagement. 
In  the  attack,  as  in  the  defence,  it  may  frequently 
become  an  object  to  protract  an  engagement,  with- 
out coming  to  any  decisive  result ;  either  for  the 
purpose  of  holding  a  position  for  a  certain  time,  to 
favor  other  objects,  as  the  arrival  of  reinforcements ; 
or  to  occupy  an  advers<irv  upon  one  point  whilst  a 

5* 


54 

decisive  blow  is  preparing  on  another.  This  game 
can  be  phiyed  oniy  upon  ground  favorable  to  alter- 
nations from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive ;  and 
should  only  be  intrusted  to  troops  thoroughly  con- 
versant with  the  duties  of  skirmishers.  The  main- 
body  is  kept  some  two  thousand  paces  to  the  rear 
of  the  skirmishers  in  such  affairs ;  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  ground,  and  making  suitable  dispositions 
of  the  troops  to  avoid  the  effects  of  the  enemy's  ar- 
tillery. Small  columns  are  thrown  forward  be- 
tween itself  and  the  troops  engaged,  which  take 
post  in  covered  ground,  to  be  at  hand  to  support 
the  sldrmishers.  The  troops  engaged  should  be 
promptly  reinforced,  when  the  enemy  presses  on- 
ward ;  and  attempts  should  be  made,  by  charging 
him  in  flank,  to  force  him  to  retire.  The  troops  in 
action  should  be  frequently  relieved,  and  the  oppor- 
tunity should  be  seized,  when  the  fresh  troops  come 
up,  to  make  an  onward  movement  on  the  enemy, 
and  force  him  from  any  points  he  may  have  gained. 
138.  Defence  against  Cavalrij.  When  infantry 
is  tlireatencd  by  cavalry,  the  proper  formation  to  re- 
pel its  charge  is  that  of  squares.  If  but  one  square 
is  formed,  it  must  rely  on  its  own  resources  to  beat 
off  the  enemy ;  but  when  there  are  several  they 
may  give  mutual  support,  by  bringing  a  flank  fire 
from  one  upon  a  force  advancing  on  either  of  the 
two  contiguous  to  it.  The  safety  of  infantrj'  against 
cavalry  will  depend  upon  the  presen'ation  of  perfect 
coolness,  good  order,  and  connection  in  the  ranks  ; 
the  avoidance  of  any  precipita'e  movements  which 
might  bring  about  a  surprise ;  and  the  husbanding 
of  its  ammunition,  and  reservation  of  its  tire  until 
the  encmv  is  within  a  deadly  range.  Well  disci- 
plined infantry,  whilst  in  position,  and  when  not  ex- 
posed to  a  fire  of  artillery,  may  securely  trust  to  its 


55 

own  resources  to  repulse  the  best  cavalrj-,  so  long  aa 
it  adopts  the  proper  precautions.  If  annoyed,  as 
sometimes  may  happen,  by  the  fire  of  a  few  horse- 
men, advanced  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  squares,  it  will 
be  better  to  throw  out  some  skirmishers,  ten  or 
twelve  paces  from  the  squares,  to  keep  off  such 
attacks,  than  to  open  a  fire  from  the  squares. 

139.  Defence,  c^c.  against  Artillery.  Infantry 
may  take  advantage,  either  of  covers  presented  by 
the  features  of  the  ground,  or  of  occasionally  shifting 
its  position,  to  avoid  the  fire  of  artillery.  Very  slight 
undulations,  or  obstructions,  like  the  low  banks 
along  the  borders  of  ditches,  will  serve  to  cover 
troops,  by  causing  the  shot  to  rise  above  them.  If 
no  covers  are  at  hand,  the  chances  of  casualties, 
when  within  point-blank  range,  may  be  diminished 
by  moving  forward,  or  backward,  some  50  paces ; 
if  tlie  fire  be  a  ricochet,  the  position  should  be  shifted 
some  50  paces  to  the  right  or  left.  The  enemy's 
batteries  may  be  annoyed,  and  sometimes  be  forced 
to  change  their  position,  by  sending  out  good  marks- 
men, wlio  advance  singly  to  within  some  250  paces 
of  them ;  where,  lying  down,  they  can  pick  otf  the 
officers,  men  and  horses. 

140.  Ailack  of  Artillery.  Whenever  it  is  found 
necessary  to  carry  a  battery  by  the  bayonet,  the 
troops  for  this  duty  are  divided  into  two  detachments ; 
one  of  which  is  charged  with  capturing  the  guns, 
and  the  other  with  attacking  the  supports  of  the 
battery. 

The  dispositions  made  by  the  detachment  which 
moves  against  the  guns  will  be  the  usual  one  of 
skirmishers ;  the  line  surromiding  tlie  battery,  and 
opening  their  fire  upon  it  wiien  within  about  250 
paces,  taking  advantage  for  this  purpose  of  any 
covers,  to  screen  the  men.     The  supports  of  the 


56 

.ine  of  sldrmishers  should  be  kept  well  to  the  rear 
to  be  ready  agair>t  a  flank  movement  on  the  line. 
If  tliis  manoeuvre  succeeds  in  drawing  tlie  lire  of 
the  guns,  and  any  confusion  is  observed  among  the 
men,  then  a  rush  must  be  immediately  made  upon 
them  with  the  bayonet. 

The  detachment  against  the  supports  of  the  bat- 
tery will  make  its  dispositions  according  to  the  kind 
of  troops  whicli  compose  the  supports.  If  of  infan- 
try, the  detachment  to  seize  the  guns,  divided  into 
two  portions,  will  advance  either  in  line,  or  column, 
as  may  be  best,  on  the  flanks  of  the  line  of  skir- 
mishers ;  gradually  getting  in  advance  of  it,  and 
closing  on  the  Hanks  of  the  batterj',  so  as  to  attack 
the  supj)orls  in  flank  ;  or  else  they  may  keep  to  the 
rear  of  the  line  of  skirmishers,  in  order  to  tempt  the 
supports  to  move  forward,  and  thus  mask  the  fire 
of  their  guns.  If  the  supports  are  of  cavalry,  the 
detachment,  divided  into  two  columns,  will  follow 
the  line  of  skirmishers,  in  rear  of  the  flanks  j  to  cover 
it  against  a  charge  of  the  cavalry. 


141.  Position.  This  arm  is  usually  placed  in 
the  rear  of  the  infantry,  on  ground  favorable  to  its 
manoeuvres,  and  where  it  will  be  masked  from  fire 
until  the  moment  arrives  to  bring  it  into  action; 
here,  if  acting  on  the  defensive,  the  cavalry  watches 
its  opportunity  to  support  the  other  troops,  driving 
back  the  enemy,  by  prompt  and  vigorous  charges, 
when  these  are  hard  pressed  ;  or,  if  on  the  offensive, 
biding  its  time,  to  rush  upon  the  assailant,  and  com- 
plete his  destruction  ;  when  his  ranks  commence  to 
waver  or  show  signs  of  disorganization  from  the 
assaults  of  the  other  arms 


57 

142.  Fiirmation.  Tlie  luibitual  formation  of 
cavalry  for  the  attack  is  in  a  line  of  two  ranks,  with 
a  reserve,  or  support  to  its  rear.  The  supports  are 
indisjiensably  requisite  to  guard  against  tliose 
chances  of  danger  to  which  cavalry  is  particularly 
expos(!d,  if  attacked  in  turn,  when  in  a  state  of  par- 
tial disorganization,  after  a  successful  charge ;  or 
when  tlireatened  by  an  offensive  movement  against 
its  flanks.  The  supports  offer  a  safeguard  against 
either  of  these  dangers ;  for,  if  the  front  line  is 
brought  up  by  the  enemy,  after  a  successful  charge, 
it  can  retire  and  rally  in  the  rear  of  the  supports ; 
and  if  tiie  enemy  makes  a  movement  against  the 
flanks,  the  supports,  placed  behind  them  and  in 
column,  can  form  and  anticipate  the  enemy's  charge. 
For  tlie  foregoing  reasons,  cavalry  should  not  give 
way  to  a  headlong  pursuit  after  a  successful  charge, 
unless  its  supports  are  at  liand ;  and,  in  cases 
where  a  charge  is  made  without  supports,  a  portion 
only  should  engage  in  pursuit,  the  rest  being  rallied 
to  form  a  support. 

143.  Cavalry  is  seldom  called  on  to  use  fire- 
arms. When  on  out-post  service,  or  acting  on  the 
defensive  on  ground  unfavorable  to  charging,  a  por- 
tion of  the  force  may  be  dispersed  as  flankers,  to 
hold  the  enemy  in  check  by  their  fire.  In  this  case 
their  movements  are  regulated  in  the  same  way  as 
other  skirmishers. 

144.  Defence.  The  defensive  qualities  of  cavalry 
lie  in  the  offensive.  A  body  of  cavalry  which  waits 
to  receive  a  charge  of  cavalry,  or  is  exposed  to  a  fire 
of  infantry,  or  artillery,  must  either  retire,  or  be 
destroyed.  This  essential  quality  of  cavalry  ren- 
ders its  services  invaluable  in  retreats  where  the 
enemy  pursues  with  vigor.  In  such  cases  it  should 
be  held  in  constant  readiness  to  take  advantage  of 


58 

every  spot  favorable  to  its  action ;  and,  by  short  and 
energetic  charges,  force  the  enemy  to  move  with 
circumspection. 

145.  Attack  against  Infantry.  So  'ong  as  in- 
fantry maintains  its  position  firmly,  particularly  if 
the  ground  is  at  all  unfavorable  to  the  movements 
of  cavalry,  the  chances  are  against  a  successful  at- 
tack by  the  latter.  Cavalry  should  therefore  either 
wait  patiently  until  a  way  is  prepared  for  its  ac- 
tion, by  a  fire  of  artillery  on  the  enemy's  infantry ; 
or  until  the  infantry  has  become  crippled  and  ex- 
hausted by  being  kept  in  action  for  some  time  ;  or 
else,  watching  its  opportunity,  make  a  charge  whilst 
the  infantry  is  in  motion,  so  as  to  surprise  it  before 
it  can  form  to  receive  the  attack. 

Cavalry  should  direct  its  charge  on  that  point  of 
the  enemy's  infantry  where  it  will  itself  be  exposed 
to  the  least  column  of  fire.  If  the  infantry  is  in  line, 
the  charge  should  be  made  on  one  of  its  flanks  ;  if 
in  square,  on  one  of  the  angles  of  the  square ;  and 
when  several  squares  are  formed,  so  as  to  afl^ord 
mutual  support  by  their  fire,  selecting  the  squares 
on  the  flanks  as  most  vulnerable,  from  their  po- 
sition. 

146.  The  formation  usually  recommended  for 
charging  against  squares,  is  that  of  three  squadrons 
in  line  at  double  distance ;  the  leading  squadron 
being  followed  by  the  others,  either  directly  in  its 
rear ;  or  else  the  squadrons  may  be  formed  in  eche- 
lon, successively  overlapping  each  other  by  about 
the  front  of  a  platoon.  The  angle  of  the  square  is 
charged  by  each  squadron  in  succession,  if  the 
charge  of  the  one  preceding  it  fails ;  the  repulsed 
squadrons  each  wheeling  to  the  right,  or  left  on  re- 
tiring ;  to  leave  the  way  clear  for  its  successor.  A 
fourth  squadron  in  column  follows  those  in  line ;  to 


5) 

enrronnd  the  square  and  ma.h:  prisoners  if  it  should 
be  broken  by  the  charge. 

147.  To  draw  the  fire  of  the  infantry  before 
charging,  a  few  skilful  flankers  may  bo  thrown 
forward,  to  open  a  fire  on  the  square.  Stratagem 
may  also  be  tried,  by  moving  along  the  front  of  the 
infantry,  at  some  400  paces,  and  tliei  charging,  if 
it  is  tempted  to  throw  away  its  fire  at  this  distance. 
In  an  attack  where  several  squares  are  in  line,  if 
one  fires  to  second  another  it  should  be  instantly 
charged. 

148.  Atiack  against  Artillery.  In  attacks  against 
artillery,  the  detachment  of  cavalry  should  be  di- 
vided into  three  bodies ;  one-fourth  of  the  detach- 
ment being  charged  with  carrying  the  guns ;  one- 
half  to  attack  the  supports  of  the  battery  ;  and  the 
remaining  fourth  acting  as  a  reserve,  to  cover  the 
parties  in  advance,  from  an  offensive  movement 
against  their  flanks,  or  rear. 

The  party  to  secure  the  guns  make  their  attack 
in  dispersed  order,  and  endeavor  to  gain  the  flanks 
of  the  battery.  When  the  battery  has  a  fair  sweep 
over  the  ground  along  which  they  must  advance, 
they  should,  by  manoeuvring  and  false  attacks,  try 
to  confuse  the  artillerists,  and  draw  their  fire  before 
making  their  charge. 

The  attack  against  the  support  of  the  battery 
will  be  directed  in  the  usual  manner ;  the  party 
manoeuvring  to  gain  their  flanks. 

ARTILLERY. 

149.  Position.  The  manner  of  placing  artil- 
lery and  its  employment  must  be  regulated  by  ita 
relative  importance  under  given  circumstances, 
with  respect  to  the  action  of  the  other  arms. 


60 

In  the  defensive,  the  principal  part  is  usually  as* 
eig-ned  to  the  artiiierj' ;  and  the  positions  taiicn  up 
by  the  other  arms  will,  therefore,  be  subordinate  to 
those  of  this  arm.  In  offensive  movements  the  re- 
verse generally  obtains. 

150.  Defence.  In  defensive  positions  the  secu- 
rity of  the  batteries  is  of  the  last  importance.  Un- 
less the  batteries  are  on  points  which  are  inacces- 
sible to  the  enemy's  cavalry  and  infantry,  they  must 
be  placed  under  the  protection  of  the  other  troops, 
and  be  outflanked  by  them. 

As  in  the  defensive,  we  should  be  prepared  to  re- 
ceive the  enemy  on  ever}'  point ;  the  batteries  must 
be  distributed  along  the  entire  front  of  the  position 
occupied,  and  on  those  points  from  which  they  can 
obtain  a  good  sweep.over  the  avenues  of  approach 
to  it ;  the  guns  being  masked,  when  the  ground  fa- 
vors, from  the  enemy's  view,  until  the  proper  mo- 
ment arrives  for  opening  their  fire. 

151.  The  distance  between  the  batteries  should 
not  be  much  over  600  paces ;  so  that  by  their  fire 
they  may  cover  well  the  ground  intervening  be- 
tween them,  and  afford  mutual  support ;  the  light 
guns  being  placed  on  the  more  salient  points  of  the 
front,  from  their  shorter  range  and  greater  f\icility 
of  manoeuvring ;  the  heavier  guns  on  the  more  re- 
tired points.  Guns  of  various  calibre  should  not  be 
placed  in  the  same  battery.  A  sufficient  interA'al 
should  also  be  left  between  batteries  of  different 
calibre ;  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  judging,  by  the 
variations  in  the  effect  of  the  shot,  of  the  weight  of 
metal  of  the  batteries. 

Those  positions  for  batteries  should  be  avoided 
from  which  the  shot  m.ust  pass  over  other  troops,  to 
attain  the  enemy.  And  those  should  be  sought  for 
from  which  a  fire  can  be  maintained  until  the  enemy 


61 

Lis  approached  even  within  good  musket-range  ctf 
them. 

Where  tlie  wings  of  a  position  are  weak,  batte- 
ries of  the  lieaviest  calibre  should  be  placed  to  se- 
cure thom. 

152.  A  sufficient  number  of  pieces — selecting 
for  tlio  object  in  view  horse-artillery  in  preference 
to  any  other — should  be  held  in  reserve  for  a  mo- 
ment of  need ;  to  be  thrown  upon  any  point  where 
the  enemy's  progress  threatens  danger;  or  to  be 
uaed  in  covering  the  retreat. 

153.  The  collection  of  a  large  number  »f  pieces 
in  a  single  battery,  is  a  dangerous  arrangement ; 
particularly  at  the  outset  of  an  engagement.  The 
exposure  of  so  many  guns  together  might  present 
a  strong  inducement  to  the  enemy  to  make  an 
elfort  to  carry  the  battery ;  a  feat  the  more  likely  to 
succeed,  as  it  is  difficult  either  to  withdraw  the 
guns,  or  change  their  position  promptly,  after  their 
tire  is  opened ;  and  one  which,  if  successful,  might 
entail  a  fatal  disaster  on  the  assailed,  from  the  loss 
of  so  many  pieces  at  once. 

154.  In  all  defensive  dispositions  the  ammunition 
should  be  most  carefully  husbanded.  A  lire  should 
never  be  opened  until  the  enemy  is  within  good 
range ;  and,  when  once  opened,  be  continued  with 
perseverance  and  coolness  up  to  the  last  moment  in 
which  it  can  be  made  effective. 

155.  AUack.  In  the  outset  of  offensive  move- 
ments, good  positions  should  be  selected  for  the 
heaviest  pieces,  from  which  they  can  maintain  a 
strong  hre  on  the  enemy  until  the  hghter  pieces  and 
the  columns  of  attack  are  brought  into  action. 
These  positions  should  be  taken  on  the  flanks  of  the 
ground  occupied  by  the  assailant,  or  on  the  centre, 
if  more  favorable  to  the  end  to  be  attained.     In  all 

6 


62 

cases,  wide  intervals  sliould  be  left  between  the  heavy 
batteries  and  ihe  other  troops ;  in  order  that  the 
latter  may  not  suffer  from  the  return  fire  which  the 
assailed  will  probably  open  on  the  batteries.  For 
the  same  reason,  care  should  be  taken  not  to  place 
other  troops  behind  a  point  occupied  by  a  battery, 
where  they  would  be  exposed  to  the  return  fire  of 
the  assailed  ;  when  this  cannot  be  avoided,  the 
troops  should  be  so  placed  as  to  be  covered  by  any 
undulation  of  the  ground ;  or  else  be  deployed  in 
line  to  lessen  the  effects  of  the  shot. 

166.  The  artillery  which  moves  with  the  col- 
umns of  attack,  should  be  divided  into  several 
strong  baiteries ;  as  the  object  in  this  case  is  to 
produce  a  decisive  impression  upon  a  few  points  of 
the  enemy's  line ;  by  bringing  an  overwhelming 
fire  to  bear  upon  these  points.  These  batteries 
should  keep  near  enough  to  the  other  troops  to  be 
in  safety  from  any  attempts  of  the  assailed  to  cap- 
ture them.  Their  usual  positions  will  be  on  tho 
flanks  and  near  the  heads  of  the  columns  of  attack ; 
the  intervals  between  the  batteries  being  sufficient 
for  the  free  manoeuvres  of  the  other  troops,  in  large 
bodies.  The  mancEUvres  of  these  batteries  should 
be  made  with  promptitude  ;  so  that  no  time  may  be 
lost  for  the  action  of  their  fire.  They  should  get 
rapidly  over  unfavorable  ground  to  good  positions 
for  firing,  and  maintain  these  as  long  as  pcssible ; 
detaching,  in  such  cases,  a  few  pieces  to  accom- 
pany the  colunms  of  attack.  In  all  the  move- 
ments of  the  batteries,  great  care  should  be  taken 
not  to  place  them  so  that  they  shall  in  the  least 
impede  the  operations  of  the  other  troops. 


CHAPTER  m. 


157.  Among  the  most  important  modem  addi- 
tions to  the  military  art,  is  that  of  topography,  ox 
the  study  of  the  natural  features  of  positions,  with 
a  view  to  turn  them  to  account  in  the  first  disposi- 
tions for  battle,  and  its  various  succeeding  phases. 

158.  It  is  only  by  this  study  that  the  coup  (Tail 
ntiliiaire,  or  the  art  of  disposing  troops  in  harmony 
with  the  ground  on  which  they  are  to  act,  can  be 
brought  to  any  high  degree  of  perfection ;  what- 
ever may  be  the  natural  gifts  of  the  individual. 

169.  This  study  is  not  altogether  of  modern 
origin.  Among  the  ancients,  some  of  the  Greek 
generals  have  given  evidence  of  a  feeling  of  its  im- 
portance ;  as  in  the  examples  of  Epaminondas, 
Xenophon,  Alexander,  and  particularly  of  Philopce- 
men.  The  Romans,  although  having  adopted  an 
order  of  battle  which  lent  itself  better  to  varied 
features  of  ground  than  that  of  the  Greeks,  still 
showed  but  little  knowledge  of  this  branch,  until 
after  the  wars  with  Pyrrhus,  when  the  art  of  Cas- 
trameialion  underwent  some  change  with  them. 

160.  The  tactics  which  grew  out  of  the  French 
Revolution  gave  to  topography  great  prominence ; 
and  no  general  perhaps  has  ever  displayed  more 
consummate  attainments  in  this  respect  than  Na- 
poleon ;  whose  descriptive  memoirs,  particularly  of 
the  Alps,  are  considered  as  models  for  all  graphic 
writings;  presenting  with  clearness  and  compre- 
hensiveness, a  picture  lliat  the  mind's  eye  cannot 
fail  to  seize. 


64 

161.  The  term  Position  is  applied  to  any  groima 
taken  up  by  a  body  of  troops  either  to  malie,  or  to 
receive  an  attack. 

162.  To  select  a  position  imderstandingly,  an 
officer  must  possess  a  thorough  practical  knowl- 
edgit  of  the  tactical  combinations  of  the  different 
arm;< ;  their  respective  qualifications  for  the  offen- 
sive and  defensive  ;  and  of  the  adaptation  of  ground 
to  th  air  particular  manoeuvres. 

163.  In  choosing  a  position,  the  ground  must 
be  examined  not  onl}''  with  respect  to  its  peculiar 
suitableness  to  the  object  in  view,  but  also  with 
reference  to  the  influence  of  that  in  its  vicinity 
upon  this  object. 

1 64.  The  first  point  to  be  looked  to  is  the  extent 
of  the  position.  This  should  be  such  that,  deduc- 
tion made  of  the  advanced-posts,  and  of  the  reserve, 
its  front  and  flanks  shall  present  an  unbroken  line 
of  troops,  from  wliich  a  close  and  well-sustained 
fire  can  bo  brought  upon  all  points  by  which  these 
can  be  approached. 

In  estimating  the  front  of  a  position,  an  allow- 
ance of  about  180  yards  may  be  made  for  each  bat- 
talion, from  600  to  700  strong ;  about  60  yards  for 
each  squadron  of  liorse  of  48  files,  the  necessary 
inter\-als  between  thc^se  imits  being  included  in  this 
estimate ;  and  from  12  to  20  yards  for  the  interval 
between  tlio  pieces  of  a  battery. 

In  estimating  the  depth,  an  allowance  of  600  to 
800,  yards  at  least,  should  be  made  from  the  front 
to  the  rear ;  in  order  that  the  two  lines  and  the  re- 
serve may  be  posted  in  suitable  relative  positions 
for  good  support. 

165.  The  position  should  offer  no  features  by 
which  the  prompt  movement  of  troops  from  one 
point  to  another,  for  mutual  support,  might  be  ob- 


65 

Btructed.  Its  deboucJies  to  the  front  for  offensive 
movements,  as  well  as  those  to  its  rear  in  case  of 
retreat,  should  be  ample.  It  should  be  beyond  the 
effective  cannon  range  of  commanding  heights  both 
on  its  front  and  flanks. 

166.  The  flanks,  being  the  weakest  points  of  a 
body  of  troops,  must  be  secured  from  being  turned, 
or  attacked ;  by  resting  them  upon  some  strong 
natural  feature  of  the  position,  as  a  river,  precipice, 
&c.,  which  tlie  enemy  can  neither  turn,  nor  seize 
upon  ;  or  else  on  some  point  that  will  afford  suffi- 
cient means  of  prolonging  the  resistance  to  enable 
reinforcements  to  reach  it  in  time,  as  an  intrenched 
village,*  a  held  -,vork,  &c.  When  the  flanks  can- 
not be  secured  in  either  of  these  ways,  they  must 
be  strengthened  by  an  accumulation  of  troops  upon 
them  ;  to  offer  a  vigorous  resistance  to  the  enemy 
should  he  attempt  an  attack. 

167.  Positions  for  the  Defensive.  When  a  posi- 
tion is  taken  up  to  maintain  a  strictly  defensive 
attitude,  the  natural  features  of  its  front  should  be 
of  a  character  to  prevent  an  enemy  from  approach- 
ing in  good  order ;  and  to  enable  the  assailed  to 
dispute,  with  advantage,  every  foot  of  ground. 
The  enemy,  moreover,  should  not  be  able  to  turn 
the  position,  when  it  is  unavoidably  exposed  to  this 
manoeuvre,  without  great  risk  to  his  own  safety,  by 
an  offensive  movement  of  the  assailed  on  his  flanks, 
or  rear. 

168.  The  manner  of  disposing  and  handling 
troops  in  a  defensive  position  will  mainly  depend 
upon  its  natural  features.  The  only  rule  that  can 
be  laid  down  is,  to  post  the  different  arms  upon 
ground  best  adapted  to  their  respective  tactics  • 

*  See  Chapters  VII,  IX.  X,  and  XI,  Mahan's  F  eld  Fortifica 
tion,  en  lutreiichuienls,  &.C.,  of  I'ositions,  &c. 
6* 


66 

and  in  such  relative  positions  as  to  afford  mutual 
support,  and  not  impede  each  other's  movements. 

169.  The  obstructions  on  the  front  and  flanks  of 
the  position  will  be  occupied  by  the  advanced-guard, 
formed  of  light  troops  of  each  arm,  if  the  ground  is 
favorable  to  their  combined  action  ;  for  the  purpose 
of  observing  the  enemy,  and  holding  him  in  check 
if  he  makes  an  onward  movement. 

170.  The  main-body  of  the  infantry  will  occupy 
every  point,  between  the  obstacles  on  which  the 
flanks  rest,  in  such  a  manner  that  no  intervals 
shall  be  presented  through  which  the  enemy  can 
penetrate  without  being  exposed  to  a  close  and 
powerful  line  of  fire. 

171.  The  artillery  will  be  placed  on  those  points 
where  it  can  have  a  commanding  view  of  the  ground 
in  advance  of  the  position,  and  sweep  by  its  fire  the 
approaches  of  the  enemy,  both  in  front  and  flank. 

172.  The  cavalry,  posted  in  rear  of  the  infantry, 
should  occupy  ground  upon  which  it  can  make 
effective  charges,  to  support  the  infantry  when 
pressed  by  the  enemy. 

173.  In  posting  troops  on  obstructed  ground,  care 
should  be  taken  not  to  place  them  on  points  where 
they  can  only  be  idle  spectators  of  the  combat: 
either  from  the  impossibility  of  their  being  ap- 
proached by  the  enemy,  or  from  their  not  being 
able  to  join  the  enemy  at  the  proper  moment.  In 
like  manner,  those  points  should  be  avoided  where, 
from  obstacles  in  their  rear,  the  safety  of  the  troops 
might  be  compromised  in  case  of  retreat.  When- 
ever it  becomes  necessary  to  dispute  the  possession 
of  the  latter  class  of  points  with  the  enemy,  the 
avenues  to  the  rear  must  be  occupied  by  detach- 
ments of  suitable  strength,  to  secure  the  retreat  of 
the  troops  in  advance. 


67 

174.  In  order  that  the  necessary  manoeiivres  may 
be  promptly  executed,  without  confusion;  and  to 
avoid  olFering;  a  mark  that  might  attract  the  enemy's 
fire,  and  occasion  useless  exposure  ;  no  more  troops 
should  be  placed  on  any  ponit  tnan  its  defence  may 
indispensably  require ;  and  whenever  it  becomes 
requisite  to  strengthen  a  weak  point,  by  an  accu- 
mulation of  troops  upon  it,  every  advantage  should 
be  taken  of  the  undulations,  or  other  accidents  of 
the  ground,  to  mask  them  from  the  enemy's  fire  un- 
til the  moment  arrives  for  bringing  them  into  ac- 
tion. 

175.  The  value  of  obstacles,  as  supports  for  the 
flanks,  or  as  obstructions  in  the  front,  or  rear  of  a 
position,  is  altogether  relative ;  and  depends  on  the 
number  of  troops.  A  veiy  slight  obstacle  on  a 
flank,  which  will  serve  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check 
but  a  few  minutes,  may  answer  all  the  purposes  of 
a  small  body  of  troops;  by  enabling  them  to  make 
such  changes  in  tlieir  dispositions  as  the  nature  of 
the  case  may  call  lor ;  whereas  a  larger  body,  un- 
der like  circumstances,  might  be  overwhelmed  on 
their  flank  before  they  could  make  suitable  ma- 
noeuvres to  prevent  it.  A  broken,  obstructed  coun- 
try to  the  rear,  presenting  few  and  narrow  avenues 
of  retreat,  might  be  fatal  to  a  large  body  of  troops 
forced  to  retire  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  ;  whereas, 
to  a  small  body,  the  same  features  of  ground  might 
present  many  points  where  strong  positions  could 
be  momentarily  taken  up  to  hold  the  enemy  in 
check,  and  force  him  to  pursue  slowly  and  circum- 
spectly. 

176.  When  it  is  found  that  the  enemy  is  moving 
upon  the  position,  the  advanced-guard  makes  suit- 
able dispositions  to  hold  him  in  check  ;  by  occupy- 
insT  with  its  skirmishers  all  the  obstacles  in  its  front 


68 

laQ  flanks ;  when  forced  to  retire  upon  the  main 
position,  these  troops  concentrate  more  and  more 
as  they  approach  it,  taking  care  not  to  mask  the 
fire,  or  impede  the  action  of  the  main-body. 

177.  The  artillery  will  only  open  its  tire  when 
the  enemy  is  within  a  destructive  range ;  it  will 
then  concentrate  its  efforts  against  the  columns  of 
attack ;  not  replying  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries, unless  it  becomes  urgent  to  do  so,  from  their 
effects  upon  the  other  troops.  The  artillery  will 
maintain  its  positions  with  pertinacity,  as  long  as 
possible ;  watching  its  opportunities,  during  the 
different  phases  of  the  action,  to  support  and  succor 
the  other  arms  ;  as,  for  example,  when  it  becomes 
necessary  to  replace  the  front  line  of  infantry  by 
the  reserve  ;  to  advance  the  cavalry ;  when  the 
other  arms  are  obstinately  disputing  a  decisive 
point ;  or  when  the  enemy  abandons  the  attack. 
The  great  mobility  of,  field-artillery,  owing  to  the 
more  recent  improvements,  places  it  in  the  power 
of  this  arm  to  act  with  great  boldness  in  support  of 
the  others.  The  ground  over  which  the  guns  may 
be  required  to  move,  for  this  purpose,  should  be  well 
examined,  before  the  attack  commences,  by  the 
officer  commanding  the  artillery  ;  that  no  delays 
may  occur  in  bringing  them  into  action  upon  the 

jroper  point  at  the  proper  moment. 

178.  The  main-body  of  the  infantry  sliould  not 
open  its  fire  until  it  can  be  thrown  in  with  deadly 
effect.  If  tlie  enemy,  unchecked  by  the  fire,  still 
pushes  forward,  lie  must  be  met  by  a  charge,  either 
in  line,  or  column,  from  the  point  menaced ;  a  por- 
tion of  the  reserve  immediately  closing  the  interval 
left  by  the  troops  making  the  charge. 

179.  The  reserve  should  not  be  brought  into  ac- 
tion unless  its  co-operation  is  indispensable  for  ol>« 


69 

taining  some  decisive  result ;  as  forcing  the  enemy 
back  from  some  important  point  from  which  the 
main-body  has  been  compelled  to  retire ;  or  cover- 
ing the  retreat  of  the  main-body,  until  it  can  rally 
and  form  again  in  the  rear. 

180.  The  cavalry  must  be  in  readiness,  from  its 
position,  to  act  promptly,  either  against  any  attempt 
upon  the  flanks  of  tiie  infantry ;  or  to  profit  by  any 
faults,  or  disorder  of  the  enemy.  If  the  enemy 
throws  forward  small  detachments  without  support- 
ing them  properly,  or  advances  his  main-line  with- 
out securing  his  flanks,  or  shows  symptem-s  of  con- 
fusion in  his  infantry,  the  opportunity  should  not  be 
lost  by  the  cavalry.  In  all  movements  of  the  in- 
fantry, either  in  advancing  or  retiring,  the  cavalry 
should  be  at  hand  to  cover  it  from  a  sudden  attack. 

181.  If  the  enemy  is  beaten  off",  pursuit  is  made, 
either  by  the  cavalry  or  by  detachments  of  infantry, 
according  to  the  features  of  the  ground  ;  whilst  the 
main-body  is  promptly  rallied,  and  placed  in  po- 
sition, to  receive  the  enemy  should  the  attack  be 
renewed. 

182.  The  dispositions  for  a  retreat  will  depend 
upon  the  circumstances  under  which  it  may  be 
made.  When  the  troops  retire  by  successive  lines, 
the  greater  portion  of  the  artillery  should  always 
be  in  the  line  nearest  the  enemy,  and  between  the 
battalions ;  the  remainder  being  in  the  second  line, 
ready  to  repulse  any  flank  attack.  The  cavalry  ia 
posted  in  rear  of  the  second  line,  either  upon  one, 
or  both  wings,  to  be  in  readiness  for  a  charge  at 
any  moment. 

183.  When  the  entire  force  moves  oflT  together, 
the  rear  is  secured  by  a  rear-guard  of  the  best 
troops,  composed  of  one,  or  several  arms,  as  the 
circumstances  of  the  groimd  may  require.     The 


70 

rear-guard  will  profit  by  the  features  of  the  ^ound 
to  check  the  enemy ;  but  will  be  careful  not  to  lose 
time,  by  prolonging  unnecessarily  the  resistance  on 
any  point ;  as  this  might  bring  the  main  force  of  the 
enemy  upon  it. 

184.  Great  circumspection  should  be  shown  in 
retreating  through  obstructed  ground  ;  in  watching 
the  enemy's  movements  on  the  flanks;  and  in  timely 
securing  defiles  leading  to  the  rear ;  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  cutting  off  the  retreat. 

185.  Attack.  An  enemy  may  be  made  to  aban- 
don a  defensive  position,  either  by  driving  him  from 
it ;  or  by  mancEuvring  to  turn  it,  and  so  force  him 
to  fall  back  to  secure  his  line  of  communications. 
In  attempting  the  latter  plan,  it  should  not  be  for- 
gotten that  the  assailant  is,  to  a  greater  or  less  de- 
gree, exposed  to  the  same  danger  as  his  adversary, 
who,  if  active  and  enterprising,  may  turn  the  tables 
on  him. 

The  celebrated  battle  of  Rivoli,  in  which  a  por- 
tion of  the  Austrian  force  turned  the  flank  of  the 
French  position,  and  was  there  obliged  to  lay  down 
their  arms, — Napoleon,  using  on  that  occasion, 
when  these  troops  were  discovered  in  his  rear,  one 
of  those  magical  expressions,  "  Those  are  ours,'^ 
by  which  he  so  well  understood  how  to  electrify 
the  soldier, — is  a  remarkable  e.xample  on  this  head. 
The  batile  of  Buena-Vista,  where  the  Mexicans, 
after  turning  the  flank  and  gaining  the  rear  of  our 
troops,  barely  escaped  a  similar  fate,  is  another ; 
whilst  that  of  Cerro-Gordo  is  as  remarkable  for  the 
masterly  and  admirable  manner  in  which  the  ene- 
my's position  was  turned  and  carried,  although 
Testing  upon  ground  which  was  fairly  deemed  im- 
practicable by  him. 

186.  In  planning  the  attack  of  a  position,  attei>» 


71 

tion  must,  in  the  first  place,  be  directed  to  those 
points  in  which  its  main-strength  resides,  and  for 
this  reason  termed  the  key-points,  the  loss  of  which 
will  force  the  assailed  to  retire.  As  the  assailed 
will  probably  put  forth  all  his  efforts  to  maintain 
these  points,  their  attack  will  demand  corresponding 
exertions  on  the  part  of  the  assailant ;  and  should 
be  made  only  with  troops  of  the  best  character. 

187.  In  the  second  place,  those  points  must  be 
carefully  examined,  which,  by  their  fire,  flank  the 
position ;  as  an  advance  upon  its  front  cannot  be 
made  without  great  loss  and  hazard  of  success  until 
the  assailed  is  dislodged  from  them. 

188.  Finally,  points  which  are  weak,  either  from 
the  features  of  the  ground,  or  from  a  faulty  dispo- 
sition of  the  troops ;  as  approaches  which  are  badly 
swept  by  the  fire  of  the  assailed  ;  an  exposed  flank 
with  too  few  troops  ;  or  a  point  where  they  are  not 
properly  placed  for  mutual  support. 

189.  The  main  effort  of  the  assailant  is  seldom 
directed  against  more  than  one  point  of  the  position ; 
that  one  being  usually  selected  which,  if  carried,  will 
lead  to  the  most  decisive  results ;  as,  for  example, 
one  of  the  flanks,  when  not  resting  upon  any  strong 
obstacles.  But  the  main  attack  is  always  com- 
bined with  demonstrations  upon  some  other  point ; 
both  with  a  view  of  deceiving  the  assailed  as  to  the 
real  point  of  attack,  and  to  prevent  him  from  with- 
drawing troops  from  other  points  to  strengthen  the 
one  menaced. 

190.  These  demonstrations,  or  false  attacks  are, 
in  some  cases,  made  by  the  advanced-guard  of  the 
assailant,  after  driving  in  that  of  the  assailed ;  in 
others,  by  a  special  detachment.  In  the  latter  case, 
the  detachment  should  seldom  exceed  a  fourth  of 
the  entire  force ;  and  should  be  composed  of  troops 


72 

of  each  arm ;  both  for  its  own  safety  against  any 
offensive  movement,  and  to  present  to  the  assailed 
a  likehhood  of  danger. 

191.  The  advanced-guard,  composed  of  light 
troops  of  each  arm,  commences  the  attack,  by  driv- 
ing in  the  advanced  posts  of  the  assailed  ;  keeping 
within  supporting  distance  of  the  main-body,  and 
occupying  such  points  as  may  be  necessary  to 
cover  its  manceu\Tes,  or  to  secure  its  retreat  in 
case  of  failure.  If  a  reconnoissance  of  the  posi- 
tion has  not  been  previously  made,  it  will  be  ef- 
fected under  cover  of  the  movements  of  the  ad- 
vanced-guard. 

192.  The  artillery  takes  position  where  it  can 
silence  the  batteries  of  the  assailed,  and  prepare 
the  way  for  the  advance  of  the  other  troops.  The 
infantry  is  usually  formed  in  two  columns  for  the 
real  attack ;  the  leading  column  being  sometimes 
preceded  by  an  advance.  A  part  of  the  artillery 
advances  either  in  one  body,  or  in  echelon,  on  the 
flank  of  the  column  of  attack  ;  the  leading  section 
preceding,  by  about  a  hundred  paces,  the  head  of 
the  column  of  attack.  If  the  column  of  attack  de- 
ploys to  open  its  fire,  the  artillery  moves  to  one  of 
its  flunks  and  seconds  it  by  a  fire  of  case  shot.  If 
the  column  charges  with  the  bayonet,  the  advanced 
portion  of  artillery  retires  to  the  position  of  that  in 
the  rear ;  to  be  ready  to  cover  the  infantry  by  its 
fire,  if  the  attack  fails.  The  cavalry  follows  in  the 
rear  of  the  infantry;  to  secure  its  flanks  from  any 
offensive  movement,  and  to  hold  the  assailed  in 
check,  should  he  attempt  ia  pursuit  after  beating 
off  the  infantry. 

193.  If  the  attack  is  successful,  the  artillcrj'  and 
the  greater  portion  of  the  infantry  are  immediately 
formed  in  good  order,  to  be  in  readiness  for  any 


73 

emereencj' ;  the  pursuit  bemg  left  to  the  cavalry 
and  some  detachments  of  infantry.  In  case  of 
failure  the  troops  engaged  fall  back  under  cover 
of  tliose  in  their  rear ;  the  artillery,  by  a  well-di- 
rected tire,  a-nd  the  cavalry  by  opportune  charges, 
holding  the  enemy  in  check,  until  order  is  re-estab- 
lished in  the  retiring  troops,  as  a  preliminary  to  a 
retreat,  or  to  a  renewal  of  the  attack. 

194.  Positions  in  obstructed  Ground.  This  term 
may  be  applied  to  localities  where  the  ground,  al- 
though level,  is  cut  up  by  ditches,  hedges,  broken 
roads,  &c.,  wliich  obstruct  the  free  movement  of 
troops. 

195.  Positions  of  this  character  are  more  favor- 
able to  the  defensive  than  the  offensive.  As,  from 
the  nature  of  the  case,  connected  movements  are, 
for  the  most  part,  impracticable,  the  commander 
will  find  it  difficult  to  direct  the  engagement,  and 
must  rely  upon  the  judgment  and  skill  of  his  sub- 
ordinates for  its  successful  issue. 

196.  The  general  disposition  of  the  troops  will 
be  in  dispersed  order.  Tliere  will  be  but  few  op- 
portunities for  the  action  of  cavalry ;  and  the  artil- 
lery can  seldom  find  positions  to  act  in  mass.  Tiie 
light  cavalry  and  light  pieces  may  be  placed  in 
front,  wherever  they  can  act  with  advantage,  and 
support  the  infantry.  The  supports  and  reserves 
should  be  kept  well  to  the  rear  of  the  troops  en- 
gaged ;  to  be  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  should  he 
attempt  to  turn  the  flanks,  a  manceuvre  to  which 
obstructed  ground  is  frequently  favorable.  The 
heavy  cavalry  and  heavy  artillery  take  post  to  tlie 
rear,  at  any  point  which  may  offer  a  good  position 
to  cover  the  retreat. 

197.  The  attack,  like  the  defence,  will  be  mainly 
conducted  by  the  infantry,  and  some  liglit  pieces ; 

7 


74 

the  infantry,  acting  as  skirmishers,  and  the  artillery 
being  employfcvl  to  force  any  opening,  that  may 
offer,  for  the  advance  of  the  infantry.  Whenever 
the  artillery  gets  a  good  position  it  should  endeavor 
to  keep  it  as  long  as  practicable.  The  cavalry 
can  effect  but  little;  as  the  enemy's,  even  if  infe- 
rior in  strengtli,  may  watch  its  opportunities,  from 
behind  obstacles,  to  make  short  and  successful 
charges.  Tlie  artillery  not  in  action  will  occupy 
the  roads,  at  points  to  the  rear  most  suitable  for 
covering  the  retreat,  if  the  attack  fails. 

198.  In  positions  of  a  mixed  character,  present- 
ing alternations  of  open  and  obstructed  ground,  the 
troops  on  the  defen^sive  must  guard,  with  great  care, 
every  accessible  point  at  wliich  the  assailant  can 
dibiniche  from  the  obstructed  upon  the  open  por- 
tions. A  strong  fire  of  heavy  artillery  should  be 
brought  to  bear  upon  these  points ;  and  cavalry 
should  be  posted  in  places  where  tliey  can  be 
masked  from  the  enemy's  fire,  and  be  at  hand  to 
charge  the  assailant,  as  he  attempts  to  debouche. 
These  efforts  should  be  seconded  by  the  bayonets 
of  the  infantry,  if  a  favorable  opportunity  occurs. 

199.  The  obstructed  ground  to  the  rear  must  be 
strongly  occupied,  lo  secure  the  retreat ;  by  post- 
ing light  troops  under  the  cover  afforded  by  the 
skirts  of  woods,  by  ditches  bordered  with  trees  and 
hedges,  &.c. ;  and  advantage  must  be  taken  of  every 
small  defile,  to  dispute  the  ground  inch  by  inch. 

200.  In  tlie  phases  of  engagements  in  positions 
of  this  character,  the  defence  must  frequently  be 
accommodated  to  th(!  troops  at  hand ;  as  in  tlie  con- 
fusion of  the  most  orderly  retreat,  in  such  cases,  it 
is  impracticable  to  preserve  tliat  connection  between 
the  movements  of  the  different  arms  which  would 
be  best  for  mutual  support.     If  the  assailant,  by 


76 

disconnected  movements,  or  a  disorderly  pursuit, 
.ays  himself  open  to  an  attack,  it  should  be  made 
and  pressed  with  vigor,  or  not  at  all. 

201.  In  the  attack  of  mixed  positions,  the  sup- 
ports and  reserves  should  be  kept  well  to  the  rear, 
whilst  the  troops  are  engaged  in  the  obstructed  por- 
tions ;  to  guard  against  otiensive  movements  on  tho 
flanks  by  the  assailed.  Those  engaged  should  close 
in  as  the  groimd  opens,  to  prepare  to  debouche  upon 
it  in  force  ;  in  which  operation  the  infantry  must  be 
covered  by  the  cavalry  and  artillery.  In  advancing 
upon  the  obstructed  ground,  the  way  must  be  pre- 
pared for  an  attack  with  the  bayonet,  by  a  heavy 
fire  of  the  artillery,  directed  particularly  upon  the 
most  accessible  points. 

Operations  of  this  character  demand  extreme  pru- 
dence and  forethought.  Every  forward  movement 
must  be  made  with  great  caution ;  every  point 
gained  must  be  well  secured ;  and  its  possession 
disputed  with  tenacity  if  the  assailed  attempts  to 
repossess  himsel  f  of  it.  In  no  other  way  can  the 
troops  engaged  be  kept  well  in  hand,  and  be  pre- 
vented from  the  confusion  and  dangers  of  a  hasty 
pursuit. 

202.  Positions  in  Forests.  In  occupying  a  for- 
est defensively,  the  skirts  and  the  openings  to  it, 
as  roads,  &c.,  must  be  strongly  guarded  by  a  line 
of  skirmishers  with  its  supports  and  reserves,  and 
by  artillery  so  placed  as  to  sweep  in  tiank  those 
points  which  are  most  accessible,  as  the  salient 
portions,  and  the  roads.  The  line  of  skirmishers, 
besides  availing  themselves  of  the  natural  covers 
of  the  position,  as  trees,  ravines,  &c.,  will  form 
abatis  in  front  of  the  more  accessible  points  ;  and 
the  cannon,  in  Uke  manner,  should  be  covered  hj 
epaulments,  when  suitable  means  are  at  hand. 


76 

203.  Tlie  main-body  will  take  up  a  central  po« 
sition,  on  ground  favorable  to  the  dei'er.ce ;  covering 
its  flanks  by  marshes,  or  other  like  obstacles , 
strengthening,  if  requisite,  its  front  by  abatis ;  and 
guarding  all  the  approaches  by  a  suitable  dispo- 
sition of  its  heavy  artillery.  The  points  of  junction 
of  roads  leading  to  the  front  should  be  strongly  oc- 
cupied, and  strengthened,  when  practicable,  by 
tield-works. 

204.  The  space  between  the  skirts  of  the  wood 
and  the  central  position  should  be  obstinately  dis- 
puted ;  advantage  being  taken  of  any  clearings 
that  may  occur,  to  post  light  pieces  and  cavalry  in 
ambush  near  them,  to  drive  back  the  assailant,  as 
he  debouches  on  the  open  ground. 

205.  As  cavalry  can  only  act,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, in  small  detachments,  the  main  body 
of  it  will  take  position  to  the  rear,  to  cover  the  re- 
treat of  the  other  troops  from  the  forest,  and  check 
the  assailant  in  dihouching  from  it. 

206.  The  attack  will  be  directed  on  the  salient 
portions,  and  upon  the  entrances  of  the  forest ;  first 
by  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery,  to  drive  back  the  infan- 
try, and  force  the  guns  of  the  assailed  to  retire. 
This  will  be  followed  up  by  a  rapid  attack  in  line, 
with  the  bayonet,  on  those  points,  whilst  demonstra- 
tions are  made  against  the  others  occupied  by  the 
assailed. 

If  the  attack  with  the  bayonet  succeeds,  the 
troops  must  secure  the  points  seized  before  pushing 
forward  in  pursuit ;  placing  some  cannon  and 
iroops  at  the  most  suitable  points,  to  cover  the  re- 
treat, should  the  assailed  make  a  strong  olTensive 
movement. 

207.  The  pursuit  should  he  made  firmly  but  cau- 
tiously ;  the  skirmishers  leading  and  rooting  out  the 


77 

assailed  from  everj*  strong  cover ;  some  field-piecea, 
and  a  column  of  infantry,  each  secured  by  skir* 
mishers  on  their  flanks,  following  upon  the  main 
road,  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry  well  to  the  rear 
but  within  supporting  distance,  to  act  according  to 
the  emergency. 

208.  If  the  assailed  makes  a  firm  stand  at  his 
central  position,  an  attack  upon  his  front  will  not 
only  be  bloody  but  of  doubtful  success ;  an  attempt 
should  therefore  be  made  to  turn  his  flanks,  whilst 
he  is  occupied  in  front  by  demonstrations  and  false 
attacks. 

If  the  assailed  retires,  the  pursuit  will  be  made 
by  some  light  pieces  followed  by  the  infaniry  and 
cavalry  ;  the  ditferent  arir.s  being  employed  accord- 
ing to  the  varying  circumstances  of  the  ground. 

209.  Positions  in  Mountains.  The  best  and 
only  safe  system  of  defence  in  mountainous  po- 
sitions is  to  occupy,  with  the  main-body,  a  central 
point,  at  which  the  principal  passes  meet ;  and  be 
always  in  a  state  of  readiness  to  act  offensively 
against  the  enemy,  on  whatever  point  he  may  ad- 
vance; throwing  forward  strong  detachments  in 
the  principal  passes  to  observe  the  enemy,  and  offer 
a  vigorous  resistance,  in  order  to  force  him  to  de- 
velop his  plan  of  attack.  So  soon  as  it  is  ascer- 
tained on  what  point  the  principal  force  of  the 
enemy  is  concentrated,  the  main-body  will  advance, 
from  the  central  position,  to  a  point  where  it  will 
be  secure  from  a  flank  attack,  to  act  offensively. 
The  detachments  on  the  other  passes  will  act  on 
the  flanks  of  the  enemy,  by  cross-roads,  if  they  can 
do  so,  or  will  try  to  fall  on  his  rear. 

210.  When  circumstances  constrain  to  a  passive 
defence,  a  position  must  be  taken  up  either  acro3% 

7* 


78 

or  along  the  valley,  which  will  best  secure  tha 
flanks,  and  cover  the  line  of  communication. 

211.  The  attack  in  mountainous  positions  ia 
conducted  on  the  same  principles  as  the  defence. 
The  assailed  must  be  threatened  on  eveiy  point ; 
by  throwing  columns  into  the  several  passes,  whilst 
tlie  main-body  advances  along  one  of  the  principal 
lines.  If  the  assailed  maintains  a  strict  defensive, 
the  several  columns  luiite  and  make  the  attack ;  if 
he  assumes  the  offensive,  the  principal  columns 
must  be  reinforced,  and  an  attempt  be  made  to 
throw  detachments  on  his  flanks  and  rear,  to  force 
him  to  fall  back.  The  flanks  of  the  troops  in 
column,  advancing  in  the  valleys,  must  be  covered 
by  detachments  of  skirmishers  on  the  heights. 

212.  The  attack  will  be  made  mainly  by  the  in- 
fantr}"-,  as  skirmishers.  A  strong  line  of  fire  must 
be  maintained  with  great  pertinacity  ;  the  supports 
must  be  kept  well  to  the  rear ;  the  reserve  and 
main-body  holding  the  points  of  junction  of  the  roads 
leading  to  the  front,  and  not  advancing  until  the 
engagement  is  well  under  way. 

Great  prudence  must  be  shown  in  advancing ;  as 
the  troops  engaged  are  liable  at  any  moment  to  an 
attack  on  their  flank.  If  the  assailed  attempts  this 
manoeu^Te,  the  line  of  skirmishers  must  hold  on 
pertinaciously  to  the  ground  gained,  whilst  the 
supports  display  and  keep  the  enem)'^  in  clieck,  un- 
til the  reserves  can  be  brought  up  to  repel  the  attack 
with  the  bayonet.  As  the  line  of  skirmishers  force 
back  the  assailed,  the  main-body  follows  in  column 
along  the  valley  ;  its  flanks  being  secured  by  skir- 
mislicrs  on  the  heights.  If  opposed  by  the  assailed, 
£he  main-body  must  attack  with  vigor,  to  carrj-  ita 
point  promptly ;  as  those  engaged  in  front  have  no 
chance  of  being  relieved. 


79 

213.  There  is  here  seldom  any  field  of  action  fol 
cavalry  ;  the  main  portion  of  this  force  will  there- 
fore be  kept  to  the  rear ;  occupying  the  points  of 
junction  of  the  passes.  Small  detachments  of  dra- 
goons may  occasionally  do  good  service  in  front ; 
making  charges,  or  tighting  on  foot,  as  the  oppor- 
tunity offers. 

214.  The  artillery  can  seldom  find  positions  off 
the  roads.  A  few^  light  pieces,  which  can  be 
placed  in  position  on  tlie  heights  and  be  well  served, 
may  frequently  produce  very  decisive  results. 
When  it  is  necessary  to  open  a  way,  for  the  main- 
body  to  advance,  at  points  of  peculiar  strength,  it 
should  be  done  by  the  heaviest  pieces.  The  horse- 
artillery  will  usually  be  attached  to  the  troops 
charged  with  making  a  demonstration  on  the  flanks 
of  the  enemy's  position,  through  the  secondary 
passes. 

215.  As  the  assailed  will  probably  obstruct  the 
passes  by  abatis,  or  other  obstacles,  a  detachment 
of  engineer  troops  should  accompany  each  column, 
being  kept  always  at  hand  to  clear  away  the  ob- 
structions. 

216.  Positions  near  Rivers.  Positions  may  be 
selected  near  rivers  either  for  the  defensive,  to  pre- 
vent an  enemy  from  passing ;  or  for  the  offensive, 
to  force  a  passage. 

217.  A  position  for  guarding  a  river  should  be 
selected  at  some  central  point,  from  which  the 
troops  can  be  rapidly  marched  to  oppose  the  enemy 
wherever  he  may  attempt  to  cross.  Small  posts 
are  established  along  the  course  of  the  river,  at  the 
most  suitable  points  for  observing  the  enemy  ;  and 
communicating  to  the  rear  intelligence  of  his  move- 
ments. 

So  soon  as  it  is  known  that  a  decided  attempt  is 


80 

to  be  made  at  any  ])oint,  tlic  cavalrj',  with  somft 
batteries  of  horse-artillery,  will  move  to  oppose  it. 
If,  on  reaching  the  point,  it  is  found  that  the  enemy 
has  succeeded  in  throwing  over  a  portion  of  his 
forces,  they  must  be  vigorously  attacked,  by  suc- 
cessive charges  of  cavalry,  and  by  a  persevering 
fire  of  the  artillery.  If  the  ground  is  obstructed,  so 
that  the  cavalry  cannot  charge,  the  dragoons  should 
dismount  and  act  as  skirmishers.  Positions  should 
be  selected  by  the  artillery,  where  it  can  take  that 
of  the  enemy,  on  the  opposite  bank,  in  flank  ;  the 
object  being  to  silence  it,  or  to  draw  off  its  fire,  to 
enable  the  cavalry  to  act.  Everything  liere  de- 
pends on  lengthening  the  aiFair ;  and  preventing  tlie 
enemy  from  reinforcing  the  troops  that  have  passed, 
until  the  main-body  can  arrive  from  the  central  po- 
sition, to  support  the  cavalry  and  artillery  engaged. 

218.  The  passage  of  a  river  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy  is  an  operation  of  extreme  difficulty ;  and 
every  means  should  therefore  be  employed  to  de- 
ceive the  enemy,  and  draw  off  his  attention  from 
the  point  selected  for  the  passage.  The  bridge- 
train  and  other  requisites  being  in  a  state  of  readi- 
ness, the  night-time  is  selected  as  most  favorable 
to  a  successful  issue. 

The  point,  selected  to  pass  a  river  in  the  face  of 
an  eneni}^,  should  combine  several  properties,  as  a 
position ;  to  give  the  assailant  a  decided  advantage 
over  the  assailed.  Tiie  river  at  tliis  point  should 
be  narrow,  so  that  the  bridge  may  be  rapidly  con- 
structed ;  the  banks  should  form  a  bend  towards 
the  assailant,  to  enable  him  to  plant  his  batteries 
in  a  position  to  concentrate  their  fire  on  tliat  part 
of  the  ground,  on  the  opposite  bank,  where  the 
troops  must  form ;  care  being  taken  that  these  bat- 
teries are  not  exjiosed  to  an  cntilading  fire  from 


81 

those  of  the  assailed,  within  the  proper  range  for 
this  fire ;  the  ground  near  the  landing  place,  on 
the  opposite  sliore,  should  present  covers,  in  order 
that  the  troops,  passed  over  in  boats,  before  the 
bridge  is  ready,  may  not  be  exposed  to  the  artillery 
and  cavalry  of  the  assailed,  and  may  be  enabled  to 
maintain  their  position  until  reinforced  by  the  main- 
body.  If  there  are  islands,  near  the  point  of  land- 
ing, from  which  a  fire  of  artillery  and  infantry  can 
be  brought  to  bear  on  the  assailed,  they  should  be 
occupied  by  infantry,  and  some  field-pieces ;  par- 
ticularly if  they  are  wooded,  or  offer  other  covers. 

219.  In  moving  upon  the  point,  silence  and  per- 
fect order  should  be  preserved  throughout.  Batte- 
ries of  the  heaviest  guns  are  placed  at  the  most 
suitable  points,  to  bring  a  converging  fire  to  bear 
upon  the  approaches  to  tlie  landing  on  the  opposite 
shore.  Light  troops  are  thrown  over  in  boats,  to 
occupy  the  ground  in  advance  of  the  landing ; 
which  troops,  if  discovered  by  the  advanced  posts 
of  the  enemy,  should  be  rapidly  reinforced.  So 
soon  as  the  bridge  is  ready,  an  advanced-guard, 
composed  of  troops  of  all  arms,  will  pass  and  take 
position,  to  cover  the  formation  of  the  main-body. 
The  advanced-guard  will  mainly  keep  on  the  de- 
fensive, acting  with  great  prudence,  not  to  ofler 
any  advantage  to  the  enemy  ;  its  task  being  to  gain 
time  for  the  rest  of  the  forces  to  pass. 

220.  The  order  in  which  the  main-body  should 
pass  must  be  regulated  by  the  character  of  the 
ground,  and  the  resistance  offered  by  the  enemy. 
Usually  a  portion  of  the  heavy  guns  follow  the  ad- 
vanced-guard, and  take  position  to  check  the  en- 
emy ;  and  these  are  followed  by  the  main-body  of 
the  infantry;  the  main-body  of  the  cavalrv  with  its 
batteries  of  horse-artillery  passing  last.     In  other 


82 

cases,  it  may  bo  best  to  throw  over  the  cavalry  an(f 
horse-artillery  before  the  other  troops. 

221.  The  task,  imposed  upon  the  batteries,  of 
covering  the  passage,  is  of  the  greatest  moment. 
Careful  attention  should  be  given  to  the  manage- 
ment of  their  fire  ;  directing  it,  in  all  cases,  upon 
that  portion  of  the  enemy's  force  whose  presence 
is  most  threatening. 

222.  A  retreat  across  a  river,  when  pressed  by 
the  enemy,  is  of  all  operations  the  most  difficult; 
and  requires  every  auxiliary  means  to  save  the  re- 
treating force  from  destruction.  The  point  selected 
for  the  passage  should  have  the  same  requisites  as 
one  for  the  offensive ;  and  its  natural  strength 
should  be  increased  by  field  works ;  in  order  that 
the  enemy  may  be  kept  from  pressing  too  hotly 
upon  the  rear  of  the  troops  that  pass  the  last. 

In  a  retreat  of  this  character,  all  the  usual  strat- 
agems for  deceiving  an  enemy  must  be  resorted  to 
before  commencing  the  movement ;  so  that  time 
sufficient  may  be  gained  for  making  the  necessary 
dispositions  to  secure  the  point  of  passage,  as  well 
as  to  gain  a  march,  or  two,  in  advance.  The 
heavy  artillery  should  be  dispatched  at  an  early 
moment  to  the  rear,  to  take  a  position  on  the  oppo- 
site shore,  for  covering  the  passage.  The  rest  of 
the  force,  covered  by  a  strong  rear-guard,  formed 
of  the  best  troops,  will  etfect  their  passage  gene- 
rally in  an  inverse  order  to  that  followed  in  one  for 
the  offensive. 

One  of  the  worst  dangers  to  be  guarded  against 
is  the  confusion  caused  by  hurry.  To  avoid  this, 
the  arrangements  for  the  march  of  the  different 
bodies  should  be  made  with  the  greatest  care ;  so 
that  each  may  reach,  at  the  proper  moment,  tha 
point  of  passage. 


CHAPTER  rV. 

ADVANCED-GUARDS    AND    ADVANCED-POSTS. 

223.  To  keep  an  enemy  in  ignorance  of  the  state 
of  our  forces  and  the  character  of  our  position  is 
one  of  the  most  indispensable  duties  in  war.  It  is 
in  this  way  that  we  obHge  him  to  take  every  pos- 
sible precaution  in  advancing ;  forcing  him  to  feel 
his  way,  step  by  step,  and  to  avoid  risking  his  own 
safety  in  hazarding  those  bold  and  rapid  move- 
ments which,  when  made  against  a  feeble,  or  an 
unprepared  enemy,  lead  to  the  most  brilliant  re- 
sults. 

224.  This  object  is  effected,  by  placing  between 
the  position  occupied  by  the  main  force,  and  the 
presumed  direction  of  the  enemy,  a  body  detached 
from  the  main  force,  but  acting  always  with  refer- 
ence to  it,  termed  an  Advanced-Guard. 

This  term  is  used  for  any  body  of  troops  so  sep- 
arated from  the  main-body ;  whatever  its  strength 
and  composition  ;  and  whether  the  troops  be  in 
position,  or  on  a  march. 

225.  For  a  large  force,  the  advanced-guard  is 
necessarily  composed  of  troops  of  all  arms ;  its 
strength  being  proportioned  to  that  of  the  ma'n 
force; — the  more  or  less  resistance  of  an  inde- 
pendent character  it  may  be  required  to  make  ; — 
and  the  greater  or  less  extent  it  may  be  found 
necessary  to  embrace,  by  its  advanced-posts,  on 
the  front  and  flanks,  to  watch  and  anticipate  every 
movement  of  the  enemy. 

The  proportion  of  the  advanced-guard  to  tjie 


84 

main-body  may  vary  from  a  third  to  a  fifth  of  the 
total  force.  In  armies  of  some  strength,  or  larpe 
corpf-cParrnep,  particularly  where  the  nature  of  the 
country  requires  a  wide  development  of  advanced- 
posts,  the  larger  proportion  is  demanded ;  as  at 
least  one-third,  or  even  one-half  of  its  strength 
will  be  required  for  the  advanced-post  service.  In 
a  small  force  of  two  or  three  thousand  n>en,  one- 
fifth  will  usually  be  all  that  can  be  well  spared  for 
the  same  purposes. 

226.  Our  purpose,  in  all  cases,  should  be  to 
keep  the  enemy  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  as  to  our 
actual  force,  and  movements ;  and  this  can  be  ef- 
fected only  by  keeping  constantly  between  him  and 
our  main-body  a  force  of  sufficient  strengih  to  ofter 
an  obstinate  resistance,  if  necessary,  to  ever}'  at- 
tempt he  may  openly  make  to  gain  information ; 
and  even  to  act  offensively  against  him,  when  oc- 
casion offers,  so  as  to  keep  him  in  doubt  as  to  the 
actual  character  and  number  of  the  troops  before 
him;  the  old  military  axiom,  being  always  kept  in 
mind,  that  "  a  sirord  opportunely  drawn  frequently 
heepn  another  back  in  its  scabbard." 

227.  In  all  defensive  positions,  the  advanced- 
guard  and  its  advanced-posts  should  retire  slowly 
but  circumspectly,  so  that  the  main-body  may  have 
rime  to  take  all  its  defensive  measures.  In  the  of- 
fensive, the  attack  of  the  advanced-guard  should  be 
decided  and  vigorous;  pressing  upon  the  enemy 
at  every  point ;  and  leaving  nothing  undone  to  de- 
moralize him,  by  the  confusion  which  so  often  fol- 
lows from  an  impetuous  onset. 

228.  Whilst  ill  position,  the  advanced-guard 
should  take  advantage  of  the  natural,  or  other  ob- 
stacles on  its  front  and  flanks  which  are  within 
eupporting  distance  ;  to  strengthen  itself,  and  gain 


85 

supports  for  its  advanced-poats.  In  this  way,  its 
means  of  resistance,  whether  acting  offensively,  or 
otherwise,  may  be  greatly  augmented.  Ground  of 
this  character,  taken  up  by  the  troops,  should  not 
be  abandoned  without  very  cogent  reasons  for  it ; 
since,  should  circumstances  bring  about  a  forward 
movement,  it  might  cost  more  to  regain  what  was 
given  up  than  to  have  maintained  it  obstinately  at 
tirst. 

229.  The  ground  to  be  taken  up  by  an  advanced- 
guard,  and  embraced  within  its  advanced-posts, 
should  be  carefully  chosen.  To  take  position  where 
the  movements  of  the  enemy  can  be  well  watched, 
whilst  our  own  troops  are  kept  concealed,  and  not 
liable  to  a  sudden  attack,  either  in  front  or  flank, 
are  the  desiderata  in  such  cases.  If,  in  following 
this  guide,  it  should  lead  to  a  development  of  ad- 
vanced-posts which  would  be  too  weak  at  any  point 
for  a  tolerable  resistance,  there  remains  but  the 
alternative  to  retire  slowly  before  the  enemy, — 
taking  care  that  he  do  not  slip  behind  the  out-posts 
and  their  supports, — upon  some  central  point  to  the 
rear,  where  the  advanced-posts,  united  to  tlie  troops 
in  reserve,  may  make  a  good  stand ;  and  from 
which,  if  the  chances  are  favorable,  they  may  ad- 
vance upon  the  enemy,  and  make  him  pay  dearly 
for  his  temerity. 

230.  In  all  affairs  of  advanced-guards  great  cir- 
cumspection is  to  be  shown,  both  by  the  otScer  in 
command  of  the  advanced^guard,  in  throwing  for- 
ward fresh  troops  to  strengthen  a  point  assailed,  as 
well  as  on  the  part  of  the  general-in-chief,  in  sus- 
taining the  advanced-guard  by  weakening  hia 
main-body.  These  are  points  that  can  only  be  de- 
cided on  the  spot.  The  safer  rule,  in  all  cases, 
is  not  to  weaken  the  main-defence,  or  main  attack, 
8 


86 

by  detaching  from  it,  to  support  a  feeble  point 
If  the  force  engaged,  under  such  circumstances, 
does  not  suflice  for  its  own  defence,  it  is  best  for  it 
to  fall  back  in  time ;  and,  taking  position  with  the 
main-body,  endeavor,  by  their  combined  efforts,  to 
turn  the  scales  of  victory  in  their  favor. 

231.  The  duties  of  advanced-guards  being  so 
much  more  frequently  to  feel  and  occupy  an  enemy, 
preparatory  to  some  decisive  blow  by  the  main-body, 
tlian  to  engage  him  with  a  view  to  follow  up  any 
advantage  gained,  it  follows,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
that  they  should  be  composed  of  the  most  efficient 
and  active  liglit  troops  at  the  general's  disposal. 
Such  troops,  in  the  hands  of  a  bold,  energetic,  but 
prudent  leader,  will  be  the  right  arm  of  an  army. 
Prompt  on  all  occasions  ;  never  taken  at  fault,  they 
keep  the  enemy  constantly  occupied ;  harass  him 
with  fatiguing  precautions,  to  secure  his  flanks  and 
rear  ;  whilst  their  own  force  is  kept  relieved  from 
these  annoyances,  and  always  fresh  for  any  great 
emergency. 

232.  Advanced-Posts.  The  duties  of  the  ad- 
vanced-posts are  the  same  whether  the  troops  are 
stationary,  or  in  movement ;  they  are,  1.  To  keep  a 
good  look-out  for  the  enemy,  and  when  in  his  imme- 

'  diate  presence,  to  take  all  means  to  be  accurately 
informed  of  his  strength,  position,  and  movements  ; 
2.  Should  the  enemy  advance,  to  hold  him  in  check 
long  enough  to  give  the  main-body  ample  time  to 
be  prepared  for  his  attack. 

233.  By  a  faithful  discharge  of  these  duties,  the 
whole  army  can,  at  all  tiuies,  and  under  all  circum- 
stances, be  kept  in  a  state  of  readiness  for  action 
without  subjecting  the  soldier  to  any  fatigue  beyond 
the  ordinary  physical  endurance  of  a  well-developed 
manhood  ;  as  but  a  small  portion,  comparatively,  of 


87 

the  force  present  Is  required  to  watch  over  the  safety 
of  the  rest,  and  can  t!  .>refore  be  frequently  relieved, 
so  that  every  one  may  have  time  sufficient  for  the 
repose  demanded  after  extraordinary  exertions. 

234.  The  object  being  to  secure  the  front  and 
flanks  of  the  position,  occupied  by  the  main-body, 
from  any  attempt  either  to  reconnoitre,  or  attack  it, 
the  detachments  which  form  the  advance-posts  must 
be  so  distributed  as  to  embrace  all  the  avenues  by 
which  the  enemy  can  approach  the  position.  The 
system  adopted,  in  most  services,  to  effect  this  object, 
consists  of  two,  or  three  concentric  lines  of  posts, 
disposed  in  ix,  fan-shaped  order.  The  exterior  line, 
which  forms  the  Out-Posts,  embraces  a  wide  cir- 
cumference ;  and  by  means  of  a  chain  of  Sentinels, 
posted  in  advance,  prevents  any  one  from  penetra- 
ting to  the  rear  between  die  posts,  without  being 
seen. 

235.  The  second  line,  which  is  one  of  Grand- 
Guards,  embraces  a  narrower  circumference  than 
the  line  of  out-posts  ;  occupying  the  more  important 
avenues  from  the  out-posts  to  the  interior ;  so  as  to 
be  in  a  position  to  support  the  out-posts  in  case  of 
necessity  ;  and  to  receive  them  if  driven  in. 

236.  The  interior  line  consists  of  several  strong 
detachments,  termed  Pickets,  posted  upon  the  main- 
avenues  to  the  position.  They  serve  as  supports  to 
the  two  exterior  lines,  upon  which  they  rally  if 
forced  to  retire  before  the  enemy. 

237.  Besides  these  dispositions  for  security,  Pa- 
troles  are  kept  up  between  the  line  of  posts,  to  keep 
the  one  informed  of  the  state  of  the  other ;  and  also 
between  the  out-posts  and  chain  of  sentinels,  to  see 
that  tlie  duties  of  the  latter  are  well  performed  ;  and 
to  search  any  ground  not  brought  well  under  the 
eyes  of  the  sentinels.     The  whole,  in  tliis  way 

8eo  Plate  1.  for  Articles  234,  31T. 


88 

inns  a  connected  system,  for  obsennnj^,-  Lhc  enemy 
and  for  mutual  support  in  case  of  attack. 

238.  The  duties  of  the  out-posts,  and  of  the 
grand-guards  which  form  their  supports,  are  strictly 
those  of  observation.  If  attacked,  they  offor  no  re- 
sistance farther  than  to  enable  them  to  feel  the 
enemy  perfectly,  and  never  lose  sight  of  him.  The 
task  of  holding  the  enemy  in  check  by  a  vigorou? 
resistance,  so  as  to  procure  sufficient  time  for  the 
hain-body  to  make  its  dispositions  for  battle,  is  con- 
iigncd  to  the  pickets. 

239.  The  ground  taken  up  by  the  advanced- 
posts  will  depend  on  the  capabilities  which  its 
natural  features  offer  for  defence ;  on  the  number 
and  character  of  the  approaches  it  presents  to  an 
enemy  for  attacking  the  front,  or  flanks  of  the  po- 
sition occupied  by  the  main-body;  and  upon  the 
facilities  it  may  afford  for  communication  between 
.the  posts. 

240.  Out-Posts.  The  position  of  the  out-posts, 
with  respect  to  the  rnain-body,  will  be  regulated  by 
the  more  or  less  broken  character  of  the  country. 
As  a  general  rule,  the  mean  distance  may  be  taken 
at  about  two  miles.  The  line  occupied  by  these 
posts  should  take  in  all  the  approaches  to  the  front 
and  flunks  of  the  main  position.  When  a  position 
is  to  be  held  for  some  time,  or  is  taken  up  after  a 
battle,  the  out-posts  may  be  thrown  farther  in  ad- 
vance ;  to  procure  greater  repose  and  security  for 
the  main-body. 

241.  The  ground  on  which  the  line  of  out-posts 
is  established  should  be  carefully  examined  ;  witli  a 
view  both  to  observation  and  defence.  As  far  as 
practicable,  those  points  should  be  selected  for  posts 
which  present  some  natural  advantages  for  the  de- 
fence ;   will  screen  the  tr  ops  from  the  cnoniy'a 


89 

view;  and  enable  them  to  watch  all  his  movements. 
Whenever  the  features  of  the  ground  do  not  ofFef 
natural  obstacles  to  cover  the  posts,  artificial  means 
of  a  slitrht  character  should  be  resorted  to.  The 
flanks  of  the  line  should  rest  upon  strong  natural 
obstacles ;  when  such  cannot  be  found,  without 
giving  the  line  too  great  an  extent,  these  points 
must  be  secured  by  strong  pickets  of  cavalry  or  in- 
fantry, thrown  back  to  form  crotchets ;  from  which 
patroles  must  be  constantly  kept  up  on  the  flanks, 
in  the  presumed  direction  of  the  enemy. 

242.  The  strength  of  each  out-post,  and  the  dis- 
tance from  one  to  the  other,  will  be  regulated  by 
the  features  of  the  ground,  and  the  number  of  sen- 
tinels, or  vedettes  that  each  post  must  throw  out. 
The  posts  should,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  within 
sight  of  the  grand-guards  to  which  they  belong ; 
and  the  sentinels  of  their  respective  posts.  When 
the  ground  does  not  permit  this  arrangement,  sen- 
tinels should  be  placed  at  intermediate  points,  to 
communicate  promptly  whatever  may  happen  at  the 
line  of  posts,  or  of  sentinels,  to  the  rear.  Posts  of 
infantry  should  not,  as  a  general  rule,  be  placed 
farther  apart  than  600  paces ;  nor  their  sentinels 
more  than  300  paces  in  advance  of  the  posts. 
Those  of  cavalry  may  be  some  1500  paces  apart; 
and  their  vedettes  from  600  to  800  paces  in  ad- 
vance. The  strength  of  each  post  should  be  cal- 
culated at  the  rate  of  four  men  for  each  sentinel, 
or  vedette. 

243.  Sentinels.  The  sentinels  and  vedettes  form 
a  chain  in  advance,  and  are  posted  on  points  from 
which  they  can  best  watch  the  enemy,  without  being 
Been  by,  or  exposed  to  him,  in  any  way.  As  one  of 
their  main  duties  is  to  prevent  any  one  from  passing 
their  chain,  they  should  be  so  placed,  with  respect 

8* 


90 

to  eacli  otlier,  tli;it  they  can  see  all  tnc  ground  be- 
tween their  respective  posts,  and  be  able  to  stop  any 
one  who  may  attempt  to  pass  between  them.  At 
night  and  in  misty  weather,  the  sentinels  should  be 
doubled  and  be  drawn  in  nearer  to  the  out-posts. 

Whenever  it  may  be  deemed  necessary  to  post 
sentinels  on  points?  beyond  the  line  of  out-posts,  they 
should  be  furnished  by  posts  detached  in  advance  of 
the  line. 

244.  Grand-Crvards.  As  the  grand-guards  fur- 
nish the  out-posts,  and  serve  as  their  supports,  not 
more  than  one-third  of  their  force  should  be  taken  for 
the  out-posts.  The  grand-guards  are  posted  on  the 
principal  avenues  leading  to  the  detachments  on 
which  they  are  to  fall  back,  if  driven  in  ;  and,  when 
of  infantry,  about  200  paces,  and  of  cavalry,  600  to 
800  paces,  in  the  rear  of  the  out-posts.  The  points 
which  they  occupy  should  be  selected,  both  to  secure 
them  from  the  enemy's  view,  and  to  give  a  ready 
communication  between  them  and  their  respective 
out-posts.  No  difficult,  or  broken  ground,  should  lie 
between  the  grand-guards  and  their  out-posts ;  if  any 
such  occur,  particularly  if  it  be  of  a  nature  to  offer 
facilities  to  an  enemy  to  penetrate  to  the  rear,  the 
whole  should  be  posted  on  the  farther,  or  hither  side 
of  it ;  and  in  preference  in  the  latter  position,  if  by 
it  the  chain  of  posts  can  be  preserved  unbroken. 

245.  Pickets.  The  main-detachments  or  pickets, 
which  form  the  supports  to  the  grand-guards  and 
out-posts,  occu])y  the  principal  avenues  to  the  po- 
sition of  tiie  main-body.  As  their  duty  is  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  check ;  the  points  which  they  take  up 
should  be  susceptible  of  a  good  defence;  such,  for 
example,  as  villages,  detilos,  &c. ;  whenever  these 
advantages  are  not  found  at  hand,  resort  should  be 
had  to  any  temporary  obstacles,  as  abatis,  &-Ch 


91 

which  can  be  readily  procured,  to  place,  the  troops 
under  shelter.  The  points  thus  occupied  should, 
as  a  general  rule,  be  about  midway  between  the 
line  of  out-posts  and  the  position  of  the  main-body. 

246.  Small  posts  should  be  thrown  forward  by 
the  pickets,  between  their  position  and  the  line  of 
grand-guards  ;  both  for  the  greater  security  of  the 
detachments,  and  as  supports  to  the  grand-guards 
In  like  manner,  when  the  line  of  pickets  is  of  con- 
siderable extent,  intermediate  posts  must  be  estab- 
lished, to  keep  open  a  communication  between  them. 

247.  No  pains  should  be  spared  to  obstruct  the 
approaches  of  the  enemy  to  the  points  occupied  by 
the  pickets ;  particularly  those  which  lead  to  the 
flanks;  leaving  open  such  only  as  will  oblige  the 
enemy  to  attack  under  the  most  unfavorable  cir- 
cumstances ;  and  if,  between  the  advanced-posts 
and  the  main-body,  a  defile,  or  other  unfavorable 
pass  should  occur,  which  the  enemy,  by  turning  the 
line  of  the  advanced-posts,  might  seize  upon,  and 
thus  cut  off  their  retreat,  it  should  be  occupied  by  a 
strong  detachment;  both  to  prevent  such  a  ma- 
ncBuvre,  and  to  favor  the  retreat  on  the  main-body. 

248.  Strength  of  Advanced- Posts.  The  entire 
strength  of  the  advanced-posts,  as  \f  ell  as  the  relative 
strength  of  tiie  pickets,  grand-guards,  and  out-posts, 
will  depend  upon  the  character  of  the  ground  cov- 
ered by  them;  as  being  more  or  less  open;  and 
presenting  more  or  less  facilities  for  circumscribing 
the  approaches  of  the  enemy  to  the  main-position. 
It  rarely  occurs  that  sufficient  troops  can  be  de- 
tached to  cover  all  the  accessible  ground,  and  per- 
form the  duties  in  a  thorough  manner. 

249.  The  strength  of  each  picket,  and  the  kind 
of  troops  of  which  it  is  composed,  will  depend  on  the 
degree  of  resistance  to  be  otfered  to  the  enemy'a 

See  Plate  II.  for  Article  24T. 


92 

attack;  and  the  character  of  the  position  occupied. 
In  most  cases,  where  a  vigorous  defence  is  called 
for,  they  will  consist  of  troops  of  all  arms  ;  and  an 
aggregate  of  several  hundred  men.  Tlie  grand- 
guards,  OTit-posts,  and  patroles,  should  not  exceed 
one-tliird  the  strength  of  the  pickets  to  which  they 
belong.  They  will  be  composed  of  cavalry,  or  infan- 
tiy,  according  to  the  more  or  less  broken  features 
of  the  ground. 

250.  It  rarely  occurs  that  artillery  is  placed  at 
the  out-posts.  Whenever  it  happens  that  a  piece, 
or  two,  may  be  deemed  necessary,  to  sweep  some 
passage,  or  defile,  in  advance  of  the  line  of  out- 
posts, the  guns  must  be  protected  by  a  strong  post, 
to  insure  their  safety  in  a  retreat. 

251.  If,  from  the  character  of  the  ground,  the 
out-posts  are  mainly  of  infantry,  some  cavalry 
should  always  be  attached  to  them,  to  patrol  in  ad- 
vance of  tlie  position,  and  to  convey  intelligence  to 
the  rear  of  what  may  be  passing  in  tlie  neighborhood 
of  the  out-posts. 

252.  When  the  advanced-posts  cover  an  advan- 
ced-guard, tiie  commanding  officer  of  the  whole 
should  take  a  pesition,  with  his  artillery  and  the 
main-body  of  his  command,  at  some  central  point,  in 
the  rear  of  the  pickets  ;  in  order  to  be  ready  to  sup- 
port them  if  hard  pressed  by  the  enemy.  The  cho'ce 
of  this  position  is  an  object  of  the  greatest  imp\  .r- 
tance  ;  as  the  safety  of  the  advanced-posts  as  well 
as  that  of  the  main-body  may  depend  upon  the  de- 
gree of  judgment  shown  in  this  selection. 

253.  So  soon  as  the  advanced-posts  have  taken 
up  tlicir  stations,  instructions  should  be  given  to  the 
officers  of  the  dilFcrent  posts,  with  respect  to  the 
pomts  upon  which  they  are  to  fall  back,  in  case  of 
being  forced  in;  the  lines  of  communication  they 


93 

must  retire  by ;  and  the  positron  tbcy  must  take  up, 
in  joining  the  supports  to  which  they  respectively 
belong. 

254.  Duties  of  OJjlcer  commanding  an  Out-Post. 
An  officer  in  command  of  any  of  the  out-posts  must 
be  capable  of  untiring  vigilance  and  activity ;  to 
perform  the  various  duties  which  devolve  upon  him. 

He  should  be  provided  with  a  good  map  of  tho 
country,  a  telescope,  and  writing  materials. 

255.  He  will  thoroughly  reconnoitre  the  ground 
upon  which  he  is  to  dispose  his  command ;  and  also 
as  far  in  advance  as  circumstances  will  admit ; 
questioning  closely  any  inhabitant  he  may  find. 
After  taking  up  hijs  position,  he  should  go  forward, 
with  the  half  of  his  command,  and  post  each  sentinel 
himself.  If,  however,  he  relieves  another  in  the 
command,  and  deems  it  advisable  to  make  any 
changes  in  the  dispositions  of  his  predecessors,  he 
should  promptly  report  the  facts  to  the  commanding- 
officer  in  his  rear. 

266.  When  the  officer  finds  that  the  enemy  is  not 
in  his  immediate  neighborhood,  he  should  endeavor 
to  feel  his  way  cautiously  towards  him  by  patrols ; 
and  when  in  immediate  presence,  he  should  omit  no 
means  to  watch  tlie  enemy's  movements  ;  and  from 
the  occurrences  of  the  moment,  such  as  noises,  the 
motion  of  clouds  of  dust,  camp  fires,  conflagrations, 
&c.,  endeavor  to  divine  what  is  passing  in  his 
camp,  and  his  probable  intentions. 

257.  Accurate  written  reports  should  be  promptly 
sent  to  the  officer  in  command,  in  the  rear,  on  all 
these  points.  The  reports  should  be  legibly  written, 
and  should  clearly,  but  concisely,  state  what  has 
fallen  under  the  officer's  eye ;  what  he  has  learned 
from  others  ;  and  the  character  of  the  sources  from 
which  liis  information  is  drawn. 


94 

258.  He  will  particularly  sec  that  no  communi- 
cation with  the  enemy  be  allowed  ;  and  that  no  flag 
bo  permitted  to  pass  the  line  of  posts,  without  orders 
from  the  rear. 

259.  The  post  under  the  officer's  command, 
whether  horse  or  foot,  should  not  all  be  allowed  to 
sleep,  or  eat  at  once.  The  horses,  when  watered, 
should  be  taken  singly,  or  by  pairs,  and  always 
mounted.  At  night,  one-half  of  the  command 
should  be  under  arms,  prepared  for  an  attack ;  the 
other  seated,  their  arms  and  the  bridles  of  their 
horses  in  hand.  The  men  should  never  be  permit- 
ted to  occupy  a  house  ;  and  if  the  weather  is  such 
that  a  fire  out  of  doors  is  indispensable,  it  should  be 
as  much  concealed  as  practicable ;  one-half  only 
being  allowed  to  sit  near  it ;  the  other  posted,  at  a 
convenient  spot  at  hand,  to  fall  on  the  enemy  should 
he  attempt  a  stroke. 

260.  When  the  position  taken  up  is  to  be  held  for 
some  time,  it  will  be  well  to  change  the  locality  ot 
the  posts  occasionally ;  this  should  be  don?,  par- 
ticularly at  night,  in  a  hilly  district ;  changing  the 
post  from  the  brow  of  the  hill,  where  the  m?n  can 
best  keep  a  look-out  by  day,  to  the  low  ground  at 
night,  as  more  favorable  to  detect  any  movement 
above. 

261.  The  out-posts  are  usually  relieved  at  day- 
break, as,  being  the  most  favorable  moment  for  the 
enemy  to  attempt  a  surprise  ;  the  new-guard  will 
serve  to  reinforce  the  old.  For  the  same  reason, 
the  old  guard  should  not  be  suffered  to  retire  before 
the  patrols  come  in,  and  report  all  safe. 

262.  As  a  general  rule,  no  post  should  ever  retire 
before  an  inferior  force  ;  and,  if  attacked  by  one  su- 
perior to  it,  resistance  should  be  ca\itiously  made 
with  a  view  solely  to  give  time  to  the  grand-guard 


95 

to  be  In  readiness  to  receive  the  enemy.  When  it 
is  seen  that  the  movement  of  the  enemy  is  serious, 
the  officer  should  draw  in  his  sentinels  as  skirmish- 
ers, and  retire  upon  the  grand-guard  ;  the  latter  will 
usually  be  divided  into  two  divisions,  one  of  which 
will  be  sent  to  take  up  a  position  to  the  rear,  to  cover 
the  retreat ;  the  other  will  act  as  as  upport  to  the  line 
of  skirmishers,  so  as  to  feel  the  enemy.  In  all  casea 
of  retiring,  whether  of  sentinels  upon  their  posts,  or 
of  posts  upon  their  supports,  care  should  be  taken  to 
assume  a  direction  towards  the  flank  of  the  force  in 
rear;  so  as  to  unmask  its  front  and  not  impede  any 
forward  movement  it  may  make,  if  necessary. 

263.  The  degree  of  resistance  to  be  offered  by  the 
pickets  will  depend  on  the  object  to  be  obtained,  and 
the  importance  of  the  point  occupied.  They  should 
not  retire  until  they  have  received  the  whole  of 
their  grand-guards,  out-posts  and  patrols. 

264.  At  night  the  precautions  should  be  neces- 
sarily redoubled  ;  and  every  movement  be  made 
with  extreme  caution.  Whenever  any  noise  ia 
heard  in  the  direction  of  a  sentinel's  post,  the  officer 
should  proceed,  with  a  part  of  his  command,  in  its 
direction  ;  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  it.  If  he  finds 
that  it  arises  from  an  onward  movement  of  the 
enemy,  he  should  only  fall  back  upon  his  grand- 
guard  when  he  sees  that  resistance  would  be  un- 
avaihng;  retiring  slowly  and  cautiously,  and  taking 
every  advantage,  wliich  the  ground  offers,  to  check 
the  enemy's  advance.  Should  the  enemy  fliU  sud- 
denly upon  his  command,  he  must  endeavor  to  cut 
his  way  through,  and  reach  his  position  in  tlie  rear 
by  the  best  circuit  he  can  find. 

265.  Advnnced-Gunrds.  Measures  of  precau- 
tion, for  a  force  in  position,  are  far  more  easily  ar- 
ranged than  for  one  in  motion.     At  a  halt  of  some 


96 

days,  but  slight  changes  in  the  first  dispositione, 
arising  from  a  more  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
ground  taken  up,  will  be  requisite ;  on  a  march, 
the  scene  is  continually  shifting;  and  the  enemy 
may  fall  on  just  at  that  point,  or  under  those  circum- 
stances in  which  we  are  least  prepared  to  meet  liim. 
Hence  a  necessity  for  doubling  the  ordinary  pre- 
cautions on  a  march,  and  keeping  the  troops  more 
in  hand,  so  as  to  be,  at  all  moments,  prepared  for 
any  emergency. 

266.  The  spirit  of  the  dispositions  is  the  same  in 
both  cases;  changes  in  the  details,  so  as  to  adapt 
our  force  to  the  changing  features  of  the  ground 
passed  over,  present  the  real  difficulty.  On  a 
march,  we  may  have  to  guard  against  an  attack  on 
tlie  head  of  the  column ;  on  either  flank,  or  both ; 
and  in  the  rear.  Hence  a  necessary  disposition  of 
movable  advanced-posts,  in  each  of  these  directions, 
keeping  pace  with  the  progress  of  the  main-body, 
and  far  enough  from  it  to  give  it  timely  warning  of 
a  threatened  attack. 

267.  Tlie  dispositions  in  front  is  termed  the  Ad- 
xanced-Guard;  those  on  the  flanks,  the  Flankers; 
and  those  in  rear,  the  Rear-Guard. 

268.  As  the  head  of  a  column  in  march  towards 
the  enemy  is  the  weak  point,  it  is  here  that  the 
principal  strengtli  must  be  accumulated,  so  that,  if 
threatened  with  an  attack,  sufficient  resistance  can 
be  offered,  to  enable  the  rear  divisions  to  come  up 
and  take  timely  position  for  battle.  The  advanced- 
guard  should  therefore  be  composed  of  troops  of  all 
arms,  and  be  always  in  a  suitable  state  of  readiness 
to  receive  the  enemy,  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  ground  upon  which  it  may  be  formc^d.  To 
watch  the  enemy;  resist  him  with  obstinacy,  should 
he  suddenly  attack,  until  time  h.\  gained  for  the 


97 

main-body  to  receive  him;  drive  in  his  advanced* 
posts  with  impetuosity  :  such  are  the  duties  wliich 
this  body  may  in  turn  be  called  on  to  perform. 

269.  The  first  of  the&e  duties,  that  of  le-arning 
the  whereabouts  of  an  enemy,  is  intrusted  to  in- 
dividuals, or  to  parties  of  more  or  less  strength, 
as  the  occasion  may  require ;  light  cavalry  being 
usuaHy  selected,  in  preference  to  any  other  arm,  fur 
this  service. 

270.  Head  of  Advanced-Ouard.  A  head  or  lead- 
ing detachment  of  some  force,  composed  usually  of 
both  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  if  requisite  some 
pioneers,  forms  the  advance  of  the  main-body  of 
the  advanced-guard ;  for  the  purpose  of  searching 
all  the  ground  within  a  dangerous  proximity ;  and 
of  clearing  the  way  for  the  advancing  columns. 
Through  tliis  detachment  a  communication  is  kept 
up  with  the  flankers;  and  all  the  gi-ound  is  thus 
hemmed  in  around  the  advancing  column,  by  which 
an  enemy  might  approach  it. 

27 1 .  The  strength  of  the  leading  detachment  will 
depend  greatly  upon  the  character  of  the  country ; 
and  upon  tlie  state  of  the  weather  and  season  being 
more  or  less  favorable  to  the  unobserved  approach 
of  an  enemy.  A  teading  detachment  of  one-fourth 
the  total  strength  of  the  advanced-guard ;  two  flank 
detachments,  to  act  as  flankers,  of  one-eighth  ;  and 
a  rear  detachment,  acting  as  a  rear-guard,  also  of 
one-eighth ;  taking,  in  all,  one-half  the  total  strength 
of  the  advanced-guard,  is  considered,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  a  good  distribution  for  the  duties  to 
be  performed. 

272.  All  the  ground,  within  the  proximity  of  tho 
advanced-guard,  must  be  carefully  searched  by  it. 
No  invariable  rule  can  be  laid  down  on  this  subject, 
everytliing  depending  on  the  character  of  the  coun 

9 


try;  the  state  of  the  weather ;  and  tlie  march  benig 
by  day  or  night,  as  to  the  more  or  less  dispersed  or- 
der that  can  be  adopted  for  examining  the  ground. 

273.  The  leading  detachment,  and  those  on  the 
flanks,  should  keep  in  a  position,  with  respect  to 
each  other,  that  will  admit  of  prompt  mutual  sup- 
port, and  guarding  against  the  approach  of  an 
enemy  unperceived.  The  flank  detachments,  for 
this  purpose,  keeping  somewhat  to  the  rear  of  the 
leading  one.  The  most  advanced  portions  of  these 
troops  should  be  of  cavalry,  unless  the  country  be 
mountainous,  or  very  thickly  wooded,  in  wliich 
cases  infantry  is  the  best  arm  for  the  duty. 

274.  The  distance  that  should  be  left  between  the 
leading  detachment  and  the  principal  body  of  the 
advanced-guard,  will  depend  upon  the  more  or  less 
of  necessary  precaution  already  alluded  to.  An 
interval  of  from  a  thousand  to  two  thousand  paces 
may  be  left  between  the  leading  detachment  and 
*he  main-portion ;  the  small  detachments  thrown 
forward  from  the  leading  detachment  may  precede 
it  from  two  hundred  to  six  hundred  paces  ;  whilst 
the  leading  men,  who  form,  as  it  were,  the  apex  of 
this  disposition,  precede  the  last  about  one  hiuidred 
paces. 

275.  Dispositions  of  Advanced-Guard.  From 
these  indications  of  the  manner  of  distributing  the 
troops  of  the  advanced-guard,  the  following  general 
dispositions,  adapted  to  ordinary  circumstances  of 
locality,  may  be  gathered.  The  apex,  or  most  ad- 
vanced point,  may  be  formed  of  a  staff,  or  other  in- 
telligent officer,  under  the  escort  of  a  few  horsemen ; 
in  his  rear  follow  small  detachments  of  horse,  pre- 
ceded by  a  line  of  horsemen,  as  skirmishers,  in  dis- 

Sersed  order,  thrown  out  from  them ;  this  line  of  small 
etachments  and  their  men  may  embrace  a  frork 
See  Plate  III.  for  Articles  2T5,  285. 


99 

of  a  thousand  or  more  paces,  according  to  thfe  face 
of  the  country.  On  each  Hank  of  the  detachments, 
from  which  the  skirmishers  are  thrown  forward, 
march  small  detachments  of  both  horse  and  foot,  as 
supports  of  the  line.  In  the  rear  of  this  line,  at  a 
hundred  paces  or  so,  may  be  placed  a  small  de- 
tachment, charged  with  patrolling  either  on  the  front 
or  flanks.  Finally,  at  some  sixty  paces  in  rear  of 
.he  detachment  for  patrols,  follows  the  remainino 
portion  of  the  horse  and  foot,  composing  the  leading 
detachment.  The  main-body  of  the  advanced- 
guard,  following  some  hundred  paces  farther  to  the 
rear ;  and  the  rear  of  its  march,  being  closed  by  tlie 
small  rear  detachment  already  mentioned. 

It  will  be  seen,  by  comparing  this  disposition  of 
the  troops  of  an  advanced-guard  in  march,  with 
the  one  adopted  for  the  advanced-posts  at  a  halt, 
that  they  are  analogous,  and  differ  in  no  material 
respect,  as  their  object  in  each  case  is  the  same. 

276.  In  a  forward  movement,  this  general  dispo- 
sition of  the  troops  of  the  leading  detachment  should 
be  adhered  to,  as  far  as  the  features  of  the  ground 
will  permit.  Whenever  these  features  become  such 
that  a  concentration  on  the  centre  is  rendered  neces- 
sary, a  proper  order  should  be  temporarily  taken, 
to  enable  the  troops  promptly  to  resume  their  original 
order,  so  soon  as  the  ground  opens.  The  leading 
line  of  skirmishers  will  carefully  examine  all  the 
ground  over  which  they  pass ;  and  observe  all  that 
occurs  around  them.  The  men,  for  this  purpose, 
keeping  in  pairs;  and  taking  all  suitable  precau- 
tions not  to  place  themselves  in  positions  favorable 
to  being  seen  from  a  distance. 

277.  If  the  enemy  is  met,  dispositions  are  imme- 
diately tajien  to  receive  him.  The  line  of  skii- 
mishers  is  strengthened  ;  the  supports  brought  up ; 


100 

anj  if  there  is  any  artillery,  it  takes  position  on  the 
road,  to  sweep  it.  In  tliis  order,  the  whole  of  the 
leading  detachment  falls  back  slowly  upon  the 
mani-body  of  the  advanced-guard  ;  and  further  dis- 
positions are  made  according  to  the  exigency  of  the 
case. 

278.  The  general  order  of  march  of  an  advanced- 
guard  remains  the  same  in  all  circumstances  of 
ground ;  the  position  of  the  troops  alone  varj-ing 
with  changes  of  its  features.  In  broken  ground, 
for  instance,  the  line  of  skirmishers  of  the  leading 
detachment  would  be  of  infantry,  and  this  line  would 
be  supported  by  some  cavalry. 

279.  A  strict  observance  of  good  order,  partic- 
ularly among  the  troops  of  the  leading  detachment, 
is  of  the  first  importance  ;  nothing  should  therefore 
be  permitted  wliich  might  either  withdraw  their  at- 
tention from  their  chief  duty  of  watching ;  or  which 
might  give  warning  to  an  enemy  of  their  approach. 
They  should  especially  guard  against  being  drawn 
into  the  use  of  tlieir  fire-arms,  short  of  an  actual 
surprise. 

280.  On  a  night-march  the  precautions  should  be 
redoubled.  The  leading  detachment  will  be  more 
concentrated,  keeping  mostly  to  the  road.  If  the 
enemy  is  seeji,  word  will  be  sent  at  once  to  the  rear, 
for  a  halt,  and  the  suitable  dispositions  will  be  taken, 
as  noiselessly  as  practicable. 

281.  All  defiles  met  with  of  any  length  should  be 
examined  carefully  by  some  scouts,  before  any 
number  of  troops  venture  into  them  ;  and  then  proper 
measures  should  be  t;iken  for  securing  them  from 
an  attack,  until  the  troops  are  all  clear  of  them. 
All  woods  that  can  be  easily  gone  round  should  be 
made  the  circuit  of  by  some  horse,  before  passing 
through  them.     Thick  forests  should  be  carefully 


101 

examined,  a  hundred  or  more  paces  on  each  side  of 
the  road.  And  in  all  cases  any  doubtful  ground  must 
be  first  searched,  by  the  leading  troops,  before  any 
large  body  approaches  within  musket-range  of  it. 

282.  Flank  Patrols.  Besides  the  flankers  pro- 
per, which  constitute  a  part  of  the  movable  ad- 
vanced-posts, detachments  of  an  independent  char- 
acter are  sent  out  to  patrol  along  the  flanks  of  the 
main-column.  These  should  keep  themselves  in 
communication,  by  suitable  dispositions  of  vedettes, 
with  the  flankers. 

283.  As  the  flank  patrols  are  frequently  beyond 
direct  supporting  distance,  they  must  adopt  all  the 
necessary  dispositions  against  surprise  of  any  other 
body  marching  independently;  having  their  ad- 
vanced-guard, &c.,  &c. 

284.  These  patrols  keep  on  a  level  with  their 
column;  and  particularly  secure  all  latenl  roods, 
or  defiles,  by  which  it  might  be  suddenly  attacked, 
until  the  column  is  beyond  danger.  Great  activity, 
watchfulness,  and  caution,  should  characterize  this 
service.  The  oiflcer  in  command  of  a  flank  patrol 
must  use  his  discretion,  in  meeting  an  enemy, 
whether  to  attack  him,  or  to  let  him  pass,  if  he  has 
not  himself  been  observed. 

285.  Rear-Guard.  The  duties  of  a  rear-guard, 
in  retreat,  will  depend  upon  the  more  or  less  of 
activity  and  vigor  shown  by  the  enemy  in  pursuit. 
If  the  enemy  is  enterprising,  then  it  will  require  all 
the  sagacity  of  the  commanding-officer ;  all  the 
firmness  of  the  soldiers ;  to  cover  and  defend  the  rear 
of  the  column,  and  to  guard  against  demonstrations 
upon  its  flanks.  To  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  just 
the  time  necessary  to  enable  the  retreating  column 
to  extricate  itself  from  unfavorable  ground ;  and 
then  to  withdraw  from  the  fight,  without  being  too 

9* 


102 

far  compromised  ;  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  press* 
ing  on  so  hotly  as  to  force  the  main-body  of  the  rear 
guard  upon  the  tail  of  the  column  whose  retreat  ia 
to  be  secured,  are  problems  of  no  easy  solution ;  and 
call  for  all  the  best  military  qualities,  both  in  the 
officer  and  the  troops  to  whom  the  solution  is  as- 
signed. 

286.  In  mutual  support  among  all  the  arms ;  ap- 
titude for  turning  to  advantage  all  variations  in  the 
features  of  the  ground ;  and  tenacity  in  keeping 
every  advantage  offered  until  the  last  safe  moment ; 
reside  the  excellence  of  a  rear-guard.  In  inter- 
dicting by  the  fire  of  its  skirmishers  all  approach  to 
its  covers ;  in  occasional  bold  manoeuvres  of  its 
light-artillery,  when  the  enemy's  columns  are  open 
to  its  fire ;  in  daring  rapid  charges  of  its  cavalry, 
when  the  enemy  presses  forward  to  gain  some 
critical  point;  a  rear-guard  may  give  an  enemy 
such  lessons  as  will  force  him  to  adopt  that  pru- 
dential course,  on  which  its  own  safety,  and  that  of 
its  column,  alone  depend. 

287.  As  the  march  of  a  rear-guard  is  an  almost 
continual  running  fight,  its  dispositions  should  be 
taken  for  this  phase  of  its  duties.  Its  rear  should 
accordingly  be  closed  by  a  line  of  sldrmishers, 
properly  supported  by  the  other  anns.  This  line 
must  equally  exhibit  caution,  coolness  and  firmness ; 
gi\ing  way  to  no  hasty  movements ;  and  reserving 
its  fire  until  it  can  be  thrown  in  with  murderous 
effect.  If  forced  back  by  superior  numbers,  the 
skirmishers  should  concentrate  on  the  flanks  of  the 
other  troops,  leaving  the  road  clear,  either  for  the 
fire  of  the  artillery,  or  for  the  action  of  cavalry,  or 
of  infantry  in  mass. 

288.  In  ail  its  acfions,  the  rear-guard  should 
never  lose  sight  of  the  danger  it  continually  runs  of 


103 

being  surroanded,  or  cut  off,  by  a  movement  on  its 
flanks,  or  rear.  Against  this,  its  only  course  is  to 
push  out  flank  patrols,  as  far  as  they  can  safely 
venture  ;  restricting  these  to  the  duties  of  conveying 
timely  warning,  to  the  main-body  of  the  rear-guard, 
of  any  appearance  of  a  movement  of  tlae  kind  re- 
ferred to ;  and  of  preventing  it,  if  attempted,  by  a 
bold  stand,  either  defensive,  or  offensive,  as  circum- 
stances may  demand. 

288.  Advanced-Posts  in  CarUonments.  As  can- 
tonments are  taken  up  either  during  seasons  vrhen 
operations  cannot  be  well  carried  on  ;  or  to  give  the 
troops  some  extraordinary  repose,  after  a  harassing 
campaign ;  more  advanced-posts  will  geEerally  be 
necessary  tlian  under  ordinary  circumstances;  and 
to  fulfil  their  end  they  ought  to  be  placed  on  ground 
favorable  to  a  strong  resistance ;  in  order  to  give 
the  separated  corps  time  to  concentrate  against  an 
earnest  attack  of  the  enemy. 

290.  A  good  disposition  of  stations  for  out-posts, 
from  which  the  enemy  can  be  seen  at  a  distance ; 
a  line  of  supports  placed  on  strong  ground  in  the 
rear ;  easy  communications  for  concentration  on 
the  main-body ;  active  and  vigilant  patrols,  kept 
moving  not  only  along  the  front,  but  penetrating  on 
the  flanks,  and  rear  of  the  enemy,  to  get  wind  of 
his  strategical  plans:  such  are  the  general  precau- 
tions demanded  of  its  advanced-posts,  by  an  army  in 
(Station  for  some  time. 

291.  In  the  disposition  of  the  main  force,  to  con- 
cur with  the  preceding,  one  precaution  should  not  be 
omitted  in  a  stay  of  any  duration ;  and  that  is,  not  to 
allow  any  one  body  to  remain  long  enough  in  a 
village,  or  inhabited  place,  to  becjomc  in  a  degree 
domesticated.  Nothing  is  more  likely  than  this  to 
injure  the  morale  of  tlie  best  troops.   The  seductions 


104 

of  otherwise  harmless  pleasures,  may  lead  to  fata* 
habits  of  remissness  in  duty ;  and  the  officer  quietly 
indulging  in  his  game  at  cards,  in  a  family  cir<-.le, 
may  receive  his  summons  for  surrender,  ;i»  Ik;  ia 
gatJieriug  up  his  last  trir.k. 


CHAPTER  V. 

RECONNAISSANCES. 

292.  There  are  no  more  important  duties,  which 
an  officer  may  be  called  upon  to  perform,  than  those 
of  collecting  and  arranging  the  information  upon 
which  either  the  general,  or  daily  operations  of  a 
campaign  must  be  based.  For  tlie  proper  perform- 
ance of  the  former,  acquirements  of  a  very  high  or- 
der, in  the  departments  of  geography  and  statistics, 
are  indispensable  requisites  ;  to  which  must  be 
added  a  minute  acquaintance  with  topography,  and 
a  good  coup  (TiEil  militaire  for  that  of  the  latter. 

293.  However  detailed  and  perfect  may  be  a  map, 
it  can  never  convey  all  the  information  that  will 
enable  an  officer  to  plan,  even  an  ordinary  march, 
with  safety ;  still  less,  operations  that  necessarily 
depend,  for  their  success,  upon  a  far  greater  num- 
ber of  contingencies.  To  supply  these  deficiencies 
of  maps,an  examination  of  the  ground  must  be  made 
by  the  eye  *,  and  verbal  information  be  gained,  on 
all  the  points  connected  with  the  operation  over  this 
ground.  This  examination  and  collection  of  facts 
is  termed  a  Reconnaissance. 

294.  From  the  sendees  demanded  of  a  reconnoi- 
tring officer,  it  is,  in  the  first  place,  evident,  that  he 
should  possess  acquirements  of  no  ordinary  charac- 
ter ;  but  in  addition  to  these  he  should  be  gifted  by 
nature  with  certain  traits,  without  which  his  acqui- 
sitions would  be  of  little  account,  in  the  discharge 
of  the  responsible  duty  in  question. 

295.  With  cleai  and  specific  information  before 


106 

him,  one-half  of  a  general's  difficulties,  in  planning 
hia  measures,  are  dissipated.  In  a  letter  from 
General  Washington  to  Major  Tallmadge,  now  to 
be  seen  framed  in  the  office  of  the  Commissary- 
General  of  New  York,  he  remarks,  in  relation  to 
reports  made  to  him,  on  a  certain  occasion  :  "  But 
these  things,  not  being  delivered  with  certainty, 
rather  perplex  than  fonn  the  judgment."  It  is  in 
truth  this  feeling  of  certainty  that  constitutes  all  the 
diiference  ;  having  it,  the  general  makes  his  dispo- 
sitions with  confidence ;  without  it,  he  acts  hesi- 
tatingly ;  and  thus  communicates  to  others  that 
want  of  confidence  felt  in  his  own  mind. 

296.  An  officer  then,  selected  for  the  duty  in  ques- 
tion, should  be  known  to  be  cool-headed  and  truth- 
ful;  one  who  sees  things  as  *hey  are,  and  tells 
clearly  and  precisely  what  he  has  seen.  In  making 
his  report,  whether  verbally  or  in  writing,  the  officer 
should  study  conciseness  and  precision  of  language. 
He  must  carefully  separate  what  he  knows,  from 
his  own  observation,  from  that  which  he  has  learned 
from  others  ;  and  add  all  the  circumstances  of  place, 
and  time,  with  accuracy. 

297.  Duties  of  Reconnoitring  Officer.  The  first 
thing  to  be  done  by  an  officer,  selected  for  a  recon- 

laissance,  is  to  ascertain  precisely  the  duty  required 
of  him;  and  what  further  should  be  done  in  case  of 
certain  contingencies  that  may,  from  the  nature  of 
tlie  duty,  be  naturally  looked  for.  In  the  perform- 
ance of  the  duty  assigned  him,  and  in  making  his 
-eport,  the  officer  should  keep  always  in  mind  the 

pecific  character  of  his  mission,  as  his  guide  in 
DOth  points. 

298.  As  the  need  of  a  reconnaissance  supposes  a 
deficiency  in  information  ujion  the  features  of  the 
country,  the  officer,  detailed  to  malce  one,  should 


107 

provide  himself  with  maps,  a  good  telescope,  sich 
simple  aids  for  judging  of  distances,  and  ascertain^ 
ing  the  relative  positions  of  objects,  as  he  can  him- 
self readily  make  ;  writing  materials  ;  one  or  more 
good  guides ;  and  gain  all  the  knowledge  he  can, 
from  the  inhabitants  at  hand,  bearing  upon  his 
mission. 

299.  The  talent  of  judging  of  distances,  and  of 
the  connection  between  the  various  features  of  a 
country  within  the  field  of  vision,  is  partly  a  natural 
and  partly  an  acquired  one.  Some  individuals  can 
never  be  brought  to  have  any  confidence  in  their 
own  judgment  on  these  points ;  others  have  a  nat- 
ural aptitude  for  them,  which  requires  but  little 
practice  for  their  perfect  development.  The  powers 
of  the  eye  vary  so  greatly  among  civilized  persons, 
that  no  general  rules  can  be  laid  down,  as  a  guide 
for  the  matter  in  question.  Among  uncivilized 
hordes,  used  to  a  roaming  life,  there  are  found  stan- 
dards which  are  well  understood  by  all, — the  Arab, 
for  instance,  calling  that  distance  a  mile,  at  which 
a  man  is  no  longer  distinguishable  from  a  woman  — 
growing  out  of  their  habits. 

300.  The  first  thing  then  to  be  done  by  an  officer, 
in  acquiring  the  coup  (Tail  militaire,  is  to  learn,  both 
from  books  and  on  the  field,  what  space  is  taken  up 
by  a  battalion  and  its  intervals,  by  a  squadron,  and 
by  a  battery  when  in  order  of  battle ;  how  much 
when  in  column  of  march ;  and  the  average  time 
required  tor  certain  movements,  under  given  circum- 
stances of  the  ground.  This  acquirement  ne  inav 
make  by  adopting  some  standard  of  his  own ;  un 
ordinary  pace,  and  that  of  a  horse,  serving  for  com- 
puting time  and  distance  reciprocally.  The  next 
step  is  to  acquire  the  habit  of  estimating,  by  the  ap- 
pearances of  these  different  objects,  from  various 


108 

points  of  view,  how  far  off  they  are.  This  must  be 
done  practically.  A  very  simple  aid  to  it  is  the 
following: — Upon  ihe  stem  of  a  lead-pencil,  cut 
square,  and  held  out  at  a  uniform  arm's  length  from 
the  eye,  by  means  of  a  thread  attached  to  it  and 
fastened  to  the  top  button-hole,  let  the  officer  mark 
off,  on  one  of  the  edges,  the  length  seen  on  it  by 
holding  the  pencil  upright  between  the  eye,  and  a 
man  placed  successively  at  different  distances  from 
it,  as  100,  150—1000  yards.  This  will  give  one 
rough  standard  for  practice.  Another  may  be  made 
by  first  ascertaining  the  average  height  of  certain 
cultivated  trees,  as  the  apple,  &-c. 

301.  For  getting  relative  positions,  a  contrivance 
for  measuring  angles  roughly  must  be  used.  This 
is  done  by  first  folding  a  leaf  of  paper  across,  and 
then  doubling  it  along  the  folded  edge,  as  if  to  divide 
it  into  four  equal  parts.  The  angle  between  the 
edge  of  the  first  fold  and  that  of  the  second  will  be 
a  tolerably  accurate  right  angle.  Now, by  cutting 
off  carefully  along  the  fold,  one  of  the  pieces,  we 
obtain  a  quadrant,  or  90° ;  then  folding  this  at  the 
angle,  so  that  the  two  edges  will  exactly  coincide, 
we  get  the  half  of  a  quadrant  or  46°  ;  and  so  on,  by 
successive  bisections,  we  can  mark  oflf  smaller  an- 
gles. Then  making  a  pen  or  pencil-mark  along 
each  of  the  folds,  and  numbering  the  angles  succes- 
sively from  0  to  90"^,  we  ha\e  a  rough  proiracfar, 
that  can  be  used  both  for  measuring  angles  and 
setting  them  off  on  a  sketch.  To  measure  vertical 
angles,  a  thread  with  a  light  plummet,  must  be  at- 
tached to  the  angular  point.  If  the  object  is  above 
the  horizon  of  the  eye,  we  hold  the  protractor  ivi'h 
the  avsrular  point  from  the  eye,  so  that  the  phuul)- 
line  will  fall  along  the  face  of  the  paper  just  tcuch- 
'\\\g  it ;  then  directing  the  top  edge  of  the  pro*;  ictoj 


109 

on  the  object,  so  that  it  is  just  seen  by  the  eye, 
sighting  along  the  edge,  the  angle  formed  between 
the  plumb-line  and  the  other  edge,  will  be  the  same 
as  the  angle  between  the  line  of  sight  and  the 
horizon  of  the  eye. 

If  the  object  is  below  the  horizon  of  the  eye,  the 
angular  point  is  placed  towards  the  eye ;  the  same 
series  of  operations  will  give  the  angle  below  the 
eye's  horizon. 

302.  Guides.  Trustworthy  guides  are  invalua- 
ble, but  most  rare,  in  an  enemy's  country.  The 
best,  from  the  information  they  acquire  by  their 
habits  of  life,  are  to  be  found  among  those  classes 
whose  avocations  keep  them  much  abroad,  going 
from  place  to  place  within  a  certain  sphere  con- 
stantly ;  such  as  common  can'iers,  hunters,  smug- 
glers, t&c.  Among  the  tirst  thing  to  be  attended  to 
by  an  otficer,  in  taking  post  at  any  point,  is  to  find 
out  persons  of  this  class,  and  to  ascertain  their 
whereabout  when  wanted.  Kind  treatment,  dou- 
ceurs, and  promises,  should  not  be  spared,  to  enlist 
either  their  good  will  or  their  interests ;  and,  if 
policy  requires  it,  they  may  openly  be  treated  with 
apparent  harshness,  to  screen  them  from  odium 
among  their  neighbors. 

303.  If  none  of  this  class  can  be  found,  then  re- 
8ort  mustbe  had  to  a  higher ;  local  authorities  being 
in  preference  selected,  and  if  necessary  forced  to 
act.  Here  very  careful  treatment  is  requisite ; 
when  the  necessity  of  the  case  is  admitted  by  them, 
much  may  be  gleaned  by  kindness,  courtesy,  and 
a  certain  deference,  from  such  persons,  that  cannot 
be  looked  for  from  their  inferiors. 

304.  Before  starting  on  his  mission,  the  officer 
should  question  his  guide  thoroughly ;  and  if  he 
has  several,  question  each  apart;  like  precautiona 

10 


no 

filiouUl  be  taken  with  respect  to  other  inhabitants. 
Care  must  be  had  to  find  out  the  usual  beats  of  one 
taken  as  a  guide,  so  as  not  to  take  him  out  of  his 
own  neighborhood.  In  all  cases,  the  guide  must 
be  well  watched,  however  trustworthy  he  may 
seem.  If  unwilling,  or  sulky,  he  must,  if  needs  be, 
be  tied,  and  attached  to  a  strong  man,  with  a  rope 
round  his  middle ;  being  first  strictly  searched  for 
any  cutting  instrument  about  him. 

305.  Should  there  be  but  one  guide,  he  must  ne- 
cessarily be  placed  with  the  most  advanced  portion 
of  the  detachment  accompanying  the  officer.  If 
there  are  several,  one  must  be  there  also ;  the  one 
apparently  the  most  intelligent  with  the  officer,  who 
should  ply  him  with  questions ;  and  the  others  in 
the  rear  strictly  guarded. 

306.  It  may  be  well  to  remark,  that  guides  are 
useful  even  in  a  country  of  easy  communications ; 
as,  in  case  of  a  rencontre,  they  may  point  out  bye- 
ways  convenient  for  retreat,  if  necessary. 

307.  Reconnaissmice.  To  designate  all  the  ob- 
jects to  be  embraced  in  a  reconnaissance,  would 
load  farther  than  the  limits  of  this  little  work  will 
alJow ;  some  general  heads,  which  will  serve  as 
guides  in  all  cases,  will  therefore  be  alone  noticed. 

308.  A  general  view  of  the  ground  to  be  ex- 
amined must  first  be  taken  in,  so  as  to  obtain  some 
notion  of  the  forms  of  the  parts,  their  connection,  and 
relations  to  each  other,  before  going  into  a  detailed 
examimition.  To  one  possessed  of  some  topograph- 
ical knowledge,  this  study  of  what  is  before  him 
will  not  demand  much  tinie.  A  level  country,  for 
example,  he  .knows  is  usually  well  cultivated,  and 
therefore  has  plenty  of  hedges,  ditches,  &.c.,  which 
lend  themselves  well  to  affairs  of  light  troops ; — may 
be  not  a  little  inconvenient  to  manoeuvres  of  artiU 


Ill 

t&ry  ^,-^aiul  frequently  bring  up  cavalry  very  unex 
pectedly  in  full  career.  In  a  mountainous  one, 
dangerous  passes,  narrow  roads,  torrents  with 
rougli  beds,  ugly  sudden  turns,  &.C.,  will  necessa« 
rily  be  met  with.  Eacii  and  all  of  these  demand  a 
particular  ejcamination,  iind  in  bis  report  tbeir  ad- 
vantages and  disadvantages  should  be  clearly 
pointed  out  by  the  officer. 

309.  If  the  reconnaissance  is  for  an  onward 
movement;  the  distances  from  halt  to  bait,  as  wel* 
as  all  others,  should  be  estimated  in  hours  of  march ^ 
the  nature  of  the  roads,  and  the  Obstacles  along 
ihem  be  carefully  detailed  ;  the  means  that  may  be 
gathered  along  the  line  to  facilitate  the  movement, 
as  veliicles,  men  and  materials  for  removing  ob- 
stacles, &LC.  Tbe  points  where  cross-roads  are 
found,  must  be  specified  ;  tlie  direction  of  these 
roads  ;  their  uses,  &c. 

310.  All  local  objects  aloiig  the  line,  as  villages, 
farm-houses,  &.c.,  sliould  be  carefully  designated, 
both  as  to  tiieir  position  on  the  line,  or  on  either  side 
of  it ;  and  also  as  to  their  form,  and  color,  &c.,  as 
"  square  white  house  on  the  riglit ;"  '*  round  gray 
stone  tower  on  hill  to  left." 

311.  The  names  of  localities,  in  tlie  way  in  v/hich 
the  inhabitants  pronounce  tliem,  should  be  carefully 
written,  and  called  over  several  times,  so  as  to  be 
eure  to  get  them  as  nearly  as  practicable  right  in 
sound  ;  then  the  names,  as  written  by  an  intelligent 
inhabitant,  should  bemadded. 

31i!.  All  halting  points  idust  be  well  looked  to; 
their  military  capabilities,  in  case  of  attack:  aa 
wed  d.s  their  resources  lor  accommodating  the 
'ifoops,  be  thoroughly  goue  into. 

If  the  halt  is  to  take  position  for  some  time,  to 
await  or  watch  tlie  enemy ,  then  more  care  must  bfl 


112 

taken,  the  whole  site  be  well  studied  as  to  its  fulfill 
Ing  the  proposeLl  end  ;  the  points  of  support  on  the 
flanks  be  designated,  as  well  as  others  in  front  and 
rear,  that  may  require  to  be  occupied  ;  the  suitable 
localities  to  be  chosen  for  parks,  hospital,  &c. ;  the 
communications  to  be  opened  or  repaired,  pointed 
out ;  and  all  the  facilities  either  for  an  advance  or 
a  retrograde  movement,  be  laid  down. 

313.  Armed  Ileconnaissance.  Reconnaissances, 
made  in  the  neighborhood  of  an  enemy,  require  to 
be  done  under  the  protection  of  a  proper  detach- 
ment ;  the  strength  and  composition  of  which  will 
depend  on  the  object  to  be  attained, 

314.  If  the  object  be  to  gain  secretly  a  knowledge 
of  the  enemy's  whereabout  and  strength,  then  a 
detachment  of  light  cavalry,  conducted  by  a  trusty 
guide,  tlirough  circuitous  bye-ways,  and  moving 
with  celerity,  but  with  proper  precautions  against 
falling  into  an  ambush,  or  ha\ang  its  retreat  cut  oft*, 
is  usually  resorted  to.  The  details  for  tliis  will  be 
found  under  the  head  Patrols. 

315.  When  an  enemy's  positioii  is  to  be  recon- 
noitred, with  a  view  to  force  him  to  show  his  hand, 
by  causing  him  to  call  out  all  his  troops;  then  a 
large  detachment  of  all  arms,  adequate  to  the  task 
of  pressing  the  enemy  vigorously,  and  also  of  with- 
drawing with  safety  when  pressed  in  turn,  must  be 
thrown  forward. 

316.  Under  the  shelter  of  either  of  these  forces, 
the  officer,  charged  «ith  the  reconnaissance,  takes 
the  best  moment,  and  best  point  of  view,  for  care- 
fully ascertaining  the  dispositions  made  by  the 
enemy.  A  good  time  will  be  at  early  dawn,  when 
troops,  in  most  services,  are  all  made  to  stand  to 
their  arms.  The  points  which  the  officer  must  ex 
^ibit  most  attention  in  finding  out,  are  those  occ  u? 


113 

piod  by  Ae  batteries,  and  all  those  in  any  way  in- 
trenched. 

317.  Patrols.  Patrols  are  of  two  classes,  from 
the  different  objects  had  in  view.  The  tirst  are 
those  made  with  a  view  of  insuring  greater  security 
from  the  enemy's  attempts  to  pass,  or  force  the  line 
of  out-posts,  and  may  therefore  be  termed  dffensive 
patrols.  They  consist  usually  of  three  or  four  men, 
who  go  the  rounds,  along  the  chain  of  sentinels  and 
between  the  posts;  seldom  venturing  farther  than 
a  few  hundred  paces  beyond  the  sentinel's  chain ; 
the  object  being  to  search  points  which  might  pre- 
sent a  cover  to  the  enemy's  scouts,  and  to  keep  the 
sentinels  on  the  alert. 

318.  The  second  class  are  those  made  exterior 
to  the  line  of  out-posts,  with  a  view  of  gaining  in- 
telligence of  the  enemy's  whereabouts ;  and  may 
therefore  be  termed  offensive  patrols.  They  are 
composed  of  larger  bodies  of  men  than  the  first 
class,  the  number  being  proportioned  both  to  tlia 
distance  to  be  gone  over,  and  the  extent  of  front  to 
be  examined.  In  a  position,  presenting  but  few 
cross-roads,  and  sparsely  settled,  a  patrol  of  ten  or 
twenty  horsemen,  may  be  found  ample,  to  search, 
with  all  desirable  thoroughness,  from  twenty  to  forty 
miles  in  advance  of  the  position,  along  the  principal 
avenues  to  it ;  whereas,  with  a  more  extended  front, 
presenting  many  lateral  avenues,  double  this  num- 
ber might  be  required  for  the  same  duty.  From  the 
information  obtained,  through  the  ordinary  channels 
of  maps,  and  by  questioning  the  iohabitants  at  hand, 
the  commanding-ofiicer  can  usually  settle,  with  siif- 
ficient  accuracy,  the  strength  of  a  patrol. 

319.  From  the  duties  to  be  performed  by  patrols, 
cavalry  are  usually  employed  alone;  in  cases  of 
very  broken  country,  infantry  may  be  necessary 

10* 


114 

but  they  should  always  be  accompanied  by  some 
norse,  if  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  transmit  Intel 
ligence  promptly  to  the  rear. 

320.  The  main  duties  of  a  patrol  are  to  find  tho 
enemy  if  in  the  neighborhood  ;  gain  a  good  idea  of 
his  position  and  strength  ;  to  make  out  his  move- 
ments, and  to  bring  in  an  accurate  account  of  his 
distance  from  the  out-posts  of  their  own  force  ;  and 
the  character  of  the  ground  between  the  position 
occupied  by  the  respective  forces. 

321.  From  the  nature  of  these  duties,  it  is  evident 
that  both  officers  and  men,  for  a  patrol,  should  be 
selected  with  especial  reference  to  their  activity,  in- 
telligence, and  the  aptitude  they  may  possess,  from 
previous  liabits  of  life,  for  a  service  requiring  a 
union  of  courage,  prudence,  and  discriminating  ob- 
servation— usually  to  be  met  with  only  in  indi- 
viduals who  have  been  thrown  very  much  upon 
their  own  resources.  When  the  character  of  the 
country  admits  of  it,  the  employment  of  such  indi- 
viduals, singly,  or  in  very  small  bodies,  as  scouts, 
is  one  of  the  most  available  means  of  gaining  intel- 
ligence of  an  enemy,  without  betraying  the  secret 
of  our  own  whereabout. 

322.  Dulu's  of  Officer  in  comviandofa  Patrol. 
In  conducting  a  patrol,  the  commanding-officer 
should  provide  himself  with  a  good  map,  telescope, 
and  guides ;  and  gain  all  the  information  he  can 
before  starting,  by  questioning  persons  in  the  neigh- 
borhood. Nothing  should  escape  his  eye  along  his 
line  of  search ;  and  he  should  particularly  note 
points  wliich  might  be  favorable  to  his  defence,  if 
driven  back  by  the  enemy  ;  or  by  which  his  retreat 
might  be  endangered. 

323.  The  order  of  march  of  the  patrol  will  be 
regulated  by  tlie  circumstances  of  its  strength,  kind 


115 

of  troops  employed,  the  character  of  the  countrji 
passed  over,  the  hour  of  the  day,  and  the  particular 
object  in  view.  The  intelligence  and  judgment  of 
the  officer  in  c  jmmand  will  have  sufficient  exercise 
on  these  poin"s ;  as  he  will  be  continually  called 
upon  to  vary  his  dispositions.  The  general  and 
obvious  rule  of  keeping  a  look-out  on  all  sides,  will 
prompt  the  general  disposition  of  an  advanced- 
guard,  rear-guard,  and  flankers,  according  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  however  small  his  com- 
mand. The  sole  object  being  to  carry  back  intelli- 
gence of  the  enemy,  no  precautions  should  be  omit- 
ted to  cover  and  secure  his  line  of  march,  without 
making,  however,  too  great  a  subdivision  of  his  force. 

324.  Too  much  circumspection  cannot  be  shown 
in  approaching  points  favorable  to  ambuscades ;  as 
woods,  ravines,  dehles,  inclosures,  farm-houses,  vil- 
lages, &c.  The  main-body  should  always  be  haUed, 
in  a  good  position  beyond  musket-shot,  or  where 
cover  can  be  obtained,  whilst  a  few  men  proceed 
cautiously  forward,  following  at  some  distance  in 
the  rear  of,  but  never  losing  sight  of  each  other,  to 
examine  the  suspected  spot.  If  the  officer  deem  it 
necessary,  at  any  point,  to  detach  from  his  command 
smaller  patrols,  to  e.xamine  points  at  some  distance 
on  his  flanks,  he  should  halt  the  rest,  at  the  point 
where  they  s^arate,  until  the  detachments  come  in 
and  report;  or,  if  he  decides  to  move  forward,  he 
should  leave  three  or  four  men  at  the  spot,  to  con- 
vey intelligence  promptly  to  the  rear,  if  anything  is 
discovered,  as  well  as  to  himself. 

325.  It  may  frequently  be  found  that  some  emi- 
nence on  the  flanks  may  present  a  good  view  of  the 
surrounding  country,  in  which  case,  if  it  be  decided 
10  use  it,  two  or  three  men  ought  to  be  detached  for 
Uie  purpose,  with  orders  to  keep  in  sight  of  each 


116 

otlier,  but  far  enough  apart  to  guard  against  a  sur- 
prise of  the  whole. 

328.  When  the  officer  finds  himself  in  the  pres« 
ence  of  the  enemy,  he  sliould  hak  his  command  at 
a  convenient  spot,  where  they  wiU  be  screened  from 
the  enemy's  view  ;  and,  having  made  his  dispo- 
sitions against  a  surprise,  he  will  proceed  with  a 
few  picked  men  to  the  most  favorable  point  from 
which  he  can  obtain  a  good  look-out,  to  reconnoitre 
the  position  occupied,  and  the  other  points  of  in- 
terest. If  he  deem  it  advisable  to  keep  his  position, 
or  change  it  for  some  other  point  more  favorable,  lie 
will  first  transmit  a  report  to  the  rear  of  what  he 
has  observed. 

327.  When  the  patrol  moves  by  night,  the  ordi- 
nary precautions  must  be  redoubled.  Signals  must 
be  agreed  upon  to  avoid  danger,  should  any  of  the 
party  become  separated  from  the  main  body.  Care- 
ful attention  must  be  given  to  everything  passing 
around ;  as  the  barking  of  dogs,  noises,  tires,  &.c. 
On  approaching  any  inhabited  spot,  the  command 
should  be  brought  to  a  halt,  whilst  a  few  picked 
men  move  noiselessly  forward,  and  if  practicable, 
by  stealing  up  to  the  windows,  learn  the  character 
of  the  inmates. 

328.  It  cannot  be  too  strongly  impressed  upon 
the  mind  of  the  officer  in  command  of  a  patrol,  that 
he  must  be  all  ears  and  eyes  ;  that  he  will  be  called 
upon  in  turn,  to  exercise  great  boldness,  caution, 
presence  of  mind  and  good  judgment,  in  accom- 
plishing a  mission  where  the  enemy  must  be  seen 
but  not  encountered  ;  and  such  roads  and  halting 
points  be  selected,  both  in  moving  forward  and  re- 
turning, as  shall  be  most  favorable  to  his  move« 
mcnts,  and  least  liable  to  e.xpose  him  to  a  surprise 
or  a  disadvantageous  collision  with  tlie  enemy. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


DETACHMENTS. 


329.  Detachments  consist  of  small  bodies  of 
troops,  composed  of  one,  or  several  arms,  to  which 
are  intrusted  some  mission  connected  with  the  ope- 
rations of  the  main-body,  but,  for  the  most  part, 
performed  beyond  the  sphere  of  its  support ;  such, 
for  example,  as  the  occupation  of  some  post,  or  de- 
file, which  is  to  be  held  temporarily,  as  necessary  to 
the  movements  of  the  main-body  ;  the  surprise  of  a 
post  held  by  the  enemy ;  the  seizure  of  a  convoy,  &c. 

330.  Tlie  composition  of  a  detachment  will  de- 
pend upon  the  nature  of  the  duty  to  be  performed ; 
the  character  of  the  country  in  which  it  is  to  ope- 
rate ;  the  distance  of  the  point  to  be  reached ;  and 
the  more  or  less  celerity  required  in  the  operation. 
As  a  general  rule,  detachments  should  be  formed 
only  of  light  troops,  well  acquainted  with  their  du- 
ties ;  and,  in  every  case  where  it  can  be  done,  they 
should  consist  of  a  proper  proportion  of  each  arm 
of  the  service,  if  the  duty  upon  which  they  are  sent 
is  at  all  of  an  important  character.  By  this  combi- 
nation each  arm  is  enabled  to  act  with  more  bold- 
ness and  vigor,  from  the  support  with  which  it  will 
meet  in  the  others ;  and  can  better  select  its  mo- 
ment for  action,  according  to  the  character  of  the 
ground  on  which  it  finds  itself. 

331.  The  combats  of  detachments  will  be  moslly 
restricted  to  firing,  and  the  skilful  employment  of 
skirmishers.  Tiie  troops  must  be  kept  perfectly  in 
hand  for  mutual  support,  tlie  artillery  keeping  nea? 


118 

the  mtantry,  and  the  cavalry,  whenever  the  oppo> 
tunity  is  presented,  hazarding  only  short  but  \'igor« 
ous  charges  against  the  enemy. 

332.  The  otficer  placed  in  command  of  a  detach- 
ment, should  be  thoroughly  conversant  with  tho 
handling  of  troops ;  so  as  to  insure  constant  reci- 
procity of  support ;  and  to  be  able  to  seize  upon 
those  opportunities  of  bringing  the  proper  arm  into 
action,  and  for  passing  from  the  defensive  to  the 
offensive,  which  combats  between  small  bodies  of 
troops  so  frequently  present. 

333.  March  of  Detachments.  As  a  detachment 
must  rely  mainly  on  its  own  resources,  the  prrson- 
n  I  end  materiel  of  the  troops  should  be  rigidly  in- 
spected before  marching ;  to  see  that  the  men  and 
horses  are  in  a  sound  state;  that  notiung  is  wanting 
in  their  equipments ;  that  the  gun  and  other  car- 
riages are  in  good  travelling  order ;  and  that  the 
necessary  amount  of  ammunition,  provisions,  and 
forage  have  been  provided  for  the  expedition. 

334.  Every  source  of  information  should  be  con- 
sulted with  respect  to  the  nature  of  the  roads,  and 
the  country  over  which  the  column  is  to  march; 
and  good  maps,  telescopes,  and  guides  should  bo 
provided.  If  a  reconnaissance  of  the  line  of  march 
has  been  directed,  it  should  be  placed  in  charge  of 
a  well  informed  staff,  or  other  officer,  conversant 
with  the  duties  required  of  him ;  so  that  the  com- 
mander of  the  detachment  may  be  accurately  in- 
formed of  the  state  of  the  roads,  as  to  their  practica- 
bility for  men,  horses,  and  carriages;  particularly  the 
number  of  hours  of  march  from  station  to  station  ; 
and  the  character  of  the  obstacles  with  which  he 
may  be  liable  to  meet, from  the  state  of  the  bridges, 
tlie  liaturo  of  the  water-courses,  and  the  defiles 
alonsf  the  route. 


119 

335.  In  order  to  avoid  being  anticipated  in  oui 
object  by  the  enemy,  every  attention  should  be  paid 
to  preserve  strict  order  among  the  troops,  and  to 
advance  with  celerity  ;  so  that  secrecy  may  be  kept 
until  the  detachment  reaches  its  destination.  The 
troops,  for  this  purpose,  should  bo  kept  as  closely 
together  as  the  character  of  the  ground  will  permit ; 
and  when  guides  are  employed,  they  must  be  strictly 
watched,  and  not  be  dismissed  until  the  march  is 
completed. 

336.  The  distribution  of  troops,  or  the  order  of 
march,  will  mainly  depend  upon  the  character  of  the 
country ;  the  general  rule  to  be  followed  is  so  to 
place  each  arm  in  the  column,  that  ihe  troops  may 
be  formed  for  action  by  the  most  prompt  and  simjjle 
movements.  In  a  very  open  country,  the  greater 
part  of  the  cavalry  will  be  at  the  head  of  the  col- 
umn ;  where  it  is  somewhat  broken,  half  of  the 
cavalry  may  be  in  front,  and  the  remainder  in  the 
rear  ;  and  in  a  very  difficult  country  the  infantry 
will  lead.  The  artillery  may  be  placed  in  the  in- 
tervals of  the  column  where  the  country  is  not  dif- 
ficult ;  in  the  contrary  case  it  will  be  in  the  rear, 
but  covered  by  a  small  detachment  which  it  pre- 
cedes. 

337.  The  column  must  be  secured  from  a  sudden 
attack  of  the  enemy  by  an  advanced-guard,  flankers, 
and  a  rear-guard.  The  advanced-guard  will  be 
composed  of  cavalry  or  infantry,  or  of  the  two  com- 
bined, according  to  the  character  of  the  country. 
[n  some  cases  it  may  be  well  to  have  two  or  three 
light  pieces  vi^ith  the  advanced-guard.  The  strength 
of  the  advanced-guard,  for  detachments  not  over 
two  thousand  men,  need  not  be  greater  than  one* 
filth  of  the  whole ;  for  larger  bodies  it  may  be  be- 

See  riate  V.  for  .\iticlcs  336,  875. 


120 

tween  a  fourth  and  a  third,  according  to  t.\e  de^ee 
of  resistance  it  rnay  be  required  to  offer. 

338.  The  advanced-guard  of  a  detachment  should 
seldom  leave  a  wider  interval  than  about  a  thousand 
paces  between  it  and  the  main-body.  In  a  broken 
country,  when  this  force  consists  of  infantry  alone 
the  distance  should  be  less,  to  avoid  an  ambush 
The  main-body  of  the  advanced-guard  should  al- 
ways be  preceded  a  few  hundred  paces  by  a  strong 
patrol  of  cavalry  or  infantry,  to  search  the  ground 
and  secure  the  advanced-guard  from  falling  into  an 
ambush,  or  from  a  sudden  attack. 

339.  The  flankers  will  consist  mainly  of  a  few 
detachments,  which  march  parallel  to  the  column 
and  a  few  hundred  paces  from  it,  according  to  the 
character  of  the  ground ;  these  will  throw  out  a  few 
men,  from  a  hundred  to  a  hundred  and  fifty  paces, 
on  their  exposed  flank,  to  keep  a  vigilant  look-out, 
in  that  direction,  for  the  enemy.  Occasional  patrols 
may  also  be  sent  out  on  the  flanks,  when  it  is 
deemed  necessary  to  push  an  examination  to  some 
distant  point,  or  to  gain  a  height  offering  a  com- 
manding view'  of  the  country.  As  the  object  of  the 
flankers  is  rather  to  give  timely  notice  to  the  main- 
body  of  an  enemy's  approach,  than  to  offer  any  se- 
rious resistance,  fhe  detachments  of  which  they  are 
composed  need  only  consist  of  a  few  men. 

340.  The  rear-guard,  except  in  a  very  broken  or 
mountainous  country,  which  would  offer  facilities  to 
the  enemy  for  slipping  to  the  rear,  need  only  be  a 
small  detachment,  placed  more  to  prevent  strag- 
glers from  falling  to  the  rear  than  for  any  othei 
object. 

341.  Night  marches  should  not  be  made,  except 
in  case  of  n'j'cessity.  When  their  object  is  to  sur- 
prise an  cut-aiy,  if  thsre  be  an  advanced-guard,  it 


121 

should  be  kept  near  the  head  of  the  column.  Patrola 
should  be  sent  forward,  with  orders  to  advance  with 
great  caution,  and  not  push  on  too  far.  Flying 
patrols  may,  if  requ'site,  be  kept  up  on  the  flanks. 
The  most  exact  order  and  silence  should  be  main- 
tained, and  extreme  vigilance  be  exercised  to  avoid 
placing  the  enemy  on  the  alert. 

342.  The  following  remarks,  on  the  subject  of 
marches,  are  taken  from  a  little  work,  "  On  the  Du- 
ties  of  Troops  composing  the  Advanced  Corps  of  an 
Armi/,'"  by  Lieut.-Col.  Leach,  of  the  British  Army  ; 
a  work  which,  for  its  sound  practical  views,  niade 
in  the  vein  of  a  judicious,  well-informed  soldier,  who 
has  seen  service,  commends  itself  to  the  juniors  of 
the  profession  generally. 

"  At  the  time  the  following  orders  were  first  is- 
sued for  the  marcli  of  tlie  light-division,  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1809,  on  its  route  from  Lisbon  to  Talavera, 
the  troops  moved  otF  by  whole  or  half  sections,  ac- 
cording to  the  width  of  the  road  ;  but,  at  a  later  pe- 
riod, a  general  order  appeared,  which  directed  that 
tlie  infantry  should  march  by  threes. 

"  The  division  having  formed  in  rear  of  the  lead- 
ing battalion,  at  whole,  half,  or  quarter  distance,  or 
in  close  column,  and  the  baggage  being  assembled 
in  rear  of  it,  the  march  was  commenced  with  pre- 
cisely the  same  regularity  as  would  be  observed  by 
a  regiment  or  regiments  moving  in  or  out  of  a  gar- 
rison town ;  the  bands  playing,  the  light-infantry 
with  arms  sloped,  and  those  of  the  ritlemen  slung 
over  the  shoulder,  the  officers  with  swords  drawn, 
and  exact  wheeling  distances  of  the  sections  pre- 
served, and  perfect  silence  observed. 

"  After  having  proceeded  a  short  distance  in  tliia 
manner,  the  word  of  commajid,  '  March  at  ease,' 
was  given  by  the  general  at  the  head  of  the  leading 
11 


122 

battalion,  and  this  was  passed  quickly  on  to  the  rear 
from  company  to  company.  Tlie  captains,  instead 
of  continuing  at  the  head  of  tlieir  companies,  droo- 
ped back  to  the  rear  of  them  :  the  reasons  for  allot- 
ting this  station  to  them  was,  that  they  might  see 
any  men  of  their  respective  companies  who  at- 
tempted to  leave  the  ranks  without  leave.  The 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  preserved  the 
wheeling  distances.  The  soldiers  now  carried  tjieir 
arms  in  any  manner  most  convenient.  Some  slung 
them  over  their  shoulders,  (most  of  them,  indeed, 
preferred  this  mode  as  the  least  fatiguing,)  others 
sloi)ed  tliem,  and  many  trailed  them,  and  they  con- 
stantly changed  from  the  right  hand  or  right  shoul- 
der to  the  left.  Whilst  some  lighted  their  short 
black  pipes,  others  sung  or  amused  their  comrades 
with  stories  and  jests,  as  is  usual  on  those  occasions. 
Although  allowed  to  prosecute  the  march  in  this 
easy  and  unrestrained  manner,  a  heavy  penalty, 
nevertheless,  awaited  the  man  who  quitted  the 
ranks  without  permission  from  the  captain  or  officer 
commanding  his  company.  The  captains  were  al- 
ways provided  with  tickets  bearing  their  own  signa- 
ture, on  each  of  which  was  written,  '  The  bearer 
has  my  permission  to  fall  out  of  the  ranks,  being 
unable  to  proceed  with  the  regiment.'  Any  soldier 
found  on  the  line  of  march  by  the  rear-guard,  with- 
out a  ticket,  was  liable  to  be  punished  for  disobe- 
dience of  orders  ;  and,  as  no  difficulty  was  ever  ex- 
perienced by  men  who  were  sick,  or  knocked  up,  in 
procuring  this  certihcate  of  inability  to  keep  up  with 
their  regiments,  such  offenders  certa.inly  merited 
punishment. 

"  If  a  soldier  wanted  to  fall  out  of  the  ranks  for  a 
few  minutes  only,  he  was  required  to  ask  leave  of 
the  captain  to  do  so,  and,  moreover,  to  take  otF  hi* 


123 

Knapsack,  and  to  give  it,  together  with  his  musketi 
in  charge  of  the  men  of  his  own  section,  to  be  car- 
ried by  them  until  he  rejoined  them.  This  was  an 
admirable  order,  and  it  operated  in  two  ways  ;  first, 
the  soldier  was  enabled,  not  being  encumbered  with 
either  knapsack  or  musket,  more  speedily  to  over- 
take the  column  on  its  march  ;  and  secondly,  if  he 
loitered  unnecessarily  on  the  way  to  rejoin  his 
comrades,  who  were  doubly  burdened  with  his  arms 
and  pack,  he  would  be  certain  to  incur  their  dis- 
pleasure. 

"  About  once  in  every  hour  and  a  quarter  or  half, 
a  halt  'was  ordered,  and  ten  or  twelve  minutes 
allowed  for  the  men  to  rest.  When  practicable, 
this  was  done  on  ground  near  which  there  was 
water ;  but  it  is  almost  unnecessary  to  add,  that 
very  frequently  it  was  not  possible  to  find  such 
favorable  spots. 

"  Preparatory  to  those  temporary  halts,  the  word 
of  command,  'Attention!'  was  given  at  the  head 
of  the  leading  regiment,  and  passed  on  rapidly  (as 
already  stated)  from  company  to  company.  Upon 
this,  the  captains  moved  quickly  from  the  rear  of 
their  companies  to  the  front ;  the  arms  of  the  soldiers 
were  regularly  shouldered  or  slung  ;  perfect  silence 
was  observed ;  the  pipes  were  instantaneously  put 
out  of  sight,  either  in  the  haversacks  or  elsewhere  ; 
the  dressing  and  the  wheeling  distances  of  the  sec- 
tions were  correctly  kept ;  and  in  an  instant  there 
was  a  magical  change  from  apparent  irregularity 
to  most  perfect  discipline  and  order. 

"  On  resuming  the  march  after  those  halts,  the 
troops  observed  the  same  extreme  regularity  during 
tho  first  hundred  or  two  of  yards,  as  I  have  already 
described.    The  words '  Marcli  at  ease'  being  again 


124 

pven,  they  returned  to  the  song,  the  story,  and  the 
tobacco-pipe. 

"  On  approaching  rivulets  or  shallow  pieces  of  wa« 
ter,  which  it  was  necessary  should  be  passed,  neither 
officers  nor  soldiers  were  allowed  to  pick  their  way 
through,  nor  was  the  smallest  break  or  irregularity 
permitted  to  exist  in  the  ranks  ;  but  the  column 
marched  througli  by  half  sections,  sections,  or  swb- 
divisions,  (according  to  the  width  of  the  ford.)  pre- 
serving the  same  order  as  if  moving  along  a  road. 

"  That  this  regulation  was,  on  some  occasions, 
too  rigidly  enforced,  I  have  never  heard  disputed ; 
still,  the  object  at  which  it  aimed,  viz.  that  of  ex- 
pending as  little  time  as  possible  on  each  day's 
march,  so  as  to  give  the  soldiers  time  to  take  their 
rest,  to  construct  huts  in  the  bivouac,  to  wash 
their  linen,  to  mend  their  clothes  or  shoes,  to  draw 
their  rations,  and  to  cook  their  meals,  that  they 
might  be  fresh  for  whatever  fatigues  happened  to 
be  in  store  for  them,  was  indisputably  a  most  de- 
sirable one. 

"  Those  who  have  campaigned  know,  that  in  ad- 
vancing to  attack  an  enemy,  or  in  retiring  before 
one,  the  passage  of  rivers  in  the  line  of  march, 
even  if  so  deep  as  to  reach  their  middles,  and  under 
the  fire  of  an  enemy  also,  are  expected  to  be  crossed 
by  tiie  troops  without  a  greater  derangement  taking 
place  in  their  order  of  march  than  the  obstacles 
which  they  are  in  the  act  of  encountering,  must  ne- 
cessarily produce  in  a  greater  or  less  degree. 

"  With  a  detachment  consisting  of  a  few  hundred 
men,  at  a  distance  from  an  enemy,  and  with  ample 
time  before  them  to  get  over  their  day's  march,  it 
would  appear  that  this  order  might  well  be  dispcn 
Bed  with  ;  but  with  a  division  of  four  or  five  thou 
sand  men,  the  case  is  widely  different. 


125 

"  Let  it  be  supposed  that  it  has  arrived  at  a 
stream  which  admits  of  being  passed  by  sections, 
subdivisions,  or  even  by  companies ;  and  that,  in- 
stead of  proceeding  straight  through  it  in  this  man- 
ner, every  soldier  is  permitted  to  pick  liis  way  across 
in  any  manner  he  may  think  proper,  and  to  break 
off  from  his  place  in  the  ranks, — what  a  vast  loss 
of  time  would  this  occasion  !  When  would  the 
rear  of  the  column  have  effected  its  passage  ? 
Surely  the  patience  of  those  belonging  to  the  front, 
centre,  and  rear  of  this  body  of  four  thousand  sol- 
diers, would  be  pretty  well  exhausted  long  before 
tJie  opposite  bank  was  gained  by  the  whole,  and 
the  march  resumed. 

"  In  the  rugged  and  mountainous  districts  which 
the  army  so  frequently  traversed  in  the  Peninsula, 
it  encountered  various  defiles  and  other  obstacles, 
which  precluded  the  possibility  of  their  being  passed 
except  by  a  very  small  number  of  men  at  a  time ; 
and  the  following  mode  was  therefore  adopted  by 
each  company  in  making  its  way  along.  The  first 
company  of  the  leading  battalion,  as  soon  as  it  had 
disentangled  itself  from  the  defile,  or  broken  ground, 
was  directed  to  march  forward,  perhaps  about  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  ;  there  to  pile  arms,  and  the  men 
to  rest.  The  head  of  the  next  company,  when  it 
had  cleared  the  defile,  halted  about  thirty  or  forty 
yards  on  the  other  side,  until  all  the  men  belonging 
to  it  came  up  in  succession.  This  done,  the  cap- 
tain moved  it  forward  independently  until  it  joined 
the  leading  company,  where  it  piled  arms.  Thus, 
each  company,  as  soon  as  it  had  cleared  the  obsta- 
cles, was  brought  up  en  masse,  and  at  a  regular 
pace,  without  reference  to  those  in  its  rear.  By 
those  means  that  most  unmilitary  exhibition  of  file 
11* 


126 

after  file  running  on,  like  a  string  of  wild  geose,  lo 
catch  tiiose  in  their  front,  was  entirely  avoided. 

"  Few  things  tend  so  effectually  to  fatigue  and 
irritate  soldiers  who  are  already  jaded,  as  that  of 
trotting  on,  bending  under  the  weight  of  pack,  belts, 
and  musket,  to  overtake  those  who  continue  lo 
march  on  in  their  front. 

343.  "  When  the  division  was  about  to  perform 
a  march  not  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  an  enemy, 
the  following  arrangements  were  made  either  for 
bivouacking  or  quartering  it,  (as  the  case  might  be,) 
so  that  no  time  should  be  lost  after  it  had  reached 
Us  destination. 

"  A  staff-officer,  accompanied  by  the  quartermas- 
ters of  the  division,  or  (if  other  duties  at  that  mo- 
ment were  required  to  be  performed  by  the  quarter- 
masters) by  a  subaltern  of  each  regiment,  preceded 
the  troops  on  horseback,  so  as  to  arrive  long  before 
them  at  the  ground  on  which  they  were  to  halt  for 
the  day,  or  at  the  town  or  village  in  which  it  was 
intended  they  should  be  quartered. 

"  A  whole  street,  or  part  of  one,  (as  circumstances 
admitted,)  was  allotted  by  the  staff-officer  to  the 
quartermasters  for  each  of  their  regiments,  who 
immediately  divided  the  street  into  equal  portions 
for  the  different  companies,  reserving  a  house  or 
two  for  the  staff  of  the  regiment. 

"  A  sergeant  of  every  company  of  the  division 
being  sent  forward  so  as  to  arrive  long  before  the 
troops,  and  being  told  by  his  quartermaster  how 
many  and  what  buildings  were  set  apart  for  his 
own  people,  again  subdivided  the  houses  into  four 
equal  parts  for  each  of  the  sections. 

"  In  the  event  of  any  noise  or  disturbance  taking 
place,  whether  by  day  or  by  night,  the  probabilities 
"vere,  that  the  officers  belonging  to  the  companies 


127 

where  such  irregularities  were  going  on,  would  cer- 
tainly hear  it,  and  as  instantaneously  put  an  end 
to  it. 

"  If,  then,  the  division  marched  into  a  town,  each 
company  was  by  its  sergeant  conducted  to  the 
houses  allotted  to  it;  in  which  they  were  estab- 
hshed  in  a  very  few  minutes.  It  rarely  happened, 
therefore,  that  the  soldiers  were  kept  wailing  in  the 
streets  for  any  length  of  time,  as  has  too  often  been 
the  case. 

"  Should  it,  on  the  other  hand,  have  been  intended 
to  bivouac  the  division,  instead  of  putting  it  into 
houses,  arrangements  of  a  similar  nature  were 
adopted,  by  sending  forward  officers  and  sergeants 
to  take  up  the  ground  ;  by  which  means  each  com- 
pany marched  at  once  up  to  its  own  sergeant,  on 
whom  they  formed  in  open  column. 

"  The  rolls  were  immediately  called  ;  the  men 
first  for  duty  were  warned  for  guards,  (also  in- 
lying and  outlying  pickets,  if  near  the  enemy.)  for 
fatigue  duties,  to  draw  the  rations,  to  procure 
wood  for  cooking  if  none  was  near  at  hand,  to  go 
for  water  if  no  river  flowed  near  the  encampment, 
&.C.  &c. 

"  This  done,  and  the  alarm-post,  or  place  of  gen- 
eral assembly,  having  been  pointed  out  to  every 
one,  the  men  were  dismissed ;  the  arms  piled,  the 
cooking  immediately  commenced,  and  all  further 
parades  were  dispensed  with  for  the  day,  except  a 
roll-call  about  sunset. 

"Parties  to  procure  forage,  whether  green  or 
dry,  were  sent  out  in  charge  of  an  officer  as  soon 
as  the  troops  were  dismissed. 

344.  "  Amongst  the  various  regulations  laid  down 
for  the  light-division,  I  must  not  omit  to  mention 
what  were  termed  mule-guards. 


128 

"  A  corporal  and  three  privates  of  every  com- 
pany, mounted  guard  at  nightfall,  whenever  the 
division  was  encamjicd.  Tlie  particular  duty  ex- 
pected from  tlie  sentinels  of  these  company  guards, 
was  to  keep  an  eye  to  the  baggage  animals  belong- 
ing to  their  officers,  (which  were  picketed  to  the 
trees  or  fastened  in  some  other  manner,)  and  to  pre- 
vent them  from  breaking  loose. 

"  After  the  establishment  of  those  little  guards, 
but  few  instances  occurred  of  whole  troops  of  noisy 
mules,  horses,  and  asses,  chasing  each  other  round 
and  through  the  camp  or  bivouac,  and  galloping 
over  tlie  faces  and  bodies  of  the  soldiers  whilst 
lliey  were  asleep. 

'•  Independent  of  their  utility  in  this  way,  every 
company  in  tlie  division,  having  its  own  sentinel, 
was  sure  to  be  instantly  apprized  of  any  alarm  du- 
ring the  night  from  the  pickets  in  front ;  and  they 
were  enabled,  also,  to  communicate  to  their  respec- 
tive companies,  without  the  least  delay,  any  orders 
arriving  at  the  camp. 

"  Tliose  only  who  have  witnessed  it  can  thor- 
oughly understand  with  what  uncommon  facility 
and  dispatch  the  division  could  suddenly  get  under 
arms,  form  in  column  of  marcii,  load  tlie  baggage, 
and  proceed  on  the  route  chalked  out  for  it." 

345.  Defensive  ineasures  of  Dctachmenls.  In  the 
combats  of  detachments,  whether  offensive  or  de- 
fensive, as  the  employment  of  skirmishers  is  the 
princi|)al  means  resorted  to,  and  tlie  troops,  but  in 
rare  cases,  act  in  mass  against  the  enemy,  posi- 
tions should  be  chosen  which  will  be  favorable  for 
this  kind  of  combat.  It  but  seldom  happens,  in 
selecting  a  position  for  the  defensive,  that  strong 
points  can  be  found  to  secure  the  wings  from  an 
attack  J  but  no  uosition  should  be  taken  up  wliicli 


129 

does  not  present  covers  for  the  infantry ;  good 
points  for  the  action  of  tJie  artillery,  where  it  will 
be  but  little  exposed ;  as  well  as  shelters  where 
the  cavalry  may  be  kept  at  hand,  ready  for  any 
emergency,  and  unexposed  to  the  lire  of  the  ene- 
my's artillery. 

346.  The  natural  features  of  the  position  will 
necessarily  determine  the  dispositions  for  the  de- 
fence. It  must,  however,  be  borne  in  mind  that, 
as  it  is  essential  to  keej)  the  troops  well  in  hand  for 
mutual  support,  they  must  not  be  too  much  dis- 
persed ;  and  that  a  position  which  requires  this 
cannot  be  vigorously  defended.  The  artillery 
should  be  kept  within  a  hundred  paces  of  the  main- 
body  of  the  infantry  ;  and  the  cavalry  at  about  two 
hundred  paces.  Offensive  movements  will  be 
mostly  left  to  the  cavalry ;  which  should  be  held  in 
reserve  as  long  as  possible,  in  order  that  it  may  act 
with  the  more  effect  upon  the  enemy  when  he  is 
weakened.  The  infantry  should  only  resort  to  the 
bayonet  under  very  favorable  circumstances ;  as, 
when  acting  in  mass,  it  will  be  more  exposed  to 
the  enemy's  fire,  and  be  more  in  danger  of  being 
surrounded. 

347.  Defiles  in  the  rear  of  a  position  do  not  pre- 
sent the  same  dangers  to  small  as  they  do  to  large 
bodies  of  troops,  and  may  indeed  be  very  favorable 
to  the  defence  in  a  retreat ;  but  a  position  should 
not  be  taken  up  too  far  in  advance  of  a  defile,  as  it 
might  give  the  enemy  an  opportunity  of  cutting  off 
the  retreat  of  the  detachment.  Whenever  this  dan- 
ger is  to  be  apprehended,  it  must  be  guarded  against 
by  flankers ;  whose  duty  it  will  be  to  give  timely 
warning  to  the  main-body  of  any  movement  of  the 
enemy  to  gain  their  rear. 

348.  If  the  detachment  is  forced  to  retreat,  the 


130 

greatest  attention  luust  be  given  to  keep  the  troops 
well  together,  and  to  inspire  them  with  confidence 
in  their  mutual  support.  Every  advant;ige  should 
be  taken  of  the  strong  features  of  the  ground  for 
chocking  the  enemy,  by  occupying  it  with  skir 
mishers.  A  portion  of  the  cavalry  should  be  alwaya 
at  hand,  to  act  offensively  when  occasion  offers. 
The  artillery  will  retire  by  half  batteries,  or  sec- 
tions, for  the  purpose  of  taking  up  successive  posi 
tions  to  secure  the  retreat  of  the  main-body.  When 
ever  a  defile  is  met  on  the  line  of  retreat,  the  en- 
trance to  it  should  be  timely  secured,  by  occupying 
every  strong  point  near  it,  to  cover  the  retreating 
column.  If  the  defile  is  of  a  character  that  admits 
of  interior  defence,  some  men  should  be  sent  in  ad- 
vance to  rai^e,  at  suitable  points,  barriers,  or  any 
other  obstacles  that  will  serve  as  shelters  from 
which  the  enemy  can  be  held  in  check. 

349.  Defence  of  Defiles.  The  term  defile  is  ap- 
plied to  any  narrow  passage  through  which  troops 
can  only  pass  in  column,  or  by  a  flank;  such,  for 
example,  as  roads  confined  between  mountains, 
causeways  through  marshes,  a  bridge,  &,c. 

350.  Defiles  are  occupied  either  to  secure  them 
for  our  own  purposes,  or  to  prevent  an  enemy  from 
passing  them.  In  either  case,  the  position  taken 
up  by  the  troops,  whether  in  advance  of,  or  in  the 
rear  of  the  defile,  to  hold  it,  will  depend  upon  its 
length  and  the  features  of  the  ground  at  its  outlets. 
If  the  ground  in  advance  is  open  to  the  enemy's 
fire,  the  entrance  to  the  defile  cannot  be  defended 
with  any  chance  of  success.  In  like  manner,  if 
the  ground  in  the  rear  is  of  the  same  character, 
and  witliin  range  of  the  enemy's  fire,  it  will  not  be 
practicable  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  debouching 
if  in  sufficient  force. 


131 

351.  Wlien  the  defile  is  to  be  secured  lor  our 
own  use,  the  ground  in  advance  must  be  occupied, 
by  taking  advantage  of  all  the  natural  features  fa- 
vorable to  the  defence.  The  flanks  of  the  position 
should,  if  practicable,  rest  upon  points  that  the 
enemy  will  not  be  able  to  turn.  The  entrance 
will  be  guarded  by  a  strong  detachment ;  and  if 
there  are  points  within  the  defile  which  would  be 
favorable  for  checking  the  enemy,  in  case  of  re- 
treat, they  should  be  prepared  for  defence,  by 
using  such  means  as  may  be  found  at  hand  for 
strengthening  them. 

352.  If  it  be  deemed  advisable  to  take  position  in 
rear  of  the  defile  rather  than  in  front,  the  entrance 
to  it  should  be  occupied  by  a  small  detachment,  for 
the  purpose  of  observing  the  enemy  ;  and  if  there 
are  points  on  the  flanks  of  the  defile  which,  if  in  pos- 
session of  the  enemy,  would  render  him  master  of 
it,  they  must  be  strongly  guarded. 

353.  The  detachment  for  the  defence  of  a  defile 
will  be  composed  of  one  or  several  arms,  according 
to  the  character  of  the  ground.  Each  arm  will  be 
posted  on  the  points  most  favorable  to  its  action,  and 
for  mutual  support.  If  the  position  taken  up  be  in 
rear  of  the  defile,  the  artillery  should  be  placed  at 
three  or  four  hundred  paces  in  the  rear,  so  as  to 
command  by  its  fire  the  interior  and  outlet.  The 
cavalry  should  be  at  some  two  hundred  paces  back, 
ready  to  charge  the  enemy  in  flank  as  he  debouches. 
The  skirmishers  should  seize  upon  every  point  near 
the  outlet  from  which  the  enemy  can  be  reached,  both 
within  the  defile  and  as  he  debouches  from  it ; 
whilst  the  main-body  of  the  infantry  will  be  posted 
on  the  right  and  left  of  the  outlet,  in  the  best  posi- 
tions for  throwing  in  a  heavy  fire,  and  then  driving 
back  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet. 


132 

854.  When  a  position  taken  in  advance  of  a  de- 
file is  likely  to  be  forced,  the  retreat  should  be  com- 
menced by  scndino;  all  the  artillery  except  two 
pieces  to  the  rear,  to  take  a  position  to  secure  the 
outlet.  A  portion  of  the  cavalry  will  next  retire, 
the  rest  remaining  with  the  rear-guard,  to  check 
by  its  charges  the  enemy,  should  he  press  on  with 
vigor  to  seize  the  entrance.  The  main-body  of  the 
infantry  will  riext  retire  by  the  usual  movements, 
either  from  the  centre  or  the  wings,  as  the  case 
may  require.  The  rear-guard,  having  secured  the 
entrance  until  the  main-body  is  far  enough  to  the 
rear  to  be  out  of  danger,  will  retire  ;  the  cavalry,  or 
the  infantry  leading,  as  the  defile  may  present  fea- 
tures most  favorable  to  the  action  of  the  one  or  the 
other  arm.  As  the  troops  successively  clear  the 
outlet,  they  will  take  position  to  receive  the  enemy 
should  he  attempt  to  force  a  passage. 

355.  In  mountainous  passes,  where  the  flanks  of 
the  defile  can  be  attained  by  the  heights  falling  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  these  points 
must  be  occupied  by  detachments,  as  well  as  all 
paths,  or  roads  leading  to  the  flanks,  or  to  the  real 
of  the  defile.  The  reserves  of  the  detachments 
should  occupy  in  preference  points  where  cross- 
roads meet.  The  communications  between  the  de- 
tachments and  the  main-body  must  be  well  pre- 
served ;  and  if  the  detachments  are  driven  in,  they 
must  fall  back  on  their  supports,  and  occupy  other 
points  on  the  llanks  previously  designated.  A  re  • 
treat,  under  such  circumstances,  will  demand  tho 
greatest  circumspection,  and  great  unity  of  action. 
To  secure  the  retreat  of  the  rear-guard,  the  lateral 
issues  should  be  well  guarded  by  detachments. 

356.  Bridges  and  dikes  are  defended  in  the  same 
manner  as   other  defiles.     A  bridge  in  an  oue» 


133 

country,  particularly  one  over  a  small  water* 
course,  is  not  susceptible  of  a  good  defence,  and  the 
best  thing  to  be  done,  to  render  the  passage  useless 
to  the  enemy,  is  to  destroy  it.  If  the  country  on 
the  side  towards  the  enemy  is  open,  whilst  on  the 
opposite  side  it  is  broken  so  as  to  present  good 
covers  for  the  troops,  a  position  may  be  taken  up 
behind  the  bridge,  and  the  dqfence  be  conducted  in 
the  usual  manner.  If,  on  the  enemy's  side,  the 
ground  is  broken,  whilst  the  other  side  is  open,  a 
defence  can  only  be  attempted  at  great  risk  ;  as,  in 
case  of  being  forced  to  retreat,  the  movement  must 
be  made  under  strong  disadvantages,  arising  from 
the  exposed  position  of  the  flanks  of  the  retreating 
force,  whilst  on  the  bridge,  to  fire,  as  well  as  that  of 
the  position  which  must  be  taken  up  on  the  opposite 
side,  if  an  attempt  is  made  to  arrest  the  enemy  at 
the  outlet  of  the  bridge.  When  both  ends  of  the 
bridge  are  favorable  to  defence,  the  side  towards  the 
enemy  may  be  occupied  by  a  detachment  whilst  the 
main-body  takes  position  on  the  opposite  side. 

357.  Fords  can  only  be  defended  with  safety  by 
taking  up  a  position  behind  them  when  the  ground 
presents  good  covers,  near  enough  to  the  point  of 
crossing,  to  bring  a  strong  fire  on  the  enemy  whilst 
passing.  Fords  are  usually  the  more  difficult  of 
defence,  as  several  are  frequently  found  in  the 
same  vicinity.  The  best  plan  to  be  resorted  to 
generally,  is  to  endeavor  to  obstruct  them  by  any 
means  at  hand. 

358.  Villages,  <^c.  Villages  which  are  acces- 
sible on  all  sides  should  not  be  occupied  by  a  de- 
tachment which  is  obliged  to  rely  only  on  its  own 
resources  ;  but  when  they  are  so  situated  that  they 
can  be  approached  by  the  enemy  only  in  front, 
having  their  flanks  covered  by  natural  obstacles 


134 

and  the  groiind  in  their  rear  being  favorable  to  a 
movement  of  retreat,  they  may  be  defended  with 
success,  provided  they  are  not  commanded  by  the 
ground  in  advance,  within  the  range  of  fire-arms, 
and  that  the  approaches  to  them  can  be  swept  by 
the  fire  of  tiie  defence. 

359.  On  occupying  a  village,  the  commanding- 
officer  should  immediately  make  himself  acquainted 
with  the  environs  to  at  least  within  the  range  of 
fire-arms  ;  and  lose  no  time  in  erecting  such  obsta- 
cles, as  barricades  across  the  streets,  abatis,  «Sz.c., 
as  the  means  at  his  disposal  will  permit. 

360.  The  defence  will  mainly  fall  upon  the  in- 
fantry, which  should  be  divided  into  three  parties  for 
this  object ;  tlie  one  will  occupy  all  favorable  points 
where  cover  can  be  obtained  on  the  outskirts  of  the 
village,  such  as  ditches,  inclosures,  &c. ;  another, 
divided  into  a  suitable  number  of  detachments,  will 
be  posted,  under  cover,  on  the  most  accessible  ave- 
nues to  the  position  occupied  by  the  first,  of  which 
they  will  form  the  supports  ;  the  third  will  form  one 
or  more  reserves,  according  to  the  extent  of  ground 
taken  up,  and  will  be  posted  at  some  central  point 
most  convenient  to  act,  according  as  circumstances 
may  demand. 

361.  The  artillery  will  be  placed  at  those  points 
where  it  can  best  sweep  the  ground  over  which  the 
enemy  must  approach  to'  attack  the  weak  points 
of  the  position.  It  should  bs  covered  by  an  epaul- 
ment,  and  be  masked  uniil  it  is  necessary  to  open 
its  fire. 

362.  Cavalry  can  aid  but  little  in  the  interior 
defence  of  a  village  ;  if  it  form  a  part  of  the  detach- 
ment, it  may  take  post  so  as  to  secure  the  flanks  of 
the  village,  if  they  are  not  well  covered  ;  otherwise 
a  position  should  be  taken  by  it  in  rear,  to  be  readj 


135 

to  cover  the  retreat,  if  the  other  troops  should  be 
driven  out  by  the  enemy. 

363.  In  the  defence  of  a  village,  the  detachment, 
unless  it  should  find  itself  decidedly  superior  to  tho 
enemy,  will  rely  mainly  upon  the  effects  of  its  hre. 
Sorties  may  be  attempted,  if  the  enemy  commits  any 
blunder ;  such  as  exposing  himself  to  a  flank  attack, 
or  not  supporting  well  his  advanced  line.  When  a 
sortie  is  decided  upon,  the  point  from  which  it  is 
made  should  be  strongly  occupied,  to  cover  the 
party  sallying  out  in  case  of  a  repulse.  The  party 
for  the  sortie  should  attack  with  vigor,  but  with  due 
precautions  against  being  cut  off;  and  if  they  suc- 
ceed in  driving  back  the  enemy,  they  must  not  en- 
gage in  a  headlong  pursuit,  but  fall  back  under 
cover  of  the  party  holding  the  point  from  which 
they  sallied. 

364.  If  the  troops  occupying  the  exterior  line  are 
in  danger  of  being  turned  by  a  flank  attack,  they 
must  retire  upon  the  village,  and  take  up  positions 
previously  designated  for  this  contingency.  To 
insure  good  order  and  steadiness  in  this  movement, 
the  supports  should  hold  the  enemy  in  check  by  a 
sortie  on  his  flank. 

365.  When  it  is  found  that  the  village  must  be 
evacuated,  the  supports  will  act  with  the  line  of 
skirmishers,  to  delay  the  progress  of  the  enemy,  by 
disputing  every  favorable  point,  in  order  that  the 
reserves  may  have  time  to  retire  and  take  up  a  po- 
sition in  the  rear,  to  secure  the  retreat  of  the  troops 
still  engaged. 

In  the  retreat,  the  troops  falling  back  on  their 
supports,  or  reserves,  should  be  careful  not  to  place 
themselves  so  as  to  obstiuct  either  their  movements, 
or  'heir  fire  upon  the  enemy. 

366.  Inclosures  and  Houses,     In  the  defence  of 


136 

posts,  it  frequently  becomes  necessary  to  occupy 
isolated  houses  nnd  strong  farm-yard  inclosures,  lo 
prevent  the  approach  of  the  enemy  on  some  point 
In  such  cases  the  doors  and  windows,  through 
wliich  an  enemy  might  force  his  way  in,  must  be 
strongly  barricaded ;  those  from  which  a  good  fire 
can  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  enemy,  siiould  be 
arranged  to  give  the  men  secure  shelter  whilst 
firing ;  loojvholes  must  also  be  made  through  the 
walls  to  give  more  fire.  If  circumstances  require 
that  the  house  be  held  to  the  last  extremity,  the  ar- 
rangements in  the  interior  must  be  made  to  defend 
it  story  by  story,  until  the  object  to  be  attained  is 
accomplished. 

367.  The  distribution  of  the  troops  will  depend 
on  the  character  of  the  inclosure.  When  it  is  spa- 
cious and  open,  the  usual  distribution  of  a  line  of 
troops  around  the  walls,  witli  supports  and  a  re- 
serve, will  be  made.  In  a  house,  the  troops  will  be 
divided  into  several  parties,  each  under  the  com- 
mand of  a  subaltern,  or  non-commissioned  officer, 
who  will  direct  the  defence  of  their  respective  sto- 
ries. When  there  are  men  enough,  two  should  be 
placed  at  each  loop-hole,  and  a  small  reserve  be 
kept  in  the  most  sheltered  spot  at  hand.  The  main 
reseiTO  will  occupy  the  point  most  convenient  to 
fall  upon  the  enemy  should  he  force  his  way  in. 
The  men  at  the  loop-holes  should  be  cautioned  not 
to  throw  away  their  fire,  and  at  suitable  intervals 
they  should  be  relieved  by  men  from  the  reserve. 

368.  It  is  but  seldom  that  artillery  can  be  used 
in  these  cases.  Some  pieces  may  be  posted  with 
advantage  in  inclosures.  Cavalry  can  be  of  no 
service,  except  it  can  act  in  ambush  from  some 
point  where  it  may  fall  on  the  enemy's  flank. 

369.  General  Measures  for  the  Attack.    The  dis» 


137 

positions  made  for  the  attack  by  the  commantling* 
officer  of  a  detachment,  will  necessarily  be  based 
upon  the  defensive  measures  of  the  enemy.  There- 
fore, in  the  tirst  place,  a  correct  knowledge  should 
be  gained  of  the  position  taken  up  by  the  enemy, 
and  the  manner  in  which  his  troops  are  distributed 
for  its  defence.  The  points  to  which  attention  will 
be  directed  in  these  respects,  are,  ^rs/,  the  natural 
features  of  the  position  as  adapted  to  a  good  de- 
fence ;  and  second,  the  distribution  of  the  troops. 

370.  On  the  tirst  point,  the  character  of  the 
ground  in  front  of  the  enemy's  position,  as  to  its 
capabilities  for  the  effective  action  of  infantry,  cav- 
alry, and  artillery,  must  be  carefully  examined  ;  the 
flanks  of  the  position,  as  to  the  practicability  of 
turninc"  them ;  linally,  its  rear,  as  olTering  a  secure 
retreat  to  the  enemy. 

371.  On  the  second  point,  we  must  endeavor  to 
ascertain  whether  the  enemy,  in  posting  his  troops, 
has  taken  advantage  of  the  features  of  ground  in 
his  front,  by  placing  each  arm  on  those  points  most 
favorable  to  its  action  ;  whether  the  extent  of  ground 
taken  up  by  the  enemy  is  susceptible  of  a  strong 
defence  by  the  troops  which  occupy  it ;  whether  the 
different  arms  are  so  posted  as  to  give  a  mutual 
support ;  whether  the  enemy  has  neglected  to  give 
proper  supports  and  reserves,  or  to  place  them  within 
suitable  distances ;  whether  he  has  crowded  too 
many  troops  upon  one  point,  or  has  posted  too  few 
on  another;  whether  the  points  occupied  by  any 
portion  of  the  troops,  particularly  by  the  artillery, 
or  cavalry,  are  exposed  to  an  enhlading  fire  of  our 
own  artillery ;  whether  his  flanks  are  assailable; 
whether  there  are  defiles  to  his  rear  which  he  has 
omitted  to  occupy;  finally,  whether  he  has  neglected 

12* 


# 


138 

to  guard  avenues  by  which  either  his  flanks  or  rea 
may  be  reached. 

372.  If  the  enemy's  troops  are  well  posted  in 
front,  occupying  all  the  advantageous  points  pre- 
sented by  tlie  ground,  and  well  supported,  we  must 
look  to  see  what  can  be  done  by  operating  on  his 
flanks,  or  by  turning  his  position  and  gaining  his 
rear,  whilst  a  feigned  attack  is  made  on  his  front. 
If  the  extent  of  his  position  is  too  great,  and  his 
troops  too  much  dispensed,  his  flanks  may  be  men- 
aced whilst  a  serious  altack  is  made  on  his  front. 

373.  Attacks  on  the  flanks  by  a  portion  of  the 
troops  are  verj'  fovorable  against  an  enemy  not 
prompt  at  manoeuvring ;  but,  wben  made  against  a 
skilful  active  enemy,  ve  expose  oifrselves  to  the 
same  attack  that  we  attempt  against  him,  besides 
weakening  our  front. 

374.  In  moving  forward  to  the  attack,  the  troops 
should  be  kept  well  in  hand  for  mutual  support. 
The  artillery  and  cavalry  should  avail  themselves 
of  all  covers  presented  by  the  ground,  to  avoid  ex- 
posure to  the  enemy's  artillery.  The  artillery 
should  reser\-e  its  fire  until  it  can  open  with  a  de- 
cided efi'ect  to  clear  the  way  for  the  action  of  the 
main-body ;  leaving  to  the  skirmishers  to  push  for- 
ward, and  by  their  fire  drive  the  enemy  from  his 
covers.  If,  however,  there  are  points  from  which 
the  enemy  cannot  be  well  dislodged  without  the  aid 
of  artillery,  it  should  be  brought  early  into  action,  to 
avoid  the  blood-shed  of  unavailing  attacks  of  the  in- 
fantry. In  no  case  should  the  artillery  be  isolated, 
but  always  covered  by  a  strong  escort;  otherwise 
it  might  at  any  moment  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands. 

375.  In  attacks  of  the  character  in  question, 
where  tlie  skirmishers  ])lay  so  important  a  part, 
they  will  be  required  to  resort  frequently  to  tlie 


139 

bayonet,  to  dislodge  the  enemy  fully  from  his  covers 
whenever  an  opportunity  offers,  some  cavalry  should 
be  at  hand  to  take  advantage  of  the  retreat  of  the 
enemy  when  driven  from  such  points. 

376.  The  cavalry  in  its  cliarges,  however  dash- 
ingly made,  should  use  due  circumspection,  and  not 
venture  too  far  in  a  headlong  pursuit,  for  fear^  of 
being  brought  up  suddenly  by  the  enemy,  advan- 
tageously posted  to  profit  by  such  faults. 

377.  The  infantry  will  only  act  in  mass  and  with 
the  bayonet  when  the  enemy  has  been  well  wearied 
by  the  tire  of  its  skirmishers  and  artillery;  if,  when 
driven  from  his  position,  the  enemy  can  be  forced 
upon  a  defile,  a  few  rounds  of  grape  followed  up  by 
the  bayonet  can  seldom  fail  of  completing  his  de- 
struction. 

378.  Attack  of  Defiles.  The  length  of  a  defile, 
and  the  circumstance  of  its  being  prepared  by  bar- 
ricades within  it,  to  protract  the  defence,  are  points 
of  grave  importance  in  planning  an  attack.  When 
the  length  is  so  great  that  the  outlet  is  beyond  the 
range  of  our  cannon,  the  troops  will  not  be  able  to 
pass  it,  except  under  the  most  favorable  circum- 
stances, as  the  enemy  can  make  the  best  dispositions 
at  a  short  distance  from  the  outlet,  to  crush  the 
troops  which  first  attempt  to  debouclie.  If  the  de- 
file is  barricaded,  the  barricades  should  not  be  at- 
tacked in  front,  except  for  very  grave  reasons,  as, 
if  skilfully  defended,  they  can  only  be  carried  at 
great  cost  of  life. 

379.  In  attacking  the  entrance  of  a  defile,  the 
troops  should  approach  along  the  most  convenient 
and  best  sheltered  avenues,  and  deploy  when  a  lit- 
tle beyond  musket  range.  The  skirmishers  and 
♦he  artillery  should  profit  by  the  ground,  in  taking 
positions  favorable  both  for  shelter,  and  to  reach 


140 

with  their  fire  the  enemy's  tixops  Skirmishers 
should  be  directed  to  close  in,  particularly  on  llie 
obstacles  by  which  the  flanks  of  the  enemy's  posi- 
tion are  strengthened,  and  endeavor  to  dislodge  his 
troops  from  tliem.  The  main-body,  liold  hi  resen^e 
to  carry  the  entrance  with  the  bayonet,  so  soon  as 
it  is'seen  that  a  serious  impression  has  been  made 
by  the  fire,  should  be  kept  under  cover,  and  as  near 
at  hand  as  the  ground  will  permit.  If  the  enemy 
gives  way,  the  main-body  should  make  a  vigorous 
attack  in  mass  witii  tlie  bayonet ;  and,  following 
up  closely  the  retreating  troops,  endeavor  to  secure 
the  outlet  by  debouching  from  it  before  the  front  is 
so  far  unmasked  by  the  retreating  troops  as  to  en- 
able those,  in  position  for  its  defence,  to  act  with 
freedom.  As  fast  as  the  troops  debouche,  they 
must  occupy  the  ground  in  front  of  the  outlet 
strongly,  leaving  a  sufficient  force  for  the  imme- 
diate defence  of  the  outlet.  The  reserve  should 
remain  at  the  other  extremity  of  the  defile  to  act 
as  circumstances  may  require.  So  soon  as  we 
find  ourselves  in  secure  possession  of  the  defile,  a 
part  of  the  reserve,  with  all  the  cavalry,  should 
pass  and  take  positions  indicated  on  the  opposite 
side.  The  greater  part  of  the  artillery  follows,  and 
takes  position  on  the  flanks  to  open  its  fire  on  tlae 
retiring  eneuiy. 

380.  If  the  attack  on  the  entrance  to  the  defile  is 
unsuccessful,  the  troops  will  retire  behind  their  re- 
serves, the  latter  covering  this  movement,  and  hold- 
ing the  enemy  in  check  should  he  attempt  a  pursuit. 
If  a  renewed  attack  is  ordered,  the  troops  first  in 
action  will  form  a  reserve  for  the  fresh  troops 
thrown  forward. 

381.  When  it  is  found  impracticable  to  force  the 
entrance  by  a  direct  attack,  resort  must  be  had  to 


141 

Btratagem,  by  pushing  forward  a  few  trcx  ps  to  act 
on  the  enemy's  flanks,  and  try  to  dislodge  him  from 
the  obstacles  by  which  they  are  covered.  If  this 
attempt  is  successful,  the  troops  in  action  must  be 
gradually  reinforced  to  gain  supports  for  the  flanks 
of  the  column  of  attack  in  its  advance  movement. 
As  the  column  penetrates  the  defile,  ground  must 
be  gradually  gained  by  throwing  forward  fresh 
troops  which  dislodge  the  enemy,  secure  the  issues 
in  case  of  retreat,  and  hold  the  points  of  support 
of  the  flanks. 

382.  In  the  attack  of  defiles  forming  mountain- 
ous passes,  the  column  of  attack  must  be  well  cov- 
ered on  the  flanks,  by  detachments  which  make  a 
simultaneous  attack  on  the  enemy's  posts  on  the 
heights,  to  prevent  the  one  from  aflx)rding  support 
to  the  other.  These  detacliments  should  be  strong 
enough  for  the  duty  assigned,  so  that  should  any 
post  offer  a  vigorous  resistance,  they  may  be  en- 
abled to  renew  their  attacks  with  fresh  troops. 

383.  Two-thirds  of  the  detachments  will  act  as 
skirmishers,  the  other  third  will  be  held  in  reserve. 
So  soon  as  any  post  is  carried,  the  reserves  will 
occupy  it.  When  the  skirmishers  move  forward, 
a  portion  or  the  whole  of  the  reserve  will  follow, 
as  circumstances  may  demand.  There  should  be 
no  intermission  in  the  attacks  when  once  com- 
menced, but  the  enemy  be  driven  by  alternate  at- 
tacks of  fire  and  the  bayonet,  from  point  to  point, 
to  enable  the  detachments  gradually  to  gain  the 
immediate  borders  of  the  defile,  so  as  to  reach  the 
rear  of  the  enemy's  troops,  and  force  them  to  re- 
tire. The  main-body,  in  the  meantime,  should  oc- 
cupy the  enemy  in  front,  to  prevent  him  from  send- 
ing succor  to  the  posts  tliat  secure  his  rear  and 
flanks. 


142 

384.  Attacks  of  Villages,  <f-c.  As  villages,  when 
occupied  with  a  view  to  defence,  are  usually  pre- 
pared for  it  by  the  addition  of  artificial  obstacles 
to  those  which  the  position  naturally  presents,  an 
open  attack  upon  them  should,  when  practicable, 
be  avoided,  as  it  can  only  succeed,  if  the  assailed 
perform  their  duty,  at  great  loss  of  life  to  the  as- 
sailant. In  any  case,  whether  made  openly  or 
otherwise,  attacks  of  this  kind  ought  not  to  be  haz- 
arded except  with  superior  numbers,  unless  the 
enemy  be  very  inferior  in  discipline. 

385.  In  conducting  the  attack  of  a  village,  the 
troops  sliould  endeavor  to  approach  their  points  of 
attack  by  avenues  which  will  afford  them  cover 
from  the  enemy's  fire  until  they  arrive  near  them, 
and  should  particularly  try  to  gain  any  command- 
ing points  from  which  a  plunging  fire  may  be 
brought  to  bear  on  the  enemy's  covered  defences. 

386.  The  most  favorable  points  of  attack  are 
those  which  are  salient ;  as  they  are  naturally 
weak ;  those  where  there  a  re  no  prepared  de- 
fences, or  where  they  are  but  slight;  and  the 
flanks  and  rear,  when  they  are  accessible,  or  are 
not  well  secured  by  troops  so  posted  as  to  cover 
them. 

387.  The  attack  will  mainly  devolve  upon  the 
infantry.  The  artillery,  by  taking  suitable  posi- 
tions either  to  enfilade  any  part  of  the  enemy's  line 
which  lies  exposed  to  its  fire,  to  dismount  the  ene- 
my's guns,  or  to  throw  shells  from  its  howitzers 
into  inclosures,  will  prepare  the  way  for  the  m« 
fAntry.  The  cavalry  can  only  act  as  a  reserve,  to 
cover  the  infantry  if  repulsed,  and  to  secure  the 
flanks  from  an  offensive  movement  against  them. 

388.  The  infantry  will  be  divided  into  three  par 
lies  for  the  attack ;  one,  which  will  display  as  skir 


143 

misherSj  may  be  a  sixth  of  the  whole ;  another 
which  will  aci  as  the  supports  of  the  first,  may  be 
about  the  one-half  of  the  whole ;  and  the  remaining 
third  will  form  the  reserve.  The  party  in  advance, 
in  dispersed  order,  will  get  over  the  ground  as  rap- 
idly as  possible,  and  endeavor  to  close  with  the 
enemy's  skirmishers ;  relying  almost  exclusively 
on  the  bayonet.  Their  supports  will  follow  in 
line,  at  from  one  hundred  to  one  hundred  and  fifty 
paces  in  their  rear ;  the  reserves  at  about  the  same 
distance  in  rear  of  the  supports,  taking  advantage 
of  the  ground  to  screen  themselves  from  tlic  ene- 
my's fire.  If  the  advanced  party  succeeds  in  its 
.attack  upon  the  interior  defences,  they  will  follow 
up  the  enemy  closely,  and  give  him  no  opportunity 
to  halt  and  make  a  stand ;  the  supports  will  ad- 
vance and  clear  the  streets  with  the  bayonet. 
Should  the  enemy  form  across  a  wide  street  to 
stop  the  advance,  the  skirmishers  will  move  for- 
ward in  open  order,  taking  advantage  of  any  shel- 
ters to  cover  themselves,  and  by  their  fire  force  the 
enemy  to  deliver  his,  and  the  supports  and  reserve 
in  mass  will  attack  witii  the  bayonet.  So  soon  as 
an  entrance  is  secured,  the  skirmishers  and  sup- 
ports will  drive  the  enemy  from  the  interior  de- 
fences in  their  front,  whilst  the  reserve  will  push 
forward  to  the  central  point,  to  attack  his  reserve 
if  posted  there,  and  to  be  in  readiness  to  support 
the  advanced  parties  at  any  point  where  succor 
may  be  necessary. 

389.  Whenever  they  can  be  pincured,  a  party 
of  well-trained  sappers  should  be  sent  forward  witli 
the  advance,  to  clear  any  obstacles  by  whi(;h  theii 
progress  might  be  impeded.  If  this  description  of 
troops  is  not  to  be  obtained,  a  few  active  men,  userf 


144 

to  handling  the  axe  and  pick  should  be  detailed  iot 

this  necessary  duty. 

390.  In  case  of  the  repulse  of  the  advance,  they 
will  fall  buck  to  the  nearest  cover  from  which  they 
can  open  a  fire  on  the  enemy,  and  after  being  joined 
by  their  supports  will  renew  the  attack. 

391.  Ilarullinir  of  Skirmishers.  Skirmishers  play 
so  important  a  part  in  all  affairs  of  detachments,  as 
well  as  in  engagements  of  larger  bodies,  the  circum- 
stances being  rare,  either  in  the  attack  or  defence, 
where  they  cannot  be  employed  with  considerable 
effect,  either  to  harass  or  occupy  the  enemy,  that  a 
few  words  may  be  here  especially  given  to  the 
manner  of  liandling  tliem ;  even  at  the  risk  of  re- 
peating what  has  been  already  laid  do^\^l. 

392.  The  number  of  skirmishers  employed  will 
greatly  depend  on  the  features  of  the  ground,  as 
being  more  or  less  favorable  to  the  action  of  cav- 
alry, or  of  infantry  in  mass.  In  no  case,  however, 
sliould  the  main-body  lie  unduly  weakened  by  de- 
taching too  many  skirmishers.  A  third  of  the  en- 
tire force  is  the  most  that  can  be  safely  thrown  for- 
ward for  this  duty ;  and,  if  it  be  found  that  they  are 
unable  to  maintain  their  ground  in  the  presence  of 
the  enemy,  it  will  be  safer  to  cause  them  to  fall 
back  and  reinforce  the  main-body,  by  forming  on 
the  flanks,  or  any  previously  designated  point,  than 
to  detach  from  the  main-body  for  their  support. 

393.  The  manner  of  forming  a  line  of  skirmish- 
ers, and  posting  their  supports  and  reserves,  with 
Jie  other  ordinary  mananivres  for  extending,  ad- 
vancing, retiring,  &c.,  belong  to  elementary  tactics, 
and  require  no  comment  here.  A  few  precepts, 
however,  may  be  mentioned,  as  connected  with  this 
Bubject.  The  line  of  skirmishers  should  not  1)6 
pushed  so  far  in  advance  of  the  main-body  iJaat  the 


145 

{alter  will  not  be  able  to  come  to  their  aid  in  time  if 
they  sliould  be  vigorously  pressed  by  the  enemy ; 
or  be  able  to  profit  by  any  advantages  obtained  by 
tliem.  The  reserves  to  support  the  line  should  in 
all  cases  be  near  enough  for  this  object ;  and,  as 
far  as  practicable,  be  posted  where  they  can  readily 
tind  cover  from  tiie  enemy's  fire ;  taking  advantage, 
for  this  purpose,  of  any  irregularities  of  ground  or 
shelters,  like  walls,  hedges,  ditches,  &c.  The  re- 
serves may  be  of  less  strength  in  broken  than  in 
open  ground  ;  being,  however,  never  less  than  a 
fourth  in  the  former,  nor  a  third  in  the  latter  case. 

394.  The  position  of  skirmishers  in  advance  of 
the  main-body  will  depend  on  the  natural  features 
of  the  ground.  As  a  general  rule,  they  ought  to 
cover  both  the  front  and  flanks  of  the  main-body, 
extending  far  enough  beyond  each  flank  for  the 
latter  purpose  ;  and,  in  all  manoeuvres  of  the  main- 
body  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  it  should  be  protected 
by  skirmishers  until  the  new  position  is  taken  up. 

395.  It  is  seldom  necessary  to  throw  forward  the 
skirmishers  before  the  main-body  is  ready  to  com- 
mence the  action.  They  should  deploy  and  extend 
oefore  coming  within  reach  of  the  enemy's  mus- 
ketry ;  and,  when  the  lines  are  near  enough  to  en- 
gage, they  should  retire  to  the  positions  previously 
assigned  them. 

396.  A  quick  eye,  presence  of  mind,  and  good 
judgment  in  taking  up  ground  are  indispensable  to 
an  ofiicer  in  command  of  skirmishers,  to  enable 
him  to  keep  his  troops  easily  in  hand  ;  preventing 
them  from  rushing  on  headlong  in  the  pursuit,  when 
any  success  is  gained ;  and  directing  them  to  seize 
upon  every  cover,  either  in  advancing  or  retiring, 
from  which  they  can  with  advantage  annoy  tlie 
enemy  or  hold  him  in  check. 

13 


146 

397.  The  accuracy  of  aim,  upon  which  the  gooQ 
effects  to  be  obtained  by  skirmishers  depends,  re« 
quires  that  the  men  should  be  kept  cool  and  m  good 
order.  All  hurried  and  violent  movements,  by 
which  the  men  may  lose  breath  and  become  ex- 
hausted, should  be  avoided  ;  and  they  should  be 
frequently  cautioned  against  rapid  firing,  which 
soon  impairs  the  aim,  and  be  directed  never  to  raise 
the  piece  until  they  feel  sure  of  their  shot. 

398.  In  an  advance  movement  of  skirmishers, 
their  line  will  necessarily  have  to  conform  to  the 
features  of  the  ground ;  when  this  is  open,  the  align- 
ment should,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  preser\'ed ; 
and  when  broken,  the  officers  should  see  that  mu- 
tual support  is  given  throughout  between  the  de- 
tached portions ;  and  that  those  on  the  flanks  be 
particularly  cautioned  not  to  suffer  their  attention  to 
be  so  much  taken  up  by  the  enemy  in  front  as  to 
neglect  securing  the  flanks  from  any  attempt  upon 
them,  either  openly  or  by  ambush. 

399.  Wherever  an  open  portion  of  ground  occurs, 
it  should  be  gotten  rapidly  over,  so  that  the  men 
shall  be  exposed  as  little  as  may  be  ;  and,  if  there 
is  any  apprehension  from  the  enemy's  cavalry  in 
such  cases,  the  men  should  be  kept  well  together, 
or  even  be  rallied  on  the  reserves,  until  tlie  charac- 
ter of  the  ground  will  enable  them  to  deploy  with 
safety. 

400.  If  the  more  advanced  portions  come  upon 
the  enemy  in  force,  tliey  should  halt  and  occupy 
him  in  front ;  whilst  a  portion  may  try  to  turn  him, 
er  to  annoy  his  flanks.  In  like  manner,  in  a  suc- 
cessful attack  on  the  enemy's  out-posts,  the  skii 
mishers  should  endeavor  to  maintain  tlieir  grouna 
when  tJiey  come  upon  his  main-body,  by  occupying 
its  attention  until  their  own  main  force  can  come  up. 


147 

401.  In  the  attack  upon  all  covered  positioas  held 
by  the  enemy,  skirmishes  play  the  most  important, 
part ;  and,  although  it  may  require  the  action  of 
masses  to  dislodge  the  enemy  under  some  ciicum- 
Btances,  there  are  but  few  in  which,  by  a  judicious 
selection  of  ground,  skirmishers  may  not  greatly 
bother  him.  The  broken  features  presented  by 
wooded  and  rocky  ravines,  or  the  beds  of  small 
fordable  streams,  irom  the  opposite  side  of  wliich  an 
enemy  must  be  rooted  out  before  ground  can  be 
gained  forward,  are  ugly  circumstances  in  an  ad- 
vance movement ;  and  great  skill  and  patience  are 
requisite  on  the  part  of  both  othcers  and  men  to  ac- 
complish their  object.  Points  which  afford  a  good 
cover  for  a  few  men,  or  from  which  a  commanding  or 
a  flanking  view  of  the  enemy's  line  can  be  obtainedj 
should  be  sought  for ;  and,  where  tlie  men  would  be 
much  exposed  in  gaining  such  points,  from  the  open 
character  of  the  intervening  ground,  they  should  be 
sent  forward  singly,  with  directions  as  to  the  best 
probable  manner  of  attaining  their  object,  and  be 
particularly  cautioned  against  exposing  themselves 
in  little  knots  of  three  or  four  together,  as  the 
chances  of  casualties  will  be  thereby  increased.  If 
the  crest  of  a  hill  intervenes  in  a  pursuit,  it  should 
be  gained  with  great  caution,  for  fear  of  coming 
suddenly  upon  the  enemy  in  force  on  the  opposite 
side. 

402.  When  the  em^my  occupies  strong  artilicial 
obstacles,  as  palisades,  an  abatis,  yards,  of  which 
the  walls  are  loop-holed,  &,c.,  an  attempt  should 
be  made  to  dislodge  him  by  shells  from  howitzers ; 
the  troops  for  the  assault  may  then  be  advanced  as 
skirmishers,  and  when  within  about  two  hundred 
paces,  should  clear  the  intervening  ground  at  full 
speed,  in  closing. 


148 

403.  In  attacks  upon  forests,  the  intervening 
*pen  ground  must  be  cleared  in  a  similar  style ; 
and  after  the  enemy  has  been  dislodged  from  the 
skirts,  the  further  advance  should  be  cautiously 
made  ;  attention  being  paid  to  preserving  the  gen- 
eral alignment ;  the  men  taking  care  to  avoid  leav- 
ing any  considerable  gaps  between  them,  or  of 
losing  sight  of  each  other.  A  vigilant  eye  should 
be  ke{)t  upon  securing  the  communications  to  the 
rear  by  the  reserves,  in  case  of  being  forced  to  re- 
tire ;  and,  before  passing  cross-roads,  it  should  be 
well  ascertained  that  they  do  not  offer  any  facilities 
for  an  olfensive  movement  of  the  enemy. 

404.  Wiienever  a  defile  is  met  with,  which  is  nof. 
strongly  guarded,  some  of  the  line  of  skirmishers 
may  enter  it  boldly,  reljnng  on  the  bayonet,  whilst 
others  take  up  points  from  which  they  can  enfilade 
it ;  but  if  the  enemy  makes  a  show  of  a  vigorous 
resistance,  the  skirmishers  should  seize  upon  the 
best  points  on  its  flanks  from  which  a  warm  steady 
fire  can  be  kept  up  on  it,  and  hold  them  until  their 
reserves,  or  if  necessary  the  main-body,  can  come 
up  and  force  their  way  with  the  bayonet.  When 
the  defile  is  carried,  the  reserves  follow  tlie  onward 
movement  of  the  line  of  skirmishers,  leaving  it  to 
be  held,  if  it  be  thought  necessary,  by  a  detach- 
ment from  tlie  main-body.         • 

405.  Skirmishers  necessarily  play  a  very  impor- 
tant part  in  mountainous  warfiirc,  as  the  broken 
character  of  the  ground  presents  many  points  from 
which  it  may  become  exceedingly  difficult  to  dis- 
lodge an  enemy  thoroughly  conversant,  from  some 
days'  occupancy,  with  all  its  resources.  In  such  at- 
tacks, as  the  valley-passes  will  usually  be  occupied 
by  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  the  skirmishers  must 
try  to  gain  successively  tlie  heiglits  on  the  flanks  of 


149 

the  main  position ;  care  being  taken  that  no  party 
gets  too  much  in  advance  of  the  other.  If  the  enemy 
retires,  a  portion  of  the  skirmishers  should  follow 
closely  upon  his  rear,  whilst  others  occupy  com- 
manding points  from  which  they  can  keep  up  a 
well-directed  fire  on  him.  If,  in  the  pursuit,  paths 
should  be  found  leading  to  the  flanks,  or  rear  of  the 
enemy's  main-position,  some  detachments  may  be 
pushed  forward  in  these  directions,  to  bother  the 
enemy,  whilst  the  rest  join  in  the  main  attack. 

406.  If  a  vigorous  resistance  is  offered  by  the 
enemy,  it  will  be  necessary  to  employ  a  number  of 
small  detachments  to  dislodge  him  from  every  cover. 
These  should  advance  along  the  most  advantageous 
paths,  proceeding  with  great  caution,  and  leaving 
no  suspicious  points  to  the  rear,  until  they  are  tho- 
roughly searched  and  their  character  ascertained. 
The  communications  to  the  rear,  by  which  the 
skirmishers  will  have  to  retire  if  repulsed,  must  be 
well  secured  by  the  reserves,  who  will  usually  take 
post  at  the  junction  of  cross-roads,  or  in  other  po- 
sitions favorable  to  receiving  the  skirmishers  and 
covering  their  retreat. 

407.  If  an  isolated  post  of  the  enemy  is  met  with, 
every  point  around  it,  from  which  a  fire  can  be 
brought  to  bear,  should  be  occupied  by  skirmish- 
ers; and  a  steady  unintermitted  fire  be  kept  up 
against  it  until  he  is  dislodged,  or  driven  from  it 
by  an  attack  with  the  bayonet  by  the  reserves. 

408.  In  the  retreat,  every  advantageous  point 
which  offers  cover  to  skirmishers,  should  be  seized 
on  by  them,  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  and  thus 
give  time  to  the  main-body  to  retire  in  good  order. 
The  skirmishers,  however,  should  not  fall  too  far 
to  rear,  so  as  not  to  compromise  their  own  safety; 
whenever  obliged  to  this,  a  part  of  the  reserves 

13* 


150 

may  be  thrown  forward,  to  reinforce  the  line,  and 
give  more  viper  to  its  fire ;  but  a  part  should  al- 
ways be  kept  in  reserve  to  be  ready  for  any  emer» 
gency.  If  the  retreat  be  through  a  defile,  and  tiie 
enemy's  pursuit  is  feeble,  it  will  usually  be  only 
necessary  to  deploy  the  reserves  of  the  skirmishers 
on  such  ground,  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  en- 
trance to  it,  as  may  be  favorable  to  bringing  a  good 
fire  to  bear  on  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  the  main- 
bfldy  has  cleared  the  defile,  or  is  sufficiently  be- 
yond the  reach  of  an  active  pursuit,  the  skirmishers 
and  tlieir  reserves  retire  by  sections ;  keeping  at 
from  two  to  three  hundred  paces  in  the  rear  of  the 
main-body.  In  case  the  enemy  should  push  for- 
ward with  vigor,  the  skirmishers  adopt  the  same 
measures ;  but  the  additional  precaution  should  be 
taken  of  holding  the  outlet  of  the  defile,  by  a  de- 
tachment posted  advantageously  for  that  object, 
until  all  the  skirmishers  have  cleared  it. 

409.  In  all  positions  taken  up  for  the  defensive 
in  mountainous,  or  broken  ground,  whether  the 
valleys  or  the  heights  be  occupied,  those  points 
from  which  the  troops  might  be  annoyed  by  the 
enemy's  skirmishers  should  be  guarded  by  our 
own,  as  well  as  all  pathways  leading  to  them  ;  at- 
tention should  be  given  so  to  post  our  skirmishers 
as  to  take  the  enemy  in  flank  in  his  assault  upon 
the  front  of  the  position. 

410.  The  safety  of  the  communications  must  be 
carefully  looked  to  in  a  retreat;  and  for  this  object 
the  position  of  the  reser\-es  should  be  judiciously 
selected ;  taking  them  at  those  points  where  the 
enemy  would  be  met,  shouM  he  take  paths  or 
cross-roads,  passing  beyond  the  flanks  of  the  line 
occupied  by  the  skirmisliors.  to  gain  their  rear 
The  skirmishers  tliemseh'cs  should  not  hold  pes 


151 

session  too  long  of  any  point,  in  order  not  to  have 
their  safely  compromised,  by  leaving  too  wide  an 
interval  between  themselves  and  the  main-body; 
and  whenever  they  are  thrown  into  inclosures, 
they  should  see  that  easy  communications  are 
opened  to  the  rear  for  a  timely  exit. 

411.  Although  skirmishers  should  rely  mainly 
on  a  steady,  well-directed  fire,  for  the  attainment 
of  their  ends,  still  a  resort  to  the  bayonet  by  the 
reserves  should  not  be  overlooked ;  as,  by  a  judi 
cious  combination  of  caution  with  boldness,  the 
enemy  may  not  only  be  held  in  check,  and  be  con- 
strained to  a  very  circumspect  course,  but  may  be 
frequently  so  forced  back  as  to  enable  the  skirmish- 
ers, if  it  be  advisable,  to  recover  lost  ground. 

412.  Tlie  fact  should  never  be  lost  sight  of,  that 
a  line  of  skirmishers  is  weak  in  itself;  and  even 
powerless  when  exposed  to  the  attack  of  cavalry, 
or  that  of  infantry  in  mass.  It  offers  but  a  bad 
mark  to  the  enemy's  round  shot  in  front,  but  it 
may  be  greatly  damaged  from  an  enfilading  posi- 
tion ;  and  care  should  therefore  be  taken  not  to 
post  a  line  behind  any  obstacle  which,  like  a  hedge, 
or  ditch,  may  so  present  itself  to  the  enemy's  bat- 
teries. The  line  may  also  greatly  suffer  when, 
manoeuvring  in  open  ground,  it  comes  within  short 
range  of  the  grape  and  canister  of  the  enemy.  The 
true  tactics,  therefore,  of  skirmishers,  is  to  avoid 
open  ground,  and  to  throw  themselves  into  that 
which  presents  obstacles  to  the  enemy's  move- 
ments, and  alfords  covers  not  exposed  to  enfilailing 
views  of  his  batteries ;  to  seek  for  positions  from 
which  their  fire  will  annoy  the  enemy  both  in  front 
and  flank,  occupying  liiin  in  front  wliilst  ground  is 
gained  on  tlie  flank  ;  and  in  all  changes  of  position, 
whetlier  advancing  or  retiring,  to  move  from  one  to 


152 

the  other,  both  with  celerity  and  by  an  orderly  hi 
multaneous  movement. 

413.  Excalading.  This  is  a  means  of  attack 
upon  which  our  English  friends  rather  pique  them- 
selves ;  in  spite  of  some  signal  failures  during  the 
Peninsular  campaigns,  and  some  successes  in 
which  as  much  seems  to  have  been  owing  to 
chance  as  to  any  other  cause ;  as  the  reader,  who 
may  look  over  Jones'' s  Journal  of  the  Sieges  carried 
on  in  these  campaigns,  will  find.  Since  that  time 
it  has  been  successfully  used  in  the  attacks  made 
on  the  stockade  forts  in  India.  How  far  it  might 
succeed  against  ourselves,  we  have  no  means  of 
judging ;  as  in  the  attempts  by  our  friends  on  our 
slight  lield-works,  during  the  last  war,  very  few  of 
them  had  an  opportunity  of  getting  further  than  the 
ditch,  under  the  deadly  tire  of  our  well-practised  cit- 
izens. It  is  a  resource,  however,  when  others  fail ; 
and,  in  a  favorable  moment,  may  succeed,  either 
through  the  surprise,  or  cowardice  of  the  assailed. 

414.  In  a  little  work,  on  the  Attack  of  Military 
Posts,  (^-c,  by  Captain,  now,  we  believe.  Colonel 
Jebb,  of  the  Royal  Engineers, — which,  as  well  as 
his  Defence  of  Out-posts,  is  cordially  commended 
to  the  perusal  of  our  young  officers,  for  its  practi- 
cal details  and  capital  common-sense  views ;  mau- 
gre  its  slap-dash  flippancy  of  style,  with  which  the 
Juniors  of  the  British  line,  it  seems,  must  be  in- 
dulged, to  cheat  them  into  a  little  study  of  their 
art, — the  manner  of  conducting  an  assault  by  esca- 
lade is  given  with  some  detail.  Whether  the  groups 
termed  rallying  columns  by  the  author,  would  act 
more  harmoniously  towards  the  attainment  of  the 
main  oljjecl,  than  the  groups  of  another  more  cele- 
brated system,  also  brought  together  by  their  attrac* 
tional  sympathies,  experiment  alone  can  determine. 


153 

415.  The  following  is  the  outline  of  the  method 
of  escalude,  proposed  by  Colonel  Jebb  in  the  work 
referred  to.  Ladders  of  suitable  length  for  the  en- 
terprise are  to  be  provided  for  scaling  the  scarp ; 
the  one  proposed  is  three  feet  longer  than  the 
height  of  the  scarp  ;  so  that,  the  foot  of  the  laddci 
being  planted  a  pace  or  two  from  the  bottom  of  the 
wall,  the  top  may  project  far  enough  above  the 
wall  to  enable  the  men  to  step  from  the  ladder 
with  ease,  in  an  upright  position.  An  allowance 
of  one  ladder  is  made  Tor  every  live  feet  of  the  face 
to  be  scaled ;  one  hundred  feet,  for  example,  re- 
quiring twenty  ladders. 

416.  To  each  ladder,  from  four  to  si.x  men  are 
assigned,  according  to  its  lenoth.  The  ladders  are 
borne,  in  the  usual  manner,  on  the  slioulders  of  the 
men ;  two  or  three  being  placed  on  each  side  for 
this  purpose. 

The  ladders  for  scaling  the  scarp  are  assigned  tc 
the  advance.  A  second  set  of  less  dimensions,  for 
descending  into  the  ditch  only,  are  assigned  to  the 
support.  The  scarp  ladders  are  placed  on  the 
ground  in  line,  at  some  suitable  point,  with  the 
proper  intervals  between  them ;  the  men  to  carry 
them,  properly  "  told  off,"  are  drawn  up  in  rear  of 
them ;  and,  at  the  proper  commands,  are  marched 
to  their  places  at  the  sides  of  the  ladders,  and  raise 
them  ready  for  the  forward  movement.  Similar 
dispositions  are  made  for  the  counterscarp  ladders, 
which  are  placed  in  line,  from  100  to  150  yards  in 
rear  of  the  others. 

417.  At  a  given  signal,  the  whole  are  to  move 
forward  ;  covered  by  an  advanced  tiring  party,  tc 
keep  down  the  tire  of  the  work,  and  followed  by  a 
reserve. 

The  scarp  ladders  are  let  down  into  the  ditch, 


154 

the  men  descend,  carry  them  across  it,  plant  them 
against  the  scarp,  and  monnt  to  the  top.  The  top 
of  the  panipet  ffaincd,  tlie  men  are  to  group  them- 
selves rapidly  in  ralhjing-columns ;  and  proceed  to 
clear  the  parapet  hy  charging  the  assailed  in  flank. 
418.  The  support  and  reserve,  in  the  meantime, 
are  to  follow  on  without  loss  of  time,  to  take  theil 
•hare  in  tlie  action. 


CHAPTER  Vn. 


419.  To  conduct  a  convoy  in  safety  through  an 
nemy's  territory,  where  it  is  exposed  to  attacks 

either  of  regular,  or  of  partisan  troops,  is  one  of 
the  most  hazardous  operations  of  war ;  owing  to 
the  ease  with  which  a  very  inferior  force  may  take 
the  escort  at  disadvantage  in  defiles,  or  other  posi- 
tions favorable  to  an  ambuscade,  or  surprise,  and 
to  the  difficulty  of  securing  a  long  column,  like 
that  presented  by  a  convoy,  from  a  sudden  attack. 

420.  The  escort  should  be  of  sufficient  strength 
to  beat  off  any  presumed  force  that  the  enemy  can 
bring  against  it.  A  weak  escort  will  only  hold  out 
a  temptation  to  the  enemy  to  attack  the  convoy. 
When  the  convoy  is  of  very  great  importance,  it 
may  be  necessary,  besides  giving  it  a  strong  escort, 
to  throw  out  detachments  between  its  line  of  march 
and  the  enemy  ;  and  when  there  are  posts  occupied 
by  our  troops  along  this  line,  they  should  keep  up 
a  vigilant  system  of  patrols,  pushing  them  as  far 
out  as  practicable,  so  that  the  escort  may  receive 
aid  ana  timely  notice  of  any  hostile  movement. 

The  escor*,,  when  it  is  deemed  necessary,  should 
be  composed  of  all  arms ;  but  always  of  both  in- 
fantry and  cavalry,  as,  from  the  necessity  of  gain- 
ing timely  information  of  the  enemy's  approach, 
patrols  of  cavalry  must  be  pushed  out  to  some 
distance,  both  in  front  and  on  the  flanks. 

421.  As  the  convoy  must  be  perfectly  hemmed  in 
and  guarded  on  all  points  by  its  escort,  the  latter  'm 


156 

nsually  divided  into  five  principal  portions  witli  tliia 
object ;  an  advanced-guard,  which  is  preceded  by  a 
small  detacliment  to  scour  and  search  the  ground 
in  front  of  tiio  line  of  march  ;  a  rear-guard  ;  flank 
ers  ;  and  the  main-body.  For  the  purpose  of  pre- 
senting a  sufficient  force  upon  those  points  of  the 
convoy  that  will  probably  be  assailed,  the  main- 
body  is  subdivided  into  four  unequal  portions  ;  one- 
half  of  it  will  constitute  a  it^serve ;  one-fourth  will 
form  a  guard  for  the  centre  of  the  convoy ;  and 
the  remaining  fourth  will  be  divided  into  two  equal 
portions,  one  of  which  will  march  directly  at  the 
head  of  the  convoy,  and  the  other  close  in  its  rear. 
This  subdivision  of  the  main-body  is  made  on  the 
supposition  thai  the  enemy  will  attack  the  convoy 
either  at  the  centre,  or  in  the  front,  or  rear.  If 
the  attack  is  made  upon  either  of  the  two  last 
points,  the  divisions  for  their  protection  can  be 
readily  reinforced  by  the  advanced,  or  the  rear- 
guard. As  the  reserve  must  be  in  readiness  to  re- 
inforce any  point  menaced,  and  to  offer  a  vigorous 
resistance,  its  strength  should  be  greater  than  either 
of  the  other  divisions. 

422.  The  order  of  march  of  the  escort  will  be 
regulated  mainly  by  the  natural  features  of  the 
ground  passed  over.  The  advanced-guard  will 
precede  the  convoy  about  a  thousand  paces.  The 
detachment  by  which  it  is  preceded,  and  which 
should  consist  of  cavalry,  will  push  forward  as 
far  as  it  can  with  safety,  taking  care  to  scour 
thoroughly  all  the  ground  passed  over.  The 
flankers,  wiiich  will  also  usually  be  composed  of 
cavalry,  will  be  divided  iut)  platoons,  and  be  thrown 
out  as  fur  as  circumsUuices  will  permit.  Each  pla- 
toon will  throw  out  a  small  detachment,  on  its  outei 
liank,  which  last  will  furnish  vedettes  to  move  along 


157 

the  outward  flank  of  the  detachment.  The  reserve 
will  usually  occupy  some  point  near  the  centre  of 
the  convoy.  The  rear-guard  will  leave  about  1 000 
paces  between  it  and  the  tail  of  the  column.  The 
divisions  immediately  at  the  head  and  tail  of  the 
train  will  keep  close  to  the  convoy.  The  centre 
division  will  usually  be  divided  into  two  portions, 
one  being  on  each  flank  of  the  convoy ;  a  space 
of  eight  or  ten  paces  being  left  in  the  centre  of  the 
train,  for  tliese  portions  to  pass  to  either  flank,  aa 
circumstances  may  require. 

4-23.  The  convoy  is  placed  under  the  orders  of 
an  officer,  subordinate  to  the  commandant  of  the 
escort,  who  is  charged  with  everything  appertain- 
ing to  its  police,  &c.  A  detachment  of  pioneers, 
or  sappers,  should  precede  the  convoy,  to  repair  the 
roads  and  bridges,  »Sic.  A  few  wagons,  with  all 
the  necessary  implements  for  the  sappers,  should 
accompany  the  convoy ;  and  it  is  also  recommended 
to  carry  with  it  a  few  chevaux-de-frise,  the  lances 
of  which  are  of  iron,  and  connected  with  the  bodies 
by  hinges,  to  pack  conveniently,  in  order  to  form  a 
temporary  obstacle  against  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
when  the  convoy  parks  for  the  night,  or  when 
tlireatened  with  an  attack. 

424.  When  a  part  of  the  convoy  consists  of  bat- 
horses,  or  mules,  they  should  be  placed  at  the  head 
of  the  column  of  wagons,  as  they  are  found  to  travel 
bettor  in  this  position  than  when  in  the  rear. 

425.  Distribution  of  the  Train,  The  train  is 
usually  divided  into  four  sections.  If  money  or 
powder  form  a  part  of  the  train,  it  should  occupy 
the  centre  of  the  second  section,  as  this  point  is 
usually  best  protected.  The  provisions  and  other 
munit'ons  will  be  distributed  equally  among  the 
other  sections  ;  so  that,  should  any  one  be  cut  off 

14 


168 

by  the  enemy,  a  portion  of  each  kind  may  be  savea 
in  tlie  remainder. 

426.  As  it  takes  some  time  to  set  the  whole  col- 
umn in  motion,  the  horses  are  harnessed  and 
hitched  to  successively,  by  sections.  The  second 
section  will  not  commence  to  harness  until  the  tirst 
is  ready  to  move  off,  and  so  on  in  succession.  Tlie 
time  for  tliis  operation  will  be  ascertained  by  the 
officer  in  charge  of  the  convoy ;  so  that  each  sec- 
tion may  be  notified  of  the  proper  moment  to  pre- 
pare for  the  march.  This  should  be  done  in  order 
not  to  fatigue  tlie  horses  unnecessarily,  by  keeping 
them  standing  in  harness. 

427.  March  of  Train.  The  convoy  will  march 
in  single  or  double  files,  according  to  the  state  of 
tlie  roads.  The  files  should  not  be  doubled  unless 
the  road  is  wide  enough  for  three  files ;  and  also 
when  the  train  can  march  in  this  order  at  least  an 
hour;  otlierwise  there  will  be  too  great  inconven- 
ience and  loss  of  time  in  changing  the  order  of 
march.  To  pass  from  single  to  double  file,  the 
hindmost  wagons  of  the  first  and  third  sections  will 
lead  off  to  the  side  of  tlie  road;  and  so  on  each  in 
succession  to  the  one  at  the  head.  The  leading 
wagons  of  the  second  and  fourth  sections  move 
briskly  on  in  their  new  line  of  direction,  followed 
by  those  in  their  rear,  until  they  come  up  with  the 
leading  wagons  of  the  other  two  sections.  An  in- 
terval of  four  paces  should  be  preserved  between 
the  files.  To  change  from  double  to  single  file,  the 
first  section  quickens  its  pace,  and  when  its  last 
wagon  has  passed  the  loading  one  of  the  second 
section,  this  and  the  rest  of  the  section  follow  in  tho 
new  line. 

428.  The  greatest  attention  should  be  paid  to  pre* 
serve  regularity  and  good  order  in  the  march.     For 


159 

ihis  purpose  small  detachments  of  infantry,  taken 
from  the  centre  division  of  the  escort,  should  march 
at  intervals  on  the  flanks  of  the  train.  When  the 
number  of  men  vi^ill  admit  of  it,  each  wagon  should 
be  under  the  guard  of  a  soldier,  or  at  least  of  one 
man  to  three  wagons.  If  neither  of  these  an'ange- 
ments  can  be  made,  each  section  may  be  placed 
under  the  charge  of  four  or  five  horsemen,  who  will 
keep  in  constant  motion  along  the  line,  to  see  that 
all  goes  on  well.  If,  for  any  purpose,  a  wagon  is 
obliged  to  halt,  it  must  fall  out  of  the  line,  and  not 
be  allowed  to  enter  it  until  the  rear  wagon  of  its 
section  has  passed.  The  line  should  be  kept  well 
closed  up ;  the  leading  wagons  slackening  their 
pace,  to  allow  the  others  to  come  up,  if  retarded  by 
any  obstacle. 

429.  Halt  of  Train.  Wlien  from  any  cause  the 
convoy  is  forced  to  halt  for  some  time,  as  for  the 
repair  of  a  bridge,  the  passage  of  a  detile,  &-c.,  the 
wagons  should  be  parked  either  in  lines  of  sections, 
or  as  many  in  line  as  the  character  of  the  ground 
will  admit  of.  An  interval  of  about  twenty  paces 
may  be  left  between  each  line.  If  there  is  any  ap- 
prehension of  an  attack  under  these  circumstances, 
the  lines  may  close  to  within  fifteen  paces;  the 
openings  on  the  flanks  being  covered  by  wagons 
placed  across  them. 

430.  Parking  of  Train.  When  the  convoy  halta 
to  park  for  the  night,  a  strong  position  should  be 
chtisen,  offering  only  one  side,  if  practicable,  to  an 
attack.  The  park  may  be  formed  by  lines  of  sec- 
tions or  in  squares,  as  may  be  deemed  most  advisa- 
ble. The  faces  of  the  park  should  be  flanked  by 
some  pieces  of  artillery,  and  the  angles  be  covered 
by  any  temporary  obstacle,  as  a  chevaux-de-frise, 
a  slight  abatis.  &c.     The  different  portions  of  the 


160 

escort  will  take  posiiion  around  the  park,  to  cover  h 
from  tlie  enemy's  approach  ;  those  divisions,  which 
march  with  tiie  convo}',  being  posted  behind  the 
wagons,  and  the  obstacles  which  cover  them.  The 
usual  dispositions  of  out-posts  and  patrols  will  be 
made,  to  guard  against  a  surprise.  It  is  not  safe  to 
park  in  villagiis,  nor  even  to  pass  through  them  on 
a  march,  when  powder  forms  a  part  of  the  convoy. 
431.  When  the  park  is  formed  as  a  temporary 
intrenchment,  to  cover  the  escort  against  an  attack, 
an  open  portion  of  ground  should  be  selected,  which 
offers  no  covers  for  the  enemy  to  approach  within 
musket-range.  The  wagons  may  be  placed  in  one 
line,  or  in  two  if  their  number  is  sufficient  to  in- 
close the  necessary  ground  for  the  troops,  &c.,  so 
as  to  form  a  square,  rectangular,  or  circular  figure, 
as  the  locality  may  require.  When  the  inclosure  is 
formed  of  a  single  line  of  wagons,  they  are  placed 
wheel  to  wheel,  with  an  outlet  of  three  or  four  feet 
between  every  six  wagons  ;  a  wagon  being  placed, 
six  paces  to  the  rear  of  the  line,  behind  each  outlet 
to  close  it.  If  the  inclosure  is  a  double  line,  the 
wagons  are  placed  end  to  end,  and  wheel  to  wheel, 
outlets,  as  in  the  preceding  case,  being  left  between 
every  four  wagons,  and  closed  as  before.  The 
poles  of  four-wheel  carriages  are  placed  outwards ; 
the  shafts  of  the  two-wheel  inwards ;  the  horses 
picketed  opposite  their  wagons.  The  wagons  that 
contain  ammunition,  or  valuables,  are  placed  within 
the  inclosure,  at  the  point  regarded  as  least  exposed. 
If  the  convoy  is  surprised  on  a  march,  and  have  not 
time  to  park  in  square,  the  files  should  be  rapidly 
doubled  if  moving  in  single  file,  the  heads  of  the 
horses  be  turned  towards  the  centre  of  the  road,  so 
as  nearly  to  touch  each  other,  and  the  wagons  be 
brought  as  closely  together  as  practicable. 


161 

432.  Duties  of  Escort.  All  the  usual  precau« 
dons,  to  guard  a  column  in  march  against  a  sur« 
prise,  should  be  redoubled  in  cases  of  convoys. 
The  patrols  on  the  flanks  and  in  front  should  push 
as  far  out  as  practicable ;  so  that  the  convoy  may 
have  timely  warning  of  an  enemy's  approach ;  in 
order  to  park,  according  to  circumstances,  before  an 
attack  can  be  made.  With  drivers  accustomed  to 
their  business,  half  an  hour  at  least  will  be  required 
for  this  operation.  The  advanced-guard  should  be 
particularly  careful  to  occupy  by  detachments  any 
lateral  roads  which  might  offer  the  enemy  a  favor- 
able point  of  attack  on  the  convoy.  These  detach- 
ments will  keep  their  posts  until  the  convoy  has 
passed;  and  they  will  join  the  rear-guard  as  it 
comes  up. 

433.  The  officer  in  command  of  tlie  head-division, 
marching  with  the  convoy,  will  see  that  his  detach- 
ment moves  on  regularly,  as  the  pace  of  the  convoy 
will  be  regulated  by  it;  and,  from  time  to  time,  he 
will  bring  it  to  a  halt,  to  allow  the  carriages  to  close 
up  ;  this  precaution  must  be  carefully  attended  to 
when  near  an  enemy. 

434.  If  menaced  with  an  attack,  the  divisions  at 
the  head  and  tail  of  the  convoy  will  keep  their  po- 
sitions and  repel  the  enemy  by  their  fire  should  he 
attack ;  the  centre  division  will  move  to  the  flank 
menaced,  and  take  position  to  cover  the  two  centre 
sections  of  the  convoy ;  the  reserve  will  move  to- 
wards the  point  threatened  ;  the  advanced  and  rear- 
guards and  flankers  will  close  upon  the  convoy  to 
be  in  readiness  to  act  as  circumstances  may  require. 

435.  Before  entering  a  defile,  a  detachment  from 
the  reserve  should  be  sent  forward  to  secure  its 
flanks  and  outlet,  and  then  send  out  patrols  iii  all 
directions  to  examine  the  ground  in  front,  and  so » 

14* 


that  all  is  safe.  As  the  convoy  comes  up  to  a  point 
iesignated  in  rear  of  the  defile,  it  is  parked  in  linea 
jf  sections.  The  centre  division  of  the  escort  will 
pin  the  advanced-guard  to  cover  the  front ;  the  rear- 
guard will  take  position  to  cover  the  rear ;  the 
flankers  on  the  flanks  ;  and  the  reserve  in  a  central 
position  to  advance  upon  the  point  wliich  may  be 
attacked.  When  the  patrols  report  all  safe,  the  ad- 
vanced-guard and  centre  division  pass  the  defile, 
and  proceed  far  enough  beyond  it  to  cover  the 
ground  where  the  convoy  will  park  as  it  reaches 
the  other  side  ;  the  reserve  and  flankers  will  cover 
the  flanks  of  the  convoy  as  it  moves  to  its  new  po- 
sition, and  will  then  take  post  as  before;  the  rear- 
guard joined  by  any  detachments  left  to  secure  par- 
ticular points  on  the  flanks  of  the  defile,  will  follow 
so  soon  as  the  convoy  and  the  rest  of  the  troops  are 
in  position.  When  all  the  troops  have  passed,  strong 
detachments  are  sent  forward,  in  all  directions,  at 
least  one  hour  before  the  convoy  is  again  put  in 
motion. 

436.  When  the  escort  takes  position  at  night, 
within  the  park,  for  defence,  the  reserve  will  be 
posted  in  the  centre,  and  the  divisions  that  march 
with  tiie  convoy  in  rear  of  their  respective  sections. 
The  advancexl  and  rear-guards  and  the  flankers  will 
take  post  without,  and  establish  their  out-posts  and 
sentinels  in  the  usual  way  for  safety.  The  cannon, 
placed  at  tlie  angles  of  the  park,  will  be  supported 
by  detachments  of  infantry  and  cavalry  in  their 
rear.  The  different  divisions  will  throw  forward 
skirmishers  to  meet  the  enemy  if  he  attacks;  whilst 
others  will  occupy  the  wagons  from  which  they  can 
fire.  Should  the  enemy  not  be  beaten  off  by  the  fire 
(/these  troops,  the  reserve  will  sally  out  and  attack 
with  the  bayonet. 


163 

437.  AUack  of  Convoij.  An  attack  upon  a  con- 
roy  is  a  comparatively  easy  and  safe  operation, 
and  may  be  made  with  a  force  quite  inferior  to  the 
escort ;  as  the  latter  is  obliged,  for  the  security  of 
the  convoy,  to  keep  on  the  defensive. 

It  will  usually  be  best  to  attempt  a  surprise, 
choosing  points  which  are  favorable  to  ambuscades. 
The  manner  of  conducting  the  attack  will  depend 
upon  its  object,  whether  it  be  to  capture  the  entire 
convoy,  to  cut  off  a  part  of  it,  or  simply  to  delay  its 
march.  In  the  first  case,  the  escort  must  be  beaten 
and  dispersed,  whilst  a  detachment  is  sent  to  secure 
the  convoy.  In  the  second,  an  attack  may  be  made 
on  one  point  with  the  view  of  drawing  the  main- 
body  of  the  escort  to  the  defence  of  that  point, 
whilst  a  detachment  atte  npts  to  cut  off  the  part  of 
the  convoy  from  which  tne  escort  has  been  with- 
drawn. In  the  last  case  the  convoy  will  be  fre- 
quently menaced  with  an  attack,  to  force  it  to  halt 
and  park  for  defence  ;  the  roads  will  be  obstructed, 
bridges  broken  down,  &c. 

438.  If  the  attack  is  successful,  the  main-body 
of  the  troops  should  be  kept  together  in  position,  to 
cover  the  captured  convoy,  whilst  the  detachment 
sent  to  secure,  or  destroy  it,  is  performing  its  duty. 
The  cavalry  will  endeavor  to  disperse  the  escort, 
and  bring  in  all  the  horses  that  may  have  been  cut 
loose  from  the  convoy.  The  precaution  should  be 
taken  of  having  spare  horses  in  harness,  in  readiness 
to  take  the  places  of  those  which  the  escort  may 
have  cut  loose,  or  maimed,  to  prevent  the  wagons 
from  being  carried  off.  For  the  attack  of  a  convoy 
parked  for  defence,  some  pieces  of  artillery  will  be 
necessary,  and  howitzers  will  be  found  particularly 
useful.  Without  the  aid  of  this  arm  it  will  be  very 
difficult  to  force  a  defensive  park  with  mfantry,  un 


164 

fess  the  escort  is  ver}*  feeble,  or  the  position  chosen 
for  die  pariv  presents  covers  within  the  effective 
range  of  musketry,  from  which,  after  keeping  up  a 
irell-directed  fire,  a  rush  may  be  made  on  the  park. 


CIIAI'TICR  VIII. 

suiii'insi;s  and  amimjscadks. 

439.  Thcsf;  Lw'o  chiHsoH  <A' opcnUonH  (k'pcmi  for 
tlicir  HUCC,(!hH  ii|ion  tlif;  HJiiiif;  poini,,  lliat  ol  hciiif^ 
uhli;  lo  iiUiic.k  the  ciwiiiy  Kuddciily  wlicii  lie  is  not 
MrcjcirciJ  lo  r<!Ki.Ht..  'J'lu;  Icriri  surprise  is  applied  lo 
niiexpccicd  al,l;u-,ks  upon  ati  <;ii('iiiy'H  posit irjii  ;  Lliat 
of  ainlnisaidc.  wlicri;  a  poHitioii  in  tiilutii  lor  (lie  piir- 
jjosc  of  l'alliiif(  .sud(li:iiiy  ujion  llio  (niciny  wlieii  ho 
rcaclios  il,.  Socrocy,  (^ood  iroops,  ;iiid  a  ihoroijjrli 
kiiowlf;d^(!  oC  tlio  locaiilios,  iiro  in(lis|)(;iisai)l{;  to  tiu; 
succosH  of  (iiUior  of  tlicso  oponi lions. 

440.  Surprise.  In  jjlaiminjf  a  Hiirpri.so,  tin; 
oflicor  miiHl  sparo  no  |)ains  in  ascujrlniriiny  liio  (aco 
of  tiio  country  Icsadinf,'  to  and  in  tli(!  iinnu'diato 
vicinity  of  tlio  ononiy's  position  ;  IIh;  characU^  and 
(lisjiosiiion  of  Ids  troojjs  ;  and  tFio  state  of  |)ropara- 
tioti  of  tliO  dclonccH  of  tlio  position.  Inlorniiition 
may  ix;  f)l)t;iJnod  on  tlioso  points  from  spies,  de- 
Kcrters,  iidiiiliilants  of  tin;  looiiiity  occupied  hy  tlio 
cneiriy,  f^ood  maps,  &-c. 

44  I .  'J'lie  troo|)s  to  lie  oinpioyed  in  tint  exjiedilion, 
as  well  us  iIk;  other  necessary  arranj^fcnienls,  will 
depfMid  npon  the  inl'orniiilion  f^aincd  on  these  points. 
if  the  |)Ositiori  1)0  an  intrenched  one,  inlimtry  will 
constitute  the  main  lorc(! ;  cavalry  and  artillery  can 
lie  (jC  littl(!  other  use  than  to  cover  th{!  nttn.'al  (d  the 
inl'antry,  and  to  make  jjrisonersof  those  who  may  es- 
ca|)e  (roin  the  position.  A  hody  of  enf^iiKter  troojis  or 
o('pick(;d  men  used  lo  haiulliiiff  tools,  will  accompiiny 
the  inlanlry,  carryinj^  with  them  such  imjdemcntK 


166 

as  may  be  requisiie  from  the  character  of  the  de- 
fences, as  axes,  saws,  crowbars,  small  scaling  lad- 
ders, &.C. 

442.  If  the  position  be  not  intrenched,  as  an  open 
village,  &.C.,  cavalry  may  perform  a  very  nnportant 
part,  by  a  sudden  dash  among  the  enemy,  in  cre- 
ating confusion  and  alarm. 

443.  As  the  success  of  the  aifair  will  greatly 
depend  upon  the  secrecy  with  which  these  prepara- 
tions are  made,  and  the  celerity  with  which  it  is 
conducted,  all  orders  for  collecting  the  necessary 
implements  and  assembling  the  troops,  should  ba 
given  at  the  shortest  notice ;  no  more  troops  should 
be  taken  than  are  indispensably  necessary,  and 
they  should  carry  nothing  with  them  but  their  arms, 
and  the  requisite  amount  of  ammunition. 

444.  Midnight  is  the  best  hour  for  small  bodies 
of  troops  to  carry  out  such  enterprises ;  as  they 
must  effect  all  they  desire  to  do  and  be  off  before 
daybreak.  A  few  hours  before  daylight  is  the  best 
time  for  large  e.xpeditions ;  as  the  dawn  of  day  will 
be  favorable  to  their  retreat,  by  which  time  they 
will  have  b3en  able  to  effect  their  purposes.  The 
season  of  the  year  and  the  state  of  the  weather 
should  be  taken  advantage  of.  Winter  and  bad 
weather  are  most  favorable,  as  the  enemy's  senti- 
nels and  out-posts  will  then,  in  all  probability,  be 
less  on  the  alert,  and  more  disposed  to  keep  under 
such  shelters  as  they  can  procure. 

445.  As  our  purpose  may  be  divined  by  the 
enemy,  measures  should  be  taken  against  such  a 
contingency.  These  will  mainly  consist,  in  secur- 
ing by  detachments  all  defiles  and  roads  by  which 
our  retreat  might  be  cut  off;  and  by  designating  a 
rallying  point,  on  which  our  force  will  fall  back,  if 
Jepulsed,  wliich  should   be   strongly  occupied  by 


167 

cavalry  and  artilloiy,  if  they  constitute  a  part  of 
tlie  force. 

446.  In  conducting  the  march,  the  troops  will  be 
kept  well  together ;  the  greatest  order  and  silence 
be  observed.  Instead  of  the  ordinary  precautions  of 
an  advanced-guard  and  flankers,  reliance  should 
rather  be  placed  upon  a  few  active  and  intelligent 
scouts,  to  gain  timely  notice  of  any  movement  on 
the  part  of  the  enemy. 

447.  Concerted  attacks  upon  several  points  are 
good  means  of  creating  confusion  and  paralyzing 
the  enemy's  efforts,  when  they  can  be  successfully 
carried  out ;  but,  as  they  may  require  some  of  the 
detachments  to  make  considerable  circuits  to  reach 
their  points,  much  will  depend  upon  chance  as  to 
their  success.  In  such  cases,  some  signal  must  be 
agreed  upen,  to  let  the  detachments,  already  in  po- 
sition, know  when  those,  which  are  likeliest  to  reach 
theirs  latest,  are  ready;  but  this  may  have  the  incon- 
venience of  giving  the  alarm  to  the  enemy.  Rockets 
may  be  used  for  this  purpose,  and  also  to  give  notice 
to  the  troops  to  retire  together. 

448.  The  retreat  after  a  successful  issue  should 
be  conducted  with  the  same  promptitude  as  the  ad- 
vance. Time  must  not  be  lost  in  waiting  too  long 
for  all  the  detachments  to  come  in  at  the  rallying 
point,  as  the  safety  of  the  whole  command  might 
be  compromised. 

449.  Ambuscade.  In  planning  an  ambuscade, 
we  should  be  well  acquainted  with  the  enemy's 
force,  and  the  state  of  discipline  shown  by  i*.  The 
position  chosen  for  the  attempt  must  be  favorable  to 
the  concealment  of  troops,  and  if  practicable  it  should 
be  reached  by  night,  every  precaution  being  taken  to 
insure  secrecy.  The  best  positions  are  those  where 
tlie  enemy  is  inclosed  in  a  defile,  or  village,  and  haa 


168 

not  taken  the  proper  precautions  to  secure  himself 
from  an  attack.  By  seizing  the  outlets  of  the  defile 
by  infantry,  in  such  cases,  and  making  an  impetuous 
charge  of  cavalry  into  it,  the  enemy  may  be  com- 
pletely routed. 

450.  Ambuscades  may  frequently  be  attempted 
with  success  in  the  affairs  of  advanced  and  rear- 
guards ;  by  pushing  the  enemy  vigorously  and  then 
falUng  back,  if  he  offers  a  strong  resistance,  so  as  to 
draw  him  upon  a  point  where  troops  are  posted  in 
force  to  receive  him. 

451.  To  trace  anything  more  than  a  mere  out- 
iine,  as  a  guide  in  operations  of  tliis  kind,  which 
depend  upon  so  many  fortuitous  circumstances, 
would  serve  but  little  useful  purpose.  An  active, 
intelligent  officer,  with  an  imamnation  fertile  in  the 
expedients  of  his  profession,  will  seldom  be  at  a  loss 
as  to  his  best  course  when  the  occasion  offers ;  to 
one  without  these  qualities,  opportunities  present 
themselves  in  vain. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

PRINCIPLES    OF    STRATEGY. 

452.  Definitions. — In  tracing  out  the  move- 
ments of  ancient  armies,  as  far  as  we  have  the 
means  of  doing  so,  from  tlie  often  very  obscure 
narratives  of  historians,  it  will  be  observed  that 
in  some  features  they  contbrm  very  closely  to 
those  of  modern  armies,  whilst  in  others  they 
differ  essentially  from  them.  Those  in  which 
this  conformity  is  seen,  and  which  pertain  only 
to  the  general  operations  of  a  campaign,  belong 
to  that  branch  of  the  military  art  which  has 
received  the  appellation  of  strategy.  Whilst  those 
in  which  a  marked  difference  is  noticeable,  such 
as  the  manner  of  conducting  marches,  disposi- 
tions for  battle,  the  arrangements  of  encamp- 
ments, etc.,  belong  to  the  domain  of  tactics.  For 
example,  the  famous  expedition^  of  Hannibal 
and  Napoleon  over  the  Alps  present  more  than 
one  point  of  resemblance  in  their  general  fea- 
tures ;  whilst  the  battles  and  combats  which 
afterwards  followed  have  no  points  of  compa- 
rison. The  reason  of  this  is,  that  general 
operations  are  controlled  by  the  topographical 
features  of  the  seat  of  war ;  whilst  those  of  a 
partial  character,  mere  evolu.tions,  or,  in  a  word, 
tactical  combinations,  depend  solely  upon  the 
weapons  with  which  troops  have  been  armed  at 
different  epochs.  The  study  of  military  history 
thus  becomes  very  instructive  in  a  strategical 
point  of  view,  whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  in  eu- 
15 


170 

doavoring  to  apply  the  notions,  gleaned  from  the 
same  source,  on  the  tactics  of  the  ancients,  to 
our  modern  armies,  errors  of  the  gravest  charac- 
ter might  be  committed.  Every  servile  imita- 
tion in  this  latter  case — an  error  which  more 
than  one  man  of  talent  has  fallen  into,  from  not 
having  sufficiently  weighed  the  enormous  differ- 
ence that  exists  between  what  are  known,  in  the 
present  day,  as  firearms,  and  the  weapons  for 
like  purposes  used  by  the  ancients,  and  the  con- 
sequences which  must  necessarily  ensue  from 
this  cause  in  the  arrangement  of  troops  for  com- 
bat— is  greatly  to  be  deprecated. 

453.  From  the  foregoing  remarks,  it  will  be 
inferred  that  strategy  is,  in  a  peculiar  sense,  the 
science  of  generals  in  command  of  armies  ;  Avhilst 
tactics,  in  all  its  ramifications,  from  the  element- 
ary drill  of  the  soldier  to  orders  of  battle,  from 
the  bivouac  of  an  outpost  to  the  encampment  of 
an  army,  belongs  to  officers  of  all  grades.  Still, 
with  these  marked  differences,  it  is  sheer  pedan- 
try to  pretend  to  define  the  precise  hmits  of 
these  two  prominent  branches  of  the  military 
art,  as  they  present  a  multitude  of  exceptions  in 
which  they  approach  and  run  into  each  other. 

Tactics,  if  we  restrict  its  meaning  to  the  evo- 
lutions and  manoeuvres  of  troops  on  the  field  of 
battle,  may  be  taught  with  mathematical  exact- 
ness, because  every  movement  is  accurately 
prescribed,  and  the  more  so  the  lower  we  des- 
cend the  scale  of  this  branch  of  military  know- 
ledge. But  this  is  far  from  being  true  of  strategy, 
because,  in  the  calculations  involved  in  its  ope- 
rations, a  great  many  considerations  enter  which 
do  not  admit  of  exact  computation,  and  upon 
which  success  or  failure  essentially  depend:  as 


171 

time,  tlie  character  of  the  roads  over  which  the 
army  has  to  move,  the  nature  of  the  obstacles 
which  he  between  it  and  the  enemy,  the  moral 
quahties  and  activity  of  the  enemy's  forces,  etc., 
etc.  For  example,  a  general  might  commit  a 
gross  mistake  by  supposing  that  the  position  a, 
PI.  VII.,  Fig.  14,  would  be  protected  by  an 
army  at  m,  from  the  attempts  of  an  enemy's 
force  at  n,  which  lies  outside  of  the  arc  of  a 
circle  described  from  a  as  a  centre  with  the 
radius  am.  For,  even  on  the  supposition  that 
the  line  of  march  of  the  two  opposing  armies 
upon  A  is  equally  favorable,  and  therefore  that 
the  army  m  might  reach  a  before  that  from  N 
could,  still  A  might  not  the  less  be  compromised, 
for  the  enemy  at  n,  although  having  the  longer 
march  to  make,  might,  by  taking  the  initiative, 
gain  the  advance  before  the  army  m  was  apprised 
of  it,  and,  reaching  a  point,  say  p,  within  the 
arc,  before  the  army  had  got  in  motion,  could 
reach  a  first,  having  the  shorter  distance  to 
march,  before  the  army  m  could.  It  is  not  there- 
fore by  the  actual  distances  that  the  advantages 
of  the  positions  of  two  armies  are  to  be  esti- 
mated, but  by  the  time  that  may  be  requisite  to 
inform  one  of  the  movements  of  another;  and 
it  is  this  element  of  time  that  in  war  gives  that 
party  so  greatly  the  advantage  over  the  other 
which  understandingly  assumes  the  initiative 
and  follows  it  up  with  activity  and  vigor.  If  to 
these  considerations  the  character  of  the  roads, 
deliles,  rivers,  etc.,  which  an  army  may  have  to 
traverse,  be  joined,  it  will  be  seen  that,  these 
circumstances  not  being  the  same  on  both  sides, 
the  problem  of  reciprocal  positions  becomes  still 
more  complicated  and  less  subject  to  geometrical 
combinations. 


172 

Having  shown  in  what  sense  the  words  stra- 
tegy and  tactics  should  be  received,  terms  upon 
the  precise  defiuiti(m  of  whicli  too  much  stress, 
perhaps,  has  Ijcen  laid  within  a  recent  period, 
that  which  is  the  real  gist  of  the  matter  under 
consideration  may  be  entered  upon. 

454.  In  all  military  operations  of  a  general 
character,  and  which  come  under  the  head  of 
strategy,  three  principal  things  are  noticeable 
and  demand  consideration;  these  are  the  line 
from  which  the  army  starts  in  commencing  its 
onward  movements  ;  the  point  which  it  aims  to 
attain ;  and  the  hue  which  it  is  obliged  to  pass 
over  to  reach  this  point. 

455.  The  first  of  these  is  termed  the  base  of 
operations ;  the  second  the  objective  or  objective 
point;  the  third  the  line  of  operations.  When 
maintaining  a  strictly  defensive  attitude,  the 
base  of  operations  becomes  what  is  termed  the 
line  of  defence,  and  in  a  backward  movement 
the  line  of  operations  becomes  the  line  of  retreat. 

To  take  a  i-ecent  example  in  our  own  history, 
the  Potomac  was  for  a  time  the  base  of  opera- 
tions for  our  army  having  in  view  the  capture 
of  Richmond  ;  this  city  was  the  objective  point ; 
and  the  roads  leading  to  it  from  the  Potomac  the 
line  of  operations.  More  recently  the  roads 
between  Richmond  and  the  Potomac  became 
our  line  of  retreat,  and  the  Rappahannock  and 
the  Potomac  successively  our  lines  of  defence. 

456.  Bases  of  Optrations. — The  base  of  opera- 
tions should  be  a  series  of  points  having  the 
properties  of  military  strength,  as  the  supplies 
of  the  army  for  its  onward  movements  are  col- 
lected upon  it ;  and  it  should  have  commodious 
lines  of  comnmnication   leading  from  it  to  the 


173 

objective.  If  these  strong  points  lie  upon  any 
natural  obstacle,  as  a  river  without  lords,  a 
rugged  mountainous  chain,  swamps,  or  thick 
primeval  forests,  and  have  an  easy  communica- 
tion between  them,  the  base  is  all  the  better, 
from  the  difSculties  which  a  line  of  this  charac- 
ter offers  to  the  enterprises  of  the  enemy  in  case 
of  being  thrown  on  the  defensive. 

457.  A  base  of  some  extent  is  better  than  a 
short  one,  because  more  latitude  is  given  to  ope- 
rate against  the  enemy,  and,  if  obliged  to  retire 
upon  it,  there  is  less  chance  of  being  separated 
from  it  by  the  enemy  gaining  our  rear.  Should 
it  consist  of  a  single  city,  for  example,  with  but 
one  line  of  operations  from  it,  by  seizing  on  this 
line  the  enemy  might  cut  off  the  army  from  all 
supplies  and  reinforcements. 

458.  The  outline  which  the  base  assumes  is 
far  from  being  a  matter  of  indifference.  If  it  is 
concave  towards  the  enemy,  or  has  its  two  ends 
resting  upon  any  natural  impassable  obstacle 
lying  in  advance  of  the  general  line,  the  army 
moving  from  it  will  find  greater  security  lor  its 
wings  than  in  a  case  where  the  base  is  either 
generally  convex  towards  the  enemy,  or  presents 
a  sahent  point  to  him. 

459.  When  an  army  moves  to  a  considerable 
distance  beyond  its  base,  it  will  become  neces- 
sary to  take  up  a  new  base  in  advance  of  the 
primitive  one,  in  order  to  have  its  depots,  from 
which  it  has  to  draw  its  supplies  of  every  de- 
scription, nearer  at  hand.  This  new  line  is 
termed  a  secondarii  base  of  operations.  It  should 
possess  the  same  military  properties  as  the  pri- 
mitive base,  and  art  should  supply  whatever 
nature  may  be  found  deficient  in  for  this  purpose, 

15* 


174 

in  order  that  every  thing  collected  for  the  army 
on  it  may  be  secure. 

460.  If  prudence  points  out  the  necessity  of 
taking  up  new  bases  as  the  army  advances  fur- 
ther into  an  enemy's  country,  it  does  not  follow 
that  the  army  should  be  detained  to  organize 
them  on  a  suitable  footing.  This  task  is  devolved 
on  a  body  of  troops  left  behind  for  this  purpose, 
who,  with  the  reinforcements  sent  forward,  oc- 
cupy the  fortified  places  on  the  new  line,  erect 
new  field  works,  establish  magazines,  &c.,  whilst 
the  army  pursues  its  march  to  profit  by  its  first 
successes. 

461.  When  the  secondary  base  is  not  parallel 
to  the  primitive  one,  that  end  of  it  which  is 
most  advanced  should  be  strengthened  by  every 
accessory  means,  as  it  is  the  one  most  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  attacks.  The  other  end,  though 
less  exposed,  from  its  retired  position,  also 
affords  less  support  to  the  army  in  advance. 

462.  An  oblique  base  affords  the  advantage 
of  threatening  the  communications  and  base  of 
the  enemy  without  exposing  our  own.  For  exam- 
ple :  the  army  m,  PI.  YII.,  fig.  15,  whose  primi- 
tive base  is  r  s,  parallel  to  p  q,  the  primitive  base 
of  the  enemy,  and  whose  natural  line  of  opera- 
tions is  the  line  a  b,  perpendicular  to  r  s  and 
p  Q,  cannot  move  against  the  left  wing  of  the 
army  n  without  running  the  risk  of  having  its 
communications  with  its  own  base  interrupted, 
unless  it  has  established  a  SQCondary  base  x  y, 
oblique  to  the  line  a  b  ;  for  tlie  military  condi- 
tions of  the  problem  are  reciprocal :  if,  under 
like  circumstances,  we  cut  the  enemy's  commu- 
nications he  maj^  do  the  same  with  respect  to 
ours  which  have  been  left  exposed.     But  with 


175 

the  new  base  x  y,  the  operation  supposed  is  no 
longer  impiudent,  since  there  is  a  direct  and 
secure  hne  of  retreat  on  the  extremity  y  of  tlie 
new  base,  which  is  near  enough  to  afford  sup- 
port in  case  of  need. 

463.  The  example  just  cited  is  analogous  to 
that  of  the  concave  base  which  has  already  been 
alluded  to.  When  the  concave  form  of  the  base 
is  very  marked,  it  affords  the  facility  of  chang- 
ing the  line  of  operations  at  pleasure,  without 
losing  the  support  of  a  good  base.  For  exam- 
ple :  let  R  s  T,  PL  VII.,  Fig.  16,  be  the  general  out- 
fine  of  the  base  :  the  army,  sr,  whicli,  at  the  outset 
of  the  campaign,  has  been  operating  on  the  line 
A  B  against  the  army,  n,  having  p  q  for  its  base, 
will  be  able,  if  compelled  by  necessity,  or 
prompted  by  some  obvious  advantage  to  be 
gained,  to  change  its  line  of  operations  to  b  c, 
resting  on  the  portion  of  the  base  st. 

464.  When  this  change  in  the  line  of  opera- 
tions is  made  just  at  the  moment  of  delivering 
a  great  battle,  it  may  be  attended  with  signal 
results,  as  the  enemy's  plans  may  be  completely 
foiled  by  it.  Great  generals  alone  have  shown 
themselves  capable  of  such  attempts. 

465.  As  to  the  army  at  n,  which  has  the  base 
p  Q  only  in  rear  of  its  line  of  operations,  a  b,  its 
movements  are  controlled  by  the  connexion : 
for  to  cover  p  q  it  must  assume  a  position  across 
A  B,  and  nearly  perpendicular  to  it.  This  is  a 
rule  which  cannot  be  violated,  even  with  the 
eupei'iority  in  numbers,  without  great  risk. 

466.  When  we  are  complete  master  of  the  sea 
between  our  own  and  the  enemy's  coast,  we 
may  choose  our  base  upon  any  point  of  the  coast 
which  oSevB  the  means  of  subsisting  an  army, 


176 

and  from  wliicli  good  communications  lead  into 
the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country.  A  good 
seaport  under  such  circumstances  is  a  sufficient 
base  for  an  invasion.  This  was  experienced  by 
the  United  States  in  its  recent  war  with  Mexico, 
and  EngUsh  history  ■  furnishes  many  hke  ex- 
amples. 

467.  Lines  of  Operation. — All  lines  of  commu- 
nication leading  towards  an  enemy's  base  do 
not  offer  equal  advantages  to  an  army  acting  on 
the  offensive.  Some  lead  more  directly  and 
offer  more  security  than  others  in  an  advance  on 
the  enemy  ;  some  may  offer  greater  advantages 
than  others  when  our  superiority  lies  either  in 
infantry  or  in  cavalry  ;  some  are  more  favorable 
as  to  subsisting  an  army,  or  affording  it  more 
convenient  transportation,  or  in  enabling  us  to 
turn  the  enemy's  position  ;  others  again  receive 
better  support  from  the  base  of  operations,  &c. 
The  talent  of  a  commanding  general  is  chiefly 
shown  in  weighing  the  advantages  and  defects 
of  each  of  these  circumstances,  and  selecting 
from  them  the  best. 

468.  A  line  of  operations  is  said  to  be  simple 
when  the  army  corps  moving  against  the  enemy 
are  kept  together,  or  at  least  are  not  so  far  sepa- 
rated as  to  be  beyond  mutual  supporting  dis- 
tances. These  corps  consequently  must  all 
move  on  roads  nearly  parallel,  and  not  too  far 
apart,  and  without  any  impassable  obstructions 
between  them. 

469.  A  Hne  of  operations  is  said  to  be  double 
when  an  army  divided  into  two  parts  follows 
two  sensibly  parallel  roads  which  are  so  far 
asunder  that  the  two  portions  cannot  be  reunited 
upon  the  same  day  on  the  same  field  of  battle. 


177 

470.  Unless  we  are  superior  to  the  enemy  oa 
each  line,  both  in  numbers  and  the  moral  quali- 
ties of  our  troops,  a  double  line  of  operations  is 
purely  disadvantageous  to  us;  and  particularly 
so  if  the  two  lines  diverge  as  we  advance ;  for 
the  enemy,  by  throwing  himself  between  the 
two  fractions  of  our  army,  may  beat  each  of  them 
separately,  and  find  himself  in  an  attitude  to  in- 
tercept our  communications.  The  more  rapidly 
the  double  lines  diverge,  the  greater  will  be  the 
danger  to  us  and  the  certainty  of  success  to  the 
enemy. 

471.  Here  we  find  a  marked  difference  be- 
tween what  may  be  termed  a  strategical  and  a* 
tactical  operation.  In  the  latter  the  greatest 
danger  that  an  arni}^  can  run  is  to  be  surrounded 
on  the  field  of  battle  ;  whereas  an  army  that 
throws  itself  by  a  strategical  movement,  be- 
tween several  fractions  of  an  enemy's  army  be- 
yond supporting  distance  of  each  other,  may,  by 
superior  activity,  defeat  them  all  in  succession. 

472.  The  only  case  in  which — the  armies  on 
the  two  sides  being  sensibly  of  equal  strength, 
and  controlling  reasons  calling  for  it — a  double 
line  can  be  followed,  in  the  face  of  a  general  of 
respectable  abihties,  is  when  the  latter  has  also 
adopted  double  divergent  lines,  or  lines  very  far 
asunder.  But  in  this  case  our  double  line  must 
be  an  interior  one,  or  lie  between  those  of  the 
enemy,  so  that  our  two  fractions  m,m',  PI.  VII., 
Fig.  17,  may,  in  case  of  need,  support  each  other 
if  attacked ;  or  be  suddenly  concentrated  so  as 
to  attack  one  of  the  fractions  on  the  enemy's 
exterior  line,  the  other  in  this  case  being  beyond 
supporting  distance  of  the  one  attacked.  This 
principle  of  interior  lines,  particularly  when  they 


178 

converge  as  we  advance,  is,  at  bottom,  only  a 
inodifiAtion  of"  the  one  of  a  single  line.  It_ 
amounts  to  keeping  the  fractions  of  our  army  in 
such  distances  from  each  other  that  they  are 
nearer  together  than  those  of  the  enemy,  and 
can  be  concentrated  on  any  one  of  his  before  it 
can  be  reinforced  by  the  others.  Still,  it  must 
be  observed,  that  it  is  always  safer  to  manoeuvre 
on  a  single  line  than  upon  two,  although  they 
may  be  interior. 

473.  It  is  important  not  to  confound  double,  or 
multiple  hnes,  with  the  various  lines  of  communi- 
cation over  which  fractions  of  an  army  are  neces- 
sarily marched,  in  order  to  concentrate  on  a  par- 
ticular point.  In  this  case  the  movements  of  all 
concur  to  the  same  end ;  the  army  corps  are 
momentarily  separated  only  to  march  with 
gi-eater  convenience  and  rapidity  ;  to  reconnoitre 
the  ground  more  thoroughly  over  which  they 
move ;  and  to  subsist  more  comfortably.  This 
momentary  separation  of  our  forces,  to  be  again 
united  at  the  moment  of  battle,  when  well  exe- 
cuted, is  the  very  acme  of  good  generalship.  It 
is  one  of  the  best  means  of  keeping  the  enemy 
for  a  long  time  uncertain  of  our  real  intentions 
as  to  the  point  of  attack.  To  know  when,  in 
turn,  to  scatter  our  forces  to  embrace  a  greater 
extent  of  country,  when  circumstances  permit 
or  call  for  it,  and  then  to  concentrate  them,  in 
order  to  strike  a  decisive  blow,  is  one  of  the 
most  marked  features  in  the  qualities  of  a  great 
captain.  No  general  of  modern  times  has  shown 
this  trait  in  as  high  a  degree  as  Napoleon. 

474.  When,  by  the  eventualities  of  a  cam  • 
paign,  we  find  ourselves  forced  to  abandon  our 
primitive  line  of  operations  and  take  up  a  new 


179 

one,  the  latter  receives  the  appellation  of  an 
accidental  Vne  of  operations.  This  term  is  not 
properly  applicable  to  a  line  voluntarily  taken 
up,  to  march  upon  a  point  which  the  enemy 
may  have  weakened  by  withdrawing  from  it 
troops,  under  the  apprehension  that  he  was 
threatened  on  some  other.  This  change  of  line, 
80  far  from  being  an  accident,  is  the  legitimate 
fruit  of  profound  combinations,  and  may  be  the 
cause  of  important  successes.  The  primitive  line 
was,  to  some  extent,  a  feint ;  and  the  line  ajipa- 
rently  but  secondary  the  true  one ;  it  cannot 
therefore  be  termed  accidental ;  it  will  be  thus 
simply  the  new  line  of  operations. 

475.  In  like  manner  in  a  retrograde  movement 
an  army  may  abandon  its  natural  line  of  retreat 
and  take  up  another,  leading  off  laterally  from 
it,  for  the  purpose  of  enticing  the  enemy  into  a 
district  of  country  less  favorable  to  him,  and  to 
throw  him  further  off  from  his  main  object.  The 
line  of  retreat  in  this  case  will  be  sensibly  paral- 
lel to  our  own  frontier  instead  of  being,  as  it  is 
generally,  perpendicular  to  it.  This  new  line  of 
retreat  also  cannot  be  classed  under  the  head  of 
accidental  lines,  since  it  is  one  voluntarily  adopt- 
ed, and  presents  advantages  over  the  natural 
line  of  retreat.  It  has  received  the  name  of  the 
j)arallii  retreat^  a  term  sufficiently  expressive  of 
tlie  thing  itself.  To  be  successi'uUy  executed  the 
retreating  army  should  not  be  too  inferior  in 
force  to  the  enemy,  and  should  run  no  risk  in 
being  cut  off  from  its  own  frontier  by  moving 
too  far  from  it.  The  local  features  are  particu- 
larly to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  such  ope- 
rations. If  they  are  of  a  broken  character,  the 
movement  will  be  the  less  perilous ;  if,  on  tlie 


180 

contrary,  the  country  is  open,  and  "without 
strong  natural  points  ot"  defence,  the  safest  plan 
■will  be  to  regain  our  frontier  by  the  shortest  line. 
476.  When  a  choice  between  several  lines  of 
operation  is  offered,  it  will  be  best  to  adopt  the 
one  where  the  army  can  be  most  easily  subsisted, 
and  in  which,  according  to  the  kind  of  troops 
of  which  it  is  composed,  the  army  will  be 
most  secure  from  the  enemy's  enterprises.  If 
the  army  is  superior  to  the  enemy  in  cavalry,  it 
will  naturally  prefer  to  move  over  an  open  dis- 
trict of  country  ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  its  main 
strength  lies  in  its  infantry,  it  will  prefer  to  skirt 
along .  the  foot  of  a  mountainous  range,  or  to 
march  through  a  broken  country.  A  line  of 
operations  parallel  and  near  to  a  river  presents 
the  advantage  of  having  its  wing  nearest  the 
water  course  secure  from  attack,  whilst  the  river 
itself  furnishes  an  excellent  communication  for 
bringing  forward  supplies.  The  defensive  posi- 
tion taken  up  by  the  enemy  also  has  great 
weight  in  determining  the  direction  of  the  line 
of  operations.  If  he  occupies  cantonments  ex- 
tending over  a  considerable  line,  the  most  natu- 
ral line  will  be  the  one  by  which  the  army  can 
throw  itself  into  the  centre  of  the  enemy's  iso- 
lated corps,  and  thus  separate  them  and  beat 
them  in  detail.  By  attacking  one  wing  of  a  po- 
sition of  this  kind  we  should,  in  all  likelihood, 
force  back  one  corps  after  another  upon  the 
neighboring  one,  until,  in  the  end,  the  whole 
would,  in  this  way,  be  concentrated  in  their 
natural  order  of  retreat.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the 
enemy's  corps  are  in  supporting  distance  of  each 
other,  the  natural  point  of  attack  is  one  of  his 
wings,  provided  that,  in  making  tliis  movement, 


181 

tlie  line  of  operations  of  our  own  army  is  not 
left  exposed ;  for  the  first  of  all  necessities  is 
never  to  place  either  our  base  or  our  line  of 
operations  in  jeopardy.  The  choice  to  be  made 
will  also  depend  upon  the  characters  and  military 
talents  of  the  enemy's  generals,  the  quality  of 
his  forces,  their  moral  condition,  &c.,  &c. ;  these 
are  points  which  carry  such  great  weight  with 
able  commanders  that  they  have  often  been 
known  to  have  adopted  plans  the  very  reverse 
of  what  they  would  have  done  under  contrary 
circumstances,  according  to  their  being  in  front 
of  one  or  another  general.  Turenne,  having  for 
his  opponent  Conde,  did  not  allow  himself  to  do 
things  which  seemed  to  him  as  easy  and  a  mas- 
ter of  course  before  the  Archduke.  On  one  oc- 
casion, in  1654,  he  lost  some  men  whilst  passing 
within  the  range  of  grape  in  front  of  the  Spanish 
lines,  which  called  forth  remarks  from  some  of 
the  officers  accompanying  him.  To  these  he  re- 
plied :  "  The  march  we  are  making  would  be 
very  imprudent  before  Conde's  position  ;  but  it 
is  very  important  that  I  should  examine  tho- 
roughly this  position ;  and  I  am  so  well  ac- 
quainted with  the  Spanish  service,  that  I  feel 
assured  that  before  the  Archduke  has  been  in- 
formed of  it,  has  sent  word  to  Conde,  and  called 
together  his  council,  I  shall  have  completed  it 
and  returned  to  camp."  "  See,"  said  that  captain 
who  more  than  other  was  capable  of  pronounc- 
ing a  judgment  on  such  points,  "here  is  some- 
thing that  pertains  to  the  divine  portion  of  the 
art."  In  truth,  military  genius  manifiests  itself  in 
just  such  subtle  distinctions  and  delicate  shades. 
477.  As  has  been  laid  down,  our  hne  of  opera- 
tions should  be  directed  on  one  wing  of  the 
16 


1S2 

enemy  when  his  forces  are  conf»entrated,  if  it  can 
be  done  without  compromising  our  hne  of 
retreat.  Now  this  is  seldom  possible,  for  the 
party  that  attempts  to  turn  another  is  necessarily 
exposed  to  the  same  danger.  This  is  rigorously 
so,  in  an  operation  of  this  kind  in  a  perfectly  un- 
obstructed country,  when  the  bases  of  the  two 
armies  are  sensibly  parallel  and  of  equal  extent. 
For  example,  an  army  m,  PI.  YII.,  Fig.  18,  can 
move  upon  the  line  of  communications  of  the  op- 
posing army,  n,  only  by  taking  up  a  line  of  opera- 
tions, s,B,  oblique  to  its  base,  R,s,  and  resting  on 
its  extremity;  but,  in  doing  so,  the  central  line 
of  operations,  a,b,  and  the  one  leading  from  the 
other  extremity  of  the  base,  are  left  uncovered ; 
and  we  thus  deprive  ourselves  of  the  advantages 
of  an  extended  base,  as,  from  our  line,  b,s,  we  can 
only  retire  on  the  point  s  in  case  of  reverse.  It 
is  only  therefore  in  cases  where  from  the  ob- 
structed character  of  the  ground  we  are  enabled 
to  defend,  with  comparatively  small  corps,  the 
lines  B  R  and  b  a,  against  the  enemy's  attempts 
to  seize  them,  that  we  may  with  some  safety  and 
probability  of  success  direct  our  principal  line 
upon  the  enemy's  wing  ;  as  by  throwing  forward 
the  two  small  corps,  m  and  m',  we  cover  our  own 
base,  and  give  the  alarm  to  the  enemy  on  his 
.centre  and  right.  It  may  therefore  be  safely 
laid  down  as  a  principle,  that  it  is  only  under 
cover  of  natural  obstacles  that  we  can  with  safety 
direct  our  principal  operation  against  the  enemy's 
wing  when  his  forces  are  in  supporting  distances 
of  each  other.  The  influence  of  the  natural  fea- 
tures of  the  country  over  which  operations  are 
carried  on  is  continually  felt  in  all  warlike  plans ; 
a  careful  study  of  the  bearing  of  these  features  is 


183 

therefore  of  the  highest  importance  to  officers  of 
all  grades;  but  particularly  i'or  those  upon  whom 
rest  the  responsibilities  of  high  command. 

478.  A  line  of  operations  which  has  too  great 
a  length,  with  respect  to  that  of  its  base,  loses 
somewhat  of  its  positive  value,  as  it  oil'ers  more 
chances  to  the  enemy  to  cut  it.  Owing  to  this, 
■we  are  therefore  under  the  necessity  of  adopting 
secondary  bases,  in  proportion  as  our  line  of 
operations  is  prolonged.  But  to  undertake  to 
establish  anything  like  mathematical  proportions 
between  these  bases  and  the  line  of  operations 
itself  would  be  simply  pedantic  and  absurd.  The 
triangle,  of  which  the  army  is  the  apex  and  the 
base  of  operations  the  base,  may  vary  under  a 
thousand  circumstances.  Its  form  and  dimen- 
sions are  seldom  if  ever  subject  to  arbitrary 
rules.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that  the  greater 
the  extent  of  the  lines,  the  further  advanced  may 
be  the  apex,  without  uncovering  the  communica- 
tions ;  like  a  pyramid,  whicli,  writhout  losing 
anything  of  its  solidity  and  stability,  may  be  the 
more  elevated  as  its  base  is  made  broader. 

479.  Strategical  Points. — The  points  of  opera- 
tion are  also  termed  strategical  points  ;  and  under 
this  appellation  are  comprised  not  only  those 
which  may  be  regarded  as  the  chief  end  to  be 
attained,  but  also  those  by  the  occupation  of 
which  the  army  will  receive  incontestable  ad- 
vantages. 

480.  The  capital  city  of  a  country  is  in  Europe 
regarded  as  a  strategical  point  of  great  import- 
ance, chiefly  from  political  considerations,  arising 
from  the  influence  which  the  seat  of  government 
exercises  over  the  whole  country.  Tliis,  to  a 
certain  extent,  is  true  of  our  own  countiy  ;  lor 


184 

although  Washington  city,  in  a  military  point  of 
view,  might  have  but  little  influence  on  the  re- 
sults of  a  war,  and  has  no  controlling  influence 
over  public  opinion  at  home,  still  its  loss  would 
be  regarded  by  Europeans  in  a  European  point 
of  view,  and  its  possession,  whether  by  a  foreign 
or  domestic  enemy,  would  have  a  damaging 
effect  abroad,  besides  exercising  a  certain  moral 
one  at  home. 

481.  A  point  is  strategical  that  gives  us  the 
control  of  several  important  roads,  the  course  of 
a  river,  or  which  guards  some  important  passage. 

482.  In  a  flat  country  there  are  usually  few 
strategical  points.  Those  which  hold  this  posi- 
tion usually  owe  it  to  fortifications  by  which 
they  are  surrounded,  and  by  the  various  resources 
for  military  purposes  which  they  can  furnish. 
Wooded,  hilly,  and  well  watered  regions  present 
many  such  points. 

483.  In  high  mountain  ranges,  strategical 
points  are  very  restricted  in  number,  but  are 
usually  of  a  very  decided  character.  They  are 
met  with  behind  the  narrow  mountain  passes  at 
the  points  of  junction  of  several  valleys  along 
which  roads  have  been  made.  They  are  also 
found  at  elevated  points  where  the  ridges  of 
several  chains  seem  to  come  together.  Troops 
occupying  such  points  can  choose  the  roads  by 
which  they  think  best  to  descend  from;  their 
movements,  in  such  a  case,  are  from  the  centre 
towards  the  circumference,  whilst  those  of  an 
opponent  can  only  be  made,  with  a  prospect  of 
success,  by  making  wide  circuits,  to  turn  the 
spurs  which  obstruct  any  lateral  movement. 
Having  entered  one  of  the  valleys  leading  to  the 
top,  an  enemy  is  obhged  to  follow  it  up,  as  he 


185 

cannot  without  great  difficulty  cross  from  one 
to  another,  whilst  the  body  of  troops  holding 
the  elevated  point  of  junction  of  the  valleys  can 
do  so  with  comparative  facility  and  prompt- 
ness. 

484.  Plan  of  Campaign. — Before  undertaking 
any  military  operation,  great  or  small,  we  should 
first  settle  down  upon  some  decided  end  to  be 
gained ;  determine  upon  beforehand,  as  far  as 
practicable,  the  steps  to  be  taken  to  attain  our 
object.  In  one  word,  we  should  clearly  see 
what  we  propose  to  accomplish,  in  order  that 
we  may  not  go  blindly  to  work  and  leave  any- 
thing to  chance.  The  mental  process  by  which 
all  that  is  here  supposed  is  elaborated  is  termed 
the  laying  out  the  plan  of  campaign. 

485.  In  the  first  place,  it  stands  to  reason  that 
this  plan  should  be  so  limited  as  to  comprise  onlj' 
the  leading  strategical  dispositions,  thus  present- 
ing only  the  outline  features,  within  which  the 
meshwork  of  the  minor  operations  is  to  be  con- 
fined ;  thus  leaving  ample  latitude  for  all  move- 
ments of  detail  and  their  execution.  Nothing 
could  be  more  absurd  than  to  pretend  to  dictate 
to  the  commanding  general  what  he  shaU  do 
from  day  to  day ;  yet  this  has  been  done,  and 
with  but  few  exceptions,  with  disastrous  results. 
Once  within  the  sphere  of  the  enemy's  opera- 
tions, a  commanding  general  is  no  longer  at 
liberty  to  do  what  he  wishes,  but  what  he  best 
can.  Marches,  manoeuvres,  combats,  depend  on 
circumstances  for  the  most  part  imperative ;  deci- 
sions arrived  at  are  often  sudden,  and  brought 
about  by  the  attitude,  resources,  strength,  and 
the  morale  of  the  enemy.  The  commanding 
general  should  have  carte  blanche  for  carrying 

16* 


18G 

out,  the  details  of  the  campaio-n,  tlic  ].\:\n  of 
■which  may  have  been  decided  upon  liy  a  inm-.cil, 
but  even  tliis  is  far  better  left  in  llie  liaiKis  of 
him  who  has  the  whole  responsilVility  of  its 
execution  on  his  shoulders,  and  has  the  greatest 
interest  in  its  success. 

486.  It  is  with  the  aid  of  the  general  maps  of 
a  country,  made  to  a  small  scale,  as  embracing  a 
wider  territory-,  that  the  general  plan  of  cam- 
I)aign  is  marked  out.  All  that  is  wanted  for  this 
object  is  that  the  map  should  contain  the  exact 
positions  of  the  places  upon  it ;  the  water  courses, 
the  mountain  crests,  the  principal  lines  of  com- 
munication, and  the  political  and  geographical 
boundaries.  The  less  detail  on  such  maps  the  better 
they  are  for  this  purpose,  as  the  mind  is  not  dis- 
tracted by  them  from  the  main  features.  For  all 
points  of  detail  topographical  maps,  on  a  large 
scale,  are  necessary.  To  these  we  have  recourse 
when  it  is  a  question  to  choose  an  encampment ; 
to  decide  upon  a  military  position ;  to  dispose  an 
order  of  battle,  &c. 

487.  The  plan  of  campaign  lays  down  the 
points  Avhere  the  troops  are  to  be  assembled,  the 
base  and  line  of  operations,  and  the  strategical 
points  to  be  attained. 

The  choice  of  the  positions  where  the  troops 
are  to  be  assembled  is  not  only  dictated  by  the 
facility  of  subsisting  them,  although  this  is  a 
point  of  great  importance;  but  bj^  their  suitable- 
ness to  deceive  xhe  enemy  as  to  the  point  on 
Avhich  we  intend  to  make  an  advance,  so  that  we 
nia}^  take  the  initiative  and  follow  up  our  blow 
with  crushing  efiect.  The  distances  of  these 
points  should  be  so  regulated,  with  respect  to  the 
one  at  which  the  army  is  to  be  concentrated  for 


187 

action,   that  all  the  corps  may  reach   this   last 
point  at  a  designated  moment. 

488.  The  base  of  operations  can  seldom  be  a 
subject  of  doubt  in  a  foreign  war,  as  it  necessa- 
rily lies  on  that  portion  of  the  frontier  next  to 
the  enemy.  The  only  question  that  can  arise  is 
at  what  point  of  the  frontier  it  will  be  best  to 
advance  against  the  enemy.  It  is  here  that  a 
consideration  of  the  general  outline  of  the  base 
comes  up.  Is  it  concave,  or  makes  to  some  ex- 
tent a  re-entering  angle,  the  army  then  in  ad- 
vancing will  find  both  its  rear  and  wings  securely 
supported.  Is  it  strongly  convex,  or  offers  a 
salient  angle,  it  has  the  advantage,  by  assem- 
bling our  army  towards  the  apex  of  the  angle,  of 
keeping  the  enemy  in  doubt  as  to  which  side  we 
will  adopt  for  our  base,  and  thus  forcing  him  to 
distribute  his  forces  on  an  arc  of  which  we  occu- 
py the  centre.  But  even  should  he  concentrate 
on  one  point,  we  have  still  the  resource  of 
threatening  him  on  one  side,  so  as  to  draw  his 
attention  there,  whilst  by  the  shortest  line  we 
throw  ourselves  on  the  opposite  one.  This  con- 
vex form  is  then  decidedly  advantageous  on  the 
opening  of  a  campaign  ;  but,  in  case  of  reverse, 
it  may  lead  to  our  separation  from  our  base. 
The  inverse  holds  for  the  concave  base. 

489.  There  can  seldom,  if  ever,  be  an  equali- 
ty of  choice  between  two  frontiers  as  a  base  of 
operations;  one  will  necessarily  offer  preponde- 
rating advantages  over  the  other,  which  will 
cause  its  adoption,  and  it  is  upon  this  one  that 
all  our  means  of  attack  must  be  brought  together 
It  is  a  grave  fault  to  pursue  a  double  offensive, 
in  starting  at  the  same  time  from  two  bases.  It 
is  much  better  to  stand  strictly  on  the  delensive 


188 

on  one  of  the  frontiers,  so  that  by  accumulating 
more  troops  on  the  other  we  may  increase  our 
chances  of  success.  It  is  a  rare  thing  that  "vve 
arrive  at  a  satisfactory  result  by  dividing  our 
forces ;  and  the  same  reasons  which  render  dou- 
ble lines  of  operation  dangerous  are  equally 
against  attempting  a  double  offensive.  "VVe 
should,  on  the  contrary,  concentrate  our  efforts 
as  much  as  we  can,  in  order  that  the  advantages 
■we  obtain  may  be  decisive  ;  and  they  must  al- 
ways be  more  so  on  the  preponderating  frontier 
than  on  the  other ;  it  is  upon  the  former,  there- 
fore, that  we  should  act  with  the  most  vigor, 
holding  back  from  the  other  all  that  is  not  indis- 
pensable to  the  defensive  ;  as  upon  the  field  of 
battle  we  refuse  one  wing,  drawing  fi'om  it 
troops  to  strengthen  the  one  engaged,  and  upon 
which  we  count  for  victory. 

490.  A  thorough  discussion  of  the  different 
lines  of  operations  is  the  essential  part  of  the 
plan  of  campaign.  There  are  so  many  considera- 
tions attendant  upon  it,  so  many  points  to  be 
carefully  weighed,  that  the  choice  of  the  best 
line  is  always  a  matter  of  great  deUcacy,  and  it  is 
here  that  the  real  general  shows  his  capacity. 
No  other  rules  can  be  well  laid  down  than  those 
previously  given  in  treating  of  hnes  of  ojjeration. 
It  may  be  further  added,  that  in  comparing 
several  lines,  the  effective  distances,  or  the  time 
which  it  will  take  troops  to  traverse  them,  are 
alone  to  be  considered,  and  not  the  distances 
upon  the  map  which  by  measurement  are  the 
shortest.  We  may  decide  on  taking  the  best 
made  road  when  urgent  motives  are  not  against 
our  doing  so  ;  for  troops  will  march  more  rapidly 
and  with  more  convenience  upon  wide  and  com- 


189 

modious  roads  than  upon  narrow  and  obstructed 
byways.  The  nature  of  towns  or  dehles  to  be 
traversed  may  ibrce  us  to  leave  them  on  one 
side  to  take  byways,  although  bad ;  lor  we 
overcome  with  less  difficulty  material  obstacles 
on  our  line  of  march  than  we  can  towns  and  de- 
files well  defended.  When  an  army  can,  in  its 
onward  movement,  rest  one  wing  upon  a  natural 
obstacle  to  an  enemy,  it  will  be  well  for  it  to 
keep  as  near  that  obstacle  as  practicable ;  be- 
cause it  will  be  better  covered  by  the  army,  the 
front  of  which  during  the  march  occupies  always 
several  miles  in  extent ;  at  least  so  long  as  a 
battle  is  not  imminent.  When  the  two  wings 
of  the  army  are  not  supported  in  this  way,  the 
line  of  operations  should  cut  the  middle  of  the 
front  of  the  army,  in  order  that  it  may  be  equally 
well  covered  on  each  side.  There  is  one  general 
rule  both  on  the  march  and  for  battle,  which  is, 
never  to  expose  your  line  of  operations;  every 
disposition,  on  the  contrary,  should  be  taken  to 
cover  it  and  defend  it  in  the  best  possible  man- 
ner. 

491.  Defensive  Plan.  The  plan  of  campaign 
for  the  defensive  is  usually  termed  the  defensive 
plan.  It  chiefly  consists  in  deciding  upon  the 
character  of  the  warfare  to  be  adopted ;  one 
Avhich  will  depend  upon  national  traits,  the  re- 
sources, topography,  and  climate  of  the  country. 
The  l^'rench,  for  example,  make  a  defensive  war- 
fare by  assailing  their  enemies  ;  the  Germans,  on 
the  contrary,  carry  on  patiently  a  methodical 
defensive  behind  their  own  frontiers;  the  Spa- 
niards have  been  seen  to  carry  on  an  extermi- 
nating war  of  detail ;  whilst  the  liussians,  under 
like  circumstances,  have  laid  waste  wiiole  pro- 


190 

vinces,  and  destroyed  by  fire  their  capital  city, 
to  deprive  their  invaders  of  every  material 
resource.  A  brave  people,  but  not  habituated  to 
privations,  will  not  drag  out  a  war  by  patient 
endurance,  but  will  endeavor  to  bring  it  speedily 
to  a  close  by  a  few  brilliant  actions ;  its  prefer- 
ences will  be  for  sledge-hammer  blows,  preferring 
the  hazard  of  a  great  decisive  battle,  in  which  it 
may  fall  with  glory,  to  a  series  of  petty  combata 
which  only  serve  to  exhaust  the  resources  of  the 
country  without  bringing  about  any  decisive 
results. 

492.  Carrying  the  war  into  the  heart  of  the 
assailant's  country,  or  that  of  his  allies,  is  the 
surest  plan  of  making  him  share  its  burdens 
and  foiling  his  plans.  The  courage  and  conduct 
of  troops  are  improved  in  this  way,  and  the 
chances  in  their  favor  increased.  But  to  be 
successful,  the  party  adopting  it  must  not  be  too 
inferior  in  strength,  and  the  nature  of  the  fron- 
tiers should  favor  it;  as  there  would  be  too 
great  a  risk  under  less  favorable  circumstances, 
and  in  these  even  it  would  not  be  prudent  to 
advance  too  far  beyond  our  own  frontier.  The 
army  Avill  chiefly  depend  for  the  supply  of  its 
wants  upon  the  zone  of  territor}"^  adjacent  to  the 
frontier,  and  this  should  be  desperately  disputed, 
by  uniting  all  its  forces  against  the  enemy's 
invading  corps.  If  this  succeeds,  from  the  de- 
fensive the  army  can  assume  the  oflensive.  If 
unsuccessful,  nothing  remains  to  be  done  but  to 
concentrate  all  the  troops  possible  and  fall  back 
upon  positions  selected  beforehand,  either  of 
great  natural  or  artificial  strength ;  as  rivers, 
mountain-passes,  fortresses,  etc.  In  this  man- 
ner the  enemy  is  drawn  forward  into  a  region 


191 

the  devastations  of  which  are  upon  his  shoulders. 
The  skiU'ul  Montecucuh,  in  his  memoii-s,  argues 
strongly  for  the  adoption  of  such  a  plan  of  de- 
fensive measures  ;  remarking  that  upon  the 
territory  of  our  enemy  we  arouse  the  discon- 
tented, whilst  the  fountains  of  men,  mone}',  and 
whatever  else  war  calls  for,  are  only  disordered 
and  fail  in  this  portion  in  which  the  war  rages. 

493.  In  fighting  on  our  own  soil  we  have 
much  to  suffer,  it  is  true,  but  the  dangers  are 
less  ;  the  home  population  are  for  us ;  they  act 
as  our  spies,  and  lend  us  every  assistance  practi- 
cable ;  we  fight  in  positions  chosen  beforehand, 
and,  in  some  cases,  strongly  intrenched  in  time ; 
and  when  the  enemy  is  compelled  to  advance  to 
attack  us,  we  can  move  in  any  direction,  because 
every  portion  of  the  territory,  not  occupied 
immediately  by  the  enemy,  can  serve  us  as  a 
base  of  operations ;  we  have  also  great  facilities 
for  threatening  his  lines  of  communication,  and 
in  forcing  him  to  detach  largely  to  hold  the 
places  he  may  have  taken  possession  of.  These 
detachments  of  the  enemy  offer  to  us  fair  game, 
as  we  may  attack  them  in  detail,  beat,  or  sur- 
round them.  When  fortune  is  favorable  to  the 
army  acting  on  the  defensive,  victory  is  more 
decisive  when  gained  within  than  beyond  its 
own  frontiers ;  because  the  enemy,  being  de- 
feated, has  defiles  to  traverse,  and  to  make  a 
retreat  in  the  presence  of  and  through  an  exas- 
perated population,  waiting  but  the  opportunity 
to  rise  and  throw  themselves  upon  him. 

494.  A  frontier  convex  towards  the  enemy  is 
favorable  to  the  defensive  at  the  outset,  and  this 
may  decide  upon  the  kind  of  warfare  to  be 
adopted.     For,  from  a  central  point,  which  we 


192 

hold  in  force,  we  overlook  the  surrounding  peri- 
phery of  the  vulnerable  frontiers  of  our  enemy, 
and  are  ready  to  invade  the  one  which  otfers 
the  most  favorable  chances  by  the  shortest  line 
to  it. 

495.  Having  decided  upon  the  general  features 
of  the  defence,  the  details  are  next  to  be  deter- 
mined on,  and  in  these  consist,  in  fact,  the  plan 
of  defence.  The  determination  of  the  points  on 
which  resistance  is  to  be  made,  those  upon 
which  we  are  to  fall  back  in  case  of  disaster, 
and  the  roads  leading  to  these,  in  retreat ;  the 
dispositions  of  oar  forces  at  the  outset  so  as  to 
anticipate  the  enemy  on  every  point;  an  indi- 
cation of  the  points  in  rear  of  our  frontier  for 
concentration,  so  soon  as  the  enemy  has  un- 
masked his  projects;  the  mode  of  supporting 
our  advanced  corps  and  those  of  observation  by 
central  reserves ;  finally,  the  designation  of  the 
points  to  be  fortified  by  art,  bridges  to  be  des- 
troyed, roads  to  be  repaired,  etc.,  etc.  :  such  are 
some  of  the  objects  upon  which  attention  must 
be  directed  in  any  defensive  plan, 

496.  The  suitable  mihtary  dispositions  in  all 
such  plans  will  be  controUed  by  the  local  topo- 
graphy ;  it  is,  therefore,  impracticable  to  lay 
down  invariable  rules  on  this  point ;  the  most 
that  can  be  said  is,  that  too  great  a  dissemination 
of  our  force  is  always  dangerous;  therefore  that, 
so  far  from  attempting  to  defend  every  pass  some 
must  be  abandoned  to  their  fate,  in  order  to 
effectually  guard  those  which  are  most  important 
and  the  more  directly  threatened  by  the  enemy. 
If,  instead  of  moving  upon  the  latter,  the  enemy 
makes  a  show  of  gaining  the  former,  he  must  be 
met   by    analogous   movements,    and    our   task 


193 

should  be  to  be  in  readiness  to  meet  him  by 
whatever  route  he  may  arrive  ;  and  also  with  the 
most  troops  Ave  can  concentrate.  It  is  from  this 
cause  that  the  configuration  of  frontiers,  and  the 
direction  and  nature  of  the  roads  by  which  they 
are  approached,  have  so  great  an  influence  upon 
the  defensive  measures  against  invasion.  If 
these  last  are  such  as  to  permit  our  moving  on 
right  lines,  from  a  centre,  ujoon  the  enemy  ma- 
noeuvring on  the  periphery,  every  advantage  of 
mobility  is  on  our  side,  and  we  ought  to  reach 
any  point  before  the  enemy.  But,  in  any  case, 
it  is  next  to  impossible  to  close  every  pass.  To 
do  so  would  require  a  continuous  line  of  troops, 
which,  from  its  extent  alone,  would  be  weak  at 
all  points,  and  which  an  enterprising  enemy 
would  easily  pierce  at  any  one.  Instead  of 
attempting  any  such  impracticable  plan  it  would 
be  better  to  place  a  considerable  force  at  some 
one  favorable  point  in  rear  of  our  frontier,  and, 
from  there,  take  the  chances  of  anticipating  the 
enemy  on  any  point  he  may  threaten  by  moving 
on  him  promptly.  In  advance  of  this  central 
force,  and  upon  its  front  and  flanks,  small  bodies 
can  be  thrown  forward  to  occupy  the  principal 
passes  momentarily  and  give  warning  of  the 
enemy's  movements.  These  detachments,  by 
retiring  slowly  and  holding  the  enemy  in  check, 
will  give  the  main  body  time  to  make  its 
dispositions,  either  to  advance  or  to  receive  the 
enemy  at  any  point  further  back.  With  these 
precautions  the  main  body  will  be  secured  from 
surprise,  and  all  the  troops  can  be  kept  near 
enough  to  concentrate  for  battle.  Such  are  the 
general  defensive  dispositions  recommended  by 
the  highest  military  authority.  It  is  readily  seen 
17 


194 

that  great  discro^lon  is  necessarily  left  to  the 
commanding  general,  and  that  his  measures 
should  lend  themselves  to  the  local  features  of 
his  line  of  defence.  All  that  is  requisite  that 
these  should  be  good  is  that  they  should  be  based 
upon  the  simple  idea  of  concentration.  This  is 
always  preferable  to  a  feeble  continuous  line, 
with  separated  bodies  that  cannot  afford  mutual 
support ;  which  are  too  far  removed  from  the 
supervision  of  the  commanding  general,  who 
cannot  be  everywhere,  and  which,  owing  to  the 
distances  between  them,  cannot  be  rallied  and 
concentrated  in  time  when  the  line  is  pierced  at 
any  point. 

497.  With  the  foregoing  dispositions  there 
§hould  be  combined  some  suitable  system  of  sig- 
nals, or  other  means  of  transmitting  intelligence 
promptly  from  the  interior  line  of  detachments 
to  the  main  body.  No  pains  should  be  spared  to 
have  this  system  as  perfect  as  practicable,  and  not 
liable  to  mistakes. 

498.  A  position  chosen  on  the  direct  road  that 
the  enemy  must  follow  is  not  always  the  best  to 
check  with  advantage  his  onward  march  ;  flank 
positions  can  also  often  be  found  of  superior  ad- 
vantage for  this  purpose,  from  which  the  enemy's 
line  of  operations  can  be  threatenedif  he  persists 
in  neglecting  this  position.  This  is  particularly 
the  case  if  the  force  thrown  on  the  flank  is  of 
such  strength  that  the  enemy  dare  not  leave  it 
in  his  rear,  and  therefore  must  attack  and  drive 
it  back  so  that  he  may  not  expose  himself  to  be 
separated  from  his  base.  In  this  manner  the 
enemy  is  forced  tc  a  battle  on  ground  of  our  own 
choice,  and  where  .ve  will  have  had  time  to  make 
every  defensive  disposition.     The  searching  out 


195 

and  establishing,  on  sound  principles,  flank  posi- 
tions for  concentration  of  troops,  forms  an  essen- 
tial feature  in  laying  down  any  plan  of  de- 
fence. 

499.  Having  decided  upon  the  most  advanced 
positions  to  be  occupied,  attention  should  next  be 
directed  to  those  of  a  secondary  character,  w^hich 
will  naturally  be  controUed  by  the  water  courses 
and  mountain  chains  in  rear  of  the  first  line. 
These  will  demand  in  their  selection  very  careful 
study.  The  best  of  this  class  are  those  which 
have  their  wings  or  extremities  resting  upon 
natural  obstacles  that  an  enemy  cannot  turn — as 
the  sea,  lakes,  unfordable  rivers,  which,  in  some 
respects,  overlook  the  lines  of  approach  on  them ; 
are  accessible  from  the  front  only  by  a  few  prac- 
ticable roads  which  can  be  easily  guarded ;  the 
general  outline  of  the  position  being  convex 
towards  the  enemy,  and  in  rear  having  good 
roads  leading  to  all  points  of  it,  along  which 
troops  can  be  rapidly  moved  to  any  point  in 
danger. 

500.  Fortified  places  on  a  frontier  will,  of 
course,  play  an  important  part  in  any  defensive 
plan ;  even  open  towns,  by  properly  covering 
them  with  field  works,  may  give  the  means\of 
eflective  resistance  to  any  usual  mode  of  attack. 
When  these  places  lie  upon  a  river,  which  is 
itself  a  line  of  defence,  particularly  when  they 
occupy  both  banks  of  it,  they  aftbrd  great  faci- 
hties  for  the  operation  of  an  army  which  can 
manoeuvre  on  either  shore  with  safety,  so  long 
as  the  place  itself  is  not  invested.  Fortifications 
so  placed  completely  prevent  the  enemy  from 
using  the  river  as  a  means  of  transportation, 
Avhilst  they  assist  us  in  so  using  them ;  and,  in 


19G 

most  cases,  they  would  therefore  force  an  enemy 
to  take  all  the  known  measures  for  giving  pos- 
session of  them  before  he  would  dare  to  pass 
beyond  them.  In  whatever  way  a  river  may 
lie,  which  has  fortified  points  on  it,  the  disad- 
vantages to  an  invading  Ibrce  are  necessarily 
great.  If  parallel  to  our  line  of  frontier  an 
enemy  cannot  cross  the  river,  leaving  these  occu- 
pied in  his  rear,  without  running  the  risk  of  a 
great  disaster.  If  perpendicular,  he  cannot  with 
safety  divide  his  forces  to  operate  on  both  banks 
at  once,  as  we  have,  by  means  of  the  fortified 
points,  the  facility  of  concentrating  on  either  side 
at  pleasure.  Without  such  strong  points  on  it, 
a  river,  on  the  contrary,  might  be  a  positive  ad- 
vantage to  the  enemy,  by  allowing  him  to  se- 
cure one  of  his  wings  from  attack  by  resting  it 
upon  the  river,  whilst  he  would  also  thus  faci- 
litate his  own  means  of  transportation. 

501.  As  to  mihtary  positions,  properly  so 
called,  that  is  localities  favorable  to  accepting 
battle,  great  care  should  be  taken  in  designating 
them  on  the  plan  of  defence,  and  in  preparing 
them  beforehand  for  every  eventuality,  by  field 
works,  lines  of  retreat,  the  removal  of  all  ob- 
structions between  the  points  of  the  position, 
&c.  In  every  plan  of  defence,  particular  care 
should  be  taken  in  pointing  out  what  roads 
should  be  carefully  preserved,  and  which,  in  any 
emergency,  may  be  broken  up,  or  otherwise  ob- 
structed. These  measures  of  destruction  are 
almost  always  put  off  so  late  as  to  become  im- 
practicable at  the  moment  of  need.  Nothing  is 
more  common  in  war  than  to  hear  that  some 
advantage  has  been  lost  or  gained,  through  the 
neglect  of  securing  or  destroying  some  bridge  or 


197 

road,  in  time.  All  roads  connecting  points  along 
the  line  of  defence,  or  which  run  parallel  to  it, 
ought  to  be  kept  in  perfect  order,  so  that  assist- 
ance can  be  promptly  carried  from  one  point  to 
another,  or  raids  be  organized  upon  the  enemy 
by  a  rapid  concentration  of  troops  at  any  point. 

502.  The  above  are  the  main  points  in  plan- 
ning a  defensive  campaign,  so  far  as  the  move- 
ment of  troops  is  concerned.  There  are  many 
others  of  not  less  importance  which  belong  to 
the  administrative  functions  of  an  army,  as  the 
commissariat,  quartermaster's,  medical  and  sig- 
nal departments.  Belonging  to  the  plan  of  de- 
fence, they  should  be  discussed  with  as  much 
care  as  the  purely  military  movements.  Com- 
bats are  comparatively  of  but  rare  occurrence, 
Avhilst  these  things  are  of  every  hour,  and  the 
health,  safety,  and  comfort  of  the  troops,  upon 
which  their  fighting  qualities  so  essentially  de- 
pend, are  due  to  the  proper  and  efficient  work- 
ing of  these  semi-military  departments. 

503.  Strategical  Operations. — It  is  by  prepara- 
tory movements,  by  marches  skilfully  conducted, 
so  as  to  throw  our  forces  on  the  vulnerable  point 
of  the  enemy's  line,  that  those  grand  results  are 
obtained,  which  flow  from  a  single  victory.  A 
battle  gained  is  always  a  fine  thing;  but  tlie 
consequences  resulting  from  it  may  be  very  dif- 
ferent, according  as,  by  our  previous  measures, 
we  are  able  to  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  commu- 
nications ;  separate  him  from  his  base ;  disperse 
his  forces,  or  simplj''  force  him  to  retreat  without 
further  loss  than  that  on  the  battle-field.  In  the 
first  case,  victory^  is  complete  if  the  first  success 
is  promptly  followed  up.  In  the  second,  the 
enemy  will  soon  be  able  to  rally  his  forces,  and 

17* 


19S 

offer  a  now  battle.  Vigor  on  the  field  and  rapi- 
dity of  pursuit  should  go  hand  in  hand  tor  great 
success.  The  latter  is  of  as  great  importance  as 
the  former.  Marshal  Saxe  was  so  thoroughly 
pervaded  with  this  conviction,  that  he  laid  it 
down  as  an  axiom,  that  "  military  success  resided 
in  the  legs  of  the  soldiers."  A  dictum  that  is  ably 
enforced  by  all  authentic  military  history. 

504.  A  march,  regarded  as  a  strategical  ope- 
ration, may  be  either  towards  or  from  the 
enemy  ;  either  a  forward  movement,  or  one  in 
retreat.  In  either  case  the  army,  if  numerous, 
is  necessarily  divided  into  several  corps,  which 
move  upon  separate  roads,  either  to  subsist  more 
easily,  or  to  have  all  the  space  necessary  for 
deployments,  and  the  other  preparatory  move- 
ments for  delivering  battle.  The  different 
columns  of  march  should  be  kept  the  closer  to- 
gether, as  the  enemy  is  known  to  be  the  more 
bold  and  active  in  his  movements.  If  there  is 
danger  of  an  attack,  the  columns  should  be  kept 
in  supporting  distances  of  each  other,  and  they 
should  not  be  thrown  into  any  position  w"here 
an  obstacle  might  prevent  their  being  brought 
together  at  any  desirable  moment  on  the  held 
of  battle.  At  the  same  time  discretion  must  be 
shown,  so  that  so  simple  a  rule  may  not  be 
pushed  to  an  absurd  extreme,  by  keeping  the 
various  columns  so  close  to  each  other  that 
parallel  roads  will  have  to  be  made  for  them 
with  the  axe  and  pick,  when  those  already  in 
use  cannot  be  turned  to  account.  Any  attempt 
of  this  kind  would,  except  in  rare  cases,  so 
greatl)'-  retard  our  movements  that  the  least 
enterprising  enemy  would  take  advantage  of  it. 
Military  history  offers  epochs  where  this  circum- 


199 

spect  course  was  pursued  by  armies,  but  no 
truly  great  general  has  ever  submitted  to  such 
trammels.  So  long  as  a  march  is  not  made 
■within  cannon  range  of  the  enemy,  more  or  less 
interval  can  be  left  between  the  columns  whilst 
executing  the  marches  which  are  to  bring 
them  into  position  on  the  battle-field,  according 
to  the  nature  of  the  locality.  The  only  limit  to 
be  fixed  is,  that  the  intervals  shall  not  be  so 
great  as  to  prevent  any  corps  reaching  the  battle- 
field on  the  day  prescribed. 

505.  Each  column  should  adopt  all  the  usual 
precautions  to  prevent  a  surprise.  Neglect  in 
doing  so  has  brought  on  some  of  the  greatest 
disasters  recorded  in  history.  Of  all  marches, 
those  which  are  most  likely  to  produce  the 
most  splendid  results  are  the  ones  that  are 
concealed  from  the  enemy,  and  therefore  termed 
secret  marches.  Well  planned  and  executed, 
they  enable  an  army  to  throw  itself  unex- 
pectedly on  the  enemy's  flank,  threaten  his 
base  of  operations,  surprise  his  cantonments,  etc. 
A  country  cut  up  with  forests,  water  courses, 
and  like  natural  obstacles,  lends  itself  best  to 
the  operations  of  a  secret  march ;  as  these  both 
conceal  the  movements  of  troops,  and  lead  the 
enemy  into  fancied  security  from  the  character 
of  the  locality,  and  cause  him  to  neglect  the 
usual  precautions  to  guard  against  a  surprise.  It 
cannot  be  too  strongly  impressed  upon  every 
soldier  that,  with  patience  and  a  determined 
will,  there  is  no  natural  obstacle  that  troops  can- 
not overcome,  when  there  is  no  enemy  to  inter- 
rupt our  work.  In  this  respect,  in  looking  back 
on  military  history,  it  may  with  truth  be  said 
that  nothing  is  impossible  to  a  determined  will. 


200 

500.  Speed  is  one  of  the  chief  characteristics 
of  strategical  marches,  as  it  is  of  the  ordinary 
movements  on  tlie  battle-field.  In  this  one 
quality  reside  all  the  advantages  that  a  fortu- 
nate initiative  may  have  procured ;  and  by  it  we 
gain  in  the  pursuit  all  the  results  that  a  victory 
on  the  battle-field  has  placed  in  our  hands.  By 
rapidity  of  movement,  we  can,  like  the  Romans, 
make  ivar  feed  ivar,  by  remaining  so  shoit  a 
period  in  any  one  spot  as  not  to  exhaust  the 
resources  around  us,  however  unequal  to  a  pro- 
longed sojourn.  By  this  means,  we  disembariass 
ourselves  of  those  immense  trains  which  are 
otherwise  indispensable  for  the  ordinary  daily 
wants  of  an  army ;  we  carry  along  with  us  only 
what  is  indispensable,  obliging  the  soldier  to 
keep  himself  always  supplied  with  a  few  days' 
rations  of  bread  in  his  knapsack,  driving  along 
with  the  army  herds  of  cattle  in  suflScient  num- 
bers to  furnish  the  meat  ration.  In  this  manner, 
an  army,  freed  from  all  of  the  impedimenta  that 
might  retard  its  motions,  will  be  able  to  accom- 
plish the  most  stupendous  labors  in  marching 
and  fighting.  No  great  success  can  be  hoped 
for  in  war  in  which  rapid  movements  do  not 
enter  as  an  element.  Even  the  very  elements 
of  Nature  seem  to  array  themselves  against  the 
slow  and  over-prudent  general.  The  chevalier 
Folard  has  very  well  remarked,  "  that  the  slow 
and  heavy  in  war  will  partake  of  as  little  of  the 
glory  of  this  world,  as  the  lukewarm  will  of  that 
of  the  world  to  come." 

507.  In  the  preceding  part  of  this  subject  the 
advantages  of  interior  lines  of  operation  were 
pointed  out.  Marches  which  lead  to  this  result 
deserve  the  close  study  of  the  general.     If  the 


201 

enemy,  for  example,  is  moving  on  an  extended 
front,  upon  our  army,  with  tlie  purpose  of  sur- 
rounding it,  the  true  resource  for  safety  is  for  us 
to  move  in  mass  upon  some  v^'eak  point  oi'  his 
centre,  and.  having  thus  separated  his  wings, 
beat  thern  botli  in  detail.  In  this  manner  we 
shall  not  only  foil  the  enemy's  plan,  but  scatter 
and  force  his  forces  on  divergent  lines  of  retreat; 
the  more  disastrous  to  him  at  the  moment,  and 
the  less  advantageous  for  his  concentration  later. 
508.  If  the  enemy's  forces  are  concentrated, 
we  may  direct  a  movement  of  our  army  towards 
each  of  his  flanks,  so  as  to  induce  him  to  sepa- 
rate in  his  centre  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
each  of  his  flanks,  when,  having  done  so,  we 
ma}'  reunite  our  separated  forces  and  rapidly 
concentrate  them  on  the  one  of  his  fractions  the 
most  accessible  to  us.  A  movement  of  this  kind 
cannot  be  attempted  with  a  prospect  of  success 
unless  the  topographical  features  are  of  such  a 
character  as  to  mask  our  movements.  For  ex- 
ample, supposing  a  river  to  lie  between  our  force 
and  that  of  the  enemy,  so  as  to  prevent  him 
from  moving  on  our  centre,  we  might  direct  two 
fractions  on  the  extreme  right  and  left  of  the 
enemy's  position,  and,  if  he  weakens  himself  on 
his  centre  to  reinforce  his  wings,  we  might  take^ 
advantage  of  this  to  cross  the  river  rapidly  on 
his  centre,  everything  having  been  prepared  for 
it,  and  tlms,  holding  a  point  between  his  wings, 
concentrate  on  either  and  overwhelm  it  before 
it  could  receive  succor  from  the  other.  Here 
everything  depends  on  rapidity  of  movement, 
and  subsequent  vigorous  action.  An  hour's 
delay  in  such  combinations  may  not  only  cause 
the  failure  of  the  best  laid  plan   but  entail  dis- 


202 

astrous  results.  A  single  hour  may  suffice  for 
the  enemy  to  gain  the  strategical  point  and 
overwhelm  us  with  superior  forces.  If  Fortune 
is  on  the  side  of  the  heavy  battalions,  she  also 
frequently  grants  her  favors  to  superior  activity 
and  audacity. 

509.  From  the  preceding  discussion,  if  based 
on  sound  principles,  and  historical  precedents 
are  strongly  in  its  favor,  it  follows  that  to  defend 
with  advantage  a  frontier  menaced  on  several 
points,  the  true  rule  is  not  to  attempt  to  hold 
every  point  in  force,  but  to  watch  every  outlet 
by  small  corps,  just  of  sufficient  strength  to  check 
and  delay  the  enemy,  and  to  hold  the  chief  por- 
tion of  our  forces  concentrated  at  some  central 
point,  from  whicli  they  can  operate  rapidly 
against  any  considerable  fraction  of  the  enemy's 
forces. 

510.  For  example,  let  us  suppose  an  army  of 
80,000  acting  on  the  defensive  against  one  of 
120,000  separated  into  three  corps  of  40,000 
each.  To  oppose  to  the  enemy  three  corps  of 
equal  strength  we  should  have  but  about  2(J,U00 
in  each,  and  consequently  would  find  ourselves 
inferior  in  numbers  on  all  points.  If,  instead  of 
this,  we  opposed  to  each  fraction  of  the  enemy 
a  corps  of  from  12,000  to  15,000,  it  would  be 
sufficient  to  hold  40,000  in  check,  whilst  our 
main  body,  consisting  of  from  35,000  to  40,000, 
holding  a  central  position,  could  move  on  the 
point  first  menaced,  and,  being  joined  by  the 
corps  of  observation,  would  offer  to  the  enemy 
an  effective  force  of  about  50,000  combatants, 
which,  all  other  things  equal,  should  beat  the 
enemy. 

511.  The  principle  is  not  the  less  true,  and 


203 

the  rule  the  less  imperative,  even  when  the  dis- 
parity of  force  is  far  greater.  It  may  happen 
that,  with  every  effort,  we  may  not  succeed  in 
obtaining  the  preponderance  in  numbers  on  any 
point ;  still  the  only  chance  of  success  lies  in 
concentrating  all  we  can,  and  trusting  to  skill, 
promptitude,  vigilance,  and  audacity,  to  do  the 
rest.  History  furnishes  brilliant  examples  of 
what  a  great  general  can  accomplish,  even  under 
apparently  the  most  discouraging  state  of  things, 
by  promptitude  and  rapidity  of  movement  in 
throwing  his  reserves  first  on  one  and  then  on 
another  of  the  enemy's  fractions. 

512.  In  marches  in  retreat,  like  those  in  ad- 
vance, the  same  general  rule  holds  of  keeping 
to  a  single  line,  so  as  to  have  our  fractions  well 
in  hand  to  oppose  the  greatest  force  possible  to 
the  enemy.  Those  retreats  thal^  are  termed 
diver ijent,  or  eccentric^  and  which  are  made  at 
the  same  time  on  divergent  routes  to  deceive 
the  enemy  and  render  his  pursuit  uncertain,  are 
extremely  dangerous.  In  separating,  to  follow 
these  divergent  lines,  we  weaken  ourselves  on 
every  point;  the  corps,  being  isolated,  offer  no 
mutual  support ;  they  are  easily  beaten,  and, 
being  forced  upon  any  impassable  obstacle,  or 
surrounded,  must  be  either  annihilated  or  forced 
to  surrender.  The  enemy,  without  allowing  his 
attention  to  be  drawn  off  from  his  object,  will 
stick  to  one  of  these  fractions  until  he  has  des- 
troyed it,  knowing  that  the  others  must  fall  an 
easy  prey  wherever  they  may  be  found  ;  as  from 
their  dispersed  condition  they  can  offer  no  effec- 
tual resistance.  Merely  to  keep  them  from 
reuniting  will  be  enough  for  present  purposes. 

513.  There  is  but  one  case  in  which  our  forces 


20-i 

can  be  dispersed  Avith  safety,  and  that  is  'when 
we  have  just  <,fained  a  decisive  victory,  and  are 
in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  who,  having  lost 
his  communications,  is  entirely  disorganized  and 
demoralized.  In  this  position  of  affairs  we  have 
only  to  throw  our  force  into  the  midst  of  these 
broken  up  fractions  to  determine  them  to  fly. 
We  may  here  attempt  any  blow  ;  no  movements 
can  fail  to  turn  out  well  except  those  which  are 
too  slow  and  methodical.  This  exception  only 
becomes  legitimate  under  the  supposition  that 
the  disorganization  and  demoralization  of  the 
defeated  armj''  are  complete. 

514.  In  a  retreat,  therefore,  even  more  than 
in  a  forward  movement,  we  must  keep  together, 
as  the  only  means  of  safety.  Keep  upj,  as  lar  as 
circumstances  will  permit,  good  order  in  the 
ranks,  or,  at«least,  march  with- some  show  of 
being  united.  Present  an  imposing  front  to  the 
enemy,  and,  should  he  pursue  with  temerity, 
turn  upon  him  and  punish  him  for  his  want  of 
prudence.  Even  dare  to  make  an  ofi'ensive  re- 
turn upon  him  when  he  attacks  or  approaches 
negligently.  More  honor  may  be  gained  in  a 
well  conducted  retreat  than  in  gaining  a  battle, 
where  fortune  frequently  plays  so  conspicuous  a 
part. 

515.  Groat  advantages  sometipies  arise  in  con- 
ducting a  retreat  parallel  to  our  frontier,  when 
the  topography  lends  itself  to  this  operation ;  as 
the  enemy,  in  following  us  up,  really  gains  but 
little  ground  in  advance.  A  few  words  have 
already  been  said  on  this  point,  in  speaking  of 
accidental  lines  of  operation.  If  a  retreat  of 
this  kind,  termed  a  pa?-a7/eZ  retreut,  is  made  ia 
the  enemy's  country,  the  army  subsists  at  the 


205 

enemy's  expense;  the  evils  of  war  fall  on  him; 
and  lie  is  almost  as  badly  oif  as  if  he  had  not 
the  upper  hand.  If  this  retreat  takes  place 
within  our  own  frontier  we  draw  after'  us  the 
victorious  army ;  we  force  him  to  move  onwards 
without  gaining  a  foot  of  ground  towards  the 
interior;  v/e  abandon  to  him  only  our  borders, 
whilst  we  force  him  to  offer  his  flank  to  any 
force  we  may  have  in  the  interior.  But,  with 
all  these  obvious  advantages,  we  must  look  out 
how  we  attempt  anything  of  the  kind  in  a  ter- 
ritory which  is  open,  and  would  give  the  enemy 
an  easy  means  of  cutting  us  off  from  our  base. 
Such  a  retreat,  therefore,  requires  to  be  covered 
by  a  river,  a  mountain  chain,  or  some  other 
obstacle  that  an  enemy  cannot  cross  with  safety, 
to  interrupt  our  communications  to  the  interior. 

516.  If  the  parallel  retreat  is  covered  by  a 
river,  all  bridges  by  which  the  enemy  might  in- 
tercept our  communications,  or  attack  in  flank, 
should  be  timely  destroyed,  the  fords  obstructed 
and  guarded.  Like  precautions  are  to  be  taken, 
when  covered  by  a  mountain  chain,  in  occupying 
the  main  defiles,  and  obstructing  other  less  im- 
portant passes.  Our  troops  should  be  so  disposed 
as  to  fall  in  mass  upon  any  corps  of  the  enemy 
that  attempts  to  force  its  way  through ;  and  we 
should  not  show  too  much  anxiety  respecting 
any  weak  body  Of  troops  that  may  have  risked  a 
raid  upon  our  rear,  as  the  peril  is  for  it  and  not 
for  our  troops. 

517.  It  will  be  readily  seen  that  a  parallel 
retreat  can  only  be  resorted  to  with  effect  along 
a  frontier  of  some  considerable  extent.  Al- 
though a  frontier  of  this  character  is  more  diffi- 
cult to  guard  than  one  more  limited,  it  presents, 

18 


206 

on  the  other  hand,  the  advantages  above  pointed 
out,  and  lends  itself  well  to  the  defensive — offen- 
sive on  our  side,  which  of  itself,  in  the  hands  of 
an  able  general,  is  the  surest  means  of  success  in 
a  defensive  war. 

518.  In  connexion  with  marches  as  strategical 
movements,  those  operations,  performed  by  de- 
tachments^ made  to  favor  some  design  of  the 
main-body,  and  termed  diversions,  find  a  place ; 
as  the  marches  of  the  main  body  and  of  the  de- 
tachment have,  for  the  most  part,  to  be  co- 
ordinated, forming  what  is  termed  combined 
marches. 

519.  Diversions,  and  detachments  made  to  aid 
the  operations  of  the  main  body,  when  they 
have  a  long  ciroiit  to  accomplish,  are  contrary 
to  sound  strategical  principles.  In  the  first 
place,  the  co-operation,  at  the  desired  moment, 
with  the  main  body,  is  extremely  uncertain,  and 
the  delay  of  an  hour  or  two  may  thus  change 
what  has  every  prospect  of  victory  into  ir- 
retrievable disaster.  Military  history  has  no 
more  striking  lessons  than  are  found  in  it  on  this 
point. 

520.  Diversions  are  dangerous  on  other  ob- 
vious grounds.  The  main-body  is  weakened  by 
the  amount  of  force  thus  withdrawn  from  it. 
The  attention  of  the  commanding  general,  which 
should  be  concentrated  on  the  principal  field  of 
action,  is  necessarily  distracted  by  any  considera- 
ble diversions,  as  he  is  necessarily  kept  anxious 
for  their  result,  knowing  by  what  slight  causes 
they  may  fail ;  besides  the  complications  that 
must  attend  affairs,  from  the  employment  of  the 
requisite  intermediate  links  between  the  two 
simultaneous  operations.     If  the  main  body  is 


207 

victorious,  its  advantages  are  seldom  complete, 
for  the  want  of  the  very  troops  that  have  been 
detached ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  is  defeated,  it 
may  result  in  disaster,  as  it  can  derive  no  succor 
from  the  detached  corps. 

521.  In  vi^ar,  as  in  every  other  art  based  upon 
settled  principles,  there  are  exceptions  to  all 
general  rules.  It  is  in  discerning  these  cases 
that  the  talent  of  the  general  is  shown.  Diver- 
sions belong  to  this  class  of  excejitions.  There 
are  cases  where  they  are  not  only  called  for  but 
are  imperative  upon  the  general.  As,  for  exam- 
ple, when  there  is  some  position  held  by  the 
enemy  that  must  be  carried  before  any  other 
step  can  be  taken,  a  diversion  may  be  made 
either  to  threaten  his  line  of  communications,  or 
to  seize  some  commanding  point  near  his  posi- 
tion which,  by  forcipg  him  to  detach  to  meet  the 
danger  to  him,  will  so  weaken  him  as  to  allow 
us  to  make  our  main  attack  with  good  prospects 
of  success.  Cases  of  this  kind  are  of  frequent 
occurrence  in  mountainous  positions,  where,  in 
order  to  force  the  enemy  from  some  vantage 
ground,  a  diversion  on  his  flank  or  rear  has  to 
be  made  by  a  long  circuit.  Here  the  exception 
becomes  the  rule.  Still,  even  in  such  cases,  care 
should  be  taken  to  call  in  the  detachment  as 
soon  as  the  result  is  obtained,  and  fall  back  upon 
the  rule  of  concentration  and  unity  of  operations. 
Besides,  diversions  are  less  dangerous  in  coun- 
tries broken  by  forests  and  mountains,  as  the 
enemy  finds  it  more  difficult  to  throw  himself 
between  the  main  body  and  the  detachment  than 
in  a  country  which  has  but  few  such  obstruc- 
tions and  masks.  In  a  mountainous  region,  a 
small  corps  may  find  itself  in  a  narrow  valley, 


208 

whore  it  can  neither  be  turned  by  its  rear  nor 
b}^  its  flanks,  and  where  a  large  bocly  would  not 
find  room  to  fight.  In  such  cases,  the  isolated 
corps  need  onl}^  be  strong  enough  to  defend 
themselves  in  front  along  the  valleys  they  occu- 
py'. Here  dissemination  of  our  forces  is  only  an 
apparent  violation  of  the  general  principle ;  as, 
by  falling  back,  each  corps  has  still  its  line  of  re- 
treat secure,  and  all  can  concentrate  on  some 
central  point  in  rear  of  the  mountain  passes. 

522.  Another  exception  is  found  where  our 
force  is  very  superior  to  that  of  the  enem}',  and 
that  we  can  better  subsist  our  troops  by  separat- 
ing them.  Here,  we  but  follow  a  rule  of  JSTapo- 
leon,  which  he  invariably  put  in  practice  ;  which 
is,  to  disperse  our  force  to  subsist  and  to  concentrate 
for  battle.  However  simple  this  rule  may  appear, 
none  but  an  able  general  can  carry  it  out  suc- 
cessfully in  practice ;  for  it  supposes  a  talent  for 
military  combinations  possessed  alone  by  gene- 
rals of  this  class.  When  our  superiority  in 
strength  and  morale  is  decidedly  superior  to  that 
of  our  adversary,  we  may  then  resort  to  diver- 
sions, to  threaten  his  communications,  to  force 
him  to  abandon  his  fortified  positions,  to  make 
raids  into  his  territory,  placing  them  under  con- 
tribution, (tc.  All  operations  of  this  character, 
undertaken  even  under  the  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, must  be  carried  out  Avith  prompti- 
tude, vigor,  and  even  audacity,  to  insure  success. 
If  made  against  a  timid,  irresolute  commander, 
the  chances  of  their  success  are  still  further  in- 
creased. But  unless  such  favorable  circum- 
stances co-operate,  it  will  be  safer  not  to  risk 
them. 

623.  In  condemning  such  diversions,  the  ob- 


209 

ject  of  which  cannot  be  mistaken,  it  does  not 
follow  that  all  blows  of  this  kind  are  to  be 
avoided.  There  is  a  class  which,  if  carried  out 
to  their  legitimate  ends,  may  change  the  entire 
aspect  of  a  war  ;  and  those  are  where  we  aban- 
don the  portion  of  our  territory  invaded  by  an 
enemy  to  carry  the  war  into  his.  This  in  no 
manner  resembles  those  of  which  mention  has 
been  made.  Here  there  is  no  division  of  our 
forces.  The  entire  movable  army  strikes  at  the 
enemy  in  the  heart  of  his  own  country.  Such 
resolutions  by  great  generals  are  stamped  with 
the  mark  of  true  genius ;  when  attempted  to  be 
carried  out  by  feeble  commanders  the  result  is 
disaster.  Such  was  the  grand  operation  of  Han- 
nibal, when  he  invaded  Italy  ;  and  such,  but  on 
a  smaller  scale  and  with  a  smaller  object,  was 
the  last  -campaign  of  Turenne  against  Monte- 
cuculi,  when,  far  from  being  intimidated  by  the 
offensive  movement  of  this  last  general,  in  cross- 
ing the  Rhine,  he  at  another  point  crossed  the 
same  river,  and,  carrying  the  war  into  the  ene- 
my's territory,  forced  Montecuculi  to  leave 
France  to  follow  him. 

524.  A  combined  march  is  undertaken  for  the 
purpose  of  reaching  two  points  of  an  enemy's 
position ;  for  example,  to  attack  it  in  front  and 
rear  at  once,  or  in  front  and  on  one  flank.  There 
is  no  operation,  however,  subject  to  so  many 
failures  as  one  of  this  kind,  however  well 
planned.  A  heavy  rain,  a  river  that  suddenly 
rises,  a  guide  that  runs  off,  a  mistake  in  a  road, 
and  hundreds  of  other  petty  causes,  by  bringing 
about  the  delay  of  an  hour,  may  frustrate  the 
best  laid  plan,  and  entail  ruinous  consequences. 
Eesides  these,  the  main  army  may  have  been 
18* 


210 

suddenly  attacked  and  forced  to  retreat,  leaving 
thus  its  detachment  to  find  its  way  back  to  it  as 
best  it  can.  Even  upon  the  field  of  battle,  it  is 
seldom  that  a  considerable  detachment  can  be 
risked  to  fall  on  the  enemy's  rear  when  he  be- 
comes engaged ;  but  when,  instead  of  a  few 
miles'  march,  a  long  detour  of  several  days  has 
to  be  made,  the  fault  committed  is  very  much 
greater.  History  offers  but  too  many  examples 
to  confirm  this  view  of  diversions.  Still  the 
temptation  to  cut  the  enemy  off  from  his  base, 
and  to  secure  grand  results,  is  so  great,  that 
generals  are  led  into  it,  and  some  rare  cases  of 
success  will  outweigh  both  the  force  of  exam- 
ples and  the  cogency  of  reasons  against  the  at- 
tempt. 

525.  Pu)-S7iit. — A  victory,  by  which  the  enemy 
is  only  forced  froji  the  battle-field,  is  for  the 
most  part  but  a  half  success,  as  the  losses  under 
fire  are  but  small  compared  to  those  arising  from 
the  demoralization  of  a  broken  and  dispersed 
army.  A  prompt  and  vigorous  pursuit  is  the 
only  means  of  insuring  complete  success.  De- 
feated and  disorganized,  the  only  hope  that 
remains  to  the  enemy  is  that  he  may  have  time 
to  rally  and  concentrate  his  scattered  troops. 
The  only  way  to  frustrate  this  hope  is  to  pursue 
these  disorganized  masses,  which  are  in  no  con- 
dition to  resist  a  very  infeiior  force  if  it  assails 
them  in  good  order.  Under  these  circumstances 
we  may  separate  our  army  into  corps,  forcing 
the  enemy  thus  upon  divergent  lines  of  retreat, 
and  preventing  all  cooperation  between  them. 
In  doing  this,  we  must,  however,  be  very  careful 
not  to  drive  the  enemy  in  such  directions  as  will 
lead  to  his  concentration  on  any  one  point. 


211 

526.  If  tlie  enemy  retires  in  good  order, 
covering  his  line  of  retreat  from  our  attempts  to 
tarn  it,  nothing  remains  to  be  done  but  to  push 
him  back  with  our  entire  force ;  keeping  close 
upon  his  heels,  and  giving  him  no  time  to  take 
advantage  of  defiles  or  other  strong  points  to 
check  us,  so  as  to  make  us  lose  time,  and  give 
the  opportunity  to  him  to  receive  reinforce- 
ments. When  he  attempts  to  do  this,  we 
should  hold  him  in  check  on  the  main  road, 
whilst  we  attempt  to  turn  his  flank,  and  endea- 
vor to  gain  his  rear.  By  this  promptitude  and 
vigor  of  action  our  forces  will  hardly  be  re- 
tarded, but  will  be  always  in  position  to  turn 
any  point  upon  which  he  attempts  to  make  a 
stand,  and  thus  force  him  to  fall  back  continu- 
ally as  we  push  forward. 

527.  When  we  have  come  up  with  the  enemy, 
we  have  one  of  two  courses  open  to  us :  either 
to  throw  ourselves  across  his  line  of  retreat,  or 
else  to  leave  this  open  to  him,  whilst  we  take  a 
position  on  his  flank.  This  last  course  is  usually 
the  more  prudent,  for,  however  weakened,  it  is 
a  very  dangerous  thing  to  reduce  an  enemy  to 
despair,  and  thus  call  forth  heroic  efforts,  where 
but  a  moment  before  there  was  nothing  but  dis- 
couragement and  a  willingness  to  get  away  at 
any  cost,  even  honor.  With  great  superiority 
of  force,  by  barring  the  way  to  the  rear,  and 
pressing  on  vigorously  in  front,  we  may  hope 
"  to  hag  "  the  entire  army ;  in  all  other  cases,  it 
is  more  certain  to  limit  ourselves  to  operating  on 
the  flank,  and  thus  secure  a  part,  with  but  little 
Joss  to  ourselves,  but  with  great  demoralization 
of  the  enemy. 

52?.    Having   dispersed  and  demoralized  the 


212 

enemy's  forces,  the  more  difficult  problem  re- 
mains of  lioldint^  the  conquered  territory.  This 
becomes  the  more  difficult  when  the  enemy's 
territory  has  no  fortified  places  that  we  liave 
been  able  to  seize,  and  thus  hold  as  rallying 
points  for  our  own  troops.  All  that  remains 
then  to  be  done  is  to  occupy  strong  strategical 
and  populated  points,  by  detachments  of  suffi- 
cient strength  to  keep  the  enemy  quiet.  This 
brings  about  numerous  inconveniences :  first,  as 
these  points  must  be  strengthened  by  field  works, 
and,  in  the  second  place,  the  main  army  must  be 
greatly  weakened  by  the  detachments  that  this 
system  renders  necessary.  In  the  mean  time 
the  enemy's  broken  forces  having  retired  to- 
wards the  interior,  are  there  reorganized,  recruit- 
ed, and  concentrated,  until,  at  last,  an  equili- 
brium between  the  two  contending  forces  is 
brought  about,  and  the  struggle  is  recommenced 
to  go,  perhaps,  through  the  same  phases. 

529.  These  inconveniences  may,  in  a  great  de- 
gree, be  avoided  by  having  a  reserve  force  in  rear 
of  the  movable  army,  charged  with  the  sole  duty 
of  holding  the  territory  occupied.  This  reserve, 
Avhich  should  not  be  further  than  a  few  days' 
march  from  the  front  of  operations  of  the  mova- 
ble forces,  should  be  dispersed  over  as  great  an 
extent,  parallel  to  this  line  as  practicable ;  thus 
enlarging  the  base  of  operations,  collecting  sup- 
plies on  a  greater  extent,  and  keeping  a  larger 
amount  of  population  quiet.  This  reserve  may 
be  composed  of  new  levies,  and,  being  held  in  all 
points  subordinate  to  the  active  army,  it  will  bo 
ready  to  cooperate  with  it  in  any  way  deemed 
best.  The  main  functions,  however,  of  this  re- 
serve will  be  to  relieve  the  active  army  from  any 


213 

appre'iiensions  respecting  its  supplies,  the  timely 
arrival  of  reinforcements,  and  its  line  of  retreat. 
It  will,  therefore,  take  all  the  requisite  measures 
to  secure  these  important  objects,  thus  leaving 
the  active  force  free  to  fight  at  pleasure,  and  the 
more  vigorously  as  it  knows  its  rear  and  all  its 
subsistence  are  free  from  danger. 

530.  Such  dispositions  suppose  us  to  be  supe- 
rior to  the  enemy  both  in  numbers  and  discipline. 
Where  this  is  not  so  we  shall  have  to  resort  to 
movable  columns,  which  can  be  directed  at  any 
moment  upon  any  point  where  their  presence  is 
needed.  By  great  activity  on  the  part  of  their 
commanders,  these  columns  seem  almost  to  mul- 
tiply themselves,  in  the  eyes  of  the  inhabitants, 
by  their  marches  and  countermarches,  and  thus 
inspire  a  salutary  apprehension, 

531.  Repose. — When,  after  long  fatigues,  some 
repose  must  be  given  to  an  army,  it  must  be  dis- 
persed over  a  sufficient  extent  for  subsistence. 
This  disposition  of  the  troops  is  termed  canton- 
ing, and  the  camps  occupied  cantonments.  This 
state  supposes  that  the  enemy  will  not  for  some 
time  be  in  a  condition  to  attack  us.  Still,  even 
this  assurance  should  not  induce  any  relaxation 
of  proper  military  precautions  to  prevent  a  sur- 
prise, and  to  enable  us  to  concentrate  on  some 
suitable  point  either  for  offensive  or  defensive 
movements.  The  dispositions  to  be  made  for 
this  purpose  resemble,  in  their  principal  fea- 
tures, those  for  one  of  advanced  posts.  Advanced 
points  are  held  by  some  of  the  troops  where 
there  is  no  relaxation  of  discipline  allowed  ;  other 
points,  in  their  rear,  are  occupied  as  supports  to 
the  first ;  and  all  are  connected  with  some  main 
central  position  where  the  army  is  to  be  concen- 


214 

trated  in  case  of  need.  The  communications  to 
the  rear,  at  least  of  all  these  detached  portions, 
should  be  kept  in  good  travelling  order,  and  no 
obstruction  to  the  iree  movements  of  the  troops 
be  even  for  an  hour  allowed  to  exist. 

532.  When  cantonments  are  taken  up  in  win- 
ter they  are  termed  imnter  quarters.  They  differ 
from  the  preceding  only  in  being  often  of  greater 
extent,  and  therefore,  from  their  weakness,  re- 
quiring all  the  additional  means  of  defence  at  our 
disposal,  taking  up  our  line  in  rear  of  some  im- 
passable natural  obstruction,  as  a  river  for  ex- 
ample. 

Remarhs. — From  the  preceding  discussions  we 
gather  what  are  the  leading  principles  of  stra- 
tegy, and  the  objects  that  constitute  the  proper 
application  of  them.  In  all  ages  professional 
men  have  been  met  with  who,  animated  alone 
by  the  spirit  of  pedantry,  have  seized  upon  any- 
thing that  has  a  novel  aspect,  and,  to  use  a 
vulgar  phrase,  have  "run  it  into  the  ground;" 
and,  most  frequently,  have  obscured  Avhat  in 
itself  was  simple  and  easily  comprehended  by 
any  sound  mind,  with  a  load  of  technical  terms 
and  distinctions  often  too  subtle  for  any  one  but 
themselves  to  discover.  Thiers,  in  his  comments 
upon  the  campaign  of  1805,  in  speaking  of  the 
battle  of  Austerlitz,  has  the  following  remarks. 
"In  the  last  century,  after  Frederick,  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Leuthen,  had  destroyed  the  Austrian  army 
by  attacking  on  one  of  its  Avings,  persons  in- 
vented the  theory  of  the  oblique  order  of  battle, 
of  which  Frederick  himself  had  never  even 
dreamed,  and  to  this  theory  they  attributed  the 
entire  success  of  this  great  man.  Subsequently, 
when  General  Bonaparte  had  shown  his  great 


215 

superiority  in  those  lofty  military  combinations, 
by  which  he  had  so  often  surprised  and  sur- 
rounded the  generals  opposed  to  him ;  other 
commentators  of  the  same  stamp  discovered  that 
the  whole  art  of  war  consisted  alone  iu  a  certain 
manoeuvre,  and  they  harped  upon  but  the  one 
string,  that  of  turning  jj^our  enemy.  To  receive 
implicitly  their  dicta  the}'  had  discovered  a  new 
science  j  and  for  it,  accordingly,  they  had  coined 
a  new  word,  strategy  ;  and,  having  done  tliis, 
each  ran  off  to  offer  his  aid  to  such  sovereigns  as 
were  willing  to  submit  themselves  to  their  teach- 
ings." This  little  bit  of  not  uncalled  for  satire, 
from  the  great  historian  of  the  Consulate  and  the 
Empire,  must  not  lead  us  to  suppose  that  he  did 
not  believe  in  the  settled  principles  of  military 
science,  or  was  disposed  in  practice  to  under- 
value them.  On  the  contrary,  in  his  comments 
on  the  campaign  of  1809,  up  to  the  taking  of 
Ratisbonne,  he  remarks:  "  If  one  dared  to  do  so 
we  would  add,  that  it  was  better  that  the  tri- 
umphs gained  were  somewhat  less,  by  acting  in 
conformity  with  the  true  principles  of  war — 
which,  after  all,  are  only  the  dicta  of  good  sense 
— in  running  no  perilous  risks,  than  to  have  ob- 
tained more  brilliant  results  in  trusting  too  much 
to  mere  chance.  Napoleon  would  never  have 
fallen  had  his  political  measures  been  conducted 
on  this  occasion  as  were  those  of  his  militfu-y 
operations." 

533.  Men  have  been  misled  by  the  very  sim- 
plicity of  these  almost  self-evident  principles, 
and  have  felt  disposed  not  to  attribute  to  them 
their  just  value,  unless  they  were  surrounded  by 
the  verbiage  of  technicalities.  Like  the  captain 
of  the   Syrian  host,   they  look   for  some  great 


216 

thing  from  their  prophet,  forg-etting  upon  ■what 
a  seemingly  narrow  basis  the  principles  of  almost 
every  science  rest ;  whilst  the  developments  to 
which  they  lead,  both  in  theory  and  practice, 
have  tasked  the  greatest  mental  powers  of  those 
who  have  come  after  their  discoverers.  A  La 
Place  condenses,  in  a  short  formula,  the  demon- 
stration of  the  stabihty  of  the  universe ;  whilst  it 
tasks  the  profound  research  and  indomitable 
industry  of  a  Bowditch  to  point  out  to  others  the 
steps  by  which  he  reached  his  sublime  conclu- 
sion. 

534.  To  others  again  this  very  simplicity  has 
been  a  cause  of  more  grievous  error,  leading 
them  to  suppose  that  what  was  so  clear  to  their 
apprehension  must  be  equally  easy  in  practice. 
Hence  our  large  class  of  generals  of  the  parlor, 
the  stock  exchange,  and  the  daily  press,  who, 
with  remorseless  energy,  without  knowing  how 
to  set  up  even  a  squad,  murder  the  reputation 
of  truly  able  men,  by  their  ceaseless,  senseless 
criticisms.  How  many  men  are  there  who  can 
demonstrate  the  most  difficult  proposition  of 
Newton's  Principia,  yet  who  would  be  puzzled 
to  apply  the  most  simple  law  of  statics  to  some 
practical  purpose.  So  is  it  in  all  the  fixed 
sciences.  In  them,  however,  the  path  once  en- 
tered on  and  there  is  no  way  of  straying  from  it. 
How  diflerent  in  almost  every  military  problem, 
except  in  the  bare  mechanism  of  tactics.  In  al- 
most every  case,  the  data  on  which  the  solution 
depends  are  wanting,  or  of  such  a  character  as 
to  render  it  very  complicated,  or  even  indeter- 
minate. Too  often  the  general  has  only  conjec- 
tures to  go  upon,  and  these  based  upon  false  pre- 
mises.    Even  wliere  he  thinks  he  sees  his  waT 


217 

clearly,  he  knows  that  the  rules  by  which  he  must 
be  guided  admit  of  many  exceptions.  That, 
whilst  he  is  deliberatingj  events  are  succeeding 
each  other  with  rapidity  ;  that  what  is  true  now, 
at  the  next  moment  may  have  no  existence,  or 
exist  in  a  contrary  sense.  All  these  considera- 
tions, and  a  thousand  others  that  will  present 
themselves  to  any  well  constituted,  reflecting 
mind,  will  readily  explain  why  history  produces, 
on  its  record,  the  names  of  so  few  great  generals ; 
■what  real  mental  superiority  it  supposes  even  ia 
men  of  second-rate  ability.  For  the  first,  as  for 
genius  in  every  line,  we  have  no  standard. 
Their  failures  are  even  grander  than  the  suc- 
cesses of  other  men.  For  the  second,  whom  we 
always  judge  after  the  event,  and  most  frequent- 
ly without  any  knowledge  of  the  circumstances 
that  led  to  it,  let  us  exercise  all  the  charity  we 
can.  Let  us  assume  the  modesty  of  suppos- 
ing, if  our  vanity  ever  disposes  us  to  act  other- 
wise, that  had  they  known  all  that  we  have 
since  gathered,  and  had  perceived  as  well  as  we 
do  what  was  best  to  be  done,  and  still  have  done 
just  the  contrary,  they  were  impelled  by  cir- 
cumstances over  which  they  had  no  control 
How  many  great  men  have  been  struck  down 
by  the  hand  of  adverse  fortune ;  and  how  much 
of  mediocrity  has,  by  happy  chance,  been  lifted 
far  above  its  true  level, 

535.  It  is  in  mihtary  history  that  we  are  to 
look  for  the  source  of  all  military  science.  In  it 
we  shall  find  those  exemplifications  of  failure 
and  success  by  which  alone  the  truth  and  value 
of  the  rules  of  strategy  can  be  tested.  Geome- 
trical diagrams  may  assist  in  fixing  the  attention, 
and  aiding  by  the  eye  the  reasoning  faculties; 
19 


218 

but  experience  alone  can  fully  satisfy  the  judg'- 
ment,  as  to  the  correctness  of  its  decisions,  in 
problems  of  so  mixed  a  character,  into  which  so 
aaany  heterogeneous  elements  enter.  Tlie  great- 
est master  of  the  art  that  the  world  has  yet  pro- 
duced, Napoleon,  recommends,  as  the  best  study 
and  preparation  of  a  commander,  a  minute  ac- 
quaintance with  the  campaigns  of  Alexander, 
Hannibal,  and  Caesar,  among  the  ancients,  and  of 
Turenne,  Frederick,  and  others,  of  modern  times. 
A  brief  synopsis  of  some  of  the  most  marked  of 
his  own  will  alone  be  here  attempted,  as  more 
immediately  illustrative  of  the  strategical  princi- 
ples above  enumerated. 


THE  CAMPAIGNS  OF  1796-97  IN  ITALY. 

"536.  The  Seat  of  T7ar.— Northern  Italy,  PI. 
Tril.,  which  has  been  the  scene  of  some  of 
the  grandest  military  dramas,  and  was  the  thea- 
tre upon  which  the  transcendent  genius  of  Na- 
poleon, as  General  Bonaparte,  first  manifested 
itself,  :as  a  great  captain,  is  that  singularly  beau- 
tiful and  rich  portion  of  Italy  which,  bounded  on 
the  nortJi  and  west  by  the  lofty  and  rugged  chain 
of  the  Alps,  on  the  south  by  the  lower  crests  of 
the  Maritime  Alps  and  the  Apennines,  and  on 
the  west  by  the  Adriatic,  is  nearly  equally  divid- 
ed by  the  river  Po,  which,  having  its  sources  in 
the  Maritime  Alps,  flows  nearly  from  west  to 
east,  emptying  into  the  Adriatic,  by  sereral 
mouths,  some  thirty  miles  to  the  south  of 
Venice.  The  Po  receives  a  number  of  affluents 
from  the  Alps  on  the  north  and  west,  and  from 
the   Apennines   on   the   south;    the   former   of 


219 

which,  from  the  greater  extent  of  surface  drain- 
ed, and  the  greater  slope  of  the  water  sheds,  are 
by  far  the  most  considerable  in  size  and  velocity  ; 
and,  on  this  account,  present  several  strong  de- 
fensive lines,  which  are  nearly  parallel,  as  the 
Ticino,  the  Adda,  and  the  Mincio,  against  au 
enemy  obliged  to  operate  on  the  north  of  the 
Po ;  but  which  are  easily  turned  by  operating  on 
the  south  side,  as  the  affluents  here,  like  the  Tre- 
bia  and  others,  present  no  serious  obstacle  ;  the 
only  one  being  the  Po  itself.  Besides  these  tri- 
butaries of  the  Po,  there  are  several  important 
streams  on  its  north  which,  draining  the  valleys 
of  the  Tyrol,  flow  from  north  to  south  for  the 
greater  part  of  their  course,  and  then  trending 
€ast,  empty  into  the  Adriatic.  The  principal  of 
these  are  the  Brenta,  which  empties  into  the 
Gulf  of  Venice,  and  at  the  mouth  of  which  is  the 
city  of  Venice ;  and  the  Adige,  upon  which  the 
strong  fortified  city  of  Verona  lies.  The  upper 
portions  of  these  streams  are  inclosed  with  steep 
banks,  and  their  current  is  rapid  ;  the  lower  por- 
tions wind  their  way  sluggishly  through  a  flat, 
and,  in  many  parts,  marshy  country.  From 
their  natural  features  and  from  the  position  of 
their  mouths,  they  present  strong  defensive  lines, 
as  they  can  be  turned  only  by  a  detour  towards 
their  sources,  through  a  broken  diflicult  country, 
or  by  an  enemy  having  control  of  the  sea. 

537.  From  the  almost  constant  state  of  war  to 
which  Italy  has  been  subjected,  being  drawn,  in 
some  manner,  into  almost  every  European  strug- 
gle, many  strongly  fortified  places  have  beea 
built  upon  these  streams ;  among  the  most  im- 
portant of  which  are  Alexandria,  on  the  Tanaro, 
a,  southern  affluent  of  the  Po;  Pavia,  on  the  Tici- 


220 

do  ;  Placentia,  on  the  Po ;  Peschiera  and  Man- 
tua, on  the  Mineio ;  and  Verona,  on  the  Adisre. 
To  these  may  be  added  Genoa,  at  the  head  of  the 
gulf  of  the  same  name,  and  at  the  foot  of  the 
northern  point  of  the  Apennines. 

538.  Political  Divisions  of  the  Theatre  of  War. 
— In  1797,  as  until  a  very  recent  period,  Austria 
and  Sardinia  were  the  preponderating  powers, 
both  as  military  states  and  from  the  control  they 
exercised  over  their  neighbors,  which,  like  Ve- 
nice and  its  small  continental  territories,  Mode- 
na,  Parma,  <&c.,  existed,  as  independent  princi- 
palities, only  through  the  sufferance  and  jealous- 
ies of  the  ruling  states.  They  were  all  hostile 
to  France,  not  only  from  her  politically  aggres- 
sive course,  but  from  their  fears  of  social  disturb- 
ances, growing  out  of  the  propagandist  republi- 
can spirit  which  the  French  armies  carried  with 
them  wherever  they  went.  This  hostile  temper 
was  most  bitterly  shown  in  the  priesthood,  and 
through  them  was  communicated  to  the  peasant 
class,  more  under  their  influence  than  any  other, 
and  who,  from  their  position,  could  offer  more 
annoyance  than  any  other  class  to  an  invading 
army. 

539.  Military  Situation. — The  French  army, 
commanded  by  Scherer,  which  in  the  preceding 
campaign  (1795)  had  gained  some  advantages 
over  the  Austrians  and  Piedmontese,  in  the  basin 
of  the  Loano,  were  distributed  from  the  Col  di 
Tende  eastwardly  along  the  Alps  towards  the 
Apennines.  Its  entire  active  force  was  not  over 
36,000  men,  one  division  of  which  was  on  the 
north  of  the  Apennines,  observing  the  entrenched 
camp  of  the  Piedmontese  at  Ceva ;  the  greater 
portion,  some  30,000,  on  the  south  side  along  the 


221 

coast.  These  troops,  although  greatly  in  want  of 
almost  every  necessary,  had  still  been  inured  to 
hardship  in  many  fields,  and  were  composed  of 
admirable  fighting  material. 

540.  The  Piedmontese,  under  Colli,  in  number 
about  20,000,  were  in  nearly  one  body  at  Ceva,  on 
the  north  slope  of  the  Apennines ;  and  the  Austri- 
ans,  numbering  from  36,000  to  38,000,  were  ad- 
vancing by  several  roads  from  Lombardy  to  Genoa. 

541.  Plan  of  Campaign. — Not  satisfied  with 
Scherer,  and  having  conceived  a  high  opinion  of 
the  military  talents  of  Bonaparte,  the  French. 
Directory  decided  to  place  the  latter  in  chief 
command,  having  adopted  his  views  of  the  com- 
ing campaign.  This  was  a  very  simple  one,  but 
stamped  with  the  genius  of  the  future  great  cap- 
tain. Several  roads  or  passes  lead  from  the 
coast,  across  the  Alps  and  Apennines,  into  the 
basin  of  the  Po.  The  principal  of  these  are  from 
Nice  by  the  Col  di  Tende ;  from  Savona  by  the 
Col  di  Montenotte ;  and  from  Genoa  by  the 
Bocchetta.  Bonaparte  resolved  to  throw  him- 
self into  the  midst  of  the  enemy's  forces,  which 
were  distributed  over  a  long  line,  and  not  in 
supporting  distances  of  each  other,  by  the  lowest 
of  these  passes,  that  of  Montenotte,  whilst  he 
alarmed  them  for  the  safety  of  Genoa  towards 
which  he  made  a  strong  demonstration. 

542.  The  opposing  generals,  Beaulieu  and 
Colli,  although  their  total  available  force  waa 
nearly  60,000  men,  had  each  a  separate  interest 
to  guard.  Beaulieu  wished  to  keep  up  his  com- 
munications, through  Genoa,  with  the  English, 
whose  fleet  controlled  the  coast,  whilst  he  co- 
vered Lombardy  in  his  rear;  whereas  Colli 
desired  to  cover  Turin,  the  capital  of  his  own  Stale. 

19* 


222 

543.  Besides  the  inherent  -weakness  of  aU 
plans  based  upon  separate  interests  under  tlie 
management  of  separate  and  independent  heads, 
the  military  status  of  the  allied  forces  was  also 
inherently  bad ;  not  only  as  to  the  position  of 
their  forces,  but  as  to  their  lines  of  retreat, 
which,  from  the  points  to  be  covered,  threw  them 
on  divergent  lines  at  the  outset,  and  thus  virtu- 
ally dissolved  all  connexion  between  the  two 
commanding  generals.  With  Bonaparte  matters 
stood  just  in  the  reverse  order.  There  was  but 
one  head  and  but  one  interest  to  be  guarded. 
His  forces  were  concentrated;  and,  if  thrown 
back,  he  covered  by  his  front  his  base  on  the 
river  Var,  and  his  magazines  which  were  in 
Provence. 

544.  With  these  advantages  Bonaparte  was 
very  young,  of  prodigious  mental  activity,  and 
of  almost  unparalleled  physical  endurance ; 
whereas  his  opponents,  Beaulieu  in  particular, 
were  old  men,  though  still  vigorous,  but  trained 
in  the  methodical  habits  of  military  routine  pe- 
culiar to  the  Austrians. 

545.  Almost  unknown  to  the  army  when  he 
took  command  of  it,  Bonaparte,  to  a  superficial 
observer,  had  little  physically  to  recommend 
him.  His  first  address,  however,  to  his  army 
breathed  that  spirit  of  determination  which  ever 
finds  its  way  to  the  heart  of  the  true  soldier, 
when  emanating  from  one  of  the  same  stamp. 
"  Soldiers,"  he  said,  "  you  are  badly  fed  and  are 
nearly  naked.  The  government  owes  you  much, 
but  can  do  nothing  for  you.  Your  fortitude, 
your  bravery  do  you  honor,  but  have  procured 
for  you  neither  benefits  nor  glory.  I  am  about 
to  lead  you  into  the  most  fertile  plains  of  the 


223 

■world ;  you  will  find  there  large  cities,  wealthy 
provinces ;  you  will  find  there  honor,  glory,  and 
riches.  Soldiers  of  Italy,  will  you  fail  in  cou- 
rage ?" 

546.  Without  going  into  details,  which,  by 
leading  the  mind  ofif  from  the  strategical  fea- 
tures, might  defeat  the  object  of  this  summary, 
it  will  be  sufficient  here  to  say  that  the  French 
and  Austrians  commenced  their  movements  on 
the  same  day,  April  11,  1796.  The  Austrians 
moved  one  column  upon  the  French,  along  the 
coast  road  from  Genoa  to  Savona,  whilst  another 
moved  on  Savona  by  Montenotte.  At  this  last 
spot  an  incident  occurred  which  perhaps  saved 
the  fortunes  of  the  French,  and  is  worthy  of 
mention,  as  showing  how  much  depends  on  the 
devotion  of  a  few  brave  men.  Colonel  Rampon, 
with  1200  men,  held  a  redoubt  which  closed  the 
pass  at  Montenotte.  Correctly  estimating  the 
importance. of  his  post,  this  hero  not  only  re- 
sisted the  efforts  of  the  Austrians,  but,  under  a 
most  murderous  fire,  he  made  his  soldiers  swear 
that  they  would  die  before  they  would  surren- 
der. An  oath  which  was  faithfully  kept  until 
relief  came  to  them  the  following  day,  after  a 
night  passed  by  all  under  arms. 

547.  Bonaparte  retiring  his  right  and  pushing 
his  centre  columns  onwards,  the  Austrians  were 
driven  back  upon  Dego,  where  they  rallied. 
Being  now  between  the  Austrians  and  Piedmon- 
tese,  he  attacks  with  impetuosity  the  former  at 
Dego,  on  his  right,  the  latter  at  Millesimo  on  his 
left.  The  results  were  that  the  Piedmontese 
were  forced  back  upon  Ceva  and  Mondovi,  and 
the  Austrians  in  the  direction  of  Acqui. 

648.  It  was   on  this   occasion,  when,  at   the 


224 

head  of  his  arnr^.y,  looking  over  the  plains  of 
Italy  stretching  out  before  him,  he  exclaimed 
with  emotion,  "  Hannibal  crossed  the  Alps,  but 
we,  we  have  turned  them."  A  phrase,  as  Thiers 
justly  remarks,  that  explains  the  whole  plan  of 
campaign  to  every  intelligent  mind. 

549.  Following  up  the  Piedmontese  he  attacks 
and  defeats  them  at  Mondovi,  from  which  they 
retire  on  Cherasco,  where  an  armistice  was 
agreed  upon,  by  which  the  strong  places  of  Alex- 
andria, Coni,  and  Tortona,  are  delivered  into  the 
possession  of  the  French. 

550.  Having  settled  with  the  Piedmontese, 
Bonaparte  prepares  to  follow  up  the  Austrians, 
who,  in  the  mean  time,  have  seized  the  fortified 
town  of  Valencia  on  the  Po,  crossed  the  Po,  and 
taken  position  at  Valleggio,  at  the  apex  of  the 
angle  formed  by  the  Po  and  Ticino.  Making  a 
feint  of  attempting  to  pass  the  Po  at  Valentia, 
Bonaparte  descended  the  river  rapidly,  and,  with 
a  small  force,  crossed  it  at  Placentia,  where  he 
disperses  the  enemy  opposing  him.  Following 
rapidly  in  pursuit,  he  made  the  celebrated  pas- 
sage of  the  bridge  of  Lodi  in  the  face  of  the  Aus- 
trians on  the  opposite  bank.  It  was  here  that 
he  received  the  sobriquet  of  Petit  Caporal  from 
his  soldiers. 

551.  Not  having  been  able  to  intercept  the 
Austrian  line  of  retreat,  by  gaining  their  rear, 
Bonaparte  takes  possession  of  Milan,  and,  after 
some  delay,  moving  on  the  Austrians,  who  had 
taken  the  Mincio  as  their  line  of  defence,  he 
makes  a  feint  of  attempting  a  passage  at  Pes- 
chiera,  and  forces  one  at  Borghetto.  At  this 
stage  of  the  campaign  the  Austrians  retire  into 
the  Tyrol,  by  the  roads  leading  north  along  the 


225 

Adige  ;  having  thrown  a  strong  garrison  into 
Mantua,  which  was  not  only  strongly  fortified 
but  in  the  midst  of  a  marsh,  and,  accessible  only 
by  narrow  causeways,  was  considered  impregna- 
ble, except  to  famine  occasioned  by  a  blockade. 

552.  Having  driven  the  Austrians  into  the 
Tyrol,  and  closely  invested  Mantua,  by  seizing 
the  ends  of  the  causeways  (June  14),  which 
formed  a  kind  of  ttte  de  pont  for  these  communi- 
cations, the  north  of  Italy  was  literally  con- 
quered, and  the  task  now  before  Bonaparte  was 
to  hold  the  country  in  his  possession. 

553.  Attributing  all  the  failures  of  the  French, 
in  their  previous  campaigns  in  this  territory,  to 
a  faulty  selection  of  their  defensive  lines,  Bona- 
parte decided  upon  selecting  the  Adige  for  his 
defensive  line,  for  the  topographical  reasons  al- 
ready stated,  as  the  Mincio,  though  a  shorter 
line,  was  at  times  fordable,  and,  besides,  had  the 
defect  of  emptying  into  the  Po. 

554.  Having  decided  upon  this  important 
point,  the  next  step  was  to  distribute  his  forces 
so  that  he  could  observe  the  Austrians  on  every 
possible  point  of  approach,  and  be  able  to  con- 
centrate in  time  to  meet  them  upon  any  one  on 
which  they  might  appear  in  force.  Three  points 
of  approach  were  accessible  to  the  enemy.  The 
first,  leading  from  the  Tyrol,  crosses  the  Adige 
near  Roveredo,  somewhat  above  the  upper  end 
of  Lake  Guarda,  and  passing  around  it  on  the 
right,  leads  to  Salo  and  Brescia  in  its  rear.  The 
second,  also  leading  from  the  same  point,  crosses 
the  river  below  Roveredo,  and  winding  along 
the  base  of  the  heights  between  it  and  the  lake, 
rises  to  the  plateau  of  Rivoli,  by  a  steep  ascent, 
near  this  place,  whence  it  reaches  a  jwint  behind 


226 

the  Adige,  nearly  midway  between  Yerona  and 
Peschiera,  sending  out  a  branch  road  to  each  of 
these  places.  The  third  leads  from  Roveredo  to 
Verona  along  the  left  bank  of  the  Adige.  The 
two  first,  at  this  period,  were  rugged  and  hardly 
practicable  for  artillery  through  the  mountainous 
portions ;  the  last  was  the  best,  but,  unlike  the 
others,  did  not  turn  the  Adige.  With  these 
favorable  defensive  topographical  features,  these 
lines  were  all  easily  guarded,  and  each  could  be 
defended  for  some  time  by  a  small  force.  To 
effect  thi.s,  Bonaparte  made  the  following  dispo- 
sition of  his  forces.  At  Salo,  3,000  men.  At 
Corona  and  Rivoli,  12,000.  Near  Verona,  5,000. 
At  Legnago,  8,000.  At  Castelnovo,  where  Bona- 
parte had  his  headquarters,  the  reserve  of  cavalry 
and  horse  artillery. 

555.  Wurmser,  who  commanded  the  Aua- 
trians,  had  his  headquarters  at  Roveredo.  His 
plan  of  campaign  was  offensive,  whilst  that  of 
Bonaparte  was,  at  the  outset,  necessarily  defen- 
sive, but  awaiting  events  to  become  also  offensive. 
From  his  superiority  of  force,  Wurmser  designed 
to  surround  the  French.  For  this  purpose,  he 
detached  one  column  of  20,000  men  to  turn  Lake 
Guarda,  by  Salo ;  whilst  with  one  of  40,000  he 
followed  the  two  other  roads.  On  July  29,  the 
French  outposts  were  attacked  and  driven  in, 

r  and  the  next  day  the  French  were  driven  from 
Salo,  Corona,  and  Rivoli,  and  the  Austrians  were 
in  march  on  Brescia. 

556.  At  this  stage  of  the  operations,  Bona- 
parte, coming  to  one  of  his  rapid  conclusions, 
decided  on  abandoning  the  siege  of  Mantua,  as 
this  place  must  eventually  fall  if  he  were  victori- 
ous, and  he  accordingly  destroyed  all  his  siege 


227    ■ 

material,  buried  hie  guns,  and  withdrew  the  be- 
sieging corps.  He  then  concentrated  rapidly  on 
Peschiera  and  Valeggio,  on  the  Mincio,  whilst 
the  Austrians,  at  the  same  time,  had  passed  the 
Adige  and  Mincio ;  Wurmser  entering  Mantua, 
whilst  a  column  of  25,000  had  reached  Lonato 
and  Castighone. 

557.  Placing  divisions  at  the  bridges  of  San 
Marco  and  Montechiaro,  on  the  Chiese,  and 
ordering  the  Austrians  to  be  held  in  check  at 
Salo,  Bonaparte  decided  to  attack  the  Austrians 
at  Lonato  and  Castiglione,  before  Wurmser,  from 
Mantua,  could  effect  a  junction  with  them. 
Aug.  3,  Bonaparte  defeated  the  Austrians  at 
Lonato,  and  marched  on  Castiglione,  where 
Massena  had  also  driven  them  back.  During 
these  movements,  Bonaparte  displayed  an  al- 
most incredible  activity,  riding  post  haste  from 
one  position  to  another  of  his  forces,  overseeing 
and  directing  everything  himself.  It  was  on 
this  occasion  that  having  only  about  1,000  men 
at  hand,  a  large  detachment  of  4,000  of  the 
enemy  coming  upon  him  with  his  staff,  at  Lonato, 
summoned  him  to  surrender.  Directing  the  offi- 
cer to  be  blindfolded  and  led  into  the  midst  of 
his  staff,  he  reprimanded  him  for  his  temerity  in 
bringing  such  a  message  to  a  general  in  the 
midst  of  his  army,  and  sent  him  back  demanding 
a  surrender  of  his  own  detachment,  which  was 
speedily  complied  with.  On  Aug.  6,  the  battle 
of  Castiglione  was  fought,  with  considerable 
odds  against  the  French;  the  Austrians  were 
driven  back,  and  Wurmser  retired  upon  Corona 
and  Rivoli,  whilst  the  column  from  Salo  retreated 
on  Roveredo. 

658.  The  results  of  this  short  campaign  of  a 


228 

•v^eek  were  most  remarkable.  The  French,  with 
not  more  than  30,000  men,  placed  60,000  Aus- 
trians  hors  de  combat ;  kilhng  or  wounding  from 
7,000  to  8,000,  and  taking  from  12,000  to  13,000 
prisoners. 

559.  After  retiring  into  the  Tyrol  and  having 
recruited  his  army  to  50,000  men,  Wurmser  pro- 
jected another  campaign  as  follows.  Leaving  a 
force  of  20,000  men  to  hold  the  upper  Adige,  with 
the  rest  of  his  army  he  proposed  to  descend  the 
Brenta,  and,  marching  on  the  Adige,  force  a  pas- 
sage at  some  point  between  Yerona  and  Legnago. 

560.  Bonaparte,  in  the  meantime,  leaving 
sufficient  forces  to  guard  the  principal  points  of 
the  Adige,  and  blockade  Mantua,  ascended  the 
Adige  to  search  for  Wurmser.  Having  united 
his  forces  at  Torbolo,  at  the  head  of  the  lake,  he 
in  succession  drove  the  Austrians  from  Mori, 
San  Marco,  Roveredo,  and  Galliano,  and  on  Sept. 
6,  entered  Trent.  Leaving  a  sufficient  force  to 
hold  the  Austrians  in  check  in  the  Tyrol,  he 
moved  Sept.  6,  with  20,000  men,  after  Wurmser. 
Overtaking  the  Austrians,  Sept.  7,  at  Primolano, 
he  drove  them  before  him  and  forced  AVurmser, 
on  Sept.  8,  from  Bassano  on  the  Brenta.  After 
a  hasty  flight,  the  Austrians  succeeded  in  cross- 
ing the  Adige  at  Legnago,  Sept.  11,  and  on  Sept. 
13,  Wurmser  got  into  Mantua.  In  this  brief 
campaign  the  Austrian  loss  was  about  20,000, 
and  that  of  the  French  8,000. 

561.  After  these  events  Bonaparte  occupied 
himself  with  recruiting  his  army,  which  num- 
bered nearly  38,000  men,  disj^ersed  over  a  much 
longer  line  than  previously,  occupying  posi- 
tions in  the  Tyrol  in  front  ol"  Trent,  on  the  Bren- 
tii,  on  the  Adige,  and  around  ilantua. 


229 

562.  Alvinzy,  who  now  took  command  of  the 
Austrian  forces  in  the  field,  crossed  the  Piava, 
Nov.  1,  and  moved  on  the  Brenta.  The  Aus- 
trian plan  of  campaign  was,  that  one  column 
under  Davidovitch  should  descend  the  two 
roads  along  the  Adige,  and  driving  the  French 
before  them  unite  with  Alvinzy,  who,  with  the 
main  force,  was  to  march  on  Verona.  From  this 
point,  the  two  armies  united  were  to  march  to 
the  relief  of  Wurmser,  in  Mantua. 

563.  Bonaparte,  in  the  meantime,  ordered 
Vaubois  to  hold  Davidovitch  in  check  whilst  he 
marched  on  Alvinzy,  whom  he  attacked,  Nov.  6, 
in  a  strong  position  between  Carmignano  and 
Bassano.  In  thia  he  was  only  partially  success- 
ful, whilst  Vaubois,  owing  to  a  panic  in  two  of 
his  demi-brigades,  was  forced  back  on  Corona 
and  Rivoli.  Under  these  circumstances,  Bona- 
parte retired,  Nov.  7,  into  Verona,  sent  rein- 
forcements to  Vaubois,  and  went  himself  to  see 
that  the  troops  were  properly  posted  at  these 
important  positions.  The  Austrians,  in  the 
meantime,  followed  after  Bonaparte  with  great 
caution,  and  took  position  on  the  heights  at  Cal- 
diero,  not  far  from  Verona.  On  Nov.  11,  Bona- 
parte advanced  on  Caldiero  and  drove  in  the 
Austrian  advanced  guard,  but  after  an  unsuccess- 
ful attack  on  the  Austrian  position,  was  oblig'id 
to  fall  back  upon  Verona. 

564.  In  this  conjuncture  of  affairs,  Bonaparte's 
condition  had  become  desperate ;  his  force  was 
reduced  to  15,000  men,  whilst  the  Austrians  had 
45,000.  With  no  chance  of  success,  if  he  eitner 
remained  in  Verona,  or  met  the  Austrians  in  a 
field  favorable  to  their  superiority  of  force,  he 
was  suddenly  inspired  by  one  of  those  impulses, 

20 


230 

which  men  term  an  inspiration  of  genius,  but 
which  are  given  only  to  those  who  merit  them 
by  a  thorough  acquaintance  with  tlie  resources 
of  their  profession,  and  which  are  only  gained 
by  painful  and  unremitted  study.  Between 
Verona  and  the  village  of  Ronco,  below  it,  the 
Adige  spreads  out  into  several  arms,  which  em- 
brace some  small  islands.  Between  this  river 
and  a  small  stream,  termed  the  Alpon,  the 
ground  is  low  and  marshy,  and  traversed  only 
by  narrow  causeways.  By  descending  the  river 
to  Ronco,  and  crossing  it  and  the  Alpon,  at  the 
village  of  Areola,  Bonaparte  saw  that  he  would 
gain  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Austrian  position 
at  Caldiero,  and  cut  Alvinzi  off  from  his  base. 
This  plan  seemed  feasible,  even  with  his  dis- 
parity of  force,  as  the  causeways  lent  themselves 
to  an  attack  of  a  small  force  against  superior 
numbers. 

565.  Leaving  but  a  small  garrison  in  Yerona, 
Bonaparte  left  the  city  by  night  for  Ronco. 
Passing  the  Adige  and  pushing  forward  columns, 
on  Nov.  15,  on  the  causeways  leading  to  Caldiero 
and  Areola,  the  French,  after  severe  fighting 
throughout  the  day,  during  which  Bonaparte 
nearly  lost  his  life  whilst  leading  a  charge,  by 
being  pushed  over  into  the  boggy  marsh,  failed 
to  gain  Areola,  and  at  night  withdrew  behind 
the  Adige.  On  the  following  day,  Nov.  16,  the 
same  harassing  attacks  were  made  on  the  Aus- 
trians,  and  the  French  again,  at  night,  withdrew 
behind  the  Adige.  On  Nov.  17,  the  French 
again  made  their  assaults  on  the  dikes,  whilst  a 
column,  descending  to  near  Albaredo,  crossed 
the  Alpon  there,  and  thus  turned  tlie  bridge  and 
village    of  Areola.     The    Austrians,   after    their 


231 

heavy  losses  in  the  last  three  days,  finding  their 
position  turned,  fell  back  upon  Vicenza.  On  the 
last  day  ot"  this  celebrated  battle,  Bonaparte  re- 
sorted to  a  stratagem  which  produced  great 
effect  on  the  enemy.  The  Austrian  left  wing 
was  covered  by  a  marsh,  having  a  thick  under- 
growth of  brush  and  tall  rushes.  Bonaparte 
ordered  an  officer  to  take  twenty-five  horse  and 
a  number  of  trumpeters,  and  proceeding  through 
this  screen,  fall  upon  the  Austrian  rear,  with  all 
the  noise  he  could  make.  This  was  admirably 
done,  and  the  enemy  gave  way. 

5G6.  In  the  meantime  the  corps  at  Rivoli  held 
the  Austrians  in  check,  and  finally  driving  them 
back  into  the  Tyrol,  reoccupied  their  former  po- 
sitions. 

567.  Both  armies  having  been  rested  and  re- 
cruited, the  French  having  45,000  and  the  Aus- 
trian 60,000,  the  Austrians  again  opened  the 
campaign,  Jan.  8,  1797,  by  driving  in  the  French 
outposts. 

568.  The  Austrian  plan  of  campaign  was,  for 
Alvinzy,  with  a  corps  of  45,000  men,  to  move 
again  by  the  upper  Adige,  whilst  Provera,  with 
another  of  20,000,  should  move  on  the  lower 
Adige,  gain  Mantua,  and  connect  with  the  terri- 
tory of  Romagna  and  the  army  of  the  Pope. 

569.  On  Jan.  12,  the  French  were  forced  back 
at  Rivoli,  but  Provera  failed  in  his  attempts  both 
at  Verona  and  Legnago.  Having  secured  these 
two  places  from  assault,  Bonaparte  turned  all  his 
attention  to  the  position  of  Rivoli,  so  long  the 
object  of  his  study  and  care.  This  position  is  a 
plateau  lying  between  a  range  of  rugged  heights, 
termed  the  Monte  Baldo,  which  lie  between,  and 
border  Lake  Guarda  and  the  Adige.     The  princi- 


232 

pal  access  to  it  is  by  the  main  road,  which  rises 
from  the  Adige  to  it  at  Incanale,  by  a  steep,  dif- 
ficult ascent.  Several  small  roads  lead  to  it 
through  the  passes  of  the  hills  in  its  front,  but 
are  not  practicable  for  artillery. 

570.  The  Austrians  were  divided  into  three 
bodies  to  make  their  attack.  One  corps,  com- 
posed of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  was  to 
move  on  the  main  road  by  Incanale ;  a  second 
of  infantry  was  to  assault  in  front,  by  the  narrow 
roads  leading  to  it;  whilst  a  third  was  to  pass 
between  Monte  Baldo  and  the  lake,  and  gain  the 
French  rear.  Still  a  fourth  corps  was  to  move 
towards  Verona  on  the  road  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Adige. 

571.  The  result  was,  that  after  heavy  fighting 
on  Jan.  14,  the  centre  column  of  the  Austrians 
was  driven  back  into  the  hills ;  the  right  hurled 
down  the  road  towards  Incanale,  in  inextricable 
confusion,  whilst  the  left,  after  coming  on  the 
French  rear,  was  forced  to  surrender.  It  was  on 
the  occasion  of  this  surrender  that  Bonaparte, 
although  the  fortunes  of  the  day  were  undecided 
in  his  front,  exclaimed,  on  seeing  these  troops  in 
his  rear,  Ceux-ld  sont  d  nous,  and  that  the  soldiers 
inspired  by  a  like  confidence,  said,  lis  sont  d 
nous. 

572.  Taking  with  him  Massena's  division,  Bo- 
naparte left  Rivoli,  Jan.  14,  and  marched  all 
night  upon  Mantua,  to  prevent  the  junction  of 
Provera's  forces,  who  had  passed  the  Adige 
above  Legnago,  with  those  of  Wurmser.  Con- 
tinuing his  march  all  the  day  of  the  15th,  and  di- 
recting other  troops  on  the  same  point,  he  made 
his  dispositions  for  battle  on  the  evening  of  the 
same  day.     On  the  16th,  he  fought  the  battle  of 


233 

La  Ihvorita,  in  which  Provera  was  taken  prison- 
er with  6,000  men,  and  Wurmser  forced  back 
into  Mantua.  Alvinzy  regained  the  Tyrol,  after 
losing  a  large  number  of  prisoners. 

573.  The  brave  old  Wurmser  held  out  in  Man- 
tu.^,  although  famine  was  ravaging  the  place. 
Having  sent  an  officer  to  propose  articles  of  ca- 
pitulation, and  who  spoke  in  confident  terms  of 
the  means  they  still  had  of  holding  out,  Bona- 
parte, who,  incognito^  listened  to  the  negotia- 
tions, stepped  forward,  and  said,  "  See,  Sir,  here 
are  the  conditions  that  I  will  grant  to  your  mar- 
shal. If  he  had  provisions  for  only  fifteen  days 
and  spoke  of  surrender  he  would  not  deserve  an 
honorable  capitulation.  That  you  are  here 
shows  that  he  is  reduced  to  extremity.  I  respect 
his  age,  his  bravery,  and  his  misfortunes.  Bear 
to  him  the  conditions  I  have  granted ;  let  him 
leave  the  place  to-morrow,  in  one  month,  or  in 
six,  I  shall  offer  him  nothing  better,  nothing 
worse.  He  may  remain  as  long  as  he  think3 
honor  demands  at  his  hands  ;  his  position  shall  in 
no  respect  be  rendered  the  more  aggravated." 

574.  Wurmser  having  surrendered  as  a  pri- 
soner of  war,  was  allowed  to  leave  the  city  with 
the  honors  of  war  on  Feb.  2,  1797,  which  was 
the  closing  scene  of  this  grand  military  drama. 

575.  Resume. — The  results  of  these  campaigns 
were  truly  stupendous.  The  French,  who  enter- 
ed upon  them  with  about  30,000  men,  and  in  all, 
did  not  receive  more  than  25,000  men  as  rein- 
forcements, had,  at  the  close,  defeated  200,000 
Austrians;  had  taken  80,000  prisoners;  killed 
or  wounded  20,000 ;  had  fought  12  pitched  bat- 
tles and  more  than  60  combats. 

576.  To  what  are  we  to  attribute  then  such 

20* 


234 

results?  The  Austrian  troops  were  not  wanting 
in  soldierly  qualities.  Their  leaders  were  men 
not  delicient  in  capacity,  in  bravery,  or  in  expe- 
rience, yet  they  failed  with  such  advantages  in 
their  favor.  The  French,  although  excellent 
soldiers,  active,  and  confident  in  their  leaders 
aud  themselves,  still  had  to  contend  against  odds 
too  great  for  success  unless  aided  by  extraordi- 
nary circumstances.  These  conditions  were 
theirs.  For  leader,  they  had  the  greatest  captain 
that  the  world  had  thus  far  seen.  Grandly  en- 
dowed by  Nature,  his  great  talent  was  to  turn 
all  his  talents  to  the  best  account.  Although  he 
had  had  but  little  experience  as  a  general,  before 
taking  command  of  the  Army  of  Italy,  he  had 
pondered  long  and  profoundly  on  his  profession ; 
he  had  stored  his  mind  with  all  that  others  had 
treasured  up.  Whilst  other  officers  were  wast- 
ing their  time  in  vain  discussions,  he  was  liter- 
ally lying  on  his  maps,  and  studying  out  the 
great  problems  then  being  solved  under  his  eye, 
and  giving  his  own  solutions  to  them.  When 
summoned  to  command  he  had  but  to  apply 
what  he  had  acquired.  In  after  years,  when 
looking  back  upon  those  scenes  in  his  caged  ex- 
ile, he  said :  "  My  profession  {mon  ttat)  is  that  of 
soldier.  I  have  made  myself  acquainted  with 
all  that  pertains  to  it.  If  I  have  need  of  gun- 
powder, I  know  how  to  conduct  the  manufacture 
of  it.  If  I  want  shoes  for  my  soldiers,  I  can 
give  directions  as  to  the  manner  in  which  they 
ought  to  be  made."  Men  of  ordinary  capacities 
think  they  can  neglect  such  things;  and  those 
who  are  ignorant  of  their  importance,  have 
sneered  at  Napoleon  for  bringing  down  his  mind 
to  attend  to   such  minutiae,  but  in   this  he  has 


235 

given  a  lesson  that  every  young  soldier  sliould 
lay  to  heart. 

577.  The  simple  principles  of  the  military  art, 
so  simple  that  all  can  see  their  bearing,  but  how 
few,  alas!  can  rightly  apply  them,  lay  at  the 
bottom  of  these  great  results ;  these  were  but  a 
legitimate  emanation  from  the  former.  Attaiik- 
ing  first  disconnected,  dispersed  corps  on  their 
centre,  and  driving  them  on  divergent  lines  of 
retreat.  Selecting  a  strong  defensive  line  on  the 
Adige,  and  holding  his  corps  well  in  hand,  for 
concentration  at  the  most  favorable  central 
point,  wherever  the  enemy  might  strike,  but 
still  observing  him  closely.  Wonderful  activity, 
aided  by  those  sudden  inspirations  of  genius,  as 
they  are  termed,  and  a  coup  d'oeil  both  for  time 
and  place  never  perhaps  surpassed.  And  last, 
that  electric  spark  which,  unseen,  flies  from  man 
to  man,  and  which  produces  such  heroic  deeds 
on  the  battle-field.  Such  were  the  causes  of 
success.  These  were  but  too  well  intensified  by 
the  faults  of  the  Austrian  generals,  repeated 
over  and  over  again,  with  hardly  a  variation, 
either  in  their  strategical  or  tactical  combina- 
tions. Dispersing  their  corps  ;  operating  on 
double  lines,  and  dividing  their  forces  on  the 
battle-field,  as  at  Rivoli,  these  men  seemed  stul- 
tified by  routine,  and  unable  to  profit  by  any 
lesson.  Add  this  to  the  spirit  of  the  Austrian 
rule  of  that  time,  and  although  our  wonder  ia 
not  lessened,  we  can  find  something  like  ade- 
quate causes  for  the  events  that  occurred. 


236 


CAMPAIGN    OF    1805. 

578.  Political  Position. — The  campaign  of  1805 
grew  out  of  what  is  known  in  French  history  aa 
the  third  Coahtion  against  France.  After  the 
rupture  of  the  peace  of  Amiens,  in  1803,  and  the 
annexation  of  Genoa  to  the  French  empire,  Eng- 
land, but  Austria  in  particular,  felt  the  perilous 
position  in  which  they  were  placed,  and  mainly 
through  their  agency,  the  coalition  between 
them  and  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Naples,  was 
brought  about,  with  a  view  of  wresting  from 
France  the  territories  she  had  acquired  beyond 
her  ancient  borders,  during  the  wars  of  the  Re- 
public. 

579.  To  this  end  Russia,  England,  and  Sweden 
were  to  attack  Holland  and  Belgium,  by  the  Avay 
of  Pomerania ;  Russia  and  Austria  were  to  ad- 
vance by  the  valley  of  the  Danube ;  the  Aus- 
trians  were  to  attack  Lombardy ;  and  the  Rus- 
sians and  English  were  to  make  a  descent  into 
Southern  Italy,  and  being  joined  by  the  Neapo- 
litans, were  to  expel  the  French  from  the  Penin- 
sula. 

580.  Formidable  as  was  the  coalition,  and 
widespread  the  circle  of  its  operations,  it  had 
the  vice  of  all  such  projects,  and  carried  within 
itself  the  seeds  of  its  own  destruction.  At  no 
period  of  his  career  was  Napoleon  in  a  more  fa- 
vorable position  to  meet  the  dangers  that  now 
threatened  him.  The  large  force  which  he  had 
distributed,  in  six  camps  of  instruction,  from  the 
Texel  to  Bayonnc,  for  the  invasion  of  England, 
had  been,  since  1803,  under  his  own  eye,  prepar- 
ing for  every  contingency  of  war.     Devoting  his 


237 

great  administrative  powers  to  perfecting  it,  he 
had  given  it  an  organization  that  has  since 
served  as  a  model  to  the  world.  In  speaking  of 
the  plan  and  the  means  at  the  disposal  of  Napo- 
leon, to  meet  this  formidable  array  against  him, 
Thiers  says :  "  Never  captain,  either  in  ancient 
or  modern  times,  had  conceived  or  executed 
plans  on  such  a  scale.  Also  never  had  a  spirit 
more  powerful,  one  of  less  unshackled  will,  and 
having  at  its  disposal  more  vast  means,  had  so 
extended  a  field  for  its  operations.  In  truth 
what  spectacle,  for  the  greater  part,  is  presented 
to  our  contemplation  in  like  cases.  Irresolute 
governments  which  are  deliberating  when  they 
should  be  acting ;  short-sighted  administrations, 
which  are  only  commencing  to  organize  their 
forces  when  they  ought  to  be  on  the  battle-field ; 
and  subordinate  to  these,  generals  who  are  hardly 
capable  of  manoeuvring  upon  the  restricted  thea- 
tre of  war  assigned  for  their  operations.  Here, 
on  the  contrary,  genius,  will,  foresight,  absolute 
liberty  of  action,  all  concurred  in  the  same  man 
to  the  same  end."  How  true  these  reflections. 
What  a  lesson  does  history  here  present  us, 
and  how  patiently  and  pointedly  has  she  repeated 
it,  from  age  to  age,  and  yet  with  how  Uttle 
profit! 

581.  Theatre  of  War. — Looking  around  him, 
from  his  central  position,  upon  the  wide  circle 
occupied  by  his  opponents.  Napoleon,  witli  his 
intuitive  insight  in  military  matters,  decided  at 
once  to  strike  a  crushing  blow  upon  the  most 
menacing  point,  judging  that  success  there 
would  dissipate  all  danger  at  every  other.  Ob- 
serving with  sufficient  forces  only  the  minor 
points,  he   determined  to  concentrate  his  main 


238 

efforts  upon  the  line  of  the  Danube,  against  the 
Auatrians  and  Russians. 

582.  The  basin  of  this  celebrated  river,  PI. 
IX.,  had  been  the  scene  of  the  great  battles 
between  France  and  Austria.  Taking  its  rise  in 
a  rugged  but  not  very  elevated  district,  termed 
the  Suabian  Alps,  and  in  the  celebrated  Black 
Forest,  near  the  point  where  the  Rhine  at  Basle 
abruptly  changes  its  westwardly  course  to  one 
nearly  due  north,  the  Danube  soon  commences 
to  receive,  from  the  south,  a  number  of  tribu- 
taries which  have  their  sources  in  the  Alps. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  Iller,  then  the  Lech,  the 
Isar,  the  Inn,  &c.  Skirting  closely  the  base  of 
the  Suabian  Alps,  and  that  of  the  southern  range 
of  mountains  by  which  Bohemia  is  encircled,  it 
receives  no  tributary  of  importance  except  from 
the  basins  lying  between  the  termination  of  the 
Suabian  Alps  and  the  hills  of  Franconia,  and  the 
territory  of  the  Upper  Palatinate  lying  between 
the  same  hills  and  the  Bohemian  mountains  on 
the  north-east. 

583.  The  southern  tributaries,  on  all  of  which 
are  fortified  points,  being,  for  the  most  part, 
deep  and  rapid,  having  the  Danube,  into  which 
they  empty,  on  the  north,  and  the  Alps,  in  which 
they  rise,  on  the  south,  have  always  been  looked 
upon  as  strong  defensive  lines  against  an  inva- 
sion from  the  side  of  France,  and  the  more  so,  as 
in  all  their  wars,  the  French  had  entered  the 
valley  of  the  Danube  at  its  head,  by  crossing  the 
Rhine  between  Strasburg  and  Lake  Constance, 
and  proceeding  through  the  defiles  of  the  Black 
Forest,  or  those  of  the  hills  separating  the  Rhine 
from  tlie  Danube. 

584:.  The  Black  Forest,  on  the  side  of  France, 


239 

wa.9  covered  with  a  heavy  forest  growth,  and 
had  passing  through  it  a  number  of  defiles  con- 
necting the  valleys  of  the  Danube  and  Necker 
with  that  of  the  Rhine.  The  Suabian  Alps, 
which  is  but  a  mountain  spur,  lying  in  a  north- 
east direction,  terminate  near  Nordlingen  in  a 
level  country.    . 

585.  Military  Positions. — Russia  and  Austria 
having  to  act  along  the  line  of  the  Danube,  the 
Austrians,  faithful  to  their  military  traditions, 
advanced  to  the  lUer,  as  their  defensive  line, 
which  they  occupied  from  Memmingen  to  Ulm. 
The  Russians  had  formed  two  corps ;  the  one, 
under  Kutusof,  was  marching  through  Moravia 
to  join  Mack,  who  commanded  the  Austrians  at 
Ulm ;  the  second,  composed  of  the  guards  and 
the  army  of  Buxhowden,  was  at  Pulawi  on  the 
Vistula  with  the  Emperor  Alexander. 

58G.  The  army  of  Napoleon  was  distributed 
as  follows  :  One  corps  in  Hanover,  under  Berna- 
dotte ;  one  in  Holland,  under  Marmont ;  the  main 
body  at  Boulogne  and  its  environs,  from  Mon- 
treuil  to  Ambleteuse. 

587.  Plan  of  Campaign. — The  Austrians  hold- 
ing the  strong  position  of  Ulm,  which  they 
regarded  as  unassailable  in  front,  were  waiting 
for  the  Russians  to  join  them  before  commencing 
offensive  operations. 

588.  Napoleon,  who  calculated  on  the  well 
known  tardiness  of  the  Russian  movements,  and 
the  traditional  military  policy  of  the  Austrians, 
based  his  plan  on  these  two  facts.  It  was  sim- 
ply to  attack  the  Austrians  before  the  Russians 
could  come  up,  and,  having  beaten  them,  to  beat 
the  Russians  in  turn.  But,  not  satisfied  with 
the  results  of  simple  victories,  Napoleon  aimed 


240 

at  a  grand  disaster  for  the  Austrians  at  Ulm, 
which  he  intended  to  accomphsh  by  turning 
their  position  below  the  Iller,  cutting  them  olf 
from  their  hne  of  retreat,  and  thus,  hemmed  in 
by  the  Alps  on  the  one  hand,  the  Danube  on  the 
other,  and  his  own  corps,  to  force  them  to  sur- 
render ;  thus,  as  Thiers  says :  "  to  make  use  of 
a  means  very  simple  in  theory,  but  very  difficult 
in  the  execution ;  that  of  beating  one's  opponents 
in  succession." 

589.  Military  Operations. — Not  the  least  re- 
markable features  of  this  campaign  were  the 
marches  by  which  the  troops  were  first  concen- 
trated, and  then  moved  in  concert  on  the  Aus- 
trians. The  army,  which  had  been  organized 
into  army  corps,  was  composed  as  follows.  The 
first  corps  under  Bernadotte,  17,000  men.  The 
second,  under  Marmont,  20,000.  The  third,  un- 
der Davoust,  26,000.  The  fourth,  under  Soult, 
40,000.  The  fifth,  under  Lannes,  18,000.  The 
sixth,  under  Ney,  24,000.  The  seventh,  under 
Augereau,  14,000.  Besides  these  there  was  the 
grand  reserve  of  22,000  cavalry  and  1,000  horse 
artillery,  under  Murat,  and  the  general  reserve 
of  7,000  men  and  24  guns  of  the  imperial  guard. 
These  last  two  corps  being  under  the  immediate 
control  of  Napoleon.  The  first  and  second  corps 
received  orders  to  concentrate  at  Wurtzburg  on 
the  Main  in  Franconia ;  the  third,  fourth,  fifth, 
and  sixth,  with  the  reserves  on  the  Rhine,  be- 
tween Manheira  and  Strasburg.  The  seventh 
corps,  which  was  at  Brest  and  had  the  whole 
breadth  of  France  to  traverse,  was  to  form  a  kind 
of  reserve  for  recruits,  &c.,  and  to  reach  Stras- 
burg after  the  others. 

690.  Acting  with  that  profound  secresy  which 


241 

he  carried  into  all  his  official  acts,  Napoleon  had 
all  his  orders  prepared  by  a  confidential  officer, 
ready  on  Aug.  26,  and  issued  Aug,  27.  The 
line  of  march  of  each  corps  was  so  chosen  that  it 
would  meet  with  no  hindrance  to  reach  its  des- 
tination on  the  day  fixed  upon.  The  first  corps 
was  to  move  Sept.  2,  and  reach  Wurtzburg, 
Sept.  20.  The  second  to  move  Sept.  1,  reach 
Mayence,  by  the  Rhine,  on  the  15th  or  16th,  and 
Wurtzburg  on  the  18th  or  19th.  The  corps 
from  Montreuil,  Boulogne,  and  Ambleteuse,  to 
move  Aug.  29,  and  to  reach  the  Rhine  between 
the  21st  and  24th  of  September.  Each  corps  was 
to  move  in  three  divisions  on  three  consecutive 
days.  In  the  meantime  Napoleon  had  used 
every  stratagem  to  put  the  allies  on  the  wrong 
scent,  and  had  gathered  all  the  information  pos- 
sible, through  his  aides-de-camp,  of  the  roads 
leading  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Danube.  He 
himself  left  Paris  Sept.  24,  and  reached  Stras- 
burg  Sept.  26. 

591.  Having  concentrated  his  army  at  the 
points  designated.  Napoleon  commenced  his 
grand  strategical  march  on  the  Austrians.  Hav- 
ing thrown  the  corps  of  Lannes  forward,  in  front 
of  Strasburg  towards  Stuttgard,  to  cover  in 
flank  the  movements  of  Ney,  Soult,  and  Davoust, 
he  ordered  Murat  to  cross  the  Rhine  at  Stras- 
burg, Sept.  25,  and,  with  the  reserve  of  cavalry, 
to  penetrate  the  defiles  through  the  Black  Fo- 
rest; and  Lannes  was  ordered  to  support  him 
with  some  battalions  of  grenadiers.  This  was 
done  simply  to  mislead  the  Austrians  as  to  the 
true  movement  on  their  flank  and  rear.  Having 
ordered  the  corps  of  Ney,  Soult,  and  Davoust  to 
take  four  days'  rations  of  bread  in  their  knap- 
21 


242 

Backs,  and  foar  days'  provision  of  biscuit  in  wa- 
gons, in  the  event  of  a  forced  march,  Napoleon 
crossed  the  Rhine  with  the  guards,  Oct.  1,  hav- 
ing seen  all  his  parks  in  motion. 

592.  Three  roads  lead  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Danube  between  Donauwirth  and  Ingolstadt  on 
this  last  stream.  First,  the  principal  one  passes 
through  Pforsheim,  Stuttgard,  and  Heidenheim, 
striking  the  Suabian  Alps,  and  communicating 
by  numerous  defiles  with  the  valley  of  the  Dan- 
ube, is  the  most  exposed  to  an  enemy  on  its  flank. 
This  road  was  taken  by  Murat,  Lannes,  Ney, 
and  the  guards.  The  second  one,  lower  down 
the  Rhine,  and  passing  through  Spire,  Hall,  and 
Ellwagen,  was  followed  by  Soult.  The  third, 
still  lower  down,  from  Manheim  through  Heidel- 
burg,  Neckar-Elz,  Ingelfingen,  and  Oethngen, 
was  taken  by  Davoust,  which  brought  him  near 
those  taken  by  Bernadotte  and  Marmont  from 
Wurtzburg. 

593.  Napoleon  designed  that  all  these*  corps 
ghould  deboiichej  between  the  6th  and  7th  of  Octo- 
ber, upon  the  plain  that  lies  between  Nordlin- 
gen,  Donauwerth,  and  Ingoldstadt,  the  movement 
pivoting  upon  the  right  wing.  Having  given 
time  for  the  heads  of  the  columns  on  his  left  to 
reach  the  same  line,  parallel  to  the  Danube,  as 
his  own,  he  gave  orders,  Oct.  4,  for  his  right  to 
move  by  Stuttgard,  sending  Murat  in  advance, 
and  ordering  him  to  move  rapidly  and  penetrate 
and  hold  each  defile,  in  succession,  on  the  flank, 
until  the  army  Avas  safely  past  it.  This  move- 
ment he  supported  by  50,000  men.  The  corps 
on  the  left  were  thus  secured  from  danger,  and 
within  supporting  distances  of  each  other.  The 
whole  army  of  180,000  men  moved  on  a  front  of 


243 

about  seventy  miles,  and  in  such  order  as  to  be 
able  to  concentrate  100,000  at  any  point  in  a  few 
hours. 

594.  Having  experienced  the  difficulty  of 
divining  the  truth  from  the  confused  statements 
of  persons  vi^itnessing  such  movement,  Napoleon 
kept  the  Austrians  ignorant  of  his  true  designs, 
by  false  reports,  spies,  deserters,»&c.,  whilst  Soult, 
on  the  6th  and  7th  of  October,  surprises  and  seizes 
the  bridges  of  Munster  and  Donauwerth ;  and 
Murat,  crossing  the  Danube,  seizes  the  bridge  at 
Rains  over  the  Lech.  Napoleon,  leaving  Ney 
with  20,000  men  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube, 
on  the  road  to  Wurtemburg,  places  Murat  and 
Lannes  between  Augsburg  and  Ulm,  at  Burgau, 
with  40,000  men,  leaving  Soult  at  Augsburg 
with  30,000.  Davoust  was  placed  at  Aichach,  to 
hold  the  Austrian  rearguard  in  check,  and  Ber- 
nadotte  placed  at  Munich.  To  prevent  the  es- 
cape of  the  Austrians  through  the  Tyrol,  Napo- 
leon pushed  Soult  forward  to  Memmingen,  on 
their  extreme  left,  giving  him  instructions  to 
reach  and  secure  his  position  by  Oct.  13 ;  hav- 
ing decided  to  carry  Ulm  by  assault  on  the  14th. 
Ney,  in  the  meantime,  had  crossed  the  Danube, 
driven  the  Austrians  from  the  strong  position  of 
Elchingen,  and  gained  possession  of  the  heights 
of  Michelsburg,  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube, 
which  completely  command  Ulm. 

595.  In  this  posture  of  affairs,  completely 
hemmed  in  at  Ulm,  the  Austrian  commander 
had  no  alternative  left  but  to  attempt  to  cut  his 
way  through  the  French  lines,  or  to  surrender. 
On  the  evening  of  the  14th,  the  Archduke  Fer- 
dmand  attempted  this  last  course  with  success, 
taking  with  him  a  detachment  of  6,000  or  7,000 


244 

cavalry,  and  a  corps  of  infantry ;  but  he  was 
quickly  followed  by  Murat,  who,  in  a  hot  and 
incessant  pursuit  of  four  days,  killed  or  captured 
the  whole  of  this  force,  with  the  exception  of 
2,000  or  3,000  cavalry,  who,  with  the  Archduke, 
succeeded  in  gaining  the  road  to  Bohemia. 

596.  Napoleon,  having  summoned  Mack  to 
surrender,  Oct.  16,  this  unfortunate  general 
asked  for  eight  days  to  wait  for  reinforcements 
to  relieve  him,  on  the  non-arrival  of  which  he 
agreed  to  surrender.  Napoleon  granted  him  six, 
and  the  place  and  army  were  given  up  Oct.  20. 

597.  Thus,  to  use  the  words  of  Thiers,  "  the 
plan  of  Napoleon  was  completely  realized.  In 
twenty  days,  without  delivering  a  great  battle, 
by  a  series  of  marches  only,  and  a  few  combats, 
an  army  of  80,000  men  was  destroyed." 

598.  The  facts  of  this  campaign  are  their  own 
best  criticism.  By  marches  profoundly  com- 
bined and  admirably  executed,  the  French  army 
was  thrown  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  Aus- 
trian, concentrated  on  the  Iller ;  and  which,  if 
attacked  in  front,  could,  if  beaten,  have  fallen 
back,  each  day  bringing  them  nearer  to  the  Rus- 
sian army,  then  in  its  march  to  form  a  junction 
with  it.  Such  a  movement  merited  the  success 
it  obtained. 

599.  For  both  political  and  military  reasons, 
Napoleon  decided  to  hasten  his  march  on  Vienna. 
The  Russians  were  in  his  front  with  about  70,000 
men.  The  Austrian  archdukes,  Charles  and 
John,  were  upon  the  right  flank  of  his  line  of 
march ;  the  former  in  Lombardy  with  70,000  of 
the  best  troops;  the  latter  in  the  Tyrol  with 
25,000  men. 

600.  Forced  to  march  between  the  Danube 


245 

and  the  Alps,  over  a  narrow  and  obstructed  zone 
of  country,  it  was  of  the  first  importance  for  Na- 
poleon to  guard  his  exposed  flank,  by  preventing 
a  junction  of  the  two  archdukes.  For  this  pur- 
pose, he  ordered  Massena,  who  held  the  defen- 
sive line  of  the  Adige,  to  keep  closely  on  the 
heels  of  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  detached  Ney 
into  the  Tyrol  to  secure  that  region  of  country. 
Bernadotte  was  also  destined  to  occupy  the  ter- 
ritory of  Salsburg,  through  which  the  Salza  river 
flows  to  join  the  Danube.  Without  entering  in- 
to the  details  of  these  movements,  it  is  sufficient 
to  say  that  they  were  all  carried  out  with  com- 
plete success ;  the  Russians,  beaten  in  several 
severe  engagements,  were  forced  across  the 
Danube  at  Krems,  and  finally  fell  back  towards 
Bohemia ;  and  the  movement,  commenced  Oct. 
26th,  ended  in  the  occupation  of  Vienna  before 
tlie  middle  of  November. 

601.  In  connexion  with  these  splendid  opera- 
tions, another  branch  of  his  profession,  not  less 
'  important,  though  wanting  the  eclat  that  attends 
marches  and  battles,  occupied  the  profound  at- 
tention of  Napoleon ;  one  which,  as  Thiers  tells 
us,  "  he  was  more  and  more  occupied  with  as  the 
scale  of  his  operations  became  the  grander,  and 
in  which  he  stands  without  an  equal,  for  fore- 
sight and  the  activity  of  his  oversight."  Those 
were  the  precautions  necessary  to  keep  his  army 
supplied  with  everything,  and  to  recruit  its 
losses.  This  system  of  precautions  had  for  its 
object  to  furnish  him  with  points  of  support, 
whether  he  advanced,  or  felt  himself  under  the 
necessity  of  retiring.  Besides  a  certain  amount 
of  fortified  strength,  he  brought  together  at 
these  points  an  immense  quantity  of  supphes  of 
21* 


246 

all  kinds,  for  his  army,  with  everything  necessa- 
ry for  the  soldiers'  comfort.  For  this  purpose 
he  selected  Augsburg,  on  the  Lech,  as  his  grand 
depot;  and  ordered  from  Nuremburg,  Katis- 
bonne  and  Munich  every  article  they  could  fur- 
nish for  his  purposes. 

602.  Being  in  quiet  possession  of  Vienna,  Na- 
poleon took  immediate  measures  both  to  secure 
it  from  attack,  and  to  follow  up  the  Russians 
into  Moravia,  before  they  could  effect  a  junction 
with  the  two  archdukes,  who,  besides,  would 
have  to  make  a  wide  circuit  through  Hungary 
to  reach  each  other.  For  the  first  purpose,  he 
called  back  Marmont,  who  was  at  Leoben  on  the 
river  Muhr,  and  placed  him  on  the  Styrian  Alps, 
nearer  to  Vienna,  to  guard  the  grand  route  from 
Italy  to  this  city.  He  brought  Massena  nearer 
to  Marmont,  and  placed  them  in  supporting  dis- 
tance of  each  other.  The  corps  of  Davoust  was 
distributed  around  Vienna;  one  division  being 
at  Neustadt  so  as  to  support  Marmont,  another 
in  the  direction  of  Presburg  to  watch  the  defiles 
from  Hungary,  a  third  in  front  of  Vienna  on 
the  road  to  Moravia.  Two  divisions  were 
placed  in  Vienna.  The  corps  of  Soult,  Lannes, 
and  Murat  marched  towards  Moravia;  whilst 
Bernadotte,  who  had  crossed  the  Danube  at 
Krems,  followed  up  the  steps  of  Kutusof 

603.  Thus,  like  a  spider  in  the  centre  of  his 
web.  Napoleon,  from  Vienna,  was  ready  for  an 
enemy's  approach  on  any  side.  Each  corps  was 
eo  placed,  that,  if  attacked,  it  could  hold  out  un- 
til supported  by  the  others  adjacent  to  it.  To 
quote  the  words  of  Thiers  again :  "  Napoleon 
thus  fulfilled,  in  the  most  perfect  manner,  the 
conditions  of  that  art  of  war,  which,  on  a  later 


24r 

day,  in  conversation  witli  his  lieutenants,  he  de- 
fined in  these  terms:  "The  art  of  skparatino 

TO      SUBSIST      AND      OF      CONCENTRATING      TO     FIGHT. 

Never  were  the  precepts  of  this  formidable  art, 
by  which  empires  are  founded  or  destroyed,  bet- 
ter defined,  or  better  carried  into  practice." 

604.  After  some  combats  with  the  Russians, 
the  French  corps  entered  Brunn,  the  capital  of 
Moravia,  Nov.  19,  and  Napoleon  fixed  there  his 
headquarters  on  the  20th.  In  the  meantime  the 
Emperors  of  Austria  and  Russia  met  at  Olmutz, 
where  they  had  assembled  about  75,000  Rus- 
sians and  15,000  Austrians,  or  90,000  men  in  alL 
After  many  discussions,  which  only  served  to 
display  the  weakness  and  folly  of  their  plans,  the 
allied  sovereigns  decided  to  march  on  Brunn,  and 
attack  the  French.  Their  plan  was  to  turn  the 
position  of  Napoleon,  in  front  of  Brunn,  by  his 
right,  and  placing  themselves  on  the  road  from 
Vienna  to  Brunn,  cut  off  his  line  of  retreat  on 
Vienna,  and  either  capture  his  army,  or  force 
him  to  retreat  on  Bohemia.  Napoleon,  who  had 
thoroughly  examined  the  country  around  Brunn, 
and  had  also  divined  the  plan  of  the  Allies,  de- 
cided to  take  up  a  position  where  he  could  act 
defensively  until  the  enemy  had  fallen  into  their 
own  trap,  and  then,  assuming  the  offensive,  over- 
whelm them.  For  this  purpose  he  selected  the 
memorable  battle-field  of  Austerlitz. 

605.  The  village  of  Austerlitz,  PL  X.,  from 
which  the  battle  takes  its  name,  lies  about 
twelve  miles  from  Brunn,  and  a  little  to  the 
south  of  east.  Between  these  two  places, 
several  small  streams  run  nearly  north  and  south, 
which,  taking  their  rise  in  a  heavily  timbered 
spur  from  the  Bohemian  range,  that  terminates 


248 

a  little  to  the  north  of  the  road  from  Brunn  to 
Olmutz,  which  here  runs  almost  due  east,  are 
lost  in  several  ponds  about  nine  miles  south  of 
the  road.  The  principal  of  these  streams,  termed 
the  Goldbach,  and  which  runs  nearly  due  south, 
lies  rather  more  than  five  miles  from  Brunn,  and 
has  along  it  several  small  villages,  the  principal 
of  which  are  Schaplanitz  on  the  north,  and  So- 
kolnitz,  Telnitz,  and  Menitz  on  the  south.  Be- 
tween the  Goldbach  and  another  small  stream,  a 
little  to  the  west  of  Aasterlitz,  running  in  a 
southwest  direction  and  emptying  into  the  same 
ponds  as  the  Goldbach,  is  the  rising  ground 
which  forms  the  plateau  of  Pratzen.  Towards 
Austerlitz,  and  to  the  north,  the  plateau  is  more 
or  less  undulating;  but  south  and  towards  the 
Goldbach,  the  slopes  are  more  steep,  and  cut  up 
into  ravines,  which  form  hollow  and  somewhat 
intricate  roads,  leading  to  the  villages.  Such 
are  the  chief  features  of  the  position  chosen  by 
Napoleon  to  receive  the  attack  of  the  Austro- 
Russian  army.  His  own  army  was  posted  along 
the  Goldbach,  from  a  small  eminence,  termed  the 
Santon — a  little  to  the  north  of  the  road  from 
Brunn  to  Olmutz — to  Menitz.  His  cavalry  on 
his  left ;  the  Santon  occupied  by  a  heavy  bat- 
tery ;  his  main  body  and  reserves  nearly  oppo- 
site the  plateau  of  Pratzen ;  and  the  villages  oc- 
cupied by  his  infantry.  Feehng  that  the  enemy 
would  attempt  to  turn  his  right,  by  the  villages 
on  it,  to  gain  the  road  to  Vienna,  which  runs 
nearly  due  south  from  Brunn,  Napoleon  decided 
to  let  them  engage  themselves  fully  in  this, 
when,  assuming  the  offensive,  he  would  carry 
the  heights  of  Pratzen,  and  thus,  having  pierced 
the  enemy's  centre,  capture  or  destroy  his  lefl 


249 

wing  at  least.  Such  was  the  simple  plan  of  this 
decisive  battle.  It  was  fought  almost  as  if  he 
had  decided  upon  the  movements  on  each  side. 
His  own  generals  literally  carried  out  his  own- 
plans,  and  the  Allies  committed  the  blunders  he 
expected.  Their  left  was  literally  captured  or 
destroyed ;  many  being  drowned  in  the  ponds, 
which,  being  frozen,  they  had  ventured  upon  for 
escape.  In  the  utter  rout  and  consequent  con- 
fusion of  all,  the  two  Emperors  vainly  attempted 
to  stop  and  rally  the  mere  mob  into  which  their 
forces  were  now  confounded.  Their  entreaties 
and  commands  were  unheeded.  The  confused 
mass  rolled  slowly  back,  like  a  flock  of  sheep, 
but  still,  from  their  mere  density  impenetrable 
to  the  French  cavalry  and  infantry,  were  lite- 
rally pushed  from  the  field.  The  two  sovereigns 
were  at  length  obliged  to  fly  rapidly  across  the 
fields  of  Moravia,  during  profound  darkness, 
separated  from  their  raihtary  households,  and 
exposed  to  the  insults  of  their  own  licentious 
soldiery.  Alexander,  whom  his  wisest  counsel- 
lors had  entreated  to  remain  at  his  capital,  and 
not  to  move  with  the  army,  where  his  presence 
could  only  give  rise  to  petty  jealousies  and  in- 
trigues, had  here  an  occasion  to  see  the  wisdom 
of  leaving  miUtary  matters  to  men  long  trained  to 
their  profession;  and,  as  Thiers  remarks,  "could 
now  well  perceive  that,  under  the  present  circuin- 
fitances,  the  presence  of  a  sovereign  was  not 
worth  that  of  a  good  general"  A  lesson  that  all 
governments  might  profit  by. 

606.  Such  was  the  great  battle  fought  Dec.  2, 
1805,  and  named  by  Napoleon  the  day  of  Auster- 
litz,  in  his  admirable  bulletin,  dated  from  the 
battle-field-     The  Austro-Russian  loss  was  15,000 


250 

killed  or  woundec!,  20,000  prisoners,  8  generals, 
and  10  colonels,  180  cannon,  with  an  immense 
amount  of  warlike  stores,  and  40  standards,  in- 
cluding those  of  the  Russian  imperial  guard. 
The  loss  of  the  French  was  only  from  7,000  to 
8,000  killed  and  wounded. 

607.  The  Austrian  as  well  as  the  Russian  sol- 
diers fought  with  indomitable  courage.  Their 
disastrous  defeat  was  the  effect  of  bad  general- 
ship. Though  greatly  outnumbering  the  French 
their  line  was  too  extended,  and  their  attack  up- 
on both  wings  by  weakening  their  centre,  gave 
Napoleon  the  opportunity  he  waited  for.  Be- 
sides this,  their  left  wing,  by  which  the  decisive 
blow  was  to  be  struck,  was  entrusted  to  a  man, 
General  Buxhowden,  vain,  presumptuous,  intem- 
perate, and  without  military  skill,  who,  when 
Eot  a  mere  idle  spectator,  only  added  to  the  con- 
fusion of  the  moment.  Added  to  this,  the  battle 
was  planned  and  the  general  movements  traced 
out  by  one  of  those  pretenders  who  are  the 
more  confident  as  they  are  the  more  incapable 
of  taking  but  one  view  of  a  case.  This  gene- 
ral, who,  as  a  spectator  of  the  scene  avers,  read 
his  plan  to  the  assembled  generals  the  night  be- 
fore the  battle,  as  a  pedant  might  have  done  to 
a  class  of  young  pupils,  when  one  of  the  num- 
ber said :  "  all  this  is  very  well,  general,  but  sup- 
pose the  enemy  should  anticipate  us,  and  make 
their  attack  near  Pratzen,  what  shall  we  do 
then  ?"  replied  :  "  that  is  not  a  supposable  case." 
In  war  he  who  does  not  foresee  and  provide  for 
every  supposable  case,  may,  like  Weirother,  on 
this  occasion  find  his  Austerlitz. 


251 


CAMPAIGN    OF    1814. 

608.  The  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1796, 
and  the  subsequent  operations,  up  to  the  defen- 
sive position  taken  up  by  Bonaparte  behind  tho 
Adige,  were  strictly  offensive ;  from  this  last 
period  to  the  close  of  this  brilliant  series  of  mili- 
tary triumphs,  Bonaparte  acted  on  what  may  be 
termed  the  defensive-offensive  ;  that  is,  he  se- 
lected his  positions,  to  observe  and  await  the 
development  of  the  enemy's  plans,  and,  when  he 
was  fairly  committed  to  them,  he  seized  the  op- 
portune moment  to  foil  him.  In  the  campaign 
of  1805,  become  Emperor,  and  with  no  will  but 
his  own  for  a  law,  we  find  him  pursue  a  like 
course  to  the  one  followed  in  1796-97.  Direct- 
ing his  admirably  organized  forces,  by  a  series  of 
combined  marches,  which  will  be  a  model  to 
generals  of  all  future  times,  so  as  to  turn  the 
enemy's  position,  and  cut  him  off  from  his  line 
of  retreat,  we  see  him,  after  his  first  overwhelm- 
ing success,  follow  it  up  without  a  day's  loss, 
driving  before  him  the  Russians,  and  capturing 
the  capital  of  Austria.  Here  he  pauses,  only  a 
moment,  to  look  around  him  and  judge  of  his 
position,  whilst  he  at  the  same  time  applies 
his  own  simple  maxim,  to  disperse  his  forces 
to  subsist,  and  concentrate  them  to  fight. 
Expecting  to  be  attacked,  with  superior  forces 
of  the  Allies  in  his  front,  he  pushes  before 
him  those  of  his  opponents  who  were  within 
reach,  and,  stopping  at  Brunn,  the  capital  of 
Moravia,  he  divines  the  enemy's  projects,  care- 
fully selects  his  field,  on  which  to  fight  a  defen- 
sive-offensive   battle,   and  at   Austerlitz    leaves 


252 

another  imperishable  record  of  his  overshadow- 
ing genius. 

609.  In  the  campaign  of  1814,  that  grand  clos- 
ing scene  of  the  terrible  drama  of  disasters  which 
opened  with  the  retreat  from  Russia,  Napoleon 
had  no  choice.  Nothing  but  the  application  of 
an  energy  and  an  audacity  which  he  alone  pos- 
sessed here  held  out  any  hope  of  success,  and 
these  he  displayed  in  a  degree  worthy  of  his 
best  days ;  combining  the  lessons  of  experience 
of  so  many  grand  military  events  with  the  acti- 
vity and  fertility  of  imagination  of  his  early 
youth. 

610.  Military  Situation. — Towards  the  close  of 
December,  1813,  the  Allied  forces  invaded  the 
French  empire.  The  Austrians  and  Russians, 
under  Schwartzenberg,  numbering  160,000  men, 
crossed  the  Rhine  at  Basle.  PI.  XI.,  whilst  the 
Prussians  under  Blucher,  60,000  strong,  crossed 
it  at  Mayence.  The  intention  of  the  first  body 
was  to  advance  on  Paris,  by  Befort  and  Langres, 
so  as  to  descend  along  the  Seine;  whilst  the 
Prussians,  passing  between  the  fortresses  on  the 
north-eastern  frontier,  were  to  strike  the  Marne, 
and  finally  concentrate  with  the  Austro-Rus- 
gians  belbre  Paris. 

611.  To  oppose  this  formidable  array  Napo- 
leon had  within  his  reach  only  about  60,000  men 
under  Marshals  Marmont,  Ney,  Victor,  and  Mor- 
tier,  and  some  troops  that  he  was  hastening  for- 
ward from  Spain,  with  such  conscripts  as  could 
be  got  together  and  incorporated,  whilst  still  un- 
disciplined, in  the  old  regiments,  that  still  pre- 
served a  skeleton  of  their  former  selves. 

612.  Theatre  of  War. — The  approach  of  th^J 
Allies  on  Paris  lay  through  what  is  known  i\A 


253 

the  basin  of  Paris;  that  sector,  which,  having 
Paris  for  its  apex,  and  the  Vosges  mountains,  on 
the  east,  as  its  base,  is  watered  by  the  Yonne, 
the  Seine,  the  Aube,  the  Marne,  the  Aisne,  and 
the  Oise,  all  of  which  flow  towards  the  one  re- 
markable centre,  Paris  and  its  environs.  From 
the  broken  character  of  the  country,  it  was  very 
favorable  to  the  plan  of  Napoleon  and  his  small 
disposable  force. 

613.  Plan  of  Campnign. — The  Allies  had  but 
one  objective  point,  Paris.  This  capital  in  their 
possession,  they  knew  they  would  be  able  to 
dictate  a  peace. 

614.  Having  put  everything  in  train  at  Paris, 
Napoleon  proceeded  to  Chalons,  on  the  Marne, 
where  he  arrived  Jan.  25,  1814 ;  his  whole  force 
under  his  hand  not  exceeding  47,000  men. 
Whilst  all  his  generals  saw  nothing  but  disaster, 
from  the  great  disparity  of  the  contending  forces, 
Napoleon  endeavored  to  infuse  hope  and  confi- 
dence into  all.  Looking  at  the  great  arc  which 
the  Allies  were  dispersed  over,  from  Belgium  to 
Switzerland,  and  the  consequent  difficulty  of 
their  being  able  to  concentrate  on  any  point,  by 
a  given  time.  Napoleon,  than  whom  none  ever 
weighed  better  the  influences  of  the  chances  of 
war,  and  the  blunders  of  leaders,  entertained 
reasonable  prospects  of  being  able  to  take  advan- 
tage of  some  of  these  necessary  openings  to  suc- 
cess. Having  at  the  outset  placed  the  Marshals 
above  named  on  the  Vosges,  between  Epinal 
and  Langres,  to  observe  and  check  the  Austrians, 
Napoleon  intended  to  fall  first  upon  Blucher,  who 
was  advancing  on  the  Marne,  by  St.  Dizier,  and, 
having  forced  him  back,  to  throw  himself  next 
upon   ihc   Austro-Russians,   under  Schwartzen- 

22 


254 

berg,  on  his  right,  who  were  advancing  on  the 
Seine.  To  accomphsh  these  ends,  he  adopted 
the  Aube,  from  its  central  position  with  respect 
to  the  Seine  and  Marne,  as  his  hne  of  communi- 
cation with  Paris;  the  main  road  passing 
through  Ferte-sous-Jouarre,  Sezanne,  and  Arcis 
and  Brienne  on  the  Aube.  Upon  this  Hne  he 
collected  his  suppHes,  ordering  each  depot  to  be 
strengthened  with  such  resources  as  field  fbrtifi- 
C-ations  could  supply. 

615.  Active  Operations. — In  pursuance  of  this 
plan,  Napoleon  moved  on  St.  Dizier,  Jan.  26, 
and  drove  the  enemy  from  it,  and,  crossing  from 
there  to  Brienne,  he,  on  Jan.  29,  attacked  and 
drove  Bhicher  from  Brienne. 

616.  The  Allies,  from  the  dispersed  state  of 
their  forces,  were  laboring  under  a  considerable 
miUtary  disadvantage,  as  Blucher  was  obliged  to 
keep  up  his  connexion  with  the  forces  in  Bel- 
gium, to  march  on  Paris  by  Chalons,  whilst 
Schwartzenberg  directed  his  column  on  the  same 
point,  by  Troyes  on  the  Seine,  to  preserve  his 
connexion  with  the  forces  in  Switzerland.  On 
January  30,  however,  the  Allies  had  concen- 
trated around  La  Ilothiere,  a  little  to  the  south 
of  Brienne,  a  force  of  170,000  men,  whilst  Na- 
poleon had  only  30,000.  With  this  force  the 
Allies  attacked  Napoleon,  who,  after  a  desperate 
resistance,  to  avoid  being  forced  into  the  Aube, 
jetired  towards  Troyes,  at  which  place  he  re- 
mained until  Feb.  8,  keeping  all  the  while  on  the 
alert,  to  profit  by  any  blunder  of  the  enemy. 

617.  After  the  success  of  La  Rothiere,  the  Al- 
lied plan  was,  for  Blucher  to  collect  the  forces 
coming  from  Belgium,  and  marching  by  the 
Marne,  gain  Napoleon's  rear,  whilst  Schwartz- 


255 

euberg  should  move  by  the  Seine,  and  Wittgon- 
Btein,  with  a  considerable  corps,  mostly  of  caval- 
ry, was  to  move  along  the  Aube,  keeping  up  thus  a 
connexion  between  Blucher  and  Schwartzenberg. 

618.  Blucher,  with  his  usual  impetuosity, 
pushed  forward  rapidly  on  Meaux,  driving  the 
French  before  him,  but,  at  the  same  time,  leav- 
ing his  forces  in  a  very  scattered  state,  from 
Chalons  to  Ferte,  along  the  Marne,  and  also  up- 
on the  Aube.  Schwartzenberg,  on  the  contrary, 
moved  slowly  and  timidly  on  Troyes,  and  re- 
called even  Wittgenstein  Irom  the  Aube  to  cover 
his  flank. 

619.  Seeing  this  state  of  the  Allies,  Napoleon 
covered  Paris  by  a  corps  holding  the  bridges 
over  the  Seine  and  Yonne ;  and  pushing  Mar- 
mont  to  Nogent,  and  then  on  Sezanne,  giving 
Ney  orders  to  follow  him,  he,  with  Mortier,  pre- 
pared to  bring  up  the  rear,  thus  concentrating 
30,000  men,  directed  on  Blucher's  flank.  From 
Sezanne,  Napoleon  moved,  Feb.  10,  on  Champ- 
aubert,  where  he  disperses  a  Russian  corps, 
capturing  the  general  and  his  stafl';  and,  on  the 
11th,  on  Montmirail,  in  face  of  the  Russians,  de- 
feating first  Sacken  with  heavy  losses,  and  next, 
turning  on  Yorck,  defeats  and  drives  him 
through  Chateau-Thierry.  Having  accomplish- 
ed this  he  returned  towards  Champaubert,  near 
which  place  Marmont  had  taken  position,  having 
been  forced  back  by  Blucher  and  joining  Marmont, 
and  assuming  the  oflensive,  he  drives  back  the 
Prussians  on  Etoges,  from  which  they  were  dri- 
vep  during  the  night  of  Feb.  14.  Thus,  in  these 
four  combats,  without  any  general  engagement^ 
Napoleon  deprived  the  Allies,  numbering  60,000 
men,  of  28,000,  a  largo  quantity  of  artihery,  and 
a  number  of  flags. 


256 

620.  In  the  meantime,  Schwartzenberg  moved 
forward,  forcing  some  of  the  bridges  over  the 
Seine  and  Yonne,  towards  Fontainebleau,  the 
French  generals  opposing  him  retreating  behind 
the  small  river  Yeres,  and  waiting  for  Napoleon's 
movement. 

621.  Leaving  Marmont  to  watch  and  check 
Blucher  should  he  advance,  Napoleon,  on  Feb. 
14,  with  a  part  of  his  guard,  moved  on  Montmi- 
rail.  Here  two  plans  presented  themselves  to 
him.  The  one,  with  only  25,000  men  at  his  dis- 
posal, to  cross  from  the  Marne,  by  cross  roads,  to 
the  Seine,  and  attack  the  dispersed  corps  of  the 
Austrians  in  flank.  The  other,  to  move  by  the 
road,  through  Meaux,  on  Fontenay,  just  south 
of  it,  near  the  Yeres,  collect  the  corps  of  Victor 
and  Oudinot  by  the  way,  which  would  swell  his 
force  to  60,000,  and  then  attack  the  Austrians  in 
front.  He  decided  for  the  latter,  as  the  cross 
roads  were  bad,  and  as  on  this  last  line  he  had  an 
excellent  highway,  gained  a  large  accession  of 
strength,  and  had  every  prospect  of  throwing 
himself  upon  the  rear  of  the  more  advanced  of 
the  enemy's  corps,  and  thus  cut  them  off. 

622.  Putting  this  resolution  into  immediate 
execution.  Napoleon  pushed  forward  his  columns 
on  Meaux,  where  he  arrived  in  person,  Feb.  15, 
and,  on  the  16th,  joined  Victor,  and  put  his 
column  in  motion,  on  the  17th,  from  Guignes,  a 
Mnall  place  south  of  Meaux.  Encountering  the 
advanced  guard  of  Wittgenstein  at  Mormant,  he 
drives  it  from  there,  causing  it  considerable  loss, 
and  marches  by  Nangis  upon  the  bridges  over 
the  Seine  at  Montereau,  Bray,  and  Nogent,  ex- 
pecting, in  this  way,  to  cut  the  enemy's  column. 
This  well  devised  plan  was  defeated  by  tlie  un- 


257 

seasonable  delay  of  Victor  at  Nangis,  as  it 
enabled  the  enemy  to  take  measures  to  dispute 
the  passage  of  these  bridges.  The  bridge  of 
Montereau  being  finally  forced,  with  considera- 
ble loss  to  both  parties,  Napoleon  intended  to 
recross  the  Seine  at  Mery,  to  the  east  of  this 
last  place,  and  then  offer  battle  to  the  Allies  in 
front  of  Troyes.  Having,  with  much  loss  of 
time,  crossed  the  Seine  at  Montereau,  Napoleon, 
having  now  about  70,000  men,  reached  Nogent, 
Feb.  22. 

623.  Blucher,  in  the  meantime,  decided  to  move 
from  the  Marne  to  the  Seine  and  join  Schwartz^ 
enberg,  and  thus  reached  Mery  Feb.  23,  the 
point  on  which  Napoleon  was  also  moving. 
Schwartzenberg,  however,  had  retired  to  Chau- 
mont  on  the  Marne,  leaving  a  corps  at  Bar,  on 
the  Aube ;  and  Blucher  then  took  position  at 
Mery  and  Arcis  on  the  Aube,  but,  Feb.  24,  pass- 
ed the  Aube  at  Anglure,  and  moved  on  Sezanne, 
to  the  north  of  it.  Continuing  this  movement, 
he  endeavored  to  cut  off  Marmont  and  Victor, 
who  eluded  him,  and  took  up  a  strong  positioni 
behind  the  Marne,  and  the  Ourcq  a  small  tribu- 
tary of  the  Marne,  which  falls  into  it  a  little  to- 
the  east  of  Meaux. 

624.  Napoleon,  seeing  this  movement  of 
Blucher,  resolves  to  follow  him,  and  throw  him* 
upon  the  Marne,  resorting  to  a  stratagem  to  de- 
ceive the  Austrians  as  to  his  being  in  front  of 
them.  Moving  by  Sezanne,  he  reached  Ferte  on 
the  Marne,  March  2.  Blucher,  now  finding  Na- 
poleon on  his  rear,  and  Marmont  and  Victor  in 
front,  moved  off  rapidly,  March  3,  hoping  to 
connect  with  the  Russians  at  Soissons  on  the 
Aisne.     Napoleon  immediately  passed  the  Marne 

22* 


258 

in  pursuit,  passing  by  Oulchy  to  Fismes,  to  cat 
off  Blucher's  retreat  in  that  direction,  and  force 
him  to  accept  battle  with  the  Aisne  behind  him. 

625.  There  hemmed  in,  there  was  no  door  of 
escape  for  Bhicher  but  through  Soissons,  which 
was  secure  from  a  coup-de-main ^  and  could  have 
withstood  any  attempt  to  take  it,  at  least  twen- 
ty-four hours.  Unfortunately  for  the  fortunes 
of  Napoleon,  this  key  of  the  Aisne  was  given  up, 
through  the  imbecility  of  its  commandant.  The 
Russians,  to  the  number  of  40,000,  not  only  es- 
caped, but  were  joined  by  60,000  Russians  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Aisne. 

626.  Having  lost  this  opportunity,  and  being 
under  the  necessity  of  beating  Blucher  before 
again  moving  on  Schwartzenberg,  Napoleon  sur- 
prised a  passage  of  the  Aisne,  at  three  points 
above  Soissons,  on  March  6th,  and,  on  the  7th,  at- 
tacked the  strong  position  of  the  Russians  and 
Prussians  on  the  heights  of  Craonne,  which  he  car- 
ried after  a  fierce  struggle  and  considerable  losses. 
Giving  his  army  some  rest,  on  March  8,  he 
moved  in  pursuit  of  the  Allies  towards  Laon  on 
the  9th ;  Marmont,  at  the  same  time,  closing  in 
on  the  left  of  the  Allies,  took  up,  at  night,  a  po- 
sition too  open  and  advanced,  from  which  he 
was  stampeded  and  forced  back  with  loss.  On 
the  10th,  a  desperate  assault  was  made  on  Laon, 
a  small  place  of  great  natural  strength,  in  which 
having  failed.  Napoleon  was  forced  to  fall  back 
on  Soissons,  having  only  about  40,000  men  and 
leaving  the  Allies  with  90,000. 

627.  With  this  disaster  closed  all  hope  of  re- 
trieving the  fortunes  of  the  day.  To  use  his 
own  words,  "  Providence  had  in  this  case  shown 
himself  on   the   side    of  the  heavy  battalions." 


259 

Though  still  struggling  with  the  same  firmness, 
activity,  and  fertility  of  resources ;  checking  and 
causing  his  opponents  to  retrograde  at  his  every 
movement ;  displaying  still  his  unparalleled  skill 
in  handling  troops ;  the  odds  against  him  were 
too  great,  both  in  the  numbers  of  the  Allies  and 
the  hopelessness  of  his  own  best  officers.  Fairly 
surrounded  by  the  enemy's  forces,  he  contem- 
plated for  a  moment  the  plan  of  retiring  towards 
the  frontier  fortresses,  and  there,  collecting  their 
garrisons,  to  force  the  Allies  to  forego  their  prey 
of  Paris,  which  they  were  about  to  clutch,  to 
follow  his  movements  in  their  rear  and  on  their 
line  of  retreat.  This  last  brilliant  scintillation 
was  quenched  by  the  stern  realities  of  his  posi- 
tion; and  quitting  St.  Dizier  March  28,  1814, 
where  he  had  opened  this  marvellous  campaign 
by  storming  it  Dec.  26,  1813,  he  reached  Paris 
only  in  time  to  take  measures  for  his  first  abdi- 
cation, 

628.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  the 
strategical  features  of  this  campaign.  Selecting 
an  interior  line  to  operate  on,  we  see  Napoleon, 
with  forces  greatly  inferior  in  numbers  and 
many  of  them  mere  conscripts,  throw  himself  first 
upon  one  column  and  then  on  the  other  of  the 
Allies,  operating  on  two  exterior  lines.  To  this 
advantage  of  position,  we  must  add  the  prestige 
of  Napoleon's  presence;  his  wonderful  activity 
and  physical  endurance ;  and  then  the  characters 
of  the  two  leading  generals,  Schwartzenberg 
and  Blucher,  with  which  he  was  well  acquainted, 
who  were  opposed  to  him.  The  former  slow 
and  pushing  prudence  to  timidity,  thus  losing 
opportunities  by  too  tardy  an  advance,  or  retir- 
ing upon  the  least  appearance  of  danger;    the 


260 

latter  reckless,  p.nd,  in  his  hatred  of  France,  fol- 
lowing rather  the  dictates  of  his  passion  than 
those  of  purely  military  reasons,  thus  constantly 
putting  himself  and  his  army  in  jeopardy.  And 
last,  though  not  least,  the  condition  of  Napo- 
leon's own  lieutenants,  who,  worn  down  by 
such  incessant  warfare,  were  sighing  for  repose, 
and  who  had  now  begun  to  look  upon  the  for- 
tunes of  their  leader  as  irretrievable.  The  pri- 
vate soldiers  alone  stood  firm,  and  were  ready 
for  every  sacrifice ;  but  in  this,  as  in  all  similar 
cases,  discouragement  commenced  at  the  top 
and  descended  to  the  ranks,  only  when  the  lat- 
ter found  there  were  none  to  head  them. 

629.  Influence  of  Fortifications. — In  this  as  well 
as  in  several  of  the  preceding  campaigns,  parti- 
cularly the  one  of  1806  against  Prussia,  the  in- 
vading armies  passed  by  the  fortified  places, 
leaving  them  in  their  rear,  and  taking  no  other 
precautions  than,  in  some  cases,  to  detach  a 
small  force  to  watch  their  garrisons.  These  ex- 
amples have  caused  some  military  writers  to  call 
in  question  the  utility  of  fortified  places  in  any 
defensive  system ;  a  view  fortunately  unsup- 
ported by  any  eminent  military  authority.  With 
the  immense  invading  armies  with  which  Napo- 
leon operated  in  Germany  and  Russia,  from  the 
campaign  of  1805  up  to  that  of  1814,  he  was  en- 
abled to  pursue  this  system  of  depending  on 
beating  and  dispersuig  the  enemy's  armies  in  the 
field,  looking,  as  a  natural  consequence,  to  the 
fall  of  the  fortified  places,  the  garrisons  of  which, 
being  feeble  and  unsupported,  could  not  be  ex- 
pected to  offer  any  resistance  to  the  overwhelm- 
ing forces  that  could  be  l>rouglit  against  them. 
The  same  was  true  of  the  invasion  of  France  by 


261 

Ihe  Allies  in  1814.  But  we  have  seen  that,  in 
the  campaign  of  1796,  Bonaparte,  ahhough  he 
had  driven  the  Austrians,  in  a  demorahzed  con- 
dition, into  the  German  Tyrol,  and  wished  to 
push  forward  by  the  same  route  to  Vienna,  did 
not  think  it  prudent  to  leave  the  strong  place  of 
Mantua,  with  a  competent  garrison,  in  his  rear. 
In  the  campaigns  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula, 
where  the  armies  were  smaller  and  more  evenly 
matched,  sieges  were  frequent  and  indispensable 
operations,  and  the  success  or  failure  of  a  cam- 
paign depended  upon  the  termination  of  these 
means  of  gaining  time  and  consuming  the  ene- 
my's active  forces.  Had  Napoleon  in  1813  been 
able  to  have  held  in  check  the  Allied  armies,  he 
would  have  found  the  fortified  places  in  Germa- 
ny, in  which,  to  the  weakening  of  his  active 
force,  he  had  thrown  garrisons  sufficiently  strong 
to  hold  them  against  a  covp-de-main,  of  the  most 
essential  importance,  in  any  favorable  turn  in  his 
affairs.  Had  Soissons  been  stronger,  or  even 
been  resolutely  held  for  a  few  hours,  or  had  the 
inconsiderable  place  of  Laon  not  afforded  the 
support  it  did  to  the  Allies,  Blucher  and  his  army 
would,  in  all  Hkehhood,  have  been  destroyed, 
and  the  Russians  on  the  other  side  of  the  Aisne 
have  been  driven  far  beyond  the  zone  of  opera- 
tions of  the  Allies  on  the  Seine.  But  still  more 
important  to  the  success  of  Napoleon's  plana 
would  have  been  even  one  or  two  places  of  some 
moment  on  his  central  position,  between  the 
Aube  and  Paris,  and  especially  had  Paris  itself 
been  encircled  with  fortifications  secure  from  an 
open  assault.  With  these  aids,  his  comparatively 
small  active  forces  would  have  been  doubled  in 
value.     The    audacity   of  Blucher  would   have 


262 

been  checked,  or  severely  punished,  and  the 
timid  Schwartzenberg  would  have  put  still  less 
than  he  did,  to  the  hazards  of  Napoleon's  skill 
and  daring. 

630.  Marches. — In  the  descriptions  of  the  pre- 
ceding campaigns,  the  influence  of  marches  skil- 
fully combined  and  executed  has  been  fully  de- 
monstrated. No  general  perhaps  of  any  age  has 
shown  such  striking  abilities  as  Napoleon  in  this 
respect.  This  was  the  result  not  only  of  admi- 
nistrative and  executive  talents  of  the  highest 
order,  but  of  the  intimate  knowledge  he  had  ac- 
quired of  the  most  minute  details  of  every  branch 
of  the  service,  by  the  most  indefatigable  in- 
dustry. 

631.  As  strategical  operations,  marches  may 
be  divided  into  two  principal  classes;  those  of 
concentration  beyond  the  sphere  of  action  of  the 
enemy;  and  those  o^ manceuvre  executed  within 
this  sphere.  In  the  former  the  forces  are  only 
brought  to  that  point  where  the  latter  com- 
mences. In  the  campaign  of  1805,  we  have 
seen  how  the  two  corps  in  Hanover  and  Hol- 
land, under  Bernadotte  and  Marmont,  were  di- 
rected upon  Wurtzburg,  whilst  those  on  the 
English  channel  were  directed  on  the  Rhine,  be- 
tween Mannheim  and  Strasburg.  Having  reach- 
ed these  points  without  any  apprehension  of  an 
enemy's  presence,  the  grand  manoeuvre  for 
throwing  them  on  the  enemy's  right  flank  and 
rear  commenced ;  those  columns  on  the  right, 
being  nearer  the  enemy,  moving  more  slowly, 
and  having  their  flank  nearest  the  enemy  care- 
fully guarded  by  a  corps  assigned  to  this  service  ; 
those  on  the  left,  moving  more  rapidly  and  pivot-" 
ing  on  the  right,  whilst  the  whole  was  so  com- 


263 

bined  that  in  a  few  hours  a  large  force  could  be 
concentrated  on  any  fraction,  if  unexpectedly 
attacked  whilst  carrying  out  this  grand  move- 
ment. 

632.  In  the  second  splendid  campaign  of  Na- 
poleon in  Germany  against  the  Austrians,  that 
of  1809,  the  same  admirable  series  of  provisions 
is  to  be  seen.  Seeing  the  evidently  hostile  atti- 
tude of  Austria,  the  first  step  of  Napoleon  was  to 
mass  his  forces  at  those  points  from  which  they 
could  be  rapidly  thrown  upon  the  Austrian  do- 
minions. For  this  purpose,  he  chose  Wurtzburg, 
Augsburg,  and  Strasburg,  PI.  XI.,  as  the  points 
lor  concentration.  On  and  towards  the  first 
point,  he  directed  the  major  part  of  his  forces 
from  Saxony  and  from  the  north  of  Germany. 
On  the  second,  the  forces  in  the  neighborhood 
of  llanau.  On  the  third,  those  from  the  interior 
of  France.  Whilst  in  Italy  he  directed  Prince 
Eugene,  with  50,000  men,  to  approach  the  Frioul. 
These,  with  other  minor  movements,  drew 
around  Austria  another  of  those  Napoleonic 
meshworks  which  had  already  proved  so  disas- 
trous to  her.  The  Austrian  army  of  200,000 
men  were  to  concentrate  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Ratisbonne,  on  the  Danube ;  part  on  one  side, 
and  a  part  on  the  other  side  of  this  stream,  but 
so  as  to  render  mutual  assistance.  Not  knowing 
where  he  with  certainty  should  find  the  main 
body  of  the  Austrians,  Napoleon  decided  upon 
trusting  nothing  to  mere  hazard,  but  to  be 
governed  in  his  movements  by  recognised  mili- 
tary principles.  To  this  end  he  withdrew  Da- 
voust  from  Eatisbonne,  on  the  Danube,  and 
threw  forward  Massena,  so  as  to  concentrate  his 
entire  force  at  Abensberg,  a  small  place  on  the 


264 

river  Abens,  and  about  midway  between  Ingold- 
Btadt  and  Ratisbonne.  Here  he  decided  to 
break  through  the  Austrian  centre,  thus  sepa- 
rating the  two  Archdukes,  Charles  and  Louis. 
In  these  plans,  he  was  aided  by  the  tardiness  of 
movement  of  the  Austrians  upon  which  he 
counted,  and  also  by  the  state  of  the  weather,  by 
which  the  roads  were  much  injured.  The  result 
of  these  skilfully  combined  marches  was  that  the 
Archduke  Charles  was  forced  upon  Ratisbonne, 
and  obliged  to  retreat  across  the  Danube  into 
Bohemia;  the  other  main  fraction  of  the  Aus- 
trian army  retiring  successively  behind  the  Inn 
and  the  Traunn,  leaving  the  road  to  Vienna 
open  to  Napoleon. 

633.  In  this  conjuncture  of  operations.  Napo- 
leon, after  considering  the  military  aspect  of 
afiairs,  decided  to  march  direct  upon  Vienna.  In 
taking  this  step  he  had  not  only  to  follow  up  the 
Archduke  Louis,  but  to  provide  against  the 
junction  of  the  Archduke  Charles  with  him,  by 
recrossing  the  Danube.  The  principal  points 
where  this  passage  might  have  been  effected  are 
Straubing,  Passau,  Lintz,  and  Krems.  These  it 
was  of  the  first  importance  to  secure  by  antici- 
pating the  Austrian  movements  on  them.  To 
carry  out  these  measures,  Massena  received 
orders  to  descend  along  the  Danube,  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  Davoust,  and  by  General  Dupas ;  and 
each,  in  succession,  to  occupy  the  places  just 
mentioned,  thus  securing  the  army  from  an  at- 
tack either  in  flank  or  in  rear,  by  the  Austrians 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube.  At  the  same 
time,  Bessic-res  was  ordered  to  push  forward  be- 
yond Landshut,  on  the  Iser,  and  keep  closely  on 
the    heels   of  the    enemy's   retreating   column; 


265 

whilst  Lannes,  under  the  immediate  command 
of  Napoleon,  moved  between  the  columns  of 
Massena  and  Bessieres,  so  as  to  throw  this  force 
upon  either  of  these  two,  as  circumstances  might 
demand.  Further  to  secure  his  right  on  their 
flank,  the  Bavarians,  his  allies,  were  directed  to 
occupy  Munich,  and,  pushing  from  there  through 
Salsburg  into  the  Tyrol,  observe  the  Archduke 
John,  and  give  timely  warning  of  his  movements. 
These  profound  combinations  met  with  all  the 
success  they  merited.  Anticipated  by  the  rapid 
movements  and  daring  of  the  French  at  every 
point,  the  Archduke  Charles  was  unable  to  join 
the  forces  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube, 
which  last,  despairing  of  being  able  to  cover 
Vienna,  effected  a  crossing  to  the  left  bank  at 
Krems. 

.  6.34.  The  disposal  of  the  troops  for  a  march 
and  the  manner  of  executing  it  belong  to  the 
practical  details  of  the  profession,  for  which  spe- 
cific rules  are  laid  down  in  every  service ;  and 
with  which  it  is  presumed  that  every  man  who 
accepts  the  responsibility  of  a  general's  position 
has  made  himself  acquainted.  All  of  this  may 
be  summed  up  in  a  few  words.  First,  the  trains 
of  every  description  must  be  covered  by  the 
troops,  for  which  purpose  they  must,  in  an 
advance  movement,  be  either  in  the  rear,  or  on 
that  flank  where  they  will  be  least  exposed  to 
the  enemy.  In  a  retreat  they  must  be  in  ad- 
vance. When  an  army  moves  in  several  nearly 
parallel  columns,  the  combination  must  be  such 
that  an  imposing  force  can  soon  be  concentrated 
on  any  point  threatened.  The  divisions  of  each 
column  must,  in  like  manner,  be  in  supporting 
distance  of  each  other,  but,  for  convenience,  not 
23 


266 

crowded  on  the  marcli.  As  to  advanced  guards, 
flankers  and  rear  guards,  both  their  strength  and 
composition  must  depend  on  the  general's  judg- 
ment, founded  on  the  force,  character,  and  posi- 
tion of  the  enemy,  and  of  the  nature  of  the  coun- 
try through  which  the  march  is  made.  Just  in 
proportion  as  he  has  read,  has  reflected,  has  had 
opportunities  for  action,  will  his  judgment  lead 
him  to  take  right  measures;  whilst  still  more 
certainly,  if  he  has  wanted  these  aids  to  forming 
an  enlightened  judgment,  will  he  take  wrong 
ones.  Let  no  man  be  so  rash  as  to  suppose  that, 
in  donning  a  general's  uniform,  he  is  forthwith 
competent  to  perform  a  general's  functions;  as 
reasonably  might  he  assume  that  in  putting  on 
the  robes  of  a  judge  he  was  ready  to  decide  any 
point  of  law. 


26T 
,  CHAPTER  IX. 

BATTLES. 

635.  Battles,  though  planned  and  fought  al- 
most solely  on  tactical  principles,  have  in  many 
cases  important  strategical  bearings  which  it  is  the 
province  of  an  able  general  to  see  and  to  take 
advantage  of.  Skilfully  combined  strategical 
marches,  when  ably  executed,  may  alone  decide 
the  fate  of  a  campaign,  without  the  necessity  of 
coming  into  collision  with  the  enemy  ;  but  this  is 
a  rare  case,  and  a  battle  is  usually  the  necessary 
sequence  to  an  important  strategical  movement, 
and,  if  well  planned  and  successfully  fought, 
may  prove  decisive  of  the  war. 

636.  Orders  of  Battle. — Mihtary  writers  desig- 
nate by  this  expression  the  general  combinations 
made  to  attack  one  or  more  points  of  an  enemy's 
position ;  whilst  they  apply  the  term  line  of  hat- 
tie  to  the  disposition  of  the  troops,  in  their  rela- 
tions to  each  other  for  mutual  co-operation,  act- 
ing either  offensively  or  defensively. 

637.  Whatever  may  be  the  disposition  of  the 
troops,  the  line  of  battle  of  any  considerable 
force  will  present  a  well  defined  centre  and  two 
wings ;  thus  offering  to  an  assailant  one  or  more 
of  these  as  his  point  of  attack.  This  has  led  to 
dividing  orders  of  battle  into  several  classes, 
arising  from  the  necessary  disposition  of  the  as- 
sailing force,  as  it  moves  to  attack  one  or  more 
of  these  points. 

638.  If  an  equal  effort  is  made  to  assail  every 


268 

point  of  the  enemy's  line,  the  assaihng  force 
must  necessarily  advance  on  a  line  parallel  to  the 
one  assailed,  and  this  therefore  has  received  the 
name  of  the  parallel  order  of  battle.  If  the  line 
of  the  assailing  force  is  sensibly  perpendicular  to 
that  of  the  assailed,  the  disposition  is  said  to  be 
the  perpendicular  order.  If  the  main  attack  is 
made  by  one  wing,  the  centre  and  other  wing 
being  held  back,  or  refused  as  it  is  termed,  the 
positions  of  the  lines  of  the  two  parties  become 
naturally  oblique  to  each  other,  and  this  is  term- 
ed the  oblique  order.  In  like  manner,  the  concave 
order  results  from  an  attack  by  both  wings,  the 
centre  being  refused,  and  the  convex  order  from 
refusing  the  wings  and  attacking  by  the  centre, 
&c. 

639.  The  order  of  battle  should  result  from 
the  position  in  which  the  enemy's  forces  are  pre- 
sented for  attack ;  and  as  these,  if  skilfully  dis- 
posed, will  be  posted  so  as  to  take  advantage  of 
the  points  of  vantage  which  the  position  they 
occupy  offers,  the  order  of  battle  for  assailing 
may  vary  in  an  infinity  of  ways.  Still  it  is  not 
to  be  inferred  that  one  order  is  not  superior  to 
another,  or  that  the  choice  between  them  is  one 
at  pleasure.  In  the  parallel  order,  for  example, 
the  opposing  forces  being  supposed  equal  in  all 
points,  there  is  no  reason  why  one  point  of  the 
enemy's  line  should  be  forced  rather  than 
another,  and,  therefore,  success  depends  either 
upon  destroying  his  whole  line,  or  simply  push- 
ing it  back  ;  as  chance  alone  will  determine  a 
break  in  any  part  of  his  line.  In  the  oblique  or- 
der, on  the  contrary,  one  wing  being  refused,  or 
merely  acting  as  a  menace,  the  other  may  be 
strongly   reinforced,   so   as   to   overwhelm    th© 


269 

■wing  opposed  to  it,  and,  if  this  succeeds,  the  as- 
saiHng  army,  by  its  simple  onward  movement,  is 
graduaUy  brought  to  gain  ground  on  the  enemy's 
rear,  and  to  threaten  his  Une  of  retreat.  Again, 
in  crossing  a  river  on  a  bridge,  or  passing 
through  any  other  defile  to  assail  an  enemy  op- 
posing this  movement,  the  order  of  battle  be- 
comes necessarily  convex ;  the  extremity  of  the 
defile  itself  becoming  the  centre  from  which  the 
assailing  forces  radiate,  to  enlarge  their  front, 
whilst  they  are  obliged  to  secure  the  defile  on 
each  flank.  To  lay  down  rules  therefore  as  to 
what  order  of  battle  should,  in  every  case,  be 
employed  would  be  pure  pedantry.  Talent, 
skill,  and  experience  can  alone  enable  a  general 
to  decide  this  point  in  any  given  case, 

640.  Line  of  Battle. — Whether  acting  offen- 
sively or  defensively,  troops  of  the  same  arm,  as 
well  as  those  of  different  arms,  must  be  so  disposed 
as  not  only  to  lend  mutual  support,  but  not  to  ob- 
struct or  impede  each  other's  operations.  On 
this  point  there  are  rules  so  self-evident  that  it 
would  seem  almost  unnecessary  to  repeat  them ; 
yet  they  have  been  violated,  with  the  loss  of  bat- 
tles consequent  on  them,  by  some  generals  of  fair 
abilities  and  experience  ;  whilst  others  of  great 
military  skill  have  done  the  same,  through  ne- 
cessity, with  successful  results.  But  let  not  this 
tempt  any  man  to  throw  aside  well  established 
precedent  to  depend  on  the  inspiration  of  the 
moment.  There  is  no  surer  way  to  bring  down 
defeat  and  disaster. 

641.  Defensive  battles  are  usually  fought  upon 
positions  selected  beforehand,  with  the  defensive 
properties  of  which  the  general  is  supposed  to 
have   made  himself  master.     With  this  know- 

23* 


270 

ledge,  he  should  be  able  to  dispose  the  different 
arms  to  the  best  advantage  for  injuring  and  re- 
pulsing the  enemy.  In  this  case,  he  naturally 
seeks  so  to  post  his  troops  that  he  may  obtain 
the  greatest  amount  of  fire,  upon  every  point  of 
approach  on  his  position,  whilst,  at  the  same 
time,  the  troops  may  find  shelter  from  that  of 
the  enemy.  The  occupation  of  heights,  woods, 
undulations  of  ground,  stone  or  brick  houses, 
stone  fences,  and  of  slight  field  works  thrown 
up  at  the  moment,  as  each  of  these  present 
themselves  along  the  front  and  flanks  of  his  po- 
sition, by  his  infantry  and  artillery,  are  obvious 
measures.  The  judgment  of  course  will  find 
play  here  so  to  select  among  several  points  as  to 
obtain  the  best  results  sought.  The  disposition 
of  the  troops  will  depend  on  the  relation  between 
their  number  and  the  extent  of  the  position. 
Where  the  troops  are  in  excess,  they  must  ne- 
cessarily be  disposed  in  several  successive  lines; 
placing,  as  far  as  practicable,  all  who  cannot  take 
a  part  in  the  earlier  phases  of  the  action  far 
enough  be3'ond  the  range  of  fire  to  secure 
them  from  damage.  Where  there  is  a  deficiency 
in  numbers,  a  single  line  may  have  to  be 
resorted  to,  and  the  intervals  of  battalions,  &c., 
increased;  but  it  is  obvious  that,  except  in 
ground  of  a  very  difficult  nature  to  an  enemy's 
approach,  this  would  be  a  very  weak  distribu- 
tion of  the  troops.  But  these  are  extreme 
cases.  The  normal  distribution  of  infantry  being 
that  of  two  lines  for  mutual  support;  and  a  re- 
serve read}'  to  prevent  or  repair  disaster,  and  to 
make,  when  the  opportunity  offers,  a  decisive 
Btroke.  As  to  the  distances  between  the  linos, 
and  the  intervals  left  in  each  line,  these  again 


271 

must  depend  on  the  judgment  of  the  eommand- 
ing  general  and  his  subordinates.  Whilst  they 
endeavor  to  expose  no  troops  to  fire  which  are 
not  themselves  engaged,  they  must  see  that  their 
second  line  is  near  enough  to  support  the  first, 
at  every  new  position  taken  up  by  the  assailant. 
Battalions  will,  to  this  end,  be  placed  either  im- 
mediately behind  those  they  are  to  support,  op- 
posite their  intervals,  or  more  or  less  to  the 
right  or  left,  as  the  ground  may  favor,  and  as,  by 
so  doing,  the  necessary  manoeuvres  of  one  or 
both  lines  shall  not  be  impeded.  Like  considera- 
tions apply  to  the  battalion,  brigade,  and  division 
intervals  of  each  line.  All  of  this  supposes  at 
least  plain  good  sense,  and  some  experience  on 
the  part  of  the  commanding  officers. 

642.  The  positions  chosen  for  the  artillery  will 
be  wherever  they  can  get  the  widest  and  longest 
range.  This  may  require  the  batteries,  in  some 
cases,  to  be  distributed  throughout  the  front  of 
the  position ;  in  others  to  be  massed.  In  the  lat- 
ter case,  the  effects  upon  any  one  point  will  be 
the  more  staggering  to  the  enemy,  but  risk  of 
greater  loss  is  run,  should  the  enemy  throw  him- 
self upon  and  capture  the  artillery  so  massed. 
A.  gap  in  a  line  has  been  filled  by  artillery,  but  the 
general,  who  would  imitate  this,  should  be  very 
certain  of  the  other  arms  by  which  his  artillery 
is  supported.  Raking  fires  along  roads,  &c., 
cross  fires  over  wide  open  spaces,  and  concen- 
trated fires  upon  openings  that  cannot  be  raked, 
such  are  the  services  that  the  general  should  en- 
deavor to  secure  from  his  artillery. 

643.  As  for  cavalry  it  has  no  passive  defensive 
properties ;  in  the  defensive  therefore  it  must  be 
kept  out  of  fire,  until  called  upon  to  act  oflen- 


272 

Bively  to  support  either  the  infantry,  or  the  ar- 
tillery when  hard  pushed.  This  of  course  it  can 
only  do  where  horses  can  be  led  to  the  charge. 
Here  the  general  has  to  show  his  knowledge  of 
what  this  arm  can  reasonably  be  called  upon  to 
perform.  That  it  has  sometimes  charged  up  or 
down  steep  broken  ground,  where  infantry 
might  have  found  an  advance  not  easy,  that  it 
has  swum  rivers,  and  dashed  up  against  fortifica- 
tions, are  all  very  creditable  to  the  audacity  of 
this  arm ;  but  no  general,  in  making  his  distribu- 
tion of  it,  would  count  upon  seeing  it  of  cours'j 
perform  such  feats. 

644.  Phases  of  Defensive  Battle. — The  artillery, 
of  course,  opens  the  ball  and  keeps  on  thunder- 
ing, and  holding  on  to  its  position  as  long  as  '\\a 
fire  can  be  made  telling  from  it ;  losing  no  time 
in  shifting  about.  Next  come  into  play  the 
light  troops,  who,  as  sharpshooters,  have  taken 
up  every  advanced  cover  to  meet  the  enemy  by 
their  fire  far  off;  these  too  hold  on  for  dear  life, 
as  every  man  picked  off  destroys  not  only  one, 
but  demoralizes  his  neighbors.  When  they  are 
forced  back,  they  judiciously,  both  for  their  own 
skins  and  to  let  the  enemy  have  the  benefit  of 
it,  slip  into  the  rear,  by  any  opening  not  likely 
to  be  swept  by  the  fire  of  the  first  line.  Now 
comes  into  play  the  deadly  volley  firing,  which 
soon  runs  into  that  of  every  man  for  himself  It 
is  now  that  the  second  line  becomes  all  alive. 
Now  that  the  reserve  is  kept  firmly  in  hand  and 
bid  to  keep  cool.  If  forced  to  yield,  the  first 
line,  without  scampering,  should  soon  leave  an 
open  field  between  the  second  and  the  eneoiy; 
and  the  second  must  have  well  made  up  its 
mind  that  the  bayonet  must  be  finally  theii  re- 


273 

liance  for  a  decisive  stroke ;  knowing  that  the 
reserve  is  still  behind  them,  untouched  and  ready 
for  any  work.  As  to  throwing  forward  the  re- 
serve, if  the  commanding  general's  eye  and  in- 
stinctive appreciation  of  the  moment  do  not  lead 
him  to  seize  it,  no  written  rules,  however  elabo- 
rate, will. 

645.  Offensive  Battles. — To  know  what  we  are 
going  to  encounter  is  half  the  battle  in  almost 
all  affairs  of  life  ;  for  we  are,  thus  far,  secure 
from  the  surprise  of  finding  something  in  our 
way  that  we  had  not  counted  upon.  In  no 
transaction  is  this  beforehand  knowledge  more 
important  than  in  preparing  for  a  battle.  There 
is  hardly  any  labor,  any  personal  risk  to  which  a 
general  should  not  subject  himself  to  gain  precise 
and  accurate  information  on  this  head.  Here  he 
must  see  for  himself,  at  the  risk  of  finding  his 
orders  misconstrued,  and  his  plans  defeated  by 
the  carelessness  or  stupidity  of  his  subordinates. 

646.  A  personal  reconnoissance  therefore  of 
the  enemy's  position  is  indispensable,  and  if  this 
is  made  on  the  eve  of  the  attack  the  general 
ehould  take  another  last  look  in  the  morning,  be- 
fore moving,  to  see  that  the  enemy  has  not  anti- 
cipated him,  and  taken  steps  that  call  for 
changes  on  his  part.  Of  course,  whatever  is  ad- 
vantageous to  the  defensive  will  particularly  en- 
gage his  attention  ;  but,  as  his  great  object  is, 
not  only  to  drive  back  the  enemy,  but  to  bring 
on  him  a  great  disaster,  the  chief  point  to  which 
he  will  bend  his  thoughts,  will  be  to  see  by 
what  mode  and  by  what  point  of  attack  he  can 
secure  the  greatest  strategical  results. 

647.  Considerations  therefore  both  of  a  tacti- 
cal and  strategical  character  must  receive  tlio 


274 

careful  examination  of  the  commanding  general, 
in  deciding  upon  his  plan  of  attack.  The  first, 
as  carrying  with  it  the  most  important  advan- 
tage, is  the  strategical  result ;  the  two  principal 
of  which  are,  first,  either  to  direct  the  main  ef- 
fort upon  that  wing  of  the  enemy  which,  if 
overthrown,  will  naturally  bring  us  on  the  hne 
of  retreat  of  his  forces,  or,  second,  upon  some 
point  between  his  two  wings  which,  if  pierced, 
may  force  his  disconnected  forces  on  divergent 
lines  of  retreat,  and  thus  expose  them  to  the  dis- 
aster of  being  beaten  in  detail,  or  to  the  capture 
or  destruction  of  one  of  the  fractions.  In  the 
battle  of  Austerlitz,  for  example,  in  which  the 
Allies  at  first  acted  offensively,  their  plan  was 
made  subservient  wholly  to  the  strategical  result. 
The  right  of  the  French  position  was  nearest  to 
their  line  of  retreat  on  Vienna ;  by  forcing  this 
point,  the  AUies  would  have  been  brought  be- 
tween the  French  and  Vienna,  thus  throwing 
them  further  from  their  base.  If  repulsed  in 
this  attempt,  the  Allies  still  covered  their  own 
line  of  retreat,  so  long  as  their  centre  and  right 
held  firm.  The  strategical  object  of  Napoleon, 
on  the  contrary,  was  to  pierce  the  Allied  centre, 
and  thus  secure  the  advantages  of  a  successful 
operation  of  this  kind. 

648.  Next  in  importance  come  what  may  be 
termed  the  grand  tactical  considerations ;  that  is, 
the  means  of  doing  most  damage  to  the  enemy 
on  the  field  of  battle  itself.  For  example,  if  the 
enemy's  position  is  such  that  he  has  an  impassa- 
ble obstacle  on  one  of  his  wings,  as  a  river,  lake, 
or  a  narrow  defile,  tactical  considerations  alone 
would  suggest  to  direct  our  main  attack  on  tho 
opposite  wing,  as,  by  defeating  this,  the  centre 


275 

and  remaining  wing  may  be  thrown  upon  the 
o'jstruction  which  it  either  cannot  pass,  or  must 
pass  with  difficulty,  and  thus  be  captured  or 
greatly  cut  up.  In  like  manner,  tactical  consi- 
derations would  engage  us  to  attack  a  height  on 
the  enem\''8  position  which,  if  gained,  would 
give  our  forces  a  decided  advantage ;  or,  if  his 
line  of  battle  presents  a  very  salient  point,  upon 
Avhich  our  efforts  can  be  concentrated  to  attack 
this  point;  or  if  his  line  at  any  point  presents  a 
wide  break,  into  which  we  can  force  our  way,  to 
do  so;  any  one  of  these  points  if  gained  would 
give  decided  tactical  advantage. 

649.  Though  not  necessarily  leading  to  the 
same  decisive  results  as  the  two  preceding,  a 
third  consideration,  in  choosing  the  point  of  at- 
tack, is  the  facility  which  the  natural  features  of 
the  ground,  over  which  we  must  move  upon  it, 
afford  for  the  combined  operation  of  the  troops 
of  the  different  arms  that  are  to  make  the  attack. 
Too  much  weight,  however,  is  not  to  be  given  to 
this,  in  selecting  the  point  of  attack ;  as  ground, 
however  difficult,  may  almost  always  be  got  over 
by  troops  of  all  arms,  and  very  often  it  more  than 
compensates  for  the  labor  of  doing  so,  by  the  cover 
and  other  advantages  it  may  afford  in  advancing. 

650.  In  the  battle  of  Austerlitz  the  tactical  ad- 
vantages were  greatly  against  the  Allied  point 
of  attack,  as  they,  in  the  first  place,  had  to  ad- 
vance against  the  villages  occupied  by  the  French 
and  through  narrow,  hollow  roads,  in  which  their 
columns  became  confused  and  disordered ;  and 
they  had  moreover,  on  the  flank  and  rear, 
several  ponds,  with  only  narrow  causeways  be- 
tween them,  on  which,  if  thrown,  there  was  no 
outlet  of  escape  except  over  these  narrow  defiles, 


276 

ttU  of  wliich  were  exposed  to  the  artillery  of  the 
French.  The  result,  as  we  know,  was  a  frightful 
disaster.  Prudence  counsels,  in  all  such  cases, 
to  forego  the  tempting  object  of  a  grand  result 
if  to  gain  it  we  expose  ourselves,  if  unsuccessful, 
to  a  great  disaster.  The  general  who  looks  for- 
ward alone,  not  providing  for  his  own  rear  or 
flanks,  or  who,  intent  only  upon  some  striking 
success,  rushes  recklessly,  in  the  pursuit  of  it, 
within  the  jaws  of  destruction,  has  learned  but 
half  his  trade,  and  that  the  most  easily  acquired 
and  the  most  dangerous  in  its  apphcation  in 
such  hands. 

651.  It  is  in  nicely  weighing  these  considera- 
tions and  selecting  the  best,  that  the  great  gene- 
ral shows  his  powers.  Recognising  settled  prin- 
ciples as  his  guides,  he  does  not  apply  them 
blindly.  Finding,  for  example,  his  opponent  in 
a  position  as  PI.  VII.,  Fig.  19,  having  his  line  of 
battle,  A,B,  oblique  to  his  hne  of  retreat,  a,c;  his 
right  resting  on  high  ground,  and  his  left  on  an 
impassable  marsh,  or  river,  there  could  be  no 
hesitation  as  to  selecting  a  as  the  point  of  attack  ; 
since,  by  carrying  it,  he  naturally  cuts  the  ene- 
my's line  of  retreat,  throws  him  back  on  the  im- 
passable obstacle,  and  obtains  command  of  the 
field  of  battle.  This  is  a  case  where  the  general, 
accepting  battle  in  such  a  position,  and  his  line 
of  battle  as  supposed,  has  committed  the  blunder 
of  following  too  implicitly  the  military  dictvm 
that  the  wings  should  be  secured  by  resting 
them  on  strong  features  of  the  position  chosen. 
The  wing  b  fulfils  this  condition,  whilst  a,  occu- 
pying the  heights,  has  a  commanding  view  of 
the  field  of  battle ;  still  the  position  is  a  danger- 
ous one,  and  the  risk  to  the  assailant,  if  repulsed, 


277 

but  trifling.  The  better  plan  here  would  have 
been,  for  the  party  on  the  defensive  to  have 
taken  the  position  c,d,  the  left  resting  on  the 
heights,  and  the  right  e,c,  thrown  back,  en  po- 
tence  as  it  ia  termed,  with  a  strong  support  f. 
In  tliis  case,  if  attacked  on  the  left,  the  assailant 
would  be  obliged  to  place  himself  in  the  perilous 
position  of  an  impassable  obstacle  behind  him*; 
if  attacked  on  the  right,  the  defensive  has  the 
advantages  of  the  heights ;  and,  in  either  case, 
if  forced  hack,  the  line  of  retreat  is  covered. 

G52.  As  a  further  illustration,  suppose  an 
army  on  the  defensive  to  have  taken  the  posi- 
tion A,B,  PI.  VII.,  Fig.  20,  its  right  wing  a,  un- 
covered, its  left  resting  on  an  impassable  obsta- 
cle, and  its  line  of  retreat  being  a,c,  running 
parallel  to  this  obstacle.  Here  the  strategical 
consideration  would  designate  b,  as  the  point  of 
attack,  as,  this  wing  being  driven  back,  the  army 
is  cut  off  from  its  line  of  retreat ;  but,  in  at- 
tempting this  the  assailant  necessarily  places 
himself  between  the  assailed  and  the  impassable 
obstacle,  and  thus  exposes  himself  to  a  great  dis- 
aster if  repulsed.  Here  prudence  and  sound 
principle  dictate  rather  to  attack  at  a,  and  by 
vigorous  pursuit,  if  successful,  endeavor  to  reap 
every  advantage. 

G53.  Although  but  one  point,  known  as  the 
key-point,  is  usually  selected  for  the  main  effort 
of  the  assailant,  still  the  whole  line  of  the  as- 
sailed is  more  or  less  menaced,  to  prevent  the 
key-point  from  receiving  reinforcements.  A 
different  course,  one  by  which  we  endeavor,  so 
to  speak,  to  envelope  the  assailed,  can  only  be 
attempted  with  a  prospect  of  success,  when  we 
are  greatly  superior  in  force.  Had  the  Allies  at 
24 


278 

AuKterlitz,  instead  of  pressing  with  such  vigor 
the  French  left  whilst  they  weakened  their  cen- 
tre in  moving  on  the  French  right,  thus  leaving 
the  plateau  of  Pratzen  a  comparatively  easy 
prey  to  the  French,  simply  menaced  the  left  and 
held  the  plateau  with  a  strong  force,  not  suc- 
ceeded in  their  main  attack,  they  would  at  least 
Jiave  avoided  the  subsequent  disaster. 

654.  Connected  with  enveloping  attacks  is 
that  of  sending  a  strong  detachment,  by  a  cir- 
cuitous route,  to  fall  on  the  enemy's  rear,  whilst 
an  attack  is  made  on  him  in  front.  Such  ma- 
noeuvres are  wrong  in  principle,  and  military 
history  presents  striking  instances  of  their  failure 
in  practice.  The  topographical  features  of  the 
immediate  theatre  of  operations  can  alone  de- 
termine whether  to  risk  turning  operations. 
When  this  is  in  a  very  broken  or  obstructed 
country  so  that  such  a  movement  may  be  con- 
cealed for  the  time  necessary  to  perform  it,  the 
risk  will  be  less,  but  the  chances  are  still  against 
it.  As  an  example  of  such  a  case,  let  us  suppose, 
PI.  VII.,  Fig.  21,  an  army  holding  the  position 
N,  covering  q,  and  that  the  line  of  operations  p,q, 
of  the  assailant  is  covered  on  one  flank  by  an 
impassable  river,  whilst  on  the  other  the  region 
is  mountainous,  but  having  roads  which  lead  to 
the  rear  of  n.  Taking  advantage  of  a  tributary 
covering  his  line  of  communication,  the  assailant, 
by  posting  a  detachment,  m,  behind  it,  sending 
another,  N,  to  occupy  the  height  on  the  right, 
behind  which  the  road  leads,  so  as  to  cover  the 
flank  march  of  the  main  force,  might  move  by 
this  road  with  safety,  and,  taking  the  position 
M,  turn  the  army  N,  and  thus  force  it  to  retire,  or 
to  accept  battle  under  dangerous  circumstances. 


279 

If  repulsed,  the  main  body,  m,  could  retire  with 
safety,  as  the  two  detachments,  m  and  n,  would 
secure  it  from  either  an  attack  in  flank,  or  in 
rear.  The  principle  then  is,  that,  in  all  turning 
movements,  or  attacks  in  flank,  the  assailant  ex- 
poses himself  to  a  like  attack,  and  he  should, 
therefore,  only  attempt  them  when  the  ground 
is  peculiarly  favorable  to  the  movement. 

655.  An  attack  on  the  centre  is  the  obvious 
operation  when  the  enemy's  line  is  too  extended 
for  the  number  of  his  forces.  It  may  also  be  the 
best  course  when  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  is 
through  a  defile  in  the  rear  of  his  centre,  as,  in 
case  of  success,  each  wing  is  cut  ofif  from  the 
line  of  retreat,  and  the  troops  of  the  centre,  if 
forced  upon  the  defile,  cannot  escape  from  a 
serious  disaster.  Where  both  flanks  of  the  ene- 
my's position  are  secure,  and  it  becomes  a  case 
of  necessity  to  attack,  some  point  of  the  front 
must  be  selected  for  the  main  effort,  which, 
if  gained,  will  give  a  decided  advantage.  For 
example,  if  there  is  a  commanding  eminence  on 
his  front,  every  effort  should  be  made  to  carry  it, 
as,  from  there,  the  field  of  battle  being  overlook- 
ed the  enemy  would  be  obliged  to  fall  back.  In 
this  case  the  order  of  battle  would  necessarily 
become  convex ;  the  divisions  of  the  centre,  to 
make  the  assault,  being  in  advance,  whilst  their 
flanks  and  rear  would  be  secured  by  the  divi- 
sions of  the  wings  advancing  in  echelon,  those 
nearest  the  centre  being  most  advanced. 

656.  Eliminating  all  exceptional  local  features, 
the  general  case  which  presents  itself  is  that, 
where  the  entire  line  of  the  enemy  is  equally 
exposed,  and  where  success  therefore  depends 
upon  the  ability  of  the  assailant  to   keep   the 


280 

whole  line  so  threatened  that  its  reserve  alone 
can  be  moved  with  safety  from  one  point  to 
another,  whilst  a  powerful  effort  with  concen- 
trated forces  is  made  on  some  one  point,  usually 
one  of  the  wings.  In  this  case  the  assailing 
wing  will  be  strongly  reinforced,  particularly 
with  artillery ;  the  centre  also  strengtheneil, 
whilst  the  opposite  wing  will  be  refused,  the  di- 
visions receding  from  towards  the  centre,  in  eche- 
lon, so  as  to  parry  any  attempt  at  turning  them, 
or  at  making  a  flank  attack  on  this  part. 

657.  The  only  general  rules  that  can  be  well 
laid  down  for  the  distribution  of  the  different 
arms  on  the  field  of  battle  have  already  been 
given.  Details  on  this  point  must  be  necessarily 
left  to  the  siibordinates,  who,  if  well  acquainted 
with  the  true  functions  and  resources  of  their 
respective  arms,  will  seldom  fail  to  post  them  so 
as  to  do  as  much  injury  to  the  enemy  and  be  ex- 
posed to  as  little  danger  to  themselves  as  the 
natural  features  of  the  field  of  battle  will  admit 
of.  The  plan  of  the  battle  having  been  decided 
on,  the  manoeuvres  to  carry  it  out  should  be  as 
simple  as  possible,  so  as  to  guard  against  the 
failures  that  almost  invariably  attend  any  at- 
tempt at  complex  movements,  within  striking 
distance  of  the  enemy.  All  distributions  for 
what  are  termed  passages  of  lines  should  be 
avoided,  even  in  the  case  of  thoroughly  drilled 
troops.  The  distribution  of  infantry  in  echelons, 
wherever  it  can  be  adopted,  is  one  of  the  best,  as 
each  division  has  its  support  at  hand  on  its  flank, 
whilst  the  interval  left  between  the  flank  of  the 
one  in  advance  and  that  of  the  one  next  it  in 
rear,  should  offer  sufficient  space  for  cavalry  or 
artillery  to  move  forward  to  the  front  if  wanted. 


281 

658.  As  \x>  the  distribution  of  troops  belong- 
ing to  the  separate  fractions  of  the  entire  force, 
as  an  army  corps,  a  division,  &c.,  the  rule  is  to  so 
distribute  them  that  they  shall  fight  under  the 
immediate  eye  of  their  respective  commanders, 
and  support  each  other.  Having,  for  example, 
a  division,  composed  of  four  brigades,  to  distri- 
bute in  line  of  battle,  the  question  may  arise  as 
to  whether  all  four  of  the  brigades  shall  be  in 
one  Hne,  the  first,  for  instance,  or  two  be  in  the 
first  and  two  in  the  second  line.  By  the  first 
distribution,  the  four  brigades  will  be  under  the 
immediate  eye  of  the  division  commander,  but 
their  supports  of  the  second  line  may  be  a 
stranger  division,  and  be  led  by  a  general,  a 
rival,  or  enemy  of  their  own  commander.  In  the 
second  case,  the  commanding  general,  being 
separated  from  the  two  divisions  in  the  first  line, 
will  not  be  able  to  give  them  that  direct  super- 
vision as  in  the  first  case ;  but  a  more  hearty  co- 
operation of  the  brigades  and  more  unity  of  con- 
cert may  be  looked  for  than  in  the  contrar^'case. 

659.  This  branch  of  the  subject  may  be  closed 
by  some  examples  of  supposed  cases  which  may 
aid  in  fixing  the  essential  principles.  That  all 
may  not  be  left  to  hazard,  some  regulations  on 
this  subject  have  to  be  laid  down ;  variations  in 
these,  according  to  circumstances,  must  depend 
on  the  general's  ability  to  adapt  his  troops  'to 
the  position  they  are  to  fight  on. 

660.  The  first  case,  PI.  XII.,  one  supposed  by 
Dufour,  is  the  distribution  of  an  army  of  about 
37,000  troops  of  all  arms,  to  attack  an  enemy'a 
position,  the  main  effort  being  directed  on  the 
enemy's  left  wing,  our  left  being  refused.  Thia 
force  he  supposes  to  be  organized  as  follows : 

24* 


282 

40  battalions  of  750  men  each,  30,000 

12  squadrons  "  120  "  1,440 

18  batteries,  72  pieces,  130  men  each    2,340 
30  companies  of  sharpshooters,  3,000 

2  companies  engineer  troops,  200 

Total,  36,980 

661.  In  this  organization,  it  will  be  noticed 
that  the  proportion  of  cavalry  to  the  infantry  is 
very  small,  and  that  but  two  guns  are  allowed 
to  every  thousand  men ;  proportions  which 
would  be  only  suitable  for  a  theatre  of  war  in 
which  cavalry  would  but  rarely  find  any  but  a 
very  confined  field  of  action,  and  in  the  case  also 
of  excellent  infantry,  which  admits  of  a  reduc- 
tion in  the  amount  of  artillery. 

662.  Having  divided  the  battalions  of  infantry 
into  four  divisions,  one  of  these  is  taken  to  form 
part  of  the  reserve,  to  which  is  assigned  the 
whole  of  the  cavalry,  and  all  the  disposable  artil- 
lery, *nd  the  sharpshooters. 

663.  The  other  three  divisions  are  designed  to 
move  on  the  right,  the  centre,  and  the  left  of  the 
enemy's  position.  As  the  main  attack  is  on  the 
right,  ten  companies  of  sharpshooters  are  at- 
tached to  it,  and  five  to  each  of  the  other  two ; 
ten  being  with  the  reserve. 

664.  In  the  attack  on  the  right  and  centre, 
each  division,  when  formed  in  line  of  battle,  is 
to  occupy  only  a  front  of  four  battalions,  the  re-  , 
maining  six  of  each  to  be  so  placed,  in  second  or 
third  line,  as  the  respective  generals  of  division 
may  deem  best. 

665.  Five  battalions  of  the  left  division  will 
deploy,  in  echelon,  on  the  left  of  the  second  di- 


283 

vision  ;  tlic  remaining  five  being  in  column  to 
the  rear,  so  as  to  move  to  the  support  of  either 
the  second,  or  third  division,  as  circumstances 
may  demand. 

666.  Having  decided  upon  this  preUminary 
plan  of  attack,  the  three  first  divisions  are  put  in 
motion  on  their  respective  points,  the  heads  of 
column  on  the  same  level ;  the  reserve  following 
the  centre  column. 

667.  The  advance  of  each  leading  column  will 
be  covered  by  an  advanced  guard,  composed  of 
the  sharpshooters,  and  the  flank  companies  of 
the  leading  brigade  of  each,  and  by  one  battery 
of  artillery. 

668.  The  deployment  will  be  that  which  natu- 
rally results  from  the  positions  of  the  brigades  in 
column  of  march ;  each  brigade  forming  one 
line,  its  artillery  on  the  right,  the  sharpshooters 
in  the  intervals  of  the  battalions,  and  the  flank 
companies  on  the  wings. 

669.  So  soon  as  the  three  advanced  guards, 
which  are  from  1,000  to  1,500  paces  in  advance 
of  their  respective  columns,  have  come  within 
good  range,  the  sharpshooters  are  thrown  out 
as  skirmishers,  the  flank  companies  supporting 
them,  each  of  these  companies  keeping  nearly 
opposite  to  the  battalion  to  which  it  belongs. 
The  artillery,  in  the  mean  time,  having  opened 
at  a  convenient  range  for  its  round  shot. 

670.  The  skirmishers  stick  to  their  work  until 
they  are  either  repulsed,  or  called  in,  when  they 
will  retire  behind  the  flank  companies;  one  half 
of  these  last  forming  the  new  chain  of  skirmish- 
ers, the  other  half  the  supports ;  and,  in  this  or- 
der, they  fall  back,  but  keeping  up  their  fire,  to 
the  intervals  between  the  battalions.     The  sharp- 


284 

shooters  then  take  position  to  the  rear  of  the 
first  line  in  the  battalion  intervals;  the  flank 
companies  doubling  on  the  wings;  and  the  bat- 
teries, which  have  thus  been  unmasked,  proceed- 
ing, on  a  trot,  to  the  front,  to  pour  in  a  heavy- 
continued  fire  on  the  enemy.  The  two  first  di- 
visions in  this  ^Tay  enter  into  the  engagement; 
the  third  merely  covering  its  position  by  its  bat- 
teries. 

671.  This  stage  of  the  action  is  here  shown  on 
the  plate  as  the  intentions  of  the  commanding 
general  may  have  been  interpreted  by  his  subor- 
dinates. The  commander  of  the  first  division 
has  taken  a  battalion  from  each  of  his  lines  to 
form  a  small  reserve,  which  he  has  placed  in  a 
third  hne,  to  be  ready  for  any  emergency.  The 
commander  of  the  second  division  has  formed  his 
first  line  into  two  echelons,  and  has  placed  a  se- 
cond battalion  to  support  the  right  one  of  the 
advanced  echelon,  and  has  thrown  forward  all 
his  sharpshooters  into  the  first  line.  In  dispos- 
ing of  his  second  brigade,  he  has  placed  three 
hattalions  nearer  to  the  centre  to  strengthen  the 
troops  engaged.  The  commander  of  the  third 
division  has  deployed  the  battalions  of  the  first 
line  in  echelons,  at  150  paces  from  each  other, 
£^nd  has  thrown  out  one  of  his  batteries  on  his 
left,  giving  it  the  companies  of  sharpshooters  as 
a  support,  with  the  view  of  checking  any  move- 
ment on  this  wing. 

672.  In  the  meantime,  the  general  command- 
ing, seeing  the  affair  well  under  way,  has  massed 
his  reserve,  in  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  first  di- 
vision, seeing  the  moment  come  to  complete  his 
stroke,  has  detached  a  brigade  of  the  reserve, 
four  companies  of  sharpshooters,  six  balterios, 


285 

and  the  half  of  his  cavalry  to  the  front;  giving 
the  artillery  orders  to  take  position  on  the  right 
and  left  of  the  batteries  of  the  first  division,  so 
as  to  get  a  slant  fire  on  the  enemy's  line ;  the 
infantry  to  mass  itself  on  the  right  of  the  artille- 
ry, to  cover  it,  and  also  by  proper  precautions  to 
guard  itself  from  a  flank  movement ;  the  cavalry 
to  post  itself,  in  echelon,  on  the  right  of  the  in- 
fantry, to  prevent  a  flank  movement  of  the  ene- 
my's cavalry.  At  the  same  time,  tvpo  batteries 
are  also  sent  forward  to  reinforce  those  of  the 
second  division.  To  give  room  for  these  move- 
ments of  the  batteries,  the  flank  battalions  of  the 
first  Une  of  the  first  division  are  thrown  into 
column  in  mass,  whilst  those  of  the  second  in- 
chne  towards  the  centre  so  as  to  avoid  being 
behind  the  batteries. 

673.  As  the  reserve  is  weakened  by  these 
movements,  the  commanding  general  orders  the 
second  brigade  of  the  third  division  to  take  post 
in  rear  of  the  centre  of  the  second  division,  to  be 
on  hand  for  any  emergency. 

674.  The  order  of  battle  which,  in  the  early 
phase  of  the  engagement,  was  parallel,  has  now 
become  oblique.  The  first  division,  having  kept 
its  centre  battalions  of  the  first  line  deployed 
until  ready  to  charge,  will,  for  this  last  stage, 
throw  these  two  battalions  also  into  column, 
whilst  the  battalions  of  the  second  line  will 
spring  forward  and  fill  the  intervals  of  the  first, 
so  as  to  present  an  unbroken  wall  to  the  enemy. 
In  this  way  the  division  will  move  forward  ra- 
pidly, bringing  down  the  bayonet,  only  when 
within  ten  or  twenty  paces  of  the  enemy's  Une, 
If  the  line  should  be  forced  to  deploy,  to  again 
open  fire,  the  battalions  of  the  first  hne  will  fall 


286 

to  the  rear,  foriD-ng  as  the  second,  leaving  thia 
task  to  those  of  the  second  and  the  sharpshoot- 
ers. 

This  onward  movement  of  the  right  will  be 
followed  by  the  centre  and  left,  care  being  taken 
that  the  whole  movement  is  performed  connect- 
edly. 

675.  This  example  gives  the  spirit  of  the 
phases  of  an  action  for  the  case  supposed.  The 
problem  to  be  resolved,  with  the  arms  now  in 
the  hands  of  troops,  being  to  extend  our  front  as 
much  as  possible,  without,  however,  weakening 
too  much  our  line  of  battle,  so  as  to  bring  all  the 
fire  we  can  upon  the  enemy's  line. 

676.  Pursuit. — The  more  vigorous  the  pursuit 
of  a  broken  enemy,  the  less  are  his  chances  of 
retrieving  himself.  It  is  seldom  prudent,  how- 
ever, unless  in  case  of  evident  panic  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  to  make  a  headlong  pursuit.  It  is 
no  unusual  thing  for  an  army  to  be  successful  on 
one  point  and  to  be  beaten  on  another,  thus 
bringing  round  a  complication  equally  dangerous 
to  both  sides ;  and  which  the  general,  who  has  best 
kept  liis  troops  in  hand,  will  have  the  greatest 
chance  to  profit  from.  If  the  enemy  therefore 
breaks  at  any  one  point,  it  is  always  the  part  of 
good  generalship  to  rally  and  speedily  reorgan- 
ize the  main  portion  of  the  successful  army,  until 
the  state  of  the  whole  field  is  ascertained  with 
some  certainty,  detaching  only  a  small  force  of 
the  freshest  troops  to  improve  the  partial  advan- 
tage, and  prevent  the  retiring  enemy  from  rally- 
ing. 

677.  This  reorganization  for  pursuit  must  not 
however  be  pushed  too  far ;  all  that  is  needed, 
if  the  troops  can  endure  more  fighting  at  once, 


287 

is  to  collect  the  scattered  fragments  and  put 
them  again  into  marching  or  battle  array,  and 
then  lose  no  further  time  to  follow  up  success. 
This  is  a  part  of  generalship  that  no  theory  can 
teach  to  one  to  whom  nature  has  not  given  the 
faculties  of  a  general. 

678.  Defensive  Battles. — The  fact  that  a  party 
acts  on  the  defensive  supposes  something  want- 
ing either  in  the  numbers  or  efficiency  of  his 
troops ;  either  of  which  defects  can  only  be  re- 
medied by  resorting  to  aids,  offered  either  by 
nature  or  art,  for  restoring  the  equilibrium  be- 
tween the  opposing  forces.  The  requisites  of 
defensive  positions  have  been  so  much  insisted 
upon,  in  other  places,  that  it  will  hardly  be  ne- 
cessary to  repeat  them  here.  There  is  but  one 
point  that  needs  to  be  strongly  inculcated,  which 
is  that  a  position  should  not  only  be  strong  tacti- 
cally, but  good  strategically.  It  should  not  only 
lend  itself  to  the  manoeuvres  of  our  troops  and 
to  the  efficacy  of  their  fire ;  but,  if  forced, 
should  favor  a  safe  retreat. 

679.  The  advantages  offered  by  heights  for 
the  defensive  may  induce  into  serious  disaster, 
a  general  who  takes  a  position  of  this  kind  from 
purely  tactical  considerations,  without  regard  to 
their  strategical  bearing;  or,  when  this  latter 
consideration  does  not  come  up,  who  looks  sim- 
ply at  the  defensive  properties  without  examin- 
ing also  the  advantages  that  a  skilful  enemy, 
operating  offensively,  might  derive  from  them. 

680.  Suppose  an  army,  PI.  VII.,  Fig.  22,  a,b, 
to  occupy  a  ridge  of  heights,  crossing  obliquely 
its  line  of  retreat  x,y  ;  its  right  resting  on  an  in- 
accessible obstacle,  as  a  precipice,  &c.  Now  an 
army,  c,i,d,  advancing  to  the  assault  of  thisposi- 


288 

tion,  might  look  upon  it  in  two  aspects.  First, 
strategically,  seeing  that  by  making  the  attack 
on  the  right,  although  the  ground  there  is  the 
most  difficult,  it  will  force  the  assailed  back,  so 
as  to  expose  his  line  of  retreat,  and  may  there- 
fore be  well  worth  the  eifort  and  cost.  Second, 
tactically,  to  assail  vigorously  the  more  exposed 
left  wing  A,  and,  throwing  it  back  on  the  right, 
necessarily  produce  a  disaster ;  as  the  character 
of  the  ground,  a  narrow  plateau,  is  supposed  to  be 
such  that  it  will  not  admit  of  a  change  of  position 
of  the  assailed  to  meet  this  attack  in  front. 
However  otherwise  advantageous,  it  would  evi- 
dently be  imprudent  then  for  a  general  to  take 
np  a  position  of  this  kind,  unless  so  superior  to 
the  enemy  that  he  will  be  able  to  foil  an  attack 
on  either  wing. 

681.  Field  Works. — There  still  remains,  how- 
ever, one  more  resource  to  the  general,  in  a 
similar  case,  when  he  has  ample  time  to  employ 
it,  and  that  is  fortification.  This  is  one  that 
every  great  general  has,  at  one  time  or  another, 
availed  himself  of,  and,  in  every  case,  with  ad- 
vantage. Military  history  is  full  of  examples 
where  the  scale  of  great  and  decisive  battles 
has  turned  on  the  taking  or  holding  a  mere 
field  work  that  had  occupied  but  a  few  hours 
time  to  throw  it  up.  This,  however,  belongs  to 
the  domain  of  fortification,  one  of  the  most  diffi- 
cult as  most  important  branches  of  the  military 
art,  and  which  demands  for  its  proper  exercise, 
military  quahfications  of  a  high  order.  There 
probably  has  existed  no  great  engineer  who, 
when  called  upon,  has  not  shown  himself 
a  superior  general ;  nor  a  great  general  who  did 
not  fully  acknowledge  and  appreciate  the  art  oi' 


289 

fortification.  Wlien  persons  therefore  express 
tlaemselves  of  a  skilful  engineer  and  say  that  he 
is  only  an  engineer,  they  show  their  own  igno- 
rance, and  proclaim  themselves  as  little  to  be 
trusted  with  the  command  of  large  bodies  of 
troops. 

674.  Distribution  of  Troops. — Where  an  army 
is  forced  to  accept  a  defensive  battle  in  an  open 
position,  which  affords  no  points  on  which  its 
flanks  can  rest  with  security,  there  is  but  one 
disposition  of  combat  open  to  it,  and  that  is  to 
secure  the  wings  by  such  an  accumulation  and 
distribution  of  troops  upon  them  that  the  assail- 
ant will  run  a  greater  risk  in  an  attack  on  one 
of  them  than  on  the  front.  The  centre  in  this 
case  will  be  deployed  in  the  first  line,  so  as  to 
bring  all  its  fire  to  bear,  both  direct  and  cross, 
over  the  approaches  to  it.  The  troops  to  sup- 
port the  wings  will  be  massed,  so  as  to  be  ready 
to  act  promptly,  as  the  phases  of  the  action  may 
demand ;  and  the  reserve  will  occupy  a  central 
position  in  the  rear,  from  which  it  can  promptly 
be  thrown  upon  any  point  pressed  by  the  assail- 
ant. 

675.  It  is  in  such  positions  that  the  formation 
of  the  order  of  battle  by  squares  is  resorted  to 
when  the  assailant  is  very  superior  in  cavalry. 
This  is  done  either  by  a  formation  of  small 
squares  by  single  battalions,  or  by  resorting  to 
larger  ones,  as  to  those  formed  of  four  or  more 
battalions.  The  first  have  the  advantage  of  be- 
ing very  promptly  formed,  but  they  afford  hardly 
more  interior  space  than  is  wanted  for  their  own 
staff,  leaving  whatever  cavalry  and  artillery  we 
have  to  find  shelter  between  the  squares.  The 
large  squares  demand  more  complication  of  ma- 

25 


290 

noeuvre,  and  more  time  in  their  formation,  but 
afford  a  large  interior  space,  where  the  caissons 
of  the  artillery,  and  even  the  cavalry,  if  in  small 
numbers,  may  find  shelter.  In  this  last  disposi- 
tion some  of  the  artillery  would  be  in  battery  in 
front  of  those  angles  of  the  squares  where  its 
fires  can  best  sweep  the  approaches  on  the  two 
adjacent  sides  of  the  square ;  other  portions 
will  be  in  the  intervals  of  the  squares,  so  as  to 
tlirow  a  flank  and  cross  fire  over  the  approaches 
to  them.  The  sharpshooters  may  be  advanced  a 
little  on  those  angles  which  are  not  occupied  by 
the  artillery  so  as  to  strengthen  these  weak 
points.  The  cavalry,  if  in  sufiicient  force  to 
charge  opportunely,  will  take  post  between  the 
squares,  where  it  will  be  least  exposed  to  the 
enemy's  artillery,  and  be  ready  to  seize  the  pro- 
per moment  for  entering  into  action. 


CHAPTER  X 

ARMT  ORGANIZATION. 

The  word  Army  is  used,  in  either  a  general  or 
a  particular  sense,  to  designate  either  the  whole, 
or  a  part  of  the  armed  force  of  the  state,  whose 
duties  are  confined  to  the  land ;  and,  in  this  re- 
spect, it  wants  that  quality  which  is  essential 
to  a  word  employed  as  a  definition.  To  em- 
brace therefore  all  that  is  comprehended  un- 
der the  term  army,  in  its  general  sense,  we 
have  to  resort  to  the  expressions,  the  land  force, 
or  the  military  force  as  distinguished  from  the 
naval  force. 

The  military  force  of  the  United  States  as  at 
present  organized  may  be  represented  under  the 
following  tabular  form. 

Regular  Army,  composed  of 

Officers  who  hold  commissions  for  an  indefinite 
period. 

Non-Commissioned  Officers  and  Privates 
who  enUst  or  engage  to  serve  for  a  definite 
period. 

Volunteers,  composed  of 

Commissioned  Officers,  Non-Commissioned 
Officers  and  Privates,  all  of  whom  are  enrolled 
voluntarily  only  for  a  definite  period. 


292 


Mtliiia,  composed  of 

Commissioned  Officers,  Non-Commissioned 
Officers  and  Privates,  all  persons  in  the  U.  S.  be- 
tween the  ages  of  18  and  45,  who,  subject  to 
military  duty,  are  enrolled  according  to  law,  and 
required  to  serve  for  a  definite  period. 

REGULAR  ARMY. 

The  regular  army  comprises  the  general  staff, 
the  staff  corps,  and  the  line. 

General  Staff. — Under  this  head  are  comprised 
the  general  officers,  and  the  officers  attached  to 
the  departments  known  as  the  adjutant  generals 
department,  the  inspectors  general,  the  quarter- 
master^s  department,  the  subsistence  department, 
the  medical  department,  the  pay  department, 
the  judge  advocate^ s  department,  and  the  signal  de- 
partment. 

Staff  Corps. — These  comprise  the  engineer 
corps,  the  topographical  engineer  corps,  and  the 
ordnance  corps. 

lAne. — The  infantry,  the  cavalry,  and  the  artil- 
lery, are  comprised  under  this  head. 

General  Officers. 

Major  Generals. 
Brigadier  Generals. 

By  the  Act  of  July  29, 1861,  each  Major  General  is  allowed 
three  aides-de-camp  to  be  taken  from  the  Captains  or 
Lieatenants  of  the  army,  and  each  Brigadier  General 
two  aides-de-camp  to  be  taken  from  the  Lieutenants  of 
the  army. 

By  an  Act  Ang.  5, 1861,  the  President  is  authorized  "on 
the  recommendation  of  any  Major  General  of  the  regular 
army  of  the  United  States,  commanding  forces  of  tho 


293 

United  States  in  tlie  field,''  to  appoint,  temporarily,  at 
discretion,  aides-de-camp  with  the  rank  of  Ciiptain,  Ma- 
jor, Lieutenant  Colonel,  and  Colonel.  This  Act  was  re- 
pealed by  the  Act  July  17,  1862,  leaving,  however,  those 
aides-de-camp  appointed  under  the  Act  Aug.  5, 1862,  in 
the  enjoyment  of  their  rank  and  offices. 

Adjutant  Generals  Department. 

1  Adjutant-General  with  the  rank  of  Briga- 
dier General, 

2  Assistant  Adjutants  General  with  the  rank 
of  Colonel. 

4  Assistant  Adjutants  General  with  the  rank 
of  Lieut.  Colonel. 

13  Assistant  Adjutants  General  with  the  rank 
of  Major. 

Inspectors  General. 

3  Inspectors  General  with  the  rank  of  Colo- 
nel. 

5  Assistant  Inspectors  General  with  the  rank 
of  Major. 

Judge  Advocate's  Department 

1  Judge  Advocate  General. 

1  Judge  Advocate  with  the  rank  of  Major. 

By  the  Act  July  17, 1862,  a  Judge  Advocate  with  the  rank 
of  Major  is  allowed  to  each  army  In  the  held. 

Signal  Officers'  Department. 

1  Signal  Ofi&cer  with  the  rank  of  Major. 

Quartermaster's  Department. 

1  Quartermaster  General  with  the   rank  of 
Brigadier  General 

25* 


294 

2  Assistant  Quartermasters  General  with  the 
rank  of  Colonel. 

4  Deputy  Quartermasters  General  with  the 
rank  of  Lieut.  Colonel. 

12  Quartermasters  with  the  rank  of  Major. 

42  Assistant  Quartermasters  with  the  rank  of 
Captain. 

By  the  Act  Aug.  8,  1861,  each  Assistant  Quartermaster 
having  served  14  years  in  the  grade  of  Captain  is  entitled 
to  be  promoted  to  the  grade  of  Major. 
Ten  military  storelceepers  are  attached  to  the  Qnarter- 
master's  department,  and  as  many  master  wagoners  as 
sergeants,  and  as  many  wagoners  as  corporals,  as  the 
President  shall  direct 

Subsistence  Department, 

1  Commissary  General  with  the  rank  of  Colo- 
nel 

1  Assistant  Commissary  General  with  the  rank 
of  Lieut.  Colonel. 

6  Commissaries  with  the  rank  of  Major. 

16  Commissaries  with  the  rank  of  Captain. 

Medical  Department. 

1  Surgeon  General  with  the  rank  of  Briga- 
dier General. 

1  Assistant  Surgeon  General  with  the  rank  of 
Colonel. 

1  Medical  Inspector  General  with  the  rank  of 
Colonel. 

8  Medical  Inspectors  with  the  rank  of  Lieut. 
Colonel. 

49  Surgeons  with  the  rank  of  Major. 

14  Assistant  Surgeons  with  the  rank  of  Cap- 
tain. 

100  Assistant  Surgeons  with  the  rank  of  a 
Lieutenant. 


295 

By  the  Aot  Ansr.  3,  1861,  fifty  medical  ondots  nre  anthorii- 
ed,  by  the  Act  May  20,  1862,  six  medicul  storekeepers 
are  autiiorized  aud  one  chaplain  to  each  permanent  hob- 
pluil. 

One  hospHal  steward,  as  sergeant,  allowed  to  each  per- 
manent hospital. 

Pay  Deparvmeni. 

1  Paymaster  General  with  the  rank  of  Colo- 
nel. 

2  Deputy  Paymasters  General  with  the  rank 
of  Lieut.  Colonel. 

25  Paymasters  with  the  rank  of  Major. 

Engineer  Corps, 

1  Colonel. 

4  Lieutenant  Colonels. 

8  Majors. 

12  Captains. 

15  First  Lieutenants. 
15  Second  Lieutenants. 

Topographical  Engineer  Corps. 

1  Colonel. 

3  Lieutenant  Colonels. 
8  Majors. 
10  Captains. 

13  First  Lieutenants. 
13  Second  Lieutenants. 

By  the  Act  March  3,  1853,  any  lieutenant  of  the  engineer, 
topographical  engineer,  or  ordnance  corps,  who  shall 
have  served  continuously  for  14  years  iu  this  grade,  is 
entitled  to  promotion  to  that  of  captain. 

By  an  Act  April  29,  1812,  "  the  military  aca- 
demy shall  consist  of  the  corps  of  engineers  " 
and  certain  named   professors,  and   the   cadets 


296 

then  appointed  into  the  army,  or  appointed  into 
it  in  future,  "  may  be  attached,  at  the  discretion 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  as  stu- 
dents, to  the  miUtary  academy." 

Ordnance  Corp$. 

1  Brigadier  General 

2  Colonels. 

2  Lieutenant  Colonels. 

4  Majors. 
12  Captains. 
12  First  Lieutenants. 
12  Second  Lieutenants. 

Engineer  Soldiers,  Four  Companiet. 

1  Captain. 

1  First  Lieutenant. 

1  Second  Lieutenant. 
10  Sergeants. 
10  Corporals. 

2  Musicians. 
64  Privates  1st  Class,  or  Artificers. 

^  64  Privates  2nd  Class,  or  Laborers. 


c 
a 

a 

o 
O 


Topographical  Engineer  Soldiers,  One  Company. 

1  Captain. 

1  First  Lieutenant. 

1  Second  Lieutenant. 
10  Sergeants. 
10  Corporals. 

2  Musicians. 
64  Privates  1st  Class. 

^  64  Privates  2nd  Class. 


a 


O 


297 


Ordnance  Soldiers. 

One  ordnance  sergeant  is  allowed  to  each  per- 
manent military  post,  and  beside  these  not  more 
than  one  hundred  and  fifty  enhsted  men,  as  the 
President  may  direct. 

Infantry. 

This  corps  consists  of  nineteen  regiments,  ten 
of  which,  termed  the  Old  Regiments^  are  each 
composed  of  ten  companies  ;  the  remaining  nine, 
termed  the  New  Regiments,  are  each  composed 
of  twenty-four  companies,  divided  into  three  bat- 
talions of  eight  companies  each. 


r 


iri  r 


Colonel. 

Lieutenant  Colonel. 

Majors. 

Adjutant. 

Keg"t'l  Quar.  Master. 

Sergeant  Major. 

Quar.  Master  Sergeant 

Principal  Musicians. 


Colonel. 

Lieutenant  Colonel. 

Majors. 

Regt'l  Adjutant 

Kegt'l  Quar.  Master. 

Drum  Major. 

Principal  Musicians. 


l 


1  Captain. 

1  First  Lieutenant 

1  Second  Lieutenant. 
4  Sergeants. 

4  Corporals. 

2  Musicians. 

42  to  74  PriTates. 


1  Major. 
8  Captains. 
8  First  Lieutenants. 
8  Second  Lieutenants. 
1  Battalion  Adjutant. 
1  Battalion  Quar.  Master 
1  Sergeant  Major. 
1  Hospital  Steward. 


1  Captain. 

1  First  Lieutenant. 

1  Second  Lieutenant. 

1  First  Sergeant 
4  Sergeants. 

8  Corporals. 

2  Musicians. 
.82  I'rirates. 


298 


Cavalry. 


Six  Regiments  of  twelve  companies  eacK 


1  Colonel. 

■  1  Captain. 

1  Lieutenant  Colonel. 

1  First  Lientenant 

3  Majors. 

1  Second  Lieutenant. 

1  Surgeon. 

1  Sup.  Second  Lieutenant. 

1  Assistant  Sursteon. 

1  First  Sergeant. 

1  Regimental  Adjutant. 

ti. 

1  Quar.  Master  Sergeant. 

1  Regt'l  Quar.  Master. 

§ 

1  Commissary  Sergeant, 

1  Kegt'l  Commissary. 

c- 

5  Sergeanta. 

1  Sergeant  Major. 

1 

8  Corporals. 

1  Quar.  Master  Sergeant. 

O 

2  Teamsters. 

1  Commissary  Sergeant. 

2  Farriers. 

2  Hospital  Stewards. 

1  Saddler. 

1  Saddler  Sergeant. 

1  Wagoner. 

1  Chief  Trumpeter 

78  Privates. 

1  Chief  Farrier. 

L 

Artillery. 

Five    Regiments.      Four 
One  New  Organization. 


Old     Organization, 


Colonel. 

Lieutenant  Colonel. 

Majors. 

Adjutant 

Kegt'l  Qaar.  Master. 

Sergeant  M^or. 


1 

1 
8 

2)1  Quar.  Master  Sergeant.  2 


Captains. 

First  Lieutenants. 

Second  Lieutenants. 

Companies. 


1  Captain. 

2  First  Lieutenants. 

1  Second  Lieutenant 
4  Sergeants. 

4  Corporals, 

2  Musicians, 
2  Artificers. 

42  to  54  PriT&te& 


299 


"5 


1  Captain. 

1  Kiist  Lieutenant. 

1  Second  Lieutenant, 

1  First  Sergeant. 

■   1  Quar.  Master  8erge*nt. 
4  Sergeants. 
8  Corporals. 

2  Musicians. 
2  Artiflcers. 
1  Wagoner. 

122  Privates. 


1  ColoDftl.  ri 

1  Lieutenant  Colonel.        S 
3  Majors.  a 

1  Adjutant.  P 

1  Kegimental   Quar.  Mas.  g, 
and  Commissary.        ^ 
1  Sergeant  Major.  ^ 

1  ('ommissary  Sergeant.     % 

2  Principal  Musicians.       ^ 
1  Hospital  Steward.  ^ 

12  Captains.  g 

12  First  Lieutenants.  o. 

12  Second  Lieutenants.        S 
(2  (.12  Companies.  O 

The  Adjutants,  Quarter  Masters  and  Commissaries  of  the 
regiments  of  the  Hue  to  be  taken  from  Lieutenants  of  the  Ke< 
giment. 

VOLUNTEERS. 

Bj  an  Act  approved  by  the  President,  July 
22,  1861,  the  President  was  authorized  to  call 
for  volunteers  not  to  exceed  500,000  men,  to  be 
organized  in  such  proportions  that  for  each  regi- 
ment of  infantry  not  more  than  one  company  of 
artillery  and  one  company  of  cavalry  be  allovred, 
these  companies  to  be  organized  as  in  the  regu- 
lar army. 

This  force,  by  the  same  Act,  may  be  divided  in- 
to divisions  of  three  or  more  brigades,  each  divi- 
sion to  be  commanded  by  a  major  general,  each 
brigade  to  consist  of  four  or  more  regiments  to 
be  commanded  by  a  brigadier  general. 

A  major  general  commanding  a  division  to  be 
allowed  three  aides-de  camp  and  one  assistant 
adjutant-general,  each  with  the  rank  of  major; 
a  brigadier  general  to  be  allowed  two  aides-de- 
camp and  one  assistant  adjutant-general,  each 
with  the  rank  of  captain ;  and  one  surgeon,  one 
assistant  quartermaster  and  one  commissary  of 
subsistence  to  be  also  attached  to  each  brigade. 

By  the  Act  July  25,  1861,  the  President  is 
authorized  to  appoint  as  many  major  generals 


300 

and  brigadier  generals  to  command  the  volunteer 
forces  as  in  his  judgment  may  be  requisite. 

By  the  same  Act  the  Governors  of  States  are 
to  appoint  the  Field,  Staff  and  Company  officers, 
and  on  their  failing  to  do  so,  these  offices  to  be 
filled  by  the  President. 

By  an  Act  Aug.  6,  1861,  Governors  of  States 
are  authorized  to  fill  vacancies  occurring  in  offi- 
cers of  volunteers. 

By  an  Act  approved  July  17,  1862,  the  Presi- 
dent may  accept  100,000  additional  volunteers 
for  nine  months,  and  an  additional  number  for 
twelve  months  for  filling  up  the  regiments  of  in- 
fantry then  in  service. 

By  the  Act  July  17,  1862,  the  President  is  au- 
thorized to  organize  army  corps. 

By  the  same  Act  the  staff  of  the  commander 
of  an  army  corps  is  to  consist  of  three  aides-de- 
camp with  the  rank  of  major,  and  two  with  the 
rank  of  captain ;  one  assistant  adjutant-general, 
one  quartermaster,  one  commissary  of  subsist- 
ence, and  one  assistant  inspector  general,  each 
with  the  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel ;  the  senior 
officer  of  artillery  to  act  as  chief  of  artillery  and 
ordnance. 

Infantry. 


f  ]  Colonel 
1  Lieutenant  Colonel. 
1  Major. 
1  Adjutant 
1  Quarter  Master. 
1  Surgeon. 

1  Assistant  Burgeon.  p" 

1  Chaplain.  g_ 

1  Sergeant  Major.  g 

1  Qiiar.  Master  Sergeant.   « 
1  Cyinuiissary  Sergeant. 

1  Hospital  Steward 

2  I'l'iiicipal  Musicians. 
10  Captains. 

10  First  Lieutenants, 
,10  Second  Lieuten&nta. 


1  Captain. 

1  First  Lieutenant 

1  Second  Lieutenant 

1  First  Sergeant. 
4  Sergeants. 

8  Corporals. 

2  Musicians. 
1  Wagoner. 

S2  Privat«a. 


301 

Engineer  Soldiers. 

By  an  Act  July  17,  1862,  volunteer  regiments  and  in 
pendent  companies  mustered  into  the  service  under 
orders  of  tlie  President  or  Secretary  of  War  or  comma 
ing  general  of  a  military  department,  or  reorganized  t 
employed  as  engineers,  pioneers,  or  sappers,  are  placed 
same  footing  as  engineer  soldiers  of  the  regular  army. 

MILITIA. 

By  the  Act  July  17, 1862,  the  President  is  au- 
thorized to  call  forth  the  mihtia  of  the  States 
for  a  term  of  service  not  to  exceed  nine  months. 

By  the  same  act,  the  enrolment  of  the  militia 
is  made  to  include  all  ablebodied  male  citizens 
between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five ;  and 
it  authorizes  the  President  to  make  all  necessary 
rules  and  regulations  for  enrolling  if  not  provid- 
ed for  by  the  laws  of  the  States. 

The  militia  so  called  forth  to  be  organized  as 
the  volunteers. 

MIUTART  HIERARCHY. 

Commander-in-  Chief. — The  President,  by  the 
Constitution,  is  "  commander-in-chief  of  the  army 
and  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  of  the  militia 
of  the  several  states,  when  called  into  the  actual 
service  of  the  United  Statea" 

Under  the  same  authority  he  nominates,  and 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate  appoints,  and  commissions  all  commia- 
eioned  officers  of  the  regular  army. 

By  an  Act  July  17,  1862,  the  President  is  au- 
thorized "  to  dismiss  and  discharge  from  the 
military  service  either  in  the  army,  navy,  marine 
corps  or  volunteer  force  in  the  United  States 
service,  any  officer,  for  any  cause  which,  in  hia 
26 


302 

judgment,  either  renders  such  officer  unsuitable  i 
for,  or  whose  dismission  would  promote,  the  j 
public  service."  i. 

By  a  Joint  Resolution,  April  4,  1862,  the  Pre-  / 
sident  is  authorized  "  whenever  military  opera- 
tions may  require  the  presence  of  two  or  more 
officers  of  the  same  grade,  in  the  same  field  or 
department,  to  assign  the  command  of  the  forces 
in  such  field  or  department,  without  regard  to 
seniority  of  rank." 

General  Officers. — But  two  classes  of  this  title 
exist  permanently  by  law,  major  general  and  bri- 
gadier general ;  the  first  being  the  highest  army 
grade,  the  second  the  next  highest.  Unless 
otherwise  assigned  by  the  President,  they  take 
rank  and  command  according  to  the  date  of  their 
commissions  in  their  respective  grades. 

The  functions  of  general  officers  are  to  com- 
mand armies  or  fractions  of  an  army  greater  thaa 
a  regiment  in  the  field,  or  to  command  the  mili- 
tary forces  distributed  over  any  district  and  usu- 
ally known  as  a  military  department.  AU  the 
orders  and  military  correspondence  affecting 
their  commands  emanate  from  or  pass  through 
them  if  coming  from  or  addressed  to  higher  miU- 
tary  authority. 

Colonels. — The  grade  of  colonel  is  next  to  that 
of  brigadier  general  Colonels  rank  and  take 
command  according  to  the  dates  of  their  com- 
missions in  this  grade.  Their  functions  are  to 
command  regiments,  being  also  charged  with 
their  administration,  good  order,  and  discipline. 
All  orders  and  military  correspondence  affijcting 
their  commands  emanate  from  them,  or  pass 
through  them  if  from  a  higher  military  source. 

Lieutenant  Colonel. — This  grade  is  next  to  that 


303 

of  colonel.  The  functions  of  the  lieutenant  colo- 
nel in  the  economy  of  the  regiment  in  our  ser- 
vice are  very  vague  during  the  presence  of  the 
colonel,  although  a  tactical  position  is  assigned 
to  the  grade.  It  seems  to  form  an  anomaly  in 
almost  every  service.  In  that  of  the  English  the 
lieutenant  colonel  is  the  actual  commander  of 
the  regiment,  the  colonelcy  being  usually  held  by 
some  general  officer.  In  France  the  grade  was 
created  first,  and  then  duties  for  it  had  to  be 
looked  up. 

Major. — This  grade  is  next  to  that  of  lieute- 
nant colonel.  No  administrative  functions  are 
specifically  attached  to  it  except  to  take  charge 
of  the  effects  of  deceased  officers.  In  our  nevy 
regiments  of  the  line  a  specific  command  is  as- 
signed to  each  major. 

Captain. — The  captain  ranks  next  to  major. 
He  is  the  head  of  the  company,  vs^hich  may  be 
termed  the  administrative  unit,  as  the  battalion 
is  the  tactical  unit.  He  is  held  responsible  for 
the  administration,  good  order  and  discipline  of 
bis  company,  and  upon  the  strict  performance  of 
these  duties  depends  the  character  of  the  army. 

Lieutenant. — In  our  service  we  have  the  grades 
of  first  and  second  lieutenants  and  that  of  brevet 
second  heutenant,  the  last  being  conferred  alone 
on  cadets,  graduates  of  the  military  academy,  and 
non-commissioned  officers,  who,  under  certain 
prescribed  conditions,  pass  an  examination  for 
this  grade  before  a  board  of  officers.  The  func- 
tions of  the  lieutenant  are  to  assist  the  captain 
in  his  company  duties. 

Cadet. — This  grade  ranks  next  to  that  of  bre^ 
vet  second  lieutenant,  the  cadet  however  not 
holding  a  commission  like  those  of  the  grades 


304 

above,  but  a  simple  warrant  or  letter  of  appoint- 
ment from  the  President,  and  he  is  therefore 
termed  a  warrant  officer.  All  cadets  at  present 
are  attached  as  students  to  the  military  academy. 

Non-  Commissioned  Officers. — Sergeant  is  tlie 
highest  grade  of  this  class  and  that  of  corpoial 
next  in  rank.  .  The  functions  of  these  grades  are 
to  assist  the  captain  and  lieutenants  in  their 
company  duties. 

Brevet  Rank. — Besides  the  rank  to  which  an 
officer  is  entitled  from  his  position  in  his  arm  of 
service,  the  President  has  the  authority  to  con- 
fer upon  him,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate,  a  superior  grade  known  as  a 
brevet.  This  grade  is  conferred  for  distinguished 
services  of  which  the  President  and  Senate  are 
the  judges.  It  confers  of  itself  no  right  to  com- 
mand in  accordance  with  the  rank,  but  the  Pre- 
sident is  authorized  to  assign  an  officer  to  a  com- 
mand in  accordance  with  it.  It  confers  a  right 
to  precedence  in  court-martials  and  of  command 
in  detachments  composed  of  troops  of  several 
arms. 

Command  of  Staff  Officers. — Officers  of  the 
general  staff  and  of  the  staff  corps  cannot  assume 
any  command  out  of  their  own  corps  unless  as- 
signed by  the  President. 

Pro7notion. — In  the  Une  promotions  up  to  the 
grade  of  captain  are  made  by  seniority  of  grade 
and  by  regiments,  from  captain  to  colonel  by 
corps  in  the  arm  to  which  the  officer  belongs. 

General  officers  are  appointed  by  selection 
without  regard  to  corps  or  previous  rank. 

Promotion  iu  the  general  staff  and  staff  corps 
ie  conlhied  to  the  corps  and  is  made  by  seniority 
of  rank. 


505 


MILITARY    ADMINISTRATION. 

The  military  administration  of  the  land  forces 
is  confided  to  the  general  staff  of  the  army;  that 
of  any  fraction  of  an  army  to  a  particular  staff 
termed  an  army  corps  staffs  a  regimental  staffs  &;c. 

Under  this  head  may  be  comprised  the  corres- 
pondence, the  quartering,  the  subsistence,  the 
sanitary  arrangements,  legal  proceedings,  and  the 
payment  of  troops. 

Correspondence. — This  is  conducted  through 
the  various  grades  of  adjutant-generals,  assistant 
adjutant-generals  and  adjutants,  through  whom 
all  orders  and  other  information  pass  to  and  from 
the  head  of  the  force  to  which  they  are  severally 
attached. 

Quartering. — Everything  connected  with  lodg- 
ing troops  in  garrison  or  in  the  field,  providing 
transportation,  clothing,  fuel  and  forage  for  them, 
is  conducted  by  the  various  grades  of  officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  belonging  to  the  quar- 
termaster's department. 

Subsistence. — The  food  of  the  troops  is  provid- 
ed by  and  distributed  under  the  direction  of  the 
various  grades  of  officers  and  non-commissioned 
ofi&cers  of  the  commissariat. 

Sanitary  Arrangements. — The  duties  under  this 
head  are  performed  by  the  officers  and  enlisted 
men  of  the  medical  staff. 

Legal  Proceedings. — Every  thing  connected  with 
the  proceedings  of  military  legal  tribunals  is 
committed  to  the  various  grades  of  judge  advo- 
cate. 

Payment. — This  duty  is  confided  to  the  various 
grades  of  paymasters. 

26* 


PLATES 


ILLUSTRATE 

MAHAN'S     OUTPOSTS 


EXPLANATION  OF  PLATE  I. 

Fig.  1  {Art  234,  p.  87.)  represents  the  general 
disposition  of  advanced  posts  of  an  army  corps, 
A,  A,  in  position. 

F,  F,  line  of  sentinels. 

E,  E,  line  of  out-posts  to  which  the  sentinels 
belong. 

D,  D,  grand  guards,  or  supports  of  out-posts. 

C,  C,  line  of  pickets  occupying  defensible  points 
to  secure  the  retreat  of  the  grand  guards,  etc. 

B,  main  body  of  the  advanced  guard  occupying 
a  strong  central  position  on  the  line  of  approach 
to  A,  A. 

Figs.  2  and  3  {Art.  317,  p.  113.)  represent  res- 
pectively the  disposition  in  march  of  a  patrole  of 
fifteen  or  thirty  men. 

a,  leading  men  of  the  advanced  guard  h. 

c,  main  body  of  the  patrole  about  150  paces  in 
rear  of  a. 

e,  flankers. 

dj  rear  guard  about  100  paces  in  rear  of  c. 

Fig.  14  {A7-t.  430,  p.  159.)  represents  a  position 
taken  up  at  night  by  a  train  with  its  escort  on  a 
small  island  traversed  by  the  main  road  on  which 
the  convoy  is  moving. 

A,  train  packed  with  a  detachment  c  on  each 
flank  for  its  immediate  police. 

6,  b,  cavalry  out-posts  and  sentinels  posted  in 
advance  of  the  bridges  leading  to  the  island  with 
infantry  supports  a  in  their  rear. 

B,  main  body  of  the  escort  composed  of  infan- 
try with  detachments  of  cavalry  on  its  flanks,  and 
the  artillery  in  the  rear,  posted  on  the  most  acces- 
sible point  of  approach. 


s 
c 

ca 
B 


A 

r-  I 


on  each  flank,  and  throTvs  ou»  sentinels  along  the  outskirts  of  the  Tillage.    These  are  supporte( 

by  a  grand  guard  ofinfantry  at  E,  on  the  road  at  the  outlet  of  the  village. 

To  guard  the  approach  by  the  road  L,  an  out-post  of  cavalry  is  placed  at  H  ",  and  throw 

forward  vedettes  on  the  right;  this  post  is  supported  by  a  grand  guard  of  infantry  E'"  whicl 

occupies  the  enclosure  of  the  cemetery,  « 

The  bridge  across  the  stream  M  is  enfiladed  by  two  guns  with  infantry  supports  on  theh  flanks 
The  reserve  D,  consisting  of  a  picket  of  cavalry  and  infantry  of  sufficient  strength  to  suppor 

the  out-posts  and  grand  guards,  is  placed  in  a  suitable  position  to  the  rear  of  the  bridge. 


EXPLANATION  OP  PLATE  IL 

Fig.  4  {Art.  247,  p.  91.)  represents  a  disposition 
of  advanced  posts  to  guard  a  position  taken  up, 
by  a  detachment  A  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artil- 
lery, on  ground  diversified  with  the  various  natu- 
ral features,  and  with  villages  and  farm  enclosures 
ou  the  avenues  of  approach  to  A  which  will  afford 
temporary  cover  for  troops. 

The  main  approach  to  A  is  by  the  roads  which 
traverse  the  village  B,  in  front,  and  cross  the 
small  stream  M,  which  has  its  source  in  the  pond 
N,  by  a  stone  bridge.  On  the  right  is  a  marsh  Q, 
which  is  impassable,  the  ground  between  it  and 
the  ridge  on  the  left  of  the  pond  N  and  in  advance, 
being  unobstructed  and  favorable  to  the  action  of 
cavalry.  The  approaches  to  the  flanks  of  A,  by 
the  roads  K  on  the  left,  and  L  on  the  right,  being 
supposed  out  of  the  hne  of  approach  of  any  con- 
siderable body  of  the  enemy,  and  requiring  there- 
fore only  a  patrole  along  each  of  them. 

From  the  character  of  the  ground  in  advance 
of  the  village  B  and  the  pond  N,  the  out-posts 
will  be  of  cavalry,  and  these  will  be  posted  in  the 
positions  H,  H,  at  the  proper  distance  in  the  rear 
of  their  chain  of  vedettes  P,  posted  along  the 
ridge  extending  between  the  village  and  pond. 
The  strength  of  each  out-post  will  be  determined 
by  the  number  of  vedettes  which  it  throws  for- 
ward. A  similar  disposition  H  will  be  made 
along  the  ridge  0  on  the  left  of  the  pond.  To 
support  these  as  well  as  a  cavalry  post  H,  at  the 
farm  enclosure  R  to  patrole  over  and  watch  the 
road  K,  grand  guards  of  infantry  E,  E"  are  posted 
at  the  enclosures  G-  and  I.  To  guard  the  approach 
to  the  village  B  an  infantry  out-post  F  is  placed 


Q  2  7  9  9  s>'  Q :?  ''i  2  2  2  2?  ".^v. .::: 


-.no  h-^ ^   f 


2?  o>'     1"    Ui  r 


^^oggg^^  V  9  g  9. 


\&'l 


on  each  flank,  and  throws  ou*  sentinels  along  the  outsVJt; 

by  a  grand  guard  of  infantry  at  E,  on  the  road  at  the  oi 
To  guard  the  approach  by  the  road  L,  an  out-post  c 

forward  vedettes  on  the  right ;  this  post  is  supported  1: 

occupies  the  enclosure  of  the  cemetery.  ^ 

The  bridge  across  the  stream  M  is  enfiladed  by  two  g|s 
The  reserve  D,  consisting  of  a  picket  of  cavalry  and 

the  out-posts  and  grand  guards,  is  placed  in  a  suitable  fiii 


2  ^',9.2^ 


e  ofJIi'Ies 


of  the  village.  These  are  supported 
,  of  the  village. 

ivalry  is  placed  at  H  ",  and  throws 
,  grand  guard  of  infantry  E'"  w^hich 

with  infantry  supports  on  their  flanks, 
itry  of  sufiBcient  strength  to  support 
ion  to  the  rear  of  the  bridge. 


Fig.5. 

At* 

Fisr. 

3^/ 

i 

« 

*i**i**i^ 

^i^ 

.A    1 

r,£ 

* 

ji 

* 

vK 

^ 

f 

EXPLANATION  OF  PI.A'J*ii;  III. 

Fig.  5  {Art.  275,  p.  98.)  shows  the  disposition 
of  the  troops  composing  tlie  head,  or  leading 
detachment  of  an  advanced  guard  marching  over 
ground  comparatively  unobstructed. 

A,  leading  file  of  the  staff  officers'  escort. 

B,  staff  officer. 

C,  remainder  of  escort. 

D,  D,  line  of  cavalry  in  dispersed  order. 

E,  E,  supports  of  D,  D,  composed  of  sections 
of  six  or  eight  cavalry  with  a  non-commissioned 
officer  to  each  section. 

F,  detachment  of  twenty  cavalry  under  an 
officer  for  patrolUng  on  either  flank. 

G,  Gr,  reserves  of  the  lines  D  and  E  of  thirty 
cavalry  each  under  an  officer,  each  preceded  by  a 
file  to  connect  with  E. 

I,  I,  flankers  of  G,  G. 

J,  two  companies  of  cavalry  and  three  of 
infantry  L  forming  the  main  reserve  of  the  head. 
Three  horsemen  K  preserve  the  connection  be- 
tween J  and  L. 

A',  main  body  of  advanced  guard. 

Fig.  6  {Art.  285,  p.  101.)  shows  the  disposition 
of  a  column  in  march  to  the  rear. 

A,  A,  regiment  of  infantry. 

B,  battery  of  twelve-pounder  guns. 

C,  regiments  of  cavalry. 

E,  battery  of  six-pounder  guns  with  two  com- 
panies D  of  infantry  as  supports. 

F,  battery  of  six-pounder  guns. 

N,  N,  closing  Hne  of  cavalry  in  dispersed  order 
supported  on  each  flank  by  one  company  M  of 
infantry,  one  company  L  of  cavalry,  and  a  reserve 
of  four  companies  of  cavalry  on  the  centre. 

K,  patrol  of  cavalry  on  the  flank  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  enemy. 


px:iir. 


I^*».*M 


M 


Fig:?. 

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AJl 

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Cf,  the  twelve  and  six-poimder  guns. 

b,  two  squadrons. 

H,  I,  K,  L,  regiments. 

il,  battery  of  six-pounder  guns. 

N,  two  squadrons. 

0,  rear-guard  of  cavalry. 

The  letters  B',  C,  D'  etc.,  sho%v  the  dispositions  of  deployment  ( 


1  the  right. 


EXPLANATION  OP  PLATE  IV. 

Fig.  7  (Art.  275,  p.  98.)  shows  the  disposition, 
in  order  of  march  and  of  battle,  of  the  main  body 
of  an  advanced  guard  in  an  open  country ;  the 
disposition  in  march  of  the  head,  or  leading  de- 
tachment of  which  is  shown  in  Fig.  5,  /V.  IJI. 
The  whole  force  is  supposed  to  consist  of  ten 
squadrons  of  cavalry,  three  field  batteries,  and  six 
regiments  of  infantry. 

A,  leading  detachment  disposed  as  in  Fig.  5, 
PI.  Ill 

B,  B,  four  squadrons. 

C,  battery  of  six-pounder  guns. 

These  troops  are  thrown  between  A  and  the 
main  body  as  a  support  to  A. 

D,  four  squadrons. 

E,  regiment. 

F,  four  companies  of  rifles. 

G,  regiment. 

H,  two  batteries,  one  of  six-pounders  and  one 
of  twelve-pounders. 

I,  K,  L,  M,  regiments. 

N,  small  rear-guard  of  cavalry. 

B',  C,  B',  show  the  disposition  of  B,  C,  B,  in 
order  of  battle. 

D',  E',  etc.,  the  corresponding  dispositions  of 
D,  E,  etc. 

Fig.  8  shows  the  dispositions  in  order  of  march 
and  deployment  of  the  same  body  in  obstructed 
ground. 

B,  B,  one  regiment  of  infantry. 

C,  battery. 

D,  two  squadrons. 

These  as  before  form  the  support  of  A. 

E,  four  companies  of  rifles. 


A  J: 

Fi^.7. 

A. 

1 

i  E_ 

B= 

B 
C 
JB 
D 

I>= 

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ee 

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:  G= 

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l'=             =m' 

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L 

M 

M= 

N 

1 

F,  one  regiment. 

G,  tlie  twelve  and  six-pounder  guns, 
b,  two  squadrons. 
H,  I,  K,  L,  regiments. 
i[,  battery  of  six-pounder  guns. 
N,  two  squadrons. 
O,  rear-guard  of  cavalry. 
The  letters  B',  C,  D'  etc.,  show  the  dispositions  of  de 


.PL.  TV. 


:  V. 

disposition 
three  regi- 
ivahy,  and 
ground  of 
on  the  left 

fipanies  of 
ers.     The 
'alrj,  and 
^ns;  one, 
ik;  with 
oports  of 
,  divided 
and  one, 
IS  a  sup- 
npanies. 
try  and 
orm  the 

on  the 
rj;  the 

having 

e  main 
etween 
V,  BB. 
rto  A, 


at  on  the  right. 


ensive 
etreat, 
iiJff  in 
0,  to 
The 
e  one 
ching 
T  and 


pany  of  cavalry  is  deployed  on  the  left  to  the  rear.  Havinc;  made  these  dispositions,  t 
akirmishera  push  forward,  keepinp;  up  a  warm  6re  on  the  enemy.  At  a  suitable  moment,  t 
reserves  on  each  flank  of  the  Une  attack  rapidly,  with  the  bayonet,  the  enemy  on  both  flan! 
If  he  retire  the  cavalry  will  endeavor  to  throw  themselves  on  his  rear  at  h,  whilst  a  detachme 
of  skirmishers  throws  itself  forward  at  a,  behind  the  height,  to  occupy  him,  and  the  reserv 
press  upon  him  to  gain  the  bridge,  thus  keeping  the  retreating  body  between  themselves  aj 
their  supports  on  the  other  side  of  the  bridge. 

Should  the  attack  fail,  the  company  of  cavalry  forms  in  line  at  6,  to  cover  the  retreat  of  t 
infantry.  .    . 


EXPLANATION  OF  PLATE  Y. 

Fig.  9  {Art.  336,  p.  119.)  shows  the  disposition 
in  march  of  a  detachment  composed  of  three  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  five  companies  of  cavahy,  and 
a  half  battery  of  six-pounder  guns,  over  ground  of 
an  ordinary  character,  but  more  open  on  the  left 
than  on  the  right  flank. 

One  regiment  of  infantry  and  two  companies  of 
cavalry  form  advanced  guard  and  flankers.  The 
head  of  the  advanced  guard  is  of  cavalry,  and 
consist  of  a  leading  file,  a,  of  three  sections ;  one, 
6,  in  the  centre,  and  one,  c  c,  on  each  flank  ;  with 
a  support,  c?,  of  one  platoon.  The  supports  of 
the  head  are  one  company  of  infantry,  divided 
into  three  sections,  one,  e,  in  the  centre,  and  one, 
//,  on  each  flank,  and  one  company,  g,  as  a  sup- 
port. The  main  reserve,  A,  of  six  companies. 
The  remaining  two  companies  of  infantry  and 
the  one  of  cavalry,  divided  into  sections,  form  the 
flankers.  The  sections,  n  n,  of  infantry,  on  the 
right  flank,  having  supports,  1 1,  of  cavalry ;  the 
sections,  k  k,  of  cavalry,  on  the  left  flank,  having 
supports,  i  i,  of  infantry. 

The  three  companies  of  cavalry,  A,  of  the  main 
body  lead,  followed  by  the  half  battery  between 
them  and  the  two  regiments  of  infantry,  B  B. 
A  small  rear  guard,  o,  of  cavalry  belonging  to  A, 
closes  the  column  of  march. 

Fig.  10  (Art.  285,  p.  101.)  shows  the  defensive 
dispositions  of  the  column,  in  march  in  retreat, 
as  represented  in  Fig.  6,  PL  III.,  in  moving  in 
the  presence  of  the  enemy,  from  the  point  C,  to 
gain  the  position  U,  beyond  the  woods  Z.  The 
hue  of  retreat  is  along  the  two  roails,  the  one 
leading  directly  from  C  to  U ;  the  other  branching 
ofl"  to  the  right,  and  traversing  the  villages  0  and 


EXPLANATION   OF   PLATE   V. 

S,  bordering  the  pond  on  the  right.  The  right 
flank  of  the  march  is  supposed  to  be  covered  from 
an  attack  by  the  two  ponds ;  the  left  alone  being 
exposed  from  the  open  character  of  the  country 
between  C  and  U. 

The  first  defensive  position  taken  up  is  along 
the  skirts  of  the  woods,  X,  up  to  which  the 
ground  rises  from  the  pond  and  the  brook  run- 
ning into  the  head  of  it,  and  the  following  dispo- 
sition made  of  the  troops. 

C,  the  rear  regiment  of  cavalry  to  rally  the  line 
of  skirmishers  and  their  supports  which  close  the 
column  of  march. 

A,  B,  one  battery  of  field  guns,  on  the  rising 
ground,  and  on  each  side  of  the  road. 

D,  a  regiment  of  infantry,  deployed  on  the 
right  of  the  guns  and  concealed  by  tho  wood, 
from  which  skirmishers  are  thrown  out  along  the 
margin  of  the  brook. 

E,  a  regiment  of  infantry  in  column,  on  the 
left  of  the  guns,  and  masked  by  the  houses  near 
them  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  guns. 

F,  two  regiments  take  post  at  this  point,  drawn 
up  in  column  on  the  two  roads,  with  a  half  bat- 
tery of  the  six-pounder  guns. 

Gr,  the  two  companies  of  infantry  take  post  in 
the  village  at  G,  which  is  hastily  put  in  a  defen- 
sive state. 

H,  the  forward  regiment  of  cavalry  deploys  on 
the  open  ground  on  the  main  road. 

M,  two  regiments  of  infantry  with  the  other 
half  battery  of  six-po'mder  guns.  • 

K,  the  battery  of  twelve-pounder  guns  to  cover 
the  movements  in  retreat  from  F  and  M,  to  the 
next  position,  K. 

In  retiring  from  this  first  position  on  the  second 


EXPLANATION   OF   PLATE   V. 

at  K,  which  is  favorable  for  the  defensive,  the 
following  dispositions  are  made. 

The  cavalry  at  C  retreats  along  the  road  to  the 
right,  and  takes  post  at  L,  to  cover  the  move- 
ments of  the  regiments  at  F,  in  their  retreat  on 
K. 

The  artillery  at  A  B,  retires  along  the  main 
road  to  a,  with  the  same  object. 

The  regiments  D  and  E  retire  alternately  on  F. 
The  half  batteries  at  E  and  M  pass  through  the 
village  and  take  position  at  N. 

The  whole  of  the  regiments  retire  through  the 
village  and  over  the  ground  between  it  and  the 
main  road  to  K. 

To  cover  the  retreat  from  K  the  artillery  will 
quit  the  position  a,  so  soon  as  the  rear  guard  has 
neared  the  village  G,  and  will  take  post  at  R. 
The  skirts  of  the  wood  and  the  walled  enclosure 
at  T  will  be  strongly  occupied  by  infantry.  The 
retreat  of  the  main  body  from  K  will  be  com- 
menced by  sending  first  the  battery  of  twelve- 
pounders  to  the  rear  to  U ;  retiring  the  other 
field  guns  by  half  batteries ;  the  infantry  by 
alternate  regiments;  the  cavalry  covering  this 
movement,  and  retiring  last,  under  the  support  of 
the  infantry  holding  the  skirts  of  the  wood. 

Fig.  13  {Art.  375,  p.  138.)  shows  the  disposi- 
tions for  the  attack  of  a  post  taken  up  by  the 
enemy  on  a  rising  ground  to  cover  a  bridge  in  its 
rear.  The  attack  is  made  by  eight  companies  of 
infantry,  and  one  of  cavalry. 

The  enemy  being  supposed  to  have  occupied 
by  skirmishers  the  skirts  of  a  wood  at  the  foot  of 
the  hill,  two  of  the  eight  companies  are  thiown 
out  as  skirmishers,  and  are  supported  by  the  other 
six  formed  in  column  on  each  flank.     The  com- 


flan 
an  . 
exp 
bet 

a 

the 
gro 
nin 
sitii 
C 
of  I 
coll 

I 

gro 

rigl 
froi 
ma 

] 
left 
the 

] 
up 
ter 

( 
the 
siv 

] 
the 

hal 

the 
ne: 


pany  of  cavalry  is  deployed  on  the  L 
skirmishers  push  forward,  keepino;  up  i 
reserves  on  each  flank  of  the  line  attacl 
If  he  retire  the  cavalry  will  endeavor  to 
of  skirmishers  throws  itself  forward  at 
press  upon  him  to  train  the  bridge,  thus 
their  supports  on  the  other  side  of  tlie 
-  Should  the  attack  fail,  the  company  i 
infantry. 


tl:^ 


ilto  the  rear.  Having  made  these  dispositions,  the 
1  irm  fire  on  the  enemy.  At  a  suitable  moment,  the 
:  bidly,  with  the  bayonet,  the  enemy  on  both  flanks. 
ibvv  themselves  on  his  rear  at  6,  whilst  a  detachment 
libehind  the  height,  to  occupy  him,  and  the  reserves 
lj;ping  the  retreating  body  between  themselves  and 
ir|a:e. 
[[ivalry  forms  in  line  at  6,  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the 


EXPLANATION  OP  PLATE  VI. 

Fig.  11  {Art.  356,  p.  132.)  shows  the  disposi- 
tions made  to  defend  a  bridge.  At  the  outlet, 
towards  the  enemy,  there  is  a  saw  mill  with  a 
walled  enclosure  in  advance  of  which  stretches  a 
small  grove.  Beliind  the  bridge  is  a  ridge  along 
A,  i.  The  detachment  for  the  defence  consists  of 
one  regiment  of  infantry;  two  companies  of 
rifles ;  two  squadrons ;  and  two  six-pounder  guns. 

One  company  of  cavalry  will  patrole  beyond 
the  grove  towards  the  enemy.  One  company  of 
rifles  a  wiU  be  posted  under  cover  in  the  centre 
of  the  grove,  and  a  half  company  on  each  flank  at 
6  and  c. 

Two  companies  of  infantry  take  post  at  d  in 
the  centre,  and  one  on  each  flank  at  e  and  /  aa 
supports  to  the  rifles :  the  enclosure  will  be  held 
by  a  post.  The  two  guns  are  placed  at  300  paces 
in  rear  of  the  bridge  to  enfilade  it.  Two  compa- 
nies are  posted  at  h  and  i  on  each  side  of  the 
hedge  as  skirmishers,  they  are  supported  by  the 
remaining  companies  in  column  at  m;  and  the 
remainder  of  the  cavalry  is  posted  to  the  rear  at 
n  in  a  favorable  position  to  cover  a  retreat. 

Fig.  12  {Art.  345,  p.  128.)  shows  tire  defensive 
dispositions  made  by  a  detachment  consisting  of 
three  regiments  of  infantry,  six  squadrons,  and  a 
battery  of  six-pounders,  to  hold  an  enemy  in 
check  for  several  hours  arriving  from  Y  towards 
the  village  X. 

At  Y  there  is  a  small  village  through  which  the 
main  road  to  X  passes;  the  road  traverses  the 
brook  S  R,  which  discharges  into  the  pond  P  on 
the  left ;  this  brook  receives  a  smaller  one  near 
/;  the  ground  between  the  brooks  and  Y  is  gen- 
tly undulating  and  interspersed  with  small  groves. 


EJtPLANATIOlT  OF  PLATE   VI. 

Between  the  brook  and  the  village,  the  ground 
rises  so  as  to  overlook  tlie  portion  towards  Y. 
Between  the  pond  and  village  lies  a  wet  meadow. 

The  main  body  takes  position  on  the  heights 
along  A,  B.  A  half  battery  takes  position  at  a, 
with  its  support  of  infantry,  from  4  to  600  paces 
in  rear  of  the  bridge  to  enfilade  it;  the  other  half 
battery  in  the  rear  at  k.  The  main  portion  of 
cavalry  at  m  on  the  right  flank ;  a  small  detach- 
ment of  it  at  c  on  the  left  flank.  The  wood  &kirt- 
ing  the  brook  S  R  is  occupied  by  skirmishers, 
their  supports  being  beyond  it  on  the  right  and 
left  of  the  road,  A  detachment  of  cavalry  at  g 
patroles  on  the  right.  The  bridges  at  n  and  o  are 
guarded  and  patroles  pushed  out  on  the  lell. 

In  front,  skirmishers  are  placed  at  T  along  the 
brook  from  i  to//  a  small  post  of  cavalry  at  Y  to 
patrole  in  advance ;  a  posv  of  cavalry  and  infantry 
at  h  to  watch  the  woods  and  roads  on  the  left; 
and  one  of  cavalry  in  the  wood  on  the  right  at  d 
to  patrole  towards  the  right. 

At  night  the  exterior  posts  are  drawn  in  and 
join  the  post  at  T  behind  the  brook. 

If  attacked  and  forced  to  retreat,  the  infantry 
and  artiUery  will  retire  by  alternate  half  batteries 
and  regiments  to  the  position  p,  r,  s,  t  behind  the 
small  brook  running  to  the  meadow  at  M ;  the 
cavalry  on  the  right  flank.  In  the  retreat  through 
the  village  and  around  it,  the  ditches  across  the 
meadow  can  be  disputed  by  skirmishers,  as  well 
as  the  outskirts  of  the  village,  these  will  be  sup- 
ported by  a  regiment  in  column  occupying  the 
open  square  in  the  centre.  If  the  ground  is  favor- 
able for  cavalry  on  the  right  of  the  village,  it  will 
be  taken  advantage  of  for  a  flank  attack  on  tho 
enemy. 


FZ.VT. 


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GENERAL  LIBRARY   UCBEBKEUY 

UX.  BERKELEY  LIBRARIES^ 


cosHaofi^'^s 


